Continuing relevance of the A-10 Warthog today and tomorrow?

[Jeb]

One thing I wonder is why did the USAF send the A-10's to Europe, as opposed to another ground attack squadron. (E.g. F-16s)

Is it force availability or something specific to the A-10 and European theater?

My cynical side says it's to placate some whiners A-10 advocates.

 

[Jeb]

I wonder what the affect of the last three US wars occurring in good weather countries has had on the CAS debate.

If it is cloudy, then how does high altitude CAS work?

I'd expect it to be reliant on your JTACs feeding up accurate coordinates and coordinating the employment of GPS guided weapons, if there wasn't enough visibility to allow your pilots to be comfortable operating below the clouds.

 

[DrRansom]

LastDingo - There is a jamming method, shine a laser beam back down the beam-rider LOS. The laser beam overwhelms the tracking camera, so that it cannot track the aircraft accurately.

LO - IIRC Pantsyr is Russian AF only, so not a threat (now) for SHORAD. On the other hand, 15km altitude puts a lot of things in range.

Jeb - I find your explanation to be extremely improbable.

 

[lastdingo]

LastDingo - There is a jamming method, shine a laser beam back down the beam-rider LOS. The laser beam overwhelms the tracking camera, so that it cannot track the aircraft accurately.

That's irrelevant because there's no time for it, though. As mentioned before, LBR guidance does not require the laser to point at the target until the last moment.
Furthermore, it's impossible to tell whether a LBR or IIR missile is incoming unless the threat arsenal doesn't include both types.
And then there's the topic of anti-laser filters; lasers are monochromatic at a limited quantity of distinct wavelengths. Materials are known which largely absorb these wavelengths and let most others pass with little absorption. That's what laser protection inserts for infantry goggles are made of. You need a "hard kill" grade laser power output to overcome such cheap filters.
And networked systems with three tracking cameras can triangulate the target position and guide a spaced laser. They would be invulnerable as long as their optics aren't be detected.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Lasers are not invisible, even while off bore.


This is very easy to prove... just look at any of the youtube vids of lasers through NVGs or IIR.

 

[quellish]

Lasers are not invisible, even while off bore.


This is very easy to prove... just look at any of the youtube vids of lasers through NVGs or IIR.

If the laser isn't in the visible part of the spectrum yes, it is invisible.

 

[SpudmanWP]

If only aircraft had some other way to see the invisible (IR) laser besides the Mk-1 Eyeball

 

[Jeb]

Jeb - I find your explanation to be extremely improbable.

How so?

 

[DrRansom]

USAF sending A-10's to Europe to appease whiners? USAF conduct an act which reinforces the whiners position, that the A-10 represents a unique capability within the air force? Makes no sense.

For beam-riding missiles, I believe that tanks already have a jamming device for optically tracked missiles. While applying that to aircraft is may be non-trivial, that idea may still have use.

 

[quellish]

If only aircraft had some other way to see the invisible (IR) laser besides the Mk-1 Eyeball

Visible spectrum is visible spectrum. Things outside the visible spectrum are "invisible".


IR is outside the visible spectrum. So, yes, an IR laser is "invisible".

 

[Jeb]

USAF sending A-10's to Europe to appease whiners? USAF conduct an act which reinforces the whiners position, that the A-10 represents a unique capability within the air force? Makes no sense.

Ahhh, I thought you were referencing my description of the JTAC process.


As for this, I said it was cynical, I didn't say it was accurate. But you have to admit, the brass making the internal decision to send an A-10 detachment overseas because "maybe that'll shut them up for a while" has a little merit.

 

[SpudmanWP]

IR is outside the visible spectrum. So, yes, an IR laser is "invisible".

It's not going to be invisible to the aircraft sensors and that is the most important part.


The idea that you can use a beam-riding AAM, even off bore, to "sneak up" on a fighter by using a claim of "the fighter cannot see the laser" is a false claim (I know, not your claim).


This is especially true of the latest generation of MLD/MAWS like EODAS. Besides, the launch of the missile will give plenty of warning and let the defender know where the missile is coming from. Remember that lasers have about a 20-30nm effective range which is well inside the detection range of the MLD/MAWS.

 

[Triton]

USAF sending A-10's to Europe to appease whiners? USAF conduct an act which reinforces the whiners position, that the A-10 represents a unique capability within the air force? Makes no sense.

As for this, I said it was cynical, I didn't say it was accurate. But you have to admit, the brass making the internal decision to send an A-10 detachment overseas because "maybe that'll shut them up for a while" has a little merit.

I have to agree with DrRansom. It reinforces the position that the A-10 Thunderbolt II represents unique capability within the United States Air Force. Why send it to Estonia for three weeks and train with the Estonian military?

 

[quellish]

It's not going to be invisible to the aircraft sensors and that is the most important part.

Energy in the "visible spectrum" is "visible". If it's not in the visible spectrum, it's not. Not sure how that can be more clear. Using a device to detect energy that is outside of the visible spectrum is irrelevant - it is still invisible.


But hey, getting back on topic, for those interested in having informed discussions about the A-10 and close air support, I recommend the following resources:


JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support


Types Of Terminal Control


"A-10s Over Kosovo" ISBN: 978-1585661220
"A-10 Thunderbolt II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 2002-07" ISBN: [/size]978-1780963044
[/size]And the other books in the series
[/size]
[/size]And because the B-1 and other "Bomb On Coordinates" platforms regularly come up, "B-1 Lancer Units in Combat" (though I cannot recall how much discussion there was of interaction with JTACs)

 

[Dragon029]

You're both right if you check a dictionary:

from Macquarie:

visible /ˈvɪzəbəl/ (say 'vizuhbuhl) adjective 1. capable of being seen; perceptible by the eye; open to sight or view.
2. Physics (of electromagnetic radiation) having a wavelength between approximately 380 and 780 nanometres.
3. perceptible by the mind.
4. apparent; manifest; obvious.
5. represented visually; prepared or converted for visual presentation: visible sound (an oscillograph of a soundwave).
6. Economics of or relating to international trade in goods which have a material form or substance (opposed to invisible).
[Middle English, from Latin vīsibilis]
–visibleness, noun
–visibly, adverbFrom Oxford:
adjective1. Able to be seen: the church spire is visible from miles away
2. Physics (Of light) within the range of wavelengths to which the eye is sensitive: the visible spectrum

3. Able to be perceived or noticed easily: a visible improvement
4. In a position of public prominence: a highly visible member of the royal entourage

5. Relating to imports or exports of tangible commodities: the visible trade gap

 

[Triton]

"Congress Issues Air Force Sharp Rebuke, Bars A-10 Retirement"
by Tony Carr|September 30th, 2015

Source:
http://www.jqpublicblog.com/congress-issues-air-force-sharp-rebuke-bars-a-10-retirement/

Late Wednesday, it was reported that President Obama is threatening to veto the 2016 NDAA discussed here, which has now passed both chambers of Congress. Such threats are not uncommon (Obama has made this threat every year in office), but actual veto of a defense authorization almost never occurs.

It was also reported that the House Armed Services Committee called the Air Force’s proposal to retire the A-10 “misguided.” Read more here.]

The final version of the 2016 defense Bill was released yesterday, and it contains more bad news for the Air Staff: barring a Presidential veto, the A-10 isn’t going anywhere for a while. In a sign of the absurdity of the moment, this is good news for basically everyone else, most of all ground troops engaged in dispersed combat and the airmen committed to providing them with dependable, competent overwatch.

Key provisions in the conference report prevent the Air Force from using any of its budget allocation to retire, prepare to retire, or place into storage any A-10 aircraft. This year’s Bill also provides a strongly-worded prohibition against reductions in A-10 manning before the end of 2016, leaving Congress time to pass another defense budget before the service can diminish its A-10 capability.

Had the language contained just these elements, it could be safely theorized that it was a “close call” and Congress merely chose to stand on the status quo. But additional language in the Bill makes it clear just how forcefully both the House and Senate have repudiated the Air Force’s arguments for retiring the A-10.

Subsection (e) of Sec. 142, which is titled “Prohibition on Availability of Funds for Retirement of A-10 Aircraft,” obligates the Secretary of the Air Force to:

“commission an appropriate entity outside the Department of Defense to conduct an assessment of the required capabilities or mission platform to replace the A-10 aircraft.”

Congress is ordering the Air Force to genuinely study how it will replace the A-10, and is concerned enough about the service’s demonstrable lack of objectivity to mandate that such a study be done outside the agency and free from the direct influence of service leaders who have already staked their reputations on killing the A-10.

This can be seen as a stinging indictment of the leadership of Gen. Mark Welsh, with Congress saying it doesn’t trust his discretion on this particular issue. More painful for Welsh and the Air Force is the comfort with which Congress can make such an indictment. The A-10 fight has done considerable damage to service credibility, culminating ultimately in this considerable loss of latitude and agenda control.

Section 142 spends its next 10 paragraphs telling the Air Force, in embarrassingly exacting detail, what its obliged study of an A-10 follow-on must encapsulate.

Key requirements contemplated by Congress include the ability to engage moving, camouflaged, or dug-in troops; the capacity for armor-piercing weaponry, including cannons and missiles; the “ability to remain within visual range of friendly forces and targets to facilitate responsiveness to ground forces and minimize re-attack times”; the ability to operate beneath low cloud ceilings, at low speeds, and within the range of typical air defenses found in enemy maneuver units; and most critically:

“[t]he ability to deliver multiple lethal firing passes and sustain long loiter endurance to support friendly forