Could Britain have done more to avoid World Wars 1 and 2?

WW1 could have been avoided if the French and Germans were not still squabbling over Alsace and Lorraine.
France had most recently lost A-L in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War.
Ever 1871, A-L had been awkward citizens of the German Reich. Meanwhile, Paris wanted to avenge those losses and stabilize the border along the Rhine River. That required pushing German soldiers from the Vosgues Mountains eastwards past the Rhine River.
During the WW1 occupation(?) Suspictious German soldiers frequently fined A-L citizens for speaking French. Even worse, they frequently fined A-L citizens for speaking both languages in the same sentence (common-practice in modern-day Quebec and Acadia).
Even when I visited A-L during the 1980s, they were very much bilingual, with citizens as likely to address me German (my third language) as in French (my second language) or English (my mother tongue).
Bottom line, if the French had not been pressing to "liberate" A-L, Germany would have been less enthusiastic about striking Westwards at the strart of WW1.
 
For WW1 and WW2


https://www.edgee.com/user/francogug/storia-alternativa


Britain could avoid WW1 and WW2 if plan of kill Franz Ferdinard of Hasburg failed .
Then we will not have a WW1 and WW2 as we know !!
 
Hi folks,
A few random British mutterings:

i) Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Could Britain and/or France have made military interventions over (e.g.) the renascent Luftwaffe or the remilitarised Rhineland? With hindsight, sure we could - but assuming the political and psychological preparedness for risking another war c. 1935 is a big ask. Even Churchill accepted that such will did not exist then.

ii) Why didn't Britain and France declare war on the USSR in 1939? Well, for a start we couldn't rely on many (if any) other countries for aid, Hitler was by far the greater threat and the USSR was much harder to get to grips with. Anyway, declaring simultaneous war on Hitler and Stalin might have been plucky (see thread on the 1940 'Operation Pike' plans) but it wasn't the best strategic plan ever developed - assuming you want the Allies to win, that is.

iii) Maybe Britain and France could have done more if backed up more strongly by the USA. But again did the will for a second European intervention exist in the USA c. 1936? No one could blame the American people for a degree of reluctance to risk committing troops to a war that might well turn chemical and/or biological from its very early stages.

iv) Pardon a personal gripe but I absolutely loathe hearing Chamberlain's bleat about far-away countries of which we pin-striped schoolboys know nothing. An appallingly insensitive remark about its original target, Czechoslovakia, and downright offensive if stretched to include Poland. Yes, I know dear Neville built up Britain's fighter defences but the extra year he bought at Munich probably benefited Hitler more than anybody. (Oh and had Churchill not been available, the likely Prime Minister in May 1940 would have been Lord Halifax - who would most likely have negotiated a peace with Hitler which would see Britain stay out of Europe in return for nebulous guarantees about preserving the bloody Empire.)

v) The Kenyan independence wars were horrible and Britain emerges with little credit from them. But the Mau Mau were not exactly a Boy Scout organisation either – as the families of knived British wives and disembowelled British schoolboys can testify. Even speaking as a thoroughly 'Stuff the Empire' British person, I fear any comparison with the Nazis won't stand up.

vi) Re: WW1 – read an interesting book by Jack Beatty: 'The Lost History of 1914: How the Great War Was Not Inevitable' - which looks at about ten different ways in which the Great War might have failed to catch fire or have taken a very different course, e.g. if civil war had broken out in Ireland in July 1914 and kept Britain preoccupied.

Okay, random British mutterings over. Happy trails, friends.

Thanks and all best,
Wingknut.
 
Those who follow many of my posts will be sick of my dragging J.W. Dunne into threads. You may turn away now.

In 1936 he proposed just this for the forthcoming WWII, putting out a booklet titled "The League of North-West Europe," which I recently had the chance to read. He proposed a kind of proto-EU, a military and economic partnership primarily of Britain, France and Germany, with the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark thrown in for luck. Together we would have been able to stave off the threat posed by Stalin, while our economic interdependence would have prevented war between ourselves.

He regarded the Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal as too unreliable to be safe in such a Union - and if we look at their roles in the EU debt crisis of recent years, he may have had a point!

OTOH I cannot agree with all that he proposed, for example he treated the remaining Scandinavian countries as a handy buffer zone between us and Stalin, whereas I would prefer to have seen them join us, as they actually did later in the short-lived EFTA - the European Free Trade Area - which predated the EU and few of you will be old enough to remember.

What I find interesting in this present discussion is that he did not take Germany as a de facto enemy but as a political sparring partner, something that other commentaries in this discussion have missed, and he sought a political solution rather than a military/policing one of the kind popular here but which, frankly, hardy ever works.

Just a few days after Dunne circulated his booklet privately (possibly under a different title?), the French signed a military pact with Stalin. In direct consequence Hitler, feeling uncomfortably squeezed by an aggressive pincer movement, responded with the highly sensible defensive precaution of re-militarising the Rhineland. A classic example of where military/policing pressures cause exactly the opposite effect desired. Dunne then had the booklet published at sixpence a pop but, of course, to no avail.
 
I might warm to Dunne's views a bit more if the Germany he had chosen to regard as a potential 'sparring partner', bulwark against Communism, etc., had been Weimar Germany or a surviving Imperial Germany, and not Germany as she actually was in 1936.
Anyway, if the claim is that a Franco-Soviet alliance was the sole and sufficient cause of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, e.g. so the Rhineland would not have been remilitarised if the Franco-Soviet pact had not been concluded, then I simply do not believe that. The Franco-Soviet pact may have made a handy excuse to wave at the gullible but such remilitarisation was coming anyway.
 
Wingknut said:
I might warm to Dunne's views a bit more if the Germany he had chosen to regard as a potential 'sparring partner', bulwark against Communism, etc., had been Weimar Germany or a surviving Imperial Germany, and not Germany as she actually was in 1936.
But that would have been hopelessly naive and self-defeating. Hitler was in power, and cutting a deal with any German replacement would have brought on the very war Dunne was trying to prevent. Don't forget that our Prime Minister subsequently agreed the far less satisfactory "Peace in our time" cop-out with Hitler, handing him Czechoslovakia as well. Dunne's proposal was well better than that.

