CSBA "Third Offset" paper

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Grand Strategy and the Third Offset??

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/04/13/new_american_grand_strategy_109256.html

I've been posting tangential 'strategy and concept of operations' articles here rather than start new threads. I apologize if some think they're misplaced.
 
http://warisboring.com/articles/2018-the-year-u-s-fighter-pilots-could-get-drone-wingmen/
 
In other news, the 'CNO Strategic Studies Group' is getting the chop: https://blog.usni.org/2016/04/13/the-non-essential-critical-requirement
 
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/10/05/us-russia-vladimir-putin-syria-ukraine-american-military-plans/73147344/
 
SCO reveals three-part playbook for innovative strike and defense

April 13, 2016


The Defense Department is making public the centerpiece of a new rapid-acquisition system -- developed in secret over nearly four years -- that aims to convert existing combat capabilities into "strategic surprises" for near-peer competitors in hopes of attracting new ideas from across the U.S. military and private sector, while simultaneously bolstering conventional deterrence against China and Russia.

The Strategic Capabilities Office, a Pentagon shop formed in 2012 whose work until recently has largely been kept under wraps, has revealed a three-part playbook for taking the existing U.S. combat inventory -- a force the United States has spent decades and hundreds of billions of dollars acquiring -- and finding news means to strike and defend in never-before-seen ways.

"One of our primary questions in SCO is how do we use these systems that we have this tremendous investment in -- in ways the world has never seen and therefore doesn't know how to counter?" SCO Director Will Roper said in a March 28 interview with reporters. "We found that there is a way to do this and it basically takes three forms."

The first approach is to repurpose existing weapons; the second, link existing capabilities together in new ways; the third is to find novel approaches to integrate commercial technology into the force, according to Roper.

"We put all those three things together and year by year we look at all the systems in the department and we are going to make one of those three factors work to our advantage," Roper said.

This spring, the SCO -- which is seeking $902 million for projects in FY-17, the bulk of which is for prototyping -- plans to publish its first solicitation seeking outside ideas. Last September, the office published a notice previewing areas of interest, including missile defense, command and control, air systems, land systems, naval systems space and communications and information operations.

The SCO has worked with the military services to develop a number of new capabilities recently declassified by the Pentagon.

The new Standard Missile-6 is touted as a textbook example of how the SCO would take an existing weapon, designed for ship defense, and give it an offensive capability to sink another ship.

"There are lots of benefits to taking something that wasn't designed for a mission and pulling it into a different domain," said Roper. Speed is one benefit, he added. The SCO was very quickly able to field this anti-ship capability faster than a traditional development program. The cost is much lower, because the Navy was leveraging a system already developed and relatively early in the planned production run, and the anti-ship capability effort was able to leverage existing contract vehicles and program support.

A key dimension of repurposing SM-6 with an offensive capability is "instant force structure" enhancement, according to Roper.

"If you looked at the FY-17 budget before you might say, 'The department isn't buying a lot of anti-ship weapons.' You'd look at that SM-6 line and see 600-ish weapons and say, 'That's for defense, wow, the U.S. is putting a lot of expense into defending ships in a contested environment; probably on the wrong side of the cost equation,'" Roper said.

The disclosure of the new SM-6 anti-ship capability, Roper said, is expected to change the calculus of anyone who might assume the 125 SM-6 missiles the Navy plans to buy between FY-17 and FY-21 are for defense only.

"Whether you are an adversary or an allied country or partner, we're buying a lot of anti-ship weapons," Roper said. "And they are dual-purpose, they are dual threat. We are going to defend ourselves while taking the fight back forward."

The SCO's second approach to developing new capabilities is to integrate existing capabilities into "teams" exemplified by the Arsenal Plane project, a new concept the Pentagon hopes to prove out in a prototype capable of ferrying huge amounts of ordnance to standoff ranges that waits for strike assignments from advanced fighters close to the action.

Because fifth-generation fighter aircraft, such as the Air Force's F-22A Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are not able to carry weapons in large quantities, there are two ways to try to solve that problem, according to Roper.

"One is you could just accept that you've got to go land and resupply and go back into the fight," he said, an option that invites other challenges about protecting bases where the aircraft are landing as well as refueling and amounts to "a really hard way" to solve the problem of increasing fighter ordnance loads.

"Or you can try to offload all the weapons and keep those forward fighters flying more of a scout role, a forward-observe role, and network them to an airplane that is standing off and doing the job of bringing in weapons and supporting multiple fighters forward," Roper said. "That is not a typical program development -- where you find a fighter isn't doing a job well enough and conclude, 'I need to build a new fighter.' This is a different approach: You say, 'I may not build another fighter, but I may build a team.'"

The third approach is to become fast, innovative adapters of commercial technology. "We're looking for ways to infuse this commercial tech," he said, adding: "We have to move quickly, we have to care about good-enough solutions that don't force us to do difficult things to aircraft or ships or submarines. And we're going to have to keep up with the pace of industry."

A SCO project that falls into this category, he said, is an advanced navigation project that takes micro-cameras and sensors -- widely used on smartphones -- and puts them on satellite-guided weapons to give them targeting capability in GPS-denied environments.

"So we very much value modular, kit-based approaches so that you avoid having to do redesigns for every system," the SCO director said. "It is hard to do that. It takes a lot of emphasis to get the architecture right up front, but it is worth it to us." -- Jason Sherman
 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a20388/how-the-us-marines-fight/
 
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a-new-generation-of-unrestricted-warfare/
 
Defense Innovation and Research

http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-to-review-the-fy17-budget-request-for-defense-innovation-and-research
 
http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/738693/new-af-development-planning-effort-key-to-third-offset.aspx
 
Trio of Articles on USAF over-commitment to Stealth at War on the Rocks:

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/stuck-on-denial-part-i-the-u-s-air-force-and-stealth/
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/rediscovering-low-altitude-getting-past-the-air-forces-overcommitment-to-stealth/
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/low-altitude-penetration-stuck-on-denial-part-iii/

Overall Thesis: The USAF over-committed to an unaffordable all-stealth force. If the USAF returned to dedicated EW/Wild Weasels, short range stand-off munitions (~15nm), and low-altitude flying, the USAF could achieve similar performance as the all-stealth force at a much lower cost.
 
DrRansom said:
Trio of Articles on USAF over-commitment to Stealth at War on the Rocks:

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/stuck-on-denial-part-i-the-u-s-air-force-and-stealth/
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/rediscovering-low-altitude-getting-past-the-air-forces-overcommitment-to-stealth/
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/low-altitude-penetration-stuck-on-denial-part-iii/

Overall Thesis: The USAF over-committed to an unaffordable all-stealth force. If the USAF returned to dedicated EW/Wild Weasels, short range stand-off munitions (~15nm), and low-altitude flying, the USAF could achieve similar performance as the all-stealth force at a much lower cost.

That "strategy" barely worked during Desert Storm. Pass.
 
http://www.defencetalk.com/us-military-to-conduct-large-scale-drills-to-counter-strategic-threats-67339/
 
http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/04/air-force-research-lab-roadmaps-for.html
 
http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/04/armored-ground-vehicles-are-testing.html
 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2016/05/02/restoring-americas-naval-dominance-tomahawks/83335008/
 
I have placed some tangential 'concepts of operation' 'current tactics/strategy' posts here hope members don't mind. IMHO, they kind of flow with the ideas/principles behind Third Offset.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/03/more-american-troops-hi-tech-weapons-europe-counter-russia/?utm_content=buffer18922&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
 
http://cimsec.org/wargaming-distributed-lethality/24857
 
Thanks! Good work keeping the thread up to date.
 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/modern-warfare-why-the-us-army-must-reform-16076
 
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/05/throwing-money-missile-defense-wont-fix-it/128093/?oref=DefenseOneFB

As such, the military services are already laying the groundwork for a system-of-systems, the so-called Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). According to then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dempsey, IAMD is an envisioned super-structure in which “all capabilities—defensive, passive, offensive, kinetic, non-kinetic—are melded into a comprehensive joint and combined force capable of preventing an adversary from effectively employing any of its offensive air and missile weapons
 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-2040-an-%E2%80%9Canti-fragile%E2%80%9D-offset-strategy?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2016/05/08/navy-fleet-future-architecture-aircraft-carrier-cno-richardson-csba-bryan-clark-force-structure-mccain/84002628/
 
