Could Britain have done more to avoid World Wars 1 and 2?

[Rickshaw]

I am presently bowing out of this discussion as I am unable to find my copy of the book.

I will however note, the "Great Game" was expressly between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain and concerned British fears about the possibility of a Russian incursion or funded rebellion in India, to wrest control from the Raj to the Kremlin.

All events after (approximately) 1895 were not part of the "Great Game". They concerned different participants and were undertaken for different reasonings. Therefore, to consider them as part of the "Great Game" is IMHO very mistaken.

 

[steelpillow]

I agree there is a case for confining "The Great Game" to the historic tussle between two particular Empires. Hopkirk puts forward a wider view that, with the might of the British Empire replaced by newer Western allies, essentially the same Game continues in new guise. I don't think it matters whether we see today's happenings as the same or a new Game, as long as we understand each other. In a hundred years' time, historians will have their own views.

 

[CNH]

I think it is time for a new thread: Could Germany Have Done More to Prevent WW I and WW 2?

 

[Hood]

I can agree with steelpillow's assessment of Hopkirk's 'The Great Game'. Its a great read and well researched, though I guess there is probably more to add following his last update (my edition is the 2006 paperback which I think was a revised 1990 edition originally).
I would also back the view that the Great Game never really ended, just moved on in different guises. Control of the Silk Road and the empires along the middle of the Eurasian landmass has been a never ending conflict since antiquity. The reasons and the players changed over time but the desire for geopolitical control has been a constant.

 

[Tony Williams]

It would also be helpful:

1. To put on demonstrations of how horrible and long-lasting a war would be, with deep trench systems, massive coils of barbed wire, carefully sited MGs, and invite European military to observe how futile attacking such defences would be.
2. Follow that up with lots of articles in the European press about the horrors of future war, plus maybe get H.G. Wells to write a novel about it (translated and widely distributed).
3. Stress the UK's support for Belgium, with royal visits etc.
4. Tell Germany that we know all about the Schlieffen plan (in fact maybe include it in Wells' novel!)

Changing the public mood from jingoism to an awareness of grim reality might contribute to making war less likely.

Hmm, probably not. I'm still working through MacMillan's book and it is clear that there was widespread recognition before 1914 of just how horrible a European war would be, with some accurate descriptions of future trench warfare gaining considerable readership, plus grim predictors of economic disaster for Europe if it happened. It was widely believed that the interrelated economies of Europe would make warfare unthinkable, effectively international suicide. Even the Kaiser read such works, and apparently approved. None of it did any good.

There was of course a similar feeling in Europe after the end of the Cold War, but the apparently civilised Yugoslavia still managed to tear itself apart in the most horrible fashion.

I am uncomfortably reminded of something I read about the end of the Roman Empire. The inhabitants of Rome simply couldn't believe that it was happening to them. They were Romans, for heaven sake, with the greatest empire the world had ever seen and its most advanced civilisation. Of course they couldn't fall to barbarians!

Hold that thought... :'(

 

[carmelo]

What if,not wanting a greatest Prussia,the Russian Empire had joint to Austrian Empire in 1866 and had attacked the Prussians?
And Napoleone III had joined too for crush the head to the snake?

 

[marauder2048]

It would also be helpful:

1. To put on demonstrations of how horrible and long-lasting a war would be, with deep trench systems, massive coils of barbed wire, carefully sited MGs, and invite European military to observe how futile attacking such defences would be.
2. Follow that up with lots of articles in the European press about the horrors of future war, plus maybe get H.G. Wells to write a novel about it (translated and widely distributed).
3. Stress the UK's support for Belgium, with royal visits etc.
4. Tell Germany that we know all about the Schlieffen plan (in fact maybe include it in Wells' novel!)

Changing the public mood from jingoism to an awareness of grim reality might contribute to making war less likely.

Hmm, probably not. I'm still working through MacMillan's book and it is clear that there was widespread recognition before 1914 of just how horrible a European war would be, with some accurate descriptions of future trench warfare gaining considerable readership, plus grim predictors of economic disaster for Europe if it happened. It was widely believed that the interrelated economies of Europe would make warfare unthinkable, effectively international suicide. Even the Kaiser read such works, and apparently approved. None of it did any good.

MacMillan's book is incredibly weak on military matters so I'm surprised you are bothering with it.

Yes, it was widely recognized that a protracted conflict would be exhausting and debilitating which is why all of the military planning of the period
stressed rapid mobilization, deployment and attack to produce decisive results as quickly as possible e.g. the Franco-Russian military pact
dictated an combined offensive no later than the 3rd week of mobilization.

It's hard to temper public expectations when the public wasn't informed of Britain's military obligations: the Secret Anglo-French General Staff
discussions weren't revealed to the Cabinet until 1912 and Parliament wasn't informed until August 1914.

Of course, German intelligence picked up on the discussions as soon as they happened and Schlieffen's final war plans featured the BEF from 1906 onwards.
And the German public was generally aware of the forces arrayed against it (which would only increase with British military reforms and Russia's Great Program)
and the and the fact that a protracted conflict meant the defeat of Germany and the Central Powers.

 

[Tony Williams]

I'm not just interested in the military aspects: I was curious about how such a catastrophic mistake as WW1 came to be made.

The author makes some interesting parallels with recent events!

 

[marauder2048]

I'm not just interested in the military aspects: I was curious about how such a catastrophic mistake as WW1 came to be made.

The author makes some interesting parallels with recent events!

And delving into a derivative, popular history account that relies on secondary sources is going to provide insight?

I'm curious as what parallels are remotely cogent. Aside from the 38th parallel, you have no large, conscript armies facing each other along a common fortified land border.

 

[Tony Williams]

I'm not just interested in the military aspects: I was curious about how such a catastrophic mistake as WW1 came to be made.

The author makes some interesting parallels with recent events!

And delving into a derivative, popular history account that relies on secondary sources is going to provide insight?

It certainly does, as I've never read a book focused on the origins of WW1 before, and this one collected some very good reviews.

I'm curious as what parallels are remotely cogent. Aside from the 38th parallel, you have no large, conscript armies facing each other along a common fortified land border.

I take it you haven't read the book, then? That amounts to relying on secondary sources for your criticism...hardly a good basis to be so dismissive of it!

 

[marauder2048]

I'm not just interested in the military aspects: I was curious about how such a catastrophic mistake as WW1 came to be made.

The author makes some interesting parallels with recent events!

And delving into a derivative, popular history account that relies on secondary sources is going to provide insight?

It certainly does, as I've never read a book focused on the origins of WW1 before, and this one collected some very good reviews.

Of course general ignorance on a topic makes almost any introductory book insightful by definition.
This is why MacMillian's project was pursued over the author's own objections: to capture the attention of gullible readership on the centennial of the outbreak of WWI.

I'm curious as what parallels are remotely cogent. Aside from the 38th parallel, you have no large, conscript armies facing each other along a common fortified land border.


I take it you haven't read the book, then? That amounts to relying on secondary sources for your criticism...hardly a good basis to be so dismissive of it!

Yet your justification for reading it was that that the book collected "good reviews" i.e. praise from secondary sources. Hardly a good basis to embrace it!

I was asking you to elaborate as you claim that the author makes some interesting parallels. My view is that author presented no cogent parallels and missed a very obvious one .

 

[Tony Williams]

Yet your justification for reading it was that that the book collected "good reviews" i.e. praise from secondary sources. Hardly a good basis to embrace it!

You are conflating two different things. In deciding to read a book, the only evidence available is secondary - what other people say about it. Only after reading the book can I get an opinion from a primary source - me!

As far as I'm concerned, it is an interesting book which provides a lot of insight into the politics, personalities and national cultures of the period, which all contributed to the reasons for the slide into war.

 

[marauder2048]

Yet your justification for reading it was that that the book collected "good reviews" i.e. praise from secondary sources. Hardly a good basis to embrace it!

You are conflating two different things. In deciding to read a book, the only evidence available is secondary - what other people say about it. Only after reading the book can I get an opinion from a primary source - me!

As far as I'm concerned, it is an interesting book which provides a lot of insight into the politics, personalities and national cultures of the period, which all contributed to the reasons for the slide into war.

Lets tackle your evasion before my alleged conflation. So I'll ask for the third time:

You stated: "the author makes interesting parallels with recent events." Is that your view and if so what are those parallels?

I hasten to add that a diplomatic history is not particularly useful for WWI as the important General Staff deliberations and virtually all of General Staff discussions between the Entente (and the Central Powers for that matter) were carried out in *secret* as in secret from the diplomatic corp. The General staffs decided and the diplomatic corp was told what to do e.g. Germany's alliance with Turkey stemmed first and foremost from a General Staff decision based on the military utility.

 

[Tony Williams]

The author makes a number of brief references to recent events in the Middle East and the Balkans, drawing parallels with events then. These are scattered through the book and I have neither the time nor the inclination to plough through the whole book again to hunt for them.

You have apparently not read the book yourself, judging by the way you keep evading this point, which makes your criticisms rather worthless. When you have read it, then we will be in a position to discuss it.

 

[marauder2048]

The author makes a number of brief references to recent events in the Middle East and the Balkans, drawing parallels with events then. These are scattered through the book and I have neither the time nor the inclination to plough through the whole book again to hunt for them.

You have apparently not read the book yourself, judging by the way you keep evading this point, which makes your criticisms rather worthless. When you have read it, then we will be in a position to discuss it.

So I guess those parallels weren't "interesting" enough to remember or defend. Or you haven't actually read it. But hey, you and the author also gave us this gem:

I have just started The War That Ended Peace by Margaret MacMillan, a well-reviewed study of the years leading up to the start of WW1.

She makes the point very early that the Europeans should have paid more attention to the US Civil War than to the relatively quick European wars which happened in the second half of the 19th century.

Gee Whiz! The General Staffs of Europe were really dumb*. They must have missed the part where the Union and the Confederacy both had:

1. Large, well-trained, peacetime armies based on conscription supplemented by large reserves of trained manpower
2. Extensive railway networks designed to support mobilization and deployment to the shared borders
3. Massive armored fortress systems on the borders designed to screen and support these deployments as well as to channel enemy forces
4. Machine guns and quick-fire artillery with gun shields supported by forward observer with telephones
5. Smokeless powder
6. Advanced armaments industries
7. Aviation
8. The internal combustion engine
9. Radio

All of which supported elaborate war plans that were the culmination of years of thought and effort which tied into an international alliance system.

Are you in a position to discuss this or do you need some time and inclination?

*In fact, at least German General Staff historian Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven had looked at parallels with the American Civil War before and after the outbreak of WWI.

 

[Tony Williams]

Gee Whiz! The General Staffs of Europe were really dumb*. They must have missed the part where the Union and the Confederacy both had:

1. Large, well-trained, peacetime armies based on conscription supplemented by large reserves of trained manpower
2. Extensive railway networks designed to support mobilization and deployment to the shared borders
3. Massive armored fortress systems on the borders designed to screen and support these deployments as well as to channel enemy forces
4. Machine guns and quick-fire artillery with gun shields supported by forward observer with telephones
5. Smokeless powder
6. Advanced armaments industries
7. Aviation
8. The internal combustion engine
9. Radio

All of which supported elaborate war plans that were the culmination of years of thought and effort which tied into an international alliance system.

And many of which strengthened the defence rather than the attack, which was the main relevance of the Civil War: the advent of fast-firing and long-ranged rifles (plus towards the end some early machine guns) hugely boosted the effectiveness of defensive positions, making them extremely hard (and very expensive in terms of lives) to take with a traditional frontal assault. Add the availability of barbed wire and much better MGs (plus faster-firing field artillery) and the situation becomes even worse for the attackers by WW1. Some military writers accurately predicted what was going to happen, but despite this there was a common belief that a bold frontal assault would carry the day and that a war would be short. The ACW turned out to be a better reflection of what actually happened, in terms of a long-drawn-out deadlock with massive casualties.

The European military staffs became obsessed with the logistical planning required to mobilise large armies and get them to where they would be needed (down to very detailed and inflexible railway timetabling) but seem to have given much less thought to what would happen next. So yes, they were really dumb in that respect. They soon discovered that their assumptions were way off the mark, but it took them years to figure out what to do about it.

 

[steelpillow]

Been wondering about all those mutual defence pacts that formed the trigger mechanism. Off hand, I can't think of any earlier example where people were drawn into wars they did not want (as opposed to wars where they were happy to weigh in) by such pacts. The usual tactic was simply to duck out on some arbitrary political pretext and watch your erstwhile ally fend for themselves. Was this a war caused, paradoxically, not by an excess of military zeal but by an excess of peacemaking zeal?

 

[Tony Williams]

There was certainly a lot of "peacemaking zeal" around, but unfortunately it was missing in the case of some crucial individuals, mainly involved in military planning in Germany and Austria Hungary.

The mutual defence pacts were designed to minimise the risk of war, by making it clear to potential aggressors that they would not be able to pick off countries one at a time - any war would be a major one. It was a kind of early version of the MAD nuclear deterrent strategy. Unfortunately there were enough people in the wrong places who believed that a war would be quickly winnable.

The UK in particular was trying to maintain a balance of power by offering (unspecified) support to France and Russia in the event of their being attacked, and carried out a lot of joint planning with the French. So when the war started with attacks on Russia and France (via Belgium - whose neutrality had been guaranteed by the UK among others), the UK really had no option, and even former peaceniks like Lloyd George realised that war was inevitable.

Italy did refuse to meet its obligations in the Triple Alliance, and eventually switched sides, but that made little difference.

 

[steelpillow]

I think some sort of war was pretty inevitable. My thought is that without all that peacemaking zeal it would have stayed local and not escalated into the "War to end all wars".

 

[Pioneer]

the Brits were accepting belt armour for their cruisers from German foundries right up until the start of the actual Second World War

Fascinating! Could you direct me to more info on this please?

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Abraham Gubler]

the Brits were accepting belt armour for their cruisers from German foundries right up until the start of the actual Second World War

Fascinating! Could you direct me to more info on this please?

I'm not sure about Germany but a lot of armour plate was ordered from Czechoslovakia. DK Brown makes mention of it in "Nelson to Vanguard" (pp16). Here is a quick summary:

1936: Realisation UK armour manuf can't meet the demand of rearmament. oOnly three left from WWI: Beardmore, Colville and English Stl which combined could manuf 18 000 tons pa against need of 44 000 tons pa by 1938-39. Admiralty pays to expand manuf capacity to 40 000 tons pa but with a schedule shortfall of 15 000 tons in total.
1937: Shortfall gets worse as plate failure rate is higher than expected.
1938: After 15 meetings in January decision made to acquire armour of abroad. Only Non Cemented (NC) armour to be acquired as thought was that foreign Cemented armour not up to Brit std. Approaches made to Germany (!) (that's DK Brown's !), USA, France, Sweden and Czechoslovakia. Only the Czechs (and Slovaks) were willing to assist. 12 000 tons ordered from Skoda with a further 2200 tons planned. Munich crisis did not appear to affect the deal.
1939: 10 000 tons had reached the UK by the time war broke out. The last shipment just made it out of Germany in the end of August 1939. Apparently German Rail worked very hard to deliever on their contract despite it only being days before the invasion of Poland. The Skoda armour was used in the armoured flight decks of HM Ships Illustrious, Victorious and Formidable with the later also having the hangar deck armour made up from this plate. In addition HM Ships Trinidad and Kenya (cruisers) used this plate for most of their bulkhead and deck armour.

 

[Justo Miranda]

As we end the first year of remembering the start of the First World War and begin to think about the end of the Second World War and the world Britain found itself in, many experts have given us their thoughts on TV and elsewhere about Britain's role in both wars and their impact on Britain's place in the world.

So my question for alternate history fans is: could Britain have done more to avoid both or either of the two World Wars?

No

 

[Foo Fighter]

Not alone but, the allied powers could have avoided denuding Germany of any remaining financial base and thus avoiding the Austrian corporal from getting into power in Germany. The whole second war MIGHT have been avoided. IMOHO of course.

 

[zen]

Start from the top, why involve yourself in others affairs?
Answer, because they are trying to involve themselves in yours.
Why fight abroad?
Answer Better fighting in someone else's country than your own!

Which would you rather be, Harold at Hastings, or Drake at Cadiz?

And so, England and the UK have since winning freedom from continental control, sought to place buffers between themselves and the imperial European ambitions of the Continents great powers....those of France Spain, Austria-Hungary, Russia and later Germany.
Each of which saw themselves as heirs of Rome, and rightful unifiers and rulers of Europe.

Backing the fellow Protestant Dutch, the Swedes, the Danes, the Portuguese....
Coming to the aid of Spain against the French, backing Prussia against the French and Russia.
Even backing Turkey against Russia.
And helping the creation of Belgium.

Because your independence is effectively only secure if others, your neighbours, are independent as well.

So it was if anything an aberration that the UK didn't involve itself directly after defeating Napoleon.
And ultimately led to the failure of allowing Prussia to unify Germany.
Creating a new Great Power that itself threatened to unify Europe.
A colossal failure considering the connection to Hannover.....

So in summary, UK75 you are asking the wrong question, because the aberration is staying out of European entanglements and doing so led to the disastrous situation of having to fight a massive war against a unified Germany.

 

[uk 75]

Zen are you suggesting that a more effective structure of collective security might have avoided war.
In the run up to WW1 the UK was uncertain in its commitment to France and Belgium. A more resolute deployment earlier on might have gone either way. The Kaiser could have regarded the arrival of a British Expeditionary Force on the Continent or even a mobilisation of the Grand Fleet as further grounds to strike at France.
Peacetime deployment of a British Army on the Continent is only possible after World War 2 when we have been booted out of Ireland and then India.

 

[riggerrob]

I am presently bowing out of this discussion as I am unable to find my copy of the book.

I will however note, the "Great Game" was expressly between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain and concerned British fears about the possibility of a Russian incursion or funded rebellion in India, to wrest control from the Raj to the Kremlin.

All events after (approximately) 1895 were not part of the "Great Game". They concerned different participants and were undertaken for different reasonings. Therefore, to consider them as part of the "Great Game" is IMHO very mistaken.

Dear Rickshaw,
I suspect that Indians and Afghan would have eventually expelled the Tsar the same way they expelled Alexander the Great, Moguls. Brits, Portugeuse, etc. invaders.

 

[zen]

Zen are you suggesting that a more effective structure of collective security might have avoided war.
In the run up to WW1 the UK was uncertain in its commitment to France and Belgium. A more resolute deployment earlier on might have gone either way. The Kaiser could have regarded the arrival of a British Expeditionary Force on the Continent or even a mobilisation of the Grand Fleet as further grounds to strike at France.
Peacetime deployment of a British Army on the Continent is only possible after World War 2 when we have been booted out of Ireland and then India.

Well that's a leading question!

The UK failed to prevent Prussia unifying Germany is the answer.

A series of independent German states was possible, constraining Prussia, Austria and making Conquest by France or Russia impossible.

So really we have to look further back than WWI. Back to the Pax Britannia post 1805.

 

[JohnR]

Was there any consideration given post WWI or WWII to breaking Germany up into the individual kingdoms and principalities of pre 1871?

 

[1635yankee]

WW2, yes. First, back up the French concerns about German remilitarization, an activity that started before the nazis assumed power. Instead, the British started sucking up to Germany out of an overblown fear of bolshevism (breaking the left started well before 1933). Second, don't accept Germany's naval build up as anything except the threat it was.

 

[1635yankee]

Was there any consideration given post WWI or WWII to breaking Germany up into the individual kingdoms and principalities of pre 1871?

I think there was some thought given before Versailles, but the decision was that this would cause even more trouble. One of the big mistakes I think the Entente made was that they didn't have a nice march down the Kaiserstrasse, with Hindenburg, Falkenhayn, and the Kaiser saluting every contingent that marched by.

 

[marauder2048]

In the run up to WW1 the UK was uncertain in its commitment to France and Belgium. A more resolute deployment earlier on might have gone either way. The Kaiser could have regarded the arrival of a British Expeditionary Force on the Continent or even a mobilisation of the Grand Fleet as further grounds to strike at France.
Peacetime deployment of a British Army on the Continent is only possible after World War 2 when we have been booted out of Ireland and then India.

This isn't really true. The "secret" Anglo-French general staff discussions had begun in 1906 and German intelligence
had gotten wind of it immediately. Thereafter, the BEF is a permanent element in all German wargames and operational planning on the period.

British double dealing i.e. the "secret" BEF deployment planning with the French while the British were trying to negotiate a treaty with the
Germans probably contributed immeasurably to the outbreak of the war.

Operationally, the German Army (and the German Navy which demanded troops to protect naval installations against a British amphib landing!)
was certain the BEF was going to appear it was just a matter of when and where.

 

[uk 75]

It is arguable whether the BEF made much difference in itself, the real threat from Britain was a long war based on using the Royal Navy to blockade.
However, Britain on its own could do little to deter Germany in either WW1 or 2.
Britain relied on the French Army to take the brunt of detering and then fighting Germany.
After 1870 this seems to have been optimistic at best.
In both wars Germany was only defeated by the involvement of the United States. But the US was uninterested in doing anything to deter Germany before the wars.
Could the British have stood aside and leave the French and Germans to fight as in 1870? Germany made this impossible by building its High Seas Fleet to challenge the Royal Navy.
Despite his professions of wanting to leave the British alone to enjoy their Empire, Hitler's air and naval build up could never have been ignored by the British.
In both wars, Britain had to fight long enough for the United States to be drawn into the fight. Although Japan was the agent for this in WW2, Hitler would quite likely have repeated the sinking of shipping involving US nationals.
The unwillingness of smaller nations to take part in any kind of open collective security arrangements with Britain and France was only abandoned with the creation of NATO involving Benelux, Denmark and Norway.

 

[marauder2048]

It is arguable whether the BEF made much difference in itself, the real threat from Britain was a long war based on using the Royal Navy to blockade.

Irrelevant since the German Army planners didn't see it that way. And they were correct; the expansion of the French and Russian
(and British) armies in the 1910s meant that the campaign in the West was going to hinge on a few divisions in the right
place and the right time.

However, Britain on its own could do little to deter Germany in either WW1 or 2.

Not responding in a panicky manner to Germany's naval expansion would have helped.
Not double dealing with the French in secret while negotiating with the Germans openly would have helped.
Not appeasing Russia after being defeated in the "Great Game" would have helped.

Britain relied on the French Army to take the brunt of detering and then fighting Germany.

Britain began to institute an Army expansion after 1906. This is plainly evident in the dominions.
Naturally, the nature of cross-channel troop movement would mean that the French Army would take
the initial brunt of fighting the Germans.

But the Anglo-French were convinced that the "Russian Steamroller" would do most of the work.
That's why the Anglo-Russian accords called from simultaneous offensives within (IIRC)
two weeks of mobilization.

After 1870 this seems to have been optimistic at best.
In both wars Germany was only defeated by the involvement of the United States.

That's being wise after the fact; the Entente miscalculated horribly.

But the US was uninterested in doing anything to deter Germany before the wars.

Britain's disastrous Irish and German policies alienating the huge Irish-German
immigrant population in the US might have had something to do with that pre WW1.

In WW2, Britain's default on her WW1 loans coupled with her territorial expansion
at the expense of the defeating Central Powers, Naval expansion tension with the US, the Anglo-Japanese alliance...

Could the British have stood aside and leave the French and Germans to fight as in 1870?

Germany made this impossible by building its High Seas Fleet to challenge the Royal Navy.

But the British weren't threatened by Russian, American, Japanese, French, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian
naval expansion during the period?


Plus, the British *won* the naval race by 1912 when the Russo-French army expansion had compelled
the Germans to abandon naval expansion in order to expand the Army; about the only noteworthy
German army expansion of the period.

The German threat to the Royal Navy was in the Ottoman-German alliance and its threat to
Britain's middle eastern oil on which the Royal Navy was increasingly dependent.

 

[uk 75]

The tone of your comments suggests your analysis sees little difference between Britain, France and Germany as malign colonial powers playing a duplicitous game.
I would not argue with any of your comments. They suggest an Irish/German/US standpoint which sees the English as deserving much of what they got. Reasonable if that is your starting point.

 

[marauder2048]

The tone of your comments suggests your analysis sees little difference between Britain, France and Germany as malign colonial powers playing a duplicitous game.

One John Maynard Keynes wrote after WW1 that: "England had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival."

My viewpoint is objective, dispassionate and rooted in history; we didn't know much about German pre-WW1
intelligence and planning until after the Fall of the Wall.

British firebombing destroyed the German (pre) WW1 archives and what was left was captured by the Russians
and those documents didn't make their way back west until post '89; Russian/Soviet archives were not exactly
beacons of scholarly research.

Plus, there was ever so brief access to the Russian archives in the 90's.

All of the above has really transformed our understanding of WWI.

 

[uk 75]

Thank you. The purpose of these threads is to extract ideas and information. You have provided that.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

They suggest an Irish/German/US standpoint which sees the English as deserving much of what they got. Reasonable if that is your starting point.

What "the English" got out of WWI & WWII was deserved and reasonable?! Do you want to run that one by me again?

 

[Fluff]

Whilst I'm sure there will be some other views, in both wars the UK appears to have 'propped up' France. Whether militarily this mattered probably misses the purpose. Had the UK not made agreements with France, then the war could have been perceived as Germany V UK, and the French may have 'waved' through the German forces, to beat on the White Cliffs. Alternatively Germany still attacks France, and rapidly wins, adding a great deal that their 'starting' forces lacked, especially in WW2.

So from a purely practical view the UK made some logical/pragmatic and maybe even deliberate choices. And of course, whilst the UK did get bombed, there was no land combat on the UK mainland.

Also point out that UK had agreements with other people that either didnt get what they thought they were promised, or Like Poland, couldnt really be actioned in a practical sense. Suggesting Governments make agreements, and use the ones they need....

 

[marauder2048]

and the French may have 'waved' through the German forces, to beat on the White Cliffs.

Like Revanchist France wouldn't have taken the opportunity to catch and drive the entire German army into the sea.
Or the Russians wouldn't have taken advantage of the German Army disappearing into Western France.

The Russian war plan (which the Germans knew about) did have a variant that called for a "Hail Mary" advance on Berlin.

 

[Hood]

I'm not sure that Britain was propping up France militarily in World War One. She had a far larger Army that was reasonably well equipped, she had one of the largest navies in Europe - admittedly the ships were of mixed quality and rather stuck in the late 19th century in design and build.
In terms of military aviation Britain heavily relied on French engines for most of the war and both nations shared and licence-built a number of designs.
In 1914 the BEF was a small token force, by 1918 it was shouldering a fair sized burden of defending France but losses by both nations had been crippling.
Both nations were helping each other, plugging each others gaps in technical need and manpower. Both relied on each other.

Such co-operation was planned in 1940, e.g. Merlins for French aircraft, French bases for RAF training schools, joint naval task forces to hunt raiders etc. The Blitzkreig put paid to those plans, had they not a very powerful combined force would have materialised, but probably not until 1941...

I find it rather odd revisionism to suggest that France would ever let the Germans roll to the Channel Coast. There was no love lost between centuries of Anglo-French conflict but in 1914 the 1870 War had rather stoked anti-German feeling and they wanted to give the Germans a bloody nose. Arguably the French-Russian agreements had far more effect in terms of geopolitics on Germany's actions, hence the Schlieffen Plan and its derivatives.

But on the other hand the 'Phoney War' of 1940 was curious. Little practical help could be given to Poland but after September there was a desire not to rock the boat. A limited French attack in the south was very half-hearted. Britain bombed a few coastal targets but morals prevented the Bomber War they had planned for. Britain schemed invasions of Norway to cut off steel supplies and triggered the German invasion of Scandinavia - causing serious blow back but crippling German naval power in the process. Britain and France never dared to declare war on the USSR despite its own invasion of Poland, the USSR playing a cautious game of being seen as friends but not allies of Germany probably paid off for Stalin. Even so Britain planned to bomb Baku, rather odd given the situation - did they intend declaring war on the USSR or not? (Subsequent history would have been very different had they done so)
What was the plan? One gets the sense had Hitler not launched Fall Gelb that Britain and France might have sat behind the Maginot Line forever. There was no real desire to do anything offensive unless forced too, and only then on the periphery of Europe.
Was the declaration of War in September 1939 actually a mixture of bluff and a desire to be seen to do something publicly? There is little sense of a desire to crush Nazism by destroying the German Army by Britain and France, more a vain hope that he might see reason or somehow fritter himself away. Smashing through the Westwall to destroy Germany seemed an unthinkable option. In truth Britain and France entered the war without purpose or aim, hence the apathy by the spring of 1940. The events of 1940 saw German take the initiative and forced the Allies to react and crucially the blows stung the governments and people into action and purpose. Sadly it made the job four times harder but at least there was agreement about what had to be done.