Anyway, if the claim is that a Franco-Soviet alliance was the sole and sufficient cause of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, e.g. so the Rhineland would not have been remilitarised if the Franco-Soviet pact had not been concluded, then I simply do not believe that. The Franco-Soviet pact may have made a handy excuse to wave at the gullible but such remilitarisation was coming anyway.
I don't think anybody believes it was the sole reason: the citizens of the Rhineland surely deserved the military protection of their own Government. The pact did no more than force Hitler's hand.
 
Sorry but any such 'sparring partner' deal with Hitler would simply have helped to legitimise his regime and I don't think Dunne's proposal was at all better than Chamberlain's (admittedly dreadful) 'Peace in our Time' short-term cop-out. Indeed, by giving the appearance of shared long-term political goals between the Western nations and Hitler, Dunne's idea might have legitimised the Nazi regime far more even than Chamberlain's fumbling did.
I simply do not believe that the Western allies joining an alliance with a post-Hitler, non-Nazi regime (e.g. if the 'Oster' conspiracy had succeeded) would have been any more of a cue for war than Dunne's (to my mind deeply suspect) alliance with Hitler. If anything, far less so.

And finally, you did seem to describe the remilitarisation of the Rhineland as a 'direct consequence' of the Franco-Soviet pact.
 
Wingknut said:
Sorry but any such 'sparring partner' deal with Hitler would simply have helped to legitimise his regime...
Remember that back in 1936 the full horror had yet to happen: worse regimes than the 1936 Nazi government had been recognized as a matter of course. Dunne could not have known what was to come.

I simply do not believe that the Western allies joining an alliance with a post-Hitler, non-Nazi regime (e.g. if the 'Oster' conspiracy had succeeded) would have been any more of a cue for war than Dunne's (to my mind deeply suspect) alliance with Hitler. If anything, far less so.
Nobody said anything about post-Hitler. Dunne's proposal was designed to curb the Hitler menace, that can hardly be described as post-Hitler. But on what basis do you claim that proposal would have positively encouraged war, and who against?

you did seem to describe the remilitarisation of the Rhineland as a 'direct consequence' of the Franco-Soviet pact.
In the sense that it forced Hitler's hand, which would not otherwise have happened at that particular moment and consequently led Dunne to publish, yes it was a direct consequence. I suppose one could nit-pick and argue that the timing was the direct consequence rather than the act, but this is not a philosophy forum.
 
The guarantees to Poland that Britain and France furnished after the collapse of Czechoslovakia was in some way like the "Blank Check" Germany gave Austria in August 1914. However, take a peek at a map. There was no way this check could have been cashed. Were it not for this guarantee, Poland perhaps could have come to some kind of accommodation with Germany, surrendering German speaking territory in return for German military support in a war with the USSR. This is not much of a deal, but Poland had the misfortune of being stuck between the USSR and Germany. Unfortunately, Poland could not just pick up and move to a safer neighborhood.
 
I'm late, but the topic is fun. ;)



I suppose the UK could have stayed out of WWI, but its leadership WANTED to join the fray, unaware of how horrible it would be.

One scenario would have been to arrange that Germany evacuates trops from belgium within three months of violation of its sovereignty in exchange for the permission to use Belgian railways with priority trains for the duration of its war with France plus three months. An English ultimatum including the threat to supply Russia with thousand of army guns and millions of shells could have led to such an agreement and it would have honoured the English guarantee for Belgian sovereignty better than to wage war without being able to push German troops out of Belgium for the next 3+ years.

-----------

Concerning WW2, the best chance to avert it was when social democratic politicians were in power during the mid-20's and such actual democrats could have been strengthened by giving them foreign policy successes such as support for a fair Eastern border, end of reparations within a few years and eased military power restrictions in a treaty that limits British and French army strengths as well (with for example 250,000 German army strength + combined 50,000 personnel for the navy and military+civilian aviation professionals).

-----------

Later on after Hitler actually became Reichskanzler, strict rearmament-hindering economic sanctions (nickel embargo, for example - Canada produced over 80% of global Nickel production during the 1930's!) and an early alliance UK-France-Czechoslovakia-Poland coupled with strong support for Romania (to keep its oil out of German reach) could have delayed the war well into the 1940's, and then all bets are off because Stalin could have played the primary aggressor role then.
It would also have been smart (and counter-intuitive) for the UK to agree to a larger German surface fleet in their naval limitation treaties of the 1930's (and limit submarine size to 300 tons at most). This would have wasted even more German rearmament ressources on the always ineffective and wasteful German navy.
 
On First World War

The British Politic and Royal House not wanted to enter the Great War
But the Moment German Imperial Army cross the Belgium Border to Attack France.
The British Empire had to enter War, because of Treaty Britain sign About Belgium, ensuring Military aid in case Belgium Neutrality is desecrated.

The Reason:
revolutionary Belgium was consolidated as Buffer state between France, Germany and Netherlands
in 1831 Leopold of Saxe-goburg and Gotha became king of Belgium, He was family of Queen Victoria
so with The Treaty of London 1839 Kingdom of Belgium became a neutral buffer state under British protection.

Had German Empire never adopted the Schlieffen plan and respect Belgium borders, the British Empire never enter into conflict and remained Neutral


On Second World War

How much the British Politic wanted Peace, show Chamberlain "sell" the Czechoslovakians to Hitler in Hope to ease him
But Hitler wanted War, even Total War, the result of that, you see today on maps of Europe.
the Only way to Keep Britain neutral is to remove Hitler out the equation
like kill him during The Great war or during Bierhall putsch or let rot in bavarian prison for years.
Here NSDAP never become popular and Conservatives, Right wings and Military fight the german Communist
The Winner bury the Weimar Republic and new State rise: either Socialist republic of Germany or The Kingdom of Germany.

under Communist Germany will focus on USSR what let to problem about Poland
here Chamberlain "sell" the poles to ease the Communist and allow border correction between SRG and USSR without War

under German King of Saxe-goburg and Gotha, the Interaction with Britain could become very Interesting...
 
The only way I could see the UK avoiding WW 1 was for it to have been more explicit about its various treaties with the various competing nations. Either that or not make those treaties in the first place. A tall order, that, as the UK had a constant need to prevent any one nation from dominating the Continent.

World War Two? Well... how about having the Entente insist on gold as the means of Germany's reparations repayments. This, as opposed to letting the Germans pay in their paper currency. That allowed for Germany to induce hyper-inflation that meant it was able to pay those reparation without any real value in doing so. That it was devastating to the German economy was seen as but a temporary thing and worth the effect. As it was disruptive enough to give the NSDAP a cause to rally support with, that proved a very wrong belief by the Wiemar crowd.
 
Michel Van said:
On First World War

The British Politic and Royal House not wanted to enter the Great War
But the Moment German Imperial Army cross the Belgium Border to Attack France.
The British Empire had to enter War, because of Treaty Britain sign About Belgium, ensuring Military aid in case Belgium Neutrality is desecrated.

The Reason:
revolutionary Belgium was consolidated as Buffer state between France, Germany and Netherlands
in 1831 Leopold of Saxe-goburg and Gotha became king of Belgium, He was family of Queen Victoria
so with The Treaty of London 1839 Kingdom of Belgium became a neutral buffer state under British protection.

Had German Empire never adopted the Schlieffen plan and respect Belgium borders, the British Empire never enter into conflict and remained Neutral

That matches my understanding also. The British were reluctantly forced to declare war to honour their obligation to Belgium - a failure to do so would have caused a massive loss of face and reputation.

That's a pity since WW1 was so devastating in its consequences for the UK (human and economic), as well as leading more or less directly to WW2, which was even more devastating. We may have been on the winning side in both wars, but if that was winning I hate to think what losing would have looked like...

Norman Friedman explores these issues in his book 'Fighting the Great War at Sea', which goes well beyond purely naval issues and into the politics. In his view, the big mistake the UK made was in being sucked in to recruiting a massive land army (Kitchener being out of control), when our strength was in maritime actions. It's worth a read.
 
Tony Williams said:
Michel Van said:
On First World War

The British Politic and Royal House not wanted to enter the Great War
But the Moment German Imperial Army cross the Belgium Border to Attack France.
The British Empire had to enter War, because of Treaty Britain sign About Belgium, ensuring Military aid in case Belgium Neutrality is desecrated.

The Reason:
revolutionary Belgium was consolidated as Buffer state between France, Germany and Netherlands
in 1831 Leopold of Saxe-goburg and Gotha became king of Belgium, He was family of Queen Victoria
so with The Treaty of London 1839 Kingdom of Belgium became a neutral buffer state under British protection.

Had German Empire never adopted the Schlieffen plan and respect Belgium borders, the British Empire never enter into conflict and remained Neutral

That matches my understanding also. The British were reluctantly forced to declare war to honour their obligation to Belgium - a failure to do so would have caused a massive loss of face and reputation.

That's a pity since WW1 was so devastating in its consequences for the UK (human and economic), as well as leading more or less directly to WW2, which was even more devastating. We may have been on the winning side in both wars, but if that was winning I hate to think what losing would have looked like...

Norman Friedman explores these issues in his book 'Fighting the Great War at Sea', which goes well beyond purely naval issues and into the politics. In his view, the big mistake the UK made was in being sucked in to recruiting a massive land army (Kitchener being out of control), when our strength was in maritime actions. It's worth a read.

I haven't read the book so wouldn't like to criticize its argument directly but I would note that without the substantial British Expeditionary force it is very likely the German Army would have defeated the French Army at some point, hence the Allies (including the UK) would have lost the War.
The British may have ideally wished to limit their involvement more to the naval sphere but they had to fight the war that was there to be fought, not one of many idealized fantasies that sometime get presented as alternatives to the slaughter of the WW1 Western Front.
 
kaiserd said:
Tony Williams said:
Norman Friedman explores these issues in his book 'Fighting the Great War at Sea', which goes well beyond purely naval issues and into the politics. In his view, the big mistake the UK made was in being sucked in to recruiting a massive land army (Kitchener being out of control), when our strength was in maritime actions. It's worth a read.

I haven't read the book so wouldn't like to criticize its argument directly but I would note that without the substantial British Expeditionary force it is very likely the German Army would have defeated the French Army at some point, hence the Allies (including the UK) would have lost the War.
The British may have ideally wished to limit their involvement more to the naval sphere but they had to fight the war that was there to be fought, not one of many idealized fantasies that sometime get presented as alternatives to the slaughter of the WW1 Western Front.

Fair point, but I think I haven't done Friedman justice (he does have a whole chapter on this, as I recall). It wasn't just naval warfare he meant, but using the UK's naval power to choose when and where to fight on land. There was nearly one good example in the Dardanelles, which could have gone very differently if the British hadn't alerted the Turks to the need to strengthen their defences by an earlier, pointless, bombardment.

Friedman argues that the British fought more like this in WW2. Yes, France was lost then and might well have been lost quite quickly in WW1 without a big British Army fighting alongside the French but, bluntly, so what? The French lost in 1870-1 as well. While the UK undoubtedly preferred a balance of power in Europe, it wasn't essential to her survival. The RN could have maintained a distant blockade, keeping up the pressure until a suitable peace settlement was agreed (from the UK's viewpoint, Belgium's independence would need to be restored).
 
Michel Van said:
On First World War

The British Politic and Royal House not wanted to enter the Great War
But the Moment German Imperial Army cross the Belgium Border to Attack France.
The British Empire had to enter War, because of Treaty Britain sign About Belgium, ensuring Military aid in case Belgium Neutrality is desecrated.

The Reason:
revolutionary Belgium was consolidated as Buffer state between France, Germany and Netherlands
in 1831 Leopold of Saxe-goburg and Gotha became king of Belgium, He was family of Queen Victoria
so with The Treaty of London 1839 Kingdom of Belgium became a neutral buffer state under British protection.

Had German Empire never adopted the Schlieffen plan and respect Belgium borders, the British Empire never enter into conflict and remained Neutral


On Second World War

How much the British Politic wanted Peace, show Chamberlain "sell" the Czechoslovakians to Hitler in Hope to ease him
But Hitler wanted War, even Total War, the result of that, you see today on maps of Europe.

WOW; so much nonsense in one post!

1) It's well-known that the English king did indeed wait for an excuse for war till the attack on Belgium, but it's also known he wasn't in a position to decide war or not war himself.
2) Chamberlain never sold the Czechoslovakians to Hitler in any way. He tolerated that Hitler took the border regions where very many Germans (Sudetendeutsche) lived.
3) Hitler didn't want war with England or France in 1939 at all - he gambled and lost.
Furthermore he considered the Englishmen as a related nation and was very open for friendly relations (if the Englishmen tolerate a re-taking of Alsace-Lothringia and the conquest of Eastern Europe).
4) It's "Coburg", not "goburg"


And finally, the First World War happened because Europeans had largely been at peace for decades (save for the peripheral Balkans War) and thus had saved a lot of tensions up for a single release thereof - and almost nobody knew about the disastrous consequences of a European war.
To fully prevent the war instead of merely staying out of it or keeping it small one would have needed to rein in on the Austrian-Hungarian government which did in 1914 100% the same as the Neocon warmonger clique did in 2002/03:

(1) Tragic terror attack hits highly symbolic target
(2) investigation yields no link to foreign governments whatsoever
(3) Government wants to blame a country (that they wanted to wage war against for a long time) anyway
(4) allies do not make a political stand for peace
(5) poison-pilled ultimatum on the innocent country
(6) innocent country gets attacked

Serbia had a de facto ally in the Russian Empire, Iraq had no protector. Thus the different consequences.


Let's say we has a time machine and want to avoid the First world War.
We would need to address the Habsburgian-Serbian tensions in some way, maybe by making this guy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf,_Crown_Prince_of_Austria fall in love with a Serbian woman in time and marry her.
We would need to address the UK-German tensions in some way, maybe by simply killing that idiot Tirpitz.
We would need to address the French-German tensions in some way, maybe by convincing v.Bismarck/Wilhelm I to not retake Alsace-Lothringia after almost 200 years of French control or by changing politics or published opinion in France away from their fixation on retaking Alsace-Lothringia.
 
lastdingo said:
Let's say we has a time machine and want to avoid the First world War.
We would need to address the Habsburgian-Serbian tensions in some way, maybe by making this guy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf,_Crown_Prince_of_Austria fall in love with a Serbian woman in time and marry her.
We would need to address the UK-German tensions in some way, maybe by simply killing that idiot Tirpitz.
We would need to address the French-German tensions in some way, maybe by convincing v.Bismarck/Wilhelm I to not retake Alsace-Lothringia after almost 200 years of French control or by changing politics or published opinion in France away from their fixation on retaking Alsace-Lothringia.

It would also be helpful:

1. To put on demonstrations of how horrible and long-lasting a war would be, with deep trench systems, massive coils of barbed wire, carefully sited MGs, and invite European military to observe how futile attacking such defences would be.
2. Follow that up with lots of articles in the European press about the horrors of future war, plus maybe get H.G. Wells to write a novel about it (translated and widely distributed).
3. Stress the UK's support for Belgium, with royal visits etc.
4. Tell Germany that we know all about the Schlieffen plan (in fact maybe include it in Wells' novel!)

Changing the public mood from jingoism to an awareness of grim reality might contribute to making war less likely.
 
Tony Williams said:
Friedman argues that the British fought more like this in WW2.

Which was a good reason why the Germans weren’t defeated or at least contained in 1940-41. In WWII the British leadership was obsessed with a technological solution to war to the significant detriment of conventional ground forces. To the extent that they even had a near critical shortage of small arms! If they had been a bit more focused on fielding a significant and filled out ground force (like in WWI) then the German offensive of 1940 would have failed and all that really bad stuff, that was a lot worse than WWI, avoided.

Tony Williams said:
Yes, France was lost then and might well have been lost quite quickly in WW1 without a big British Army fighting alongside the French but, bluntly, so what? The French lost in 1870-1 as well. While the UK undoubtedly preferred a balance of power in Europe, it wasn't essential to her survival. The RN could have maintained a distant blockade, keeping up the pressure until a suitable peace settlement was agreed (from the UK's viewpoint, Belgium's independence would need to be restored).

Just like how the British defeated Napoleon right? Except of course that isn’t what happened. Napoleon needed the Russian, Prussian and Peninsular Armies to over through his empire (for the first time). Imperial Germany in control of France and Russia and allied to Austria and Turkey has very little to fear in WWI. What pain they suffer from being cut off from maritime trade is far surpassed by the pain the UK suffers from being cut off from European trade. Neither is existential but the British will lose far more profit being unable to sell to the Europeans and unable to source cheap food and resources from Europe.

The only way to stop WWI from happening is to constrain the aggressor. In the main case this is Kaiser Wilhelm II. Maybe if the UK had made a big stink over the Daily Telegraph affair it could have added to the displeasure in Germany leading to his abdication in 1908? With Prince von Bülow remaining Chancellor and a young(ish) Kaiser Wilhelm III on the throne WWI could have been avoided?
 
Just veering back to WW2, a few amateur's suggestions for things Britain should / could have done differently:
i) Soften / scrap 'war guilt' clauses at Versailles.
ii) Either abandon altogether or else consistently enforce Versailles strictures against German re-armament.
iii) Refrain from giving preferential financial treatment to Franco's rebel forces in the Spanish Civil War.
iv) Make clearer undertakings on behalf of Czechoslovakia.

In a nutshell: thanks for taking Fighter Command seriously but basically, shove off, Neville C.

Photograph of the Surrealist artists Roland Penrose, James Cant, Julian Trevelyan and T.Graham wearing masks of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made by McWilliam in the May Day Procession, 1938 http://pallant.org.uk/exhibitions/past-exhibitions/2014/main-galleries/british-artists-and-the-spanish-civil-war/british-artists-and-the-spanish-civil-war/themes1/we-ask-your-attention
 

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Definitively the way more sure for avoid WW-II is that Hitler is killed in WW-I.
In 1917 a British soldier shoot to the head of Adolf Hitler;the death is immediate.
In 20s nazi party never become a big movement.
With a bit of fortune Weimar democracy survives to the crisis of early 30s without become communist or fascist.
anyway a eventual right wing government is not crazy nut as nazi,so reasonably reaches a honest,satisfactory agreement with UK and France.
Maybe the Kaiser is restored (not Willhielm but the son).
In 1939 Germany is in peace with his neighbors and with British Empire and France, Stalin is busy to kill fellow communists,Mussolini is satisfied with his little Empire,Japan alone not challenge the western powers.
In a peacefull 1940 FDR not run for a third term.
In November a young Republican,Thomas E. Dewey, is elect President of United States.
The German Chancellor send his congratulations to the new American commander in chief.
 
Lately I've been rummaging around trying to learn more about the American Civil War, and the technologies explored in it, and I found myself wondering if maybe not only Britain but Europe collectively would have done more to avoid WW1 if European states had got themselves a clearer idea of the realities of how mechanised warfare had progressed.
 
I have just started The War That Ended Peace by Margaret MacMillan, a well-reviewed study of the years leading up to the start of WW1.

She makes the point very early that the Europeans should have paid more attention to the US Civil War than to the relatively quick European wars which happened in the second half of the 19th century.
 
Wingknut said:
Lately I've been rummaging around trying to learn more about the American Civil War, and the technologies explored in it, and I found myself wondering if maybe not only Britain but Europe collectively would have done more to avoid WW1 if European states had got themselves a clearer idea of the realities of how mechanised warfare had progressed.

Ehh there were two major European wars fought AFTER the ACW and using even more advanced industrial military technology. The Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War. Industrial warfare does not mean war has to be attritional stalemate.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
Ehh there were two major European wars fought AFTER the ACW and using even more advanced industrial military technology. The Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War. Industrial warfare does not mean war has to be attritional stalemate.

Well, Abraham, oddly enough, I knew that, plus betwixt the ACW and WW1, there were various encounters with (e.g.) the Boers and the Zulus for Blighty to get mixed up in too. (Not that Britain seemed to learn a lot from fighting the Boers either ...)

But (here's the thing) I didn't say that mechanised / industrialised war must be (or even have to end in) 'attritional stalemate'. (Your words, not mine.)

What I do think is that the ACW experience, with its mass slaughters of charging cavalry, nascent trench warfare, proposals for aerial bombardment and poison gas, etc., was a better model for what was coming '14-'18 than Europe cared to notice.

Cheers, 'Wingknut'.

EDIT: For more on ACW chemical (even biological) warfare, see e.g.
http://militaryhistorynow.com/2014/04/25/yellow-fever-greek-fire-and-poison-gas-secret-weapons-of-the-u-s-civil-war/

For more on ACW plans for aerial bombardment (both Union and Confederate) see this thread here, especially my first and fourth posts (plus links therein):
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,27185.0.html

FURTHER EDIT: Now this I confess was news to me: Britain apparently deployed picric acid shells (please note though as an explosive agent and not as a poison) in the second Boer War: "During the Boer War, British troops fired picric acid–filled shells, although to little effect", quote from page 11 of Chapter 2 of Jeffrey Smart's History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective , http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/ch-2electrv699.pdf
See also source cited at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Picric_acid#cite_note-7

However, picric acid also has its medicinal uses (oddly enough): "Picric acid was also used as a treatment for trench foot suffered by soldiers stationed on the Western Front during World War I", https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Picric_acid

Although please note I might submit there is a significant difference between chemical agents used as poisons and incendiaries on the one hand, and chemicals used to make explosives, lachrymatory agents or even medicinally on the other. Being tear-gassed is no fun, I'll wager, but being poison-gassed is a deal worse.
 
I have restrained to post in that thread for a long time, but too much is too much. Warning: this is a RANT fueled by years of "French cheese eating surrender monkeys in WWII"

So don't read it if you don't like strong words and opinions.

Here's my point of view about the whole 1938-1940 enchilada.

As of 1938 France needed Great Britain (namely, the BEF) to help balancing the fact that German population was twice that of France. But unfortunately Chamberlain was a coward (God know if I hate that man). Think what you want of France in Munich or WWII, but at least French PM Edouard Daladier was a realistic, if not pessimistic man - unlike Chamberlain.

Just compare their reactions when their respective aircrafts landed at Croydon and Le Bourget airports - back from Munich.

Daladier was afraid of being lynched, and he was startled to heer people cheering he had saved peace. He famously muttered "AH, LES CONS" ("poor fools !) He was stunned and ashamed of the Munich deal, until the end of his days in 1968.

Meanwhile Chamberlain was jumping up and down excitedly claiming "I have saved peace for generations" Yeah, you did, stupid. Reading history obviously tell us you saved six million jews.

Initially, French PM Edouard Daladier wanted to fight for the Czech, but Chamberlain (and, admittedly, a very very stupid French high command, ok) persuaded him war would be a disaster.
While there's a fact that is always ignored: when the Allies throwned the Czech under a bus and Nazis invaded, the Allies offered Hitler SKODA on a silver plate - and Skoda was one of the best tank and steel manufacturer in Europe. Most of the tanks that rolled over France, Belgium, Netherlands and other countries in spring 1940 ( Panzers II) were build at the Skoda works between 1938 and 1940.

That's a matter of fact and has fascinating, far-reaching consequences. It means that, as of 1936-1938 (before Skoda), the Wermacht was a PITIFUL force, and France alone could have kicked Hitler arse. Forget the Maginot line - the regular army was much bigger than anything the 1938 Wermacht could thrown in the west.
But losing 1.5 million in WWI made French opinion reluctant to fight a third war against Germany (don't forget 1870 !) The French hoped the British would lift their spirit and help fighting Hitler, and there Chamberlain appeasement was a disaster, to say the least. Like it or not, it made France more depressed and isolated than ever, facing the Hitler ogre.

The aviation front was no better (or at least it seemed so)

In August 1938 as war with Germany over the Czech loomed in the horizon, French aviation minister Henri Vuillemin was invited to Germany by Luftwaffe top brass and was shown a potemkine show of (mostly faken) Luftwaffe air power (which, as of 1938, was pitiful - He-51 was still the main fighter, while Bf-109 B/C/D were not that good compare to a Curtiss H-75 or a MS-406). Unfortunately the potemkine show worked very well, and Vuillemin come back deeply depressed and pessimistic - France lacked an Air Force strong enough to fight for the Czech. An opinion which was WRONG !

It is one of the great military and political ironies of modern times: that France in 1938 knew that war with Hitler was unavoidable in the near future, but, did not wanted to fight another WWI - losing 1.5 million men makes one reluctant.
The irony that I mentionned is that France wanted to fight in 1938, but was invaded in 1940, and is now considered the Great Coward of WWII; while the main, great, REAL coward was Chamberlain in Munich (not all Great Britain, fortunately, wanted f*cking appeasement - my anger is aimed at Chamberlain) and Great Britain was not invaded, and become the hero country of WWII (admittedly, with great suffering and courage - no question about that)

One has to realise that Chamberlain goddam appeasement policy led to Hitler victories and, indirectly, to the Shoah. In a fitting irony, Chamberlain did not lived long enough to see the splendid results of his appeasement policy: cancer got him in November 1940. At least that other super-coward, Halifax, lived long enough to see it. I can tell you that, to the end of his days in 1968, Edouard Daladier was utterly ashamed of Munich.
 
I have to agree with your view Archibald, an elderly gent who I was friendly with blamed Chamberlain for the deaths of his friends in WWII.

My personal opinion is that the golden opportunity was lost during the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The French army should have moved immediately and forced the German troops out and the Royal Navy should have blockaded all German ports. If the Germans remained belligerent
with the arrival of the BEF the allies should have pushed on and occupied the Ruhr. Also all German shipping in British, Commonwealth and French ports should have been seized.

These actions I would hope would cause the Nazi's to loose face in the electorate's eye's and bring about a collapse of the Nazi party.
 
Wingknut said:
What I do think is that the ACW experience, with its mass slaughters of charging cavalry, nascent trench warfare, proposals for aerial bombardment and poison gas, etc., was a better model for what was coming '14-'18

If you think the above was something unique to the ACW and WWI then that is because you don't know anything about the Franco-Prussian War. This war in on 1870 had all the tactical and operational features of the ACW and more (mass use of breach loading rifles and even.early machineguns). The key difference between it and ACW and WWI was the lack of popular support for the French government by the French people resulting in an absence of the sort of resiliance shown in ACW and WWI that meant the war was dragged out even after one side suffered a massive defeat.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
Wingknut said:
What I do think is that the ACW experience, with its mass slaughters of charging cavalry, nascent trench warfare, proposals for aerial bombardment and poison gas, etc., was a better model for what was coming '14-'18

If you think the above was something unique to the ACW and WWI then that is because you don't know anything about the Franco-Prussian War. This war in on 1870 had all the tactical and operational features of the ACW and more (mass use of breach loading rifles and even.early machineguns). The key difference between it and ACW and WWI was the lack of popular support for the French government by the French people resulting in an absence of the sort of resiliance shown in ACW and WWI that meant the war was dragged out even after one side suffered a massive defeat.

Well, Abraham, sorry if this sounds less than enchanted with your efforts but while you talk a brave game, you're making my point for me: let’s look at what semi-automatic Gatling guns did in the ACW, shall we? And then Maxim comes along in 1883 with a fully-automated gun. If ACW Gatling massacres of cavalry were bad, all the more reason to think that the move to fully-auto. weapons would be worse. If European powers made the same mistakes in the Franco-Prussian war as were made in the ACW, then the more fool Europe. As for "all the tactical and operational features”, what, you mean like chemical weapons and biological agents? See previous post. (A handy quote for you to help with that all-important Google search: “The French considered and rejected the idea of dipping bayonets in cyanide during the Franco-Prussian War”, Alan Cobb, Biological and Chemical Weapons: The Debate Over Modern Warfare, 2000. But not gas seemingly. Or biological agents. Corrections welcome of course.)
And I didn't say "unique" - you said "unique". Again, your choice of word and not mine.

Yeah, and I hate Chamberlain too, by the way. And Halifax. (Stains on Britain's honour ... like we needed any more stains there ...)

(And while I would hesitate to use "hate" to describe my feelings re: J. W. Dunne, I fear anyone who was talking of political alliances with Hitler in 1936 (please note after the 'Night of the Long Knives' and the announcement of the Nuremberg Laws) was at best ... well, I won't say it, but perhaps 'misguided' begins to hint at my suspicions. No one could have been in any doubt about the nature of the Nazi regime after that, even if there had been any room for doubt before.)

Thanks, 'Wingknut'
 
Afterthought: another apparent analogy between ACW and WW1 but disanalogy between those two and the Franco-Prussian war seems to be this: please, please correct me if I'm wrong but there weren't any submarines in the Franco-Prussian War, were there? (Only references I could find to such were clearly about Steampunk fantasy devices.)
Hard to picture Prussian submarines infiltrating Paris down the Seine but please do let me know if there were any.
Cheers as aye, 'Wingknut'.
 
1935-38 Appeasement was neither NC's own policy nor inherently wrong: PM Baldwin 29/7/36:“If there is any fighting in Europe to be done I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it” H.M-Hyde, Br.Air Policy Between the Wars, Heinemann, 1976, P389. Bolshevism was widespread in W.Europe, mid-1930s (largest Party in France was PCF) so to turn Germany East, to do the dying on our behalf, was the cause of sympathy for fascism in some quarters. Then we all knew that our boots on ground in the Ruhr would unite Germans in homeland defence, body bags would create riot at home. Peace was the word. (The analogy is precise with Mid.East today: "something must be done"...but not at risk to our boys).

That is my A to this Q: No, because the times were ripe for Nationalism to flourish. This was - is - an overwhelming belief/ faith/ comfort in the presence of uncertainty, change. A sense of National Identity arose around 1900 in Serbia, Germany, Italy - all having been nulls a generation earlier (these Nations had not existed in modern times before 1860). Elites of the Empires of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Turkey resented a sense of decline and looked for external diversion. So: I am as good as you arrogant French, Brits.

Pull up the photo at Cowes Yachting Week, 1912: 3 evident kinsmen in cod caps, same beard. In the Kaiser's perception, his cousins, Czar and King, and the World at large did not offer him and his people the respect, equality he/they deserved. So: just you watch me!
 
To change tack.... if some remarkable increase in diplomatic competence had actually succeeded in avoiding WW1 or any other major European conflict, how would the rest of the last century have panned out?

Some initial thoughts:

Europe would have remained richer and more powerful for longer, slowing down the shift in the balance of power towards the USA.

Presumably the absolute monarchies in Germany, Austro-Hungary and Russia might have continued their gradual evolution towards democracy, avoiding major revolutions (and preventing the ideological gulf between communism and capitalism, which would have had knock-on consequences for China).

Would Austro-Hungary have inevitably fallen apart, or just become federalised?

Social structures would probably have remained more conservative, with female emancipation etc taking longer.

Any thoughts?
 
I think a "peaceful" twentieth century for Europe needs to be taken in the context of the wider geopolitical scene.

The Royal Navy, once unchallenged owner of the high seas, was being challenged not only by Germany and America but also Japan. Maintaining its lead was bankrupting the Empire on Which the Sun Never Set and was unsustainable, was or no war. Gunboat diplomacy would never be the same again.

Then, there was the centuries-old Great Game, as it has come to be called, for the control of Central Asia. The Silk Road wound through it, bringing fabulous riches and the greatest cities the world had ever seen. It first comes to our attention as a great Zoroastrian civilisation. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Persia and Tamerlaine successively conquered it. Modern interest and the Great Game proper begin with the British annexation of India in the South and Russian expansion from the North. Whoever controlled central Asia had the enemy Empire at their mercy.. And so For centuries the two empires vied for control of the wild independent city-states isolated among their vast seas of impassable desert and forests of even less appealing mountains. Whole armies were annihilated time after time at the hands of parching heat, freezing cold or outright treachery. Great heroes rose and fell, a single personality changing the balance of power across thousand of miles and a dozen nations, only to see their gains and more lost to a foolish successor or an even greater masterstroke by their enemy. Some say it continues openly today in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, more covertly in Pakistan and the former Soviet states in the north. It makes Game of Thrones look like a kids' end-of-term play, falls short of Tolkien's grandeur only in the lack of a Ring of Power. Truly, it was and still is The Great Game. I recommend the book of that title by Peter Hopkirk. You can catch a flavour of its edges from Rudyard Kipling's novel Kim.

By the dawn of the twentieth century Britain had pushed its Indian dominions out into what is now Pakistan, but Russia had pretty much cleaned up everywhere else except Afghanistan. Had WWI not occurred (returning to topic), the Game would surely have continued, with Britain pushing back at the wastes of the high Pamirs where Himalaya, Karakorum and Hindu Kush meet in a grip of death save for a few crucial seasonal routes for invading armies. Japanese designs on China would have sapped its strength as ever and Russia would have retaken Sinkiang, the Easternmost of the Islamic princeling states. Tibet, China's other westernmost conquest, would have come back into focus, still within memory of Britain's farcical and tragic invasion several years before. Local rebellion, backed by a Russia which forgot to leave afterwards, would have been the play - if only to flank the Pamir. Far to the West, the Ottoman Empire would have pushed back too, seeking to regain that lost trouble spot, the Caucasus. Set against this would be continued Russian expansion into Finland, Poland and presently a play for all those countries that Stalin in reality acquired a few years later.
The Russians had evolved and honed a technique that was close to Microsoft's embrace-extend-extinguish. First came favourable trade deals and political sweetmeats. Then the threat from an aggressive neighbour (manufactured in the event that none was in the offing) and the accompanying defensive army with its military administration. Later, at some opportune moment, the old government would be officially extinguished. The British powers never had an attention span longer than a goldfish and never could compete once Russia had got organised. That too would have been the fate of Eastern Europe - probably in about Stalin's timescale, too. Only the might of Germany, with whatever rump of Austria-Hungary it could gather together, would stop it in its tracks.
Or, perhaps some British adventure in Afghanistan or a Japanese Empire retaking of Sinkiang and Tibet would divert resources and Europe might relax.
Then Gandhi would have come along and bankrupted the moral case for Empire. Some would have listened, others redoubled their efforts.
The simple truth is, if open war were avoided, the cold war would have begun half a century earlier. The game would have played on, most probably - save for the Nazis and the holocaust - much as it has done.
 
I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it
So Great Britain was to seat on his hands and watch the continent goes ablaze.
Nice for France, (and the other democracies) which were none of both (France had large far-right and far-left factions for sure, but power remained with fragile coalitions of moderates parties). Typical of that egoism I mentionned.
I can understand however that the battle of the Somme was equal in horror to Verdun, and that very few British people wanted to try it again.

As for submarines - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_submarine_Plongeur
But I don't think submarines would have been very useful in Sedan (yes, in 1870 did the German armies breaked out at the exact same place - the Sedan plateau - as they would in 1940 - talk about a lesson learned)
 
steelpillow said:
I think a "peaceful" twentieth century for Europe needs to be taken in the context of the wider geopolitical scene.
..................
The simple truth is, if open war were avoided, the cold war would have begun half a century earlier. The game would have played on, most probably - save for the Nazis and the holocaust - much as it has done.
Thanks for the detailed response.

MacMillan's book on the run-up to WW1 (which I am still working through) makes it clear that Russia was highly conflicted for all sorts of reasons. Their policy fluctuated between trying to expand eastwards (leading to the clash with Japan) and focusing on the west (where the most powerful nations on Earth were concentrated), depending on the views of whichever individuals were most influential at the time.

All of the major European powers were involved in a juggling act with alliances and ententes to try to ensure that they were not isolated and thereby vulnerable to attack. They were also keen to acquire status by extending their territories (inc colonies) where possible. Russia was no different in that respect from the other centres of power (Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, GB, Italy - to some degree), and I don't see any suggestion of the fundamental kind of difference between Russia and the others that came with the communist revolution and caused the Cold War.
 
IMHO, the answer is yes, but no more and probably less than the other major players. France was trying to aid Russia, to increase its credibility as an Eastern threat to Germany. In my opinion, the Kaiser did not want a war, but his incompetent leadership first put the British on the defensive with the naval race and later entered a set of alliances, the consequences of which he really did not understand. At a lower level in the German Army and government were many supporters of a "Greater Germany" who saw an opportunity in war to expand to the East. This expansion was achieved with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but with the military defeat of Germany in the West, this had to be given up. Then begins the runup to WW II, the German Army, by refusing to admit its role in the defeat, creating the myth "undefeated in the field, forcing the abdication of the Kaiser, and working continuously to undermine the Weimar Republic, paved the way for the Nazis to ultimately get control of Germany and put it on a renewed path for expansion to the East. There are many things other countries, including Britain, might have done to contain this threat, but the genesis of the threat in both wars was the German military and its drive for expansion of military power and territory. As with any complex situation, there are simple explanations which miss many important aspects and are incorrect, at least in part. My explanation must of course fall into that category. But, it takes only one aggressive party to start a war and the German Army was certainly that during the entire period being discussed.

Best Regards,

Artie Bob
 
Tony Williams said:
I don't see any suggestion of the fundamental kind of difference between Russia and the others that came with the communist revolution and caused the Cold War.

I should have been clearer that I meant a slightly different cold war. Such a war is simply a politico-military power struggle carried out without significant bloodshed. The real Cold War was principally between Russia and the West. Had WWI not happened, the politico-military power struggle between Russia and Britain (the Great Game) would have carried on without bloodshed. Moreover, the kind of treaties and diplomacy that we suppose prevented WWI would have drawn others in to the Game. In this sense, The Cold War was just what we called the Great Game in the 20th century. In the real world America got drawn in and the stage widened across the globe but that makes no fundamental difference, its final fling was a classic Great Game expulsion in Afghanistan. At least, that's what I meant by the cold war happening anyway. Communism was entirely optional.
 
"The Great Game" was over and done with by about 1895. The Afghans had expanded their border eastwards to meet the Chinese declared border and create a buffer between the Tsarist Russians and the British in the Pamirs. The two empires were isolated from one another by a neutral third nation (Aghanistan) under British control.

There was though, a new player in Kaiser led Germany, which was interested in rousing the Muslim population of Persia and Central Asia against the British - something the British greatly feared by in reality the Kaiser's minions were children playing in the big kids' playground. They didn't understand nor know the rules and believed in romantic fantasies about rousing the local populations to a Jihad against India. In reality, the local populations were more interested in taking their money and weapons and using them against their local rulers, than the British in far off India.

The Ottomans played along but they were so weakened by 1900 that they were ineffectual in controlling their subject populations. The Persians similarly were interested in maintaining their own positions of power rather than engaging in a war with the British Empire.

Only in India itself was their potential for a rebellion which might have hurt the British but they remembered the effect of the Great Mutiny and kept an iron control over the Indian hot heads. Gandhi and the Congress Party believed helping the British would stand them in better stead and so helped suppress the revolutionaries only to be betrayed (in their eyes) by the Raj.
 
Kadija_Man said:
"The Great Game" was over and done with by about 1895.

According to Hopkirk, the Game was not yet done. During those last years of the 19th century European nations joined the Eastern fray as well, scrambling to wrest territories from the dying Manchu empire of China, while Japan started pushing Russia out of of its farthest Eastern conquests. Russian interest in retaking Chitral from the British also remained active, then the main Anglo-Russian action moved eastwards to abortive attempts on both sides to take the prize of Tibet from China. The end of the Game officially came with the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention on 31 August 1907.

However it did not lie in its grave for long. A few years later the Bolsheviks came to power and tore up the Convention. As Hopkirk put it, "Far from being over, the Great Game was destined to begin again in a new guise and with renewed vigour, as Lenin vowed to set the East ablaze with the heady gospel of Marxism."

A key provision of the Anglo-Russian Convention had been the recognition by Russia that Afghanistan was within Britain's sphere of influence. Like all preceding peace agreements it proved worthless. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would later drive squadrons of battle tanks through it. Neither party asked the Afghans first. Today, attempts at political control continue to lurch to and fro between masterstroke and mess-up, between peacemaking and open warfare, on both sides as they ever did. It is for reasons such as these that some say the Great Game is still alive and well.
 
I would recommend that you re-read Hopkirk if you believe that is the message that he purveys to his readers for it is not. As I stated, the Great Game had ended by about 1895. Afghanistan separated the two Empires. There was no where they touched. Chitral was a small kingdom, high in the Pamirs/Himalayas. Few knew of it, few cared about it. China was a sideshow and concerned Russia and Great Britain more often than not in alliance than opposition.

As for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was never a greater mistake made by the Kremlin and for reasons other than the Great Game. Britain had departed India 40 years before. The Great Game was well and truly over and done with. All Afghanistan did was lure the Soviet soldiery to their deaths in the mountains, just as it had when the British had first invaded in 1839. Today, the Americans and their allies are learning the same lessons, the hard way.

Germany was by the turn of the 20th century the far greater threat to both Russia and Great Britain and both had realised that and become united in their opposition to Berlin. "The Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend," is an old cliche. London and Russia knew that and signed on August 31, 1907, in St. Petersburg, the Anglo-Russian Convention, the final key alliance between the two powers which welded a wall around the Central Powers.

IMHO, the fault for WWI can be squarely laid, not at the feet of London but Berlin. An obstreperous Kaiser who out sourced his foreign policy to his military high command and allowed them only one response to any event ("Invade France!") and the Austro-Hungarians who wanted to expand their empire rather than face the realities of it's disintegration in the face of the growing tide of nationalism that it faced.
 
Kadija_Man said:
I would recommend that you re-read Hopkirk if you believe that is the message that he purveys to his readers for it is not.
'''
Chitral was a small kingdom, high in the Pamirs/Himalayas. Few knew of it, few cared about it.

Perhaps you are relying on an old edition. I refer you to the 2006 paperback edition, pub. John Murray:
* "The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 finally brought the Great Game to an end" (pp. 521-2)
* "Or had it?" (p 522)
* "Far from being over, the Great Game was destined to begin again in a new guise and with renewed vigour, as Lenin vowed to set the East ablaze with the heady gospel of Marxism." (p. 522)
* The Foreword (pp. xiii--xvii) is titled "The New Great Game". It covers the post-cold war (i.e. post-Marxist) era and features a full-spread map to illustrate the message.

Then again, he evidently thought Chitral was important enough for Chapter 35 (pp. 483-501) to merit the title "The Race for Chitral" and in it to explain what was going on and why. Chapter 26 covers the Tibetan fiasco. I expect you will find these last in your own edition too, as they precede the chapter containing the above remarks,

I can't help thinking that the Great Game must have nine lives.
 
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