Apparently McCain, in his infinite wisdom, has never heard of these:
 

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Looks like one of those options in the upper right is along the lines of something I've wondered about for a while. If we were to assume that carrier-based deep strike is an important capability that we haven't quite figured out since the A-12 -- A/F-X era, and if the carrier air wing is smaller than it once was as a result (plus the impact of budget pressures), would it not be an interesting exercise to examine a ship that can efficiently embark today's smaller air wing, supplemented by long-range missiles for the deep strike mission (500-2500 nm). I wouldn't be religious about the missile type, be it MRBMs, subsonic cruise missiles, boost-glide, etc.

It would have to be a deep magazine to make it worthwhile, but of course the missile compliment would be dedicated to the first day of war, high-value targets and hopefully the F-35s and F-18s would then have a (relatively) easier set of targets for the remainder of the air war.

Seems like this kind of CV could be built in the current shipyards using mostly the current propulsion, catapults, electronics and radars, defensive weapons, etc., and with the currently programmed aircraft types. Of course you'd have to add in the missile launching capability, whether that's a "VLS" or something else, plus the associated fire control and support systems.

I'm sure I've made a number of errors in my thinking here that the SPF faithful will not be reluctant to point out. :) I'll start: why not just put the missile capability on a bunch of Virginias and eliminate the complexity?
 
George Allegrezza said:
I'm sure I've made a number of errors in my thinking here that the SPF faithful will not be reluctant to point out. :)

No need. The USN already found them which is why the Fords have the configuration they do. ;)

George Allegrezza said:
I'll start: why not just put the missile capability on a bunch of Virginias and eliminate the complexity?

Because the Virginias already have missiles. You can't count them twice.
 
I think you'd need more SSGNs than currently programmed to take over that part of the A2AD-type strike mission that was envisioned for RAQ-25 or whatever it was until a couple of weeks ago. Trading carrier-based aircraft for more subs and missiles, in other words.
 
George Allegrezza said:
I think you'd need more SSGNs than currently programmed to take over that part of the A2AD-type strike mission that was envisioned for RAQ-25 or whatever it was until a couple of weeks ago. Trading carrier-based aircraft for more subs and missiles, in other words.
I personally would totally trade a CVN to convert the last 5 or so remaining Ohio's to SSGNs and add/keep D5's aboard although conventionally armed.
 
bobbymike said:
George Allegrezza said:
I think you'd need more SSGNs than currently programmed to take over that part of the A2AD-type strike mission that was envisioned for RAQ-25 or whatever it was until a couple of weeks ago. Trading carrier-based aircraft for more subs and missiles, in other words.
I personally would totally trade a CVN to convert the last 5 or so remaining Ohio's to SSGNs and add/keep D5's aboard although conventionally armed.

I'm sure they'd trade a CVN for a couple more Virginias with maybe a total of maybe 40 more Tomahawks. That's a good deal ain't it? ;)
 
Just switching Virginia production over completely to the Block V with VPM would make a lot more sense compared to converting (and refuelling) a few more SSBNs. Much more flexibility and the VPM is sized much more reasonably to actual usage. The SSGN warload are pretty excessive most of the time.
 
George Allegrezza said:
Looks like one of those options in the upper right is along the lines of something I've wondered about for a while. If we were to assume that carrier-based deep strike is an important capability that we haven't quite figured out since the A-12 -- A/F-X era, and if the carrier air wing is smaller than it once was as a result (plus the impact of budget pressures), would it not be an interesting exercise to examine a ship that can efficiently embark today's smaller air wing, supplemented by long-range missiles for the deep strike mission (500-2500 nm). I wouldn't be religious about the missile type, be it MRBMs, subsonic cruise missiles, boost-glide, etc.

Shrinking the size of a carrier's airwing doesn't have nearly the impact on cost that you would expect. We've talked about these studies a bit over on the Ford thread and I think the cost difference for a reduction to 55 aircraft is only around 8%. So many of the costs of a carrier are nearly fixed -- catapults, arresting engines, elevators, radars, maintenance shops, etc.

Edit: the lecture in this post works the numbers. Sizing the carrier for 80 instead of 55 aircraft doubles sorties generation for a net cost of 13% (including aircraft, though F-35 may shift that a bit). Even if you don't max out the airwing on the larger carrier, you get much better sortie generation out of the bigger deck.

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,17605.msg277741.html#msg277741

And trying to combine strike missile launchers and air wing operations is a bit complicated. The aviators tend to object to having missiles flying through the pattern. If you have these new strike missile options, it makes more sense to shift them to surface combatant launch platforms (more DDG-1000s, for example.)
 
TomS said:
Just switching Virginia production over completely to the Block V with VPM would make a lot more sense compared to converting (and refuelling) a few more SSBNs. Much more flexibility and the VPM is sized much more reasonably to actual usage. The SSGN warload are pretty excessive most of the time.

We had the opportunity to make them so much more flexible and squandered it. No reason there shouldn't be 4-packs of conventional ballistic missiles in some of those tubes, Sea Lance, KEI, etc.
 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/swarming-mini-drones-inside-the-pentagons-plan-overwhelm-16135
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-fight-to-protect-the-most-valuable-real-estate-in-space/2016/05/09/df590af2-1144-11e6-8967-7ac733c56f12_story.html?utm_content=buffer8658c&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
 
http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/758219/darpas-plan-x-gives-military-operators-a-place-to-wage-cyber-warfare
 
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/us-needs-more-weapons-can-be-quickly-and-easily-modified/127787/?oref=DefenseOneFB
 
Retro Innovation

—Will Skowronski

5/16/2016

​The Senate Armed Services Committee thinks the best way for the Pentagon to achieve its “Third Offset” strategy is to replicate how it pulled off the “Second Offset” during the Cold War. To that end, the committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act calls for a retro shake-up in how the Defense Department plans and buys its weapons. The markup, which is expected to be released in full next week, eliminates the Defense acquisition chief position currently held by Frank Kendall and resurrects the the position of undersecretary of defense for research and engineering—the position that helped lead “the development of stealth, precision guided munitions, and other advanced capabilities as part of the so-called “Second Offset” strategy,” according a summary of the bill released Thursday evening. To allow the USD (R&E) to focus on innovation, some of the duties now handled by undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics’ would be handed off to the undersecretary of management and support—a position mandated by the Fiscal 2015 NDAA and set to be filled in 2017—and a new assistant secretary of defense for acquisition policy and oversight position that would report to the USD (R&E). The move is not about Kendall and the job he’s doing, but the job he has, a SASC aide told reporters Friday. (See also: An Air Force of the Future from the April issue of Air Force Magazine.) (For more coverage of the SASC's markup of the NDAA see: SASC Approves Policy Bill and McCain: NDAA Really a Reform Bill.)
 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/14/wiped-out-air-force-losing-pilots-and-planes-to-cuts-scrounging-for-spare-parts.html?intcmp=hplnws
 
Building Skynet

—John A. Tirpak

5/18/2016

​A major part of the Air Force’s efforts toward the “Third Offset” of technologies will be in the realm of autonomous machines, service Chief Scientist Greg Zacharias said Tuesday. Speaking at an AFA Mitchell Institute event in Arlington, Va., Zacharias said this area of research encompasses everything from “big data” to self-directed flying machines and a range of tools—such as the F-35’s helmet—to “help humans make better decisions faster.” The first big roadmap to this effort was released by his predecessor, Mica Endsley, with the 2015 report “Autonomous Horizons,” and Zacharias said he expects Volume II to be released late this summer and yet a third volume in 2017. A practical demonstration of one aspect of autonomy will be the “loyal wingman” concept of an unmanned vehicle flying cooperatively with a manned aircraft: the request for information to industry for concepts is “out now,” Zacharias told reporters, and he expects a demonstration in the 2020-2021 time period. Asked if people should be worried about “Terminator” gun-wielding robots, Zacharias said “we’re far away” from such devices but “it’s always a concern. I don’t want to downgrade it.” He added that the Pentagon is “very sensitive” to these concerns and is codifying rules to ensure human control of weapons release. But, “I think most of the benefits” of autonomy “will be in the non-killer applications, … decision aids, and ways to leverage people’s intelligence.” (See also: Rise of the Machines from the April issue of Air Force Magazine.)
 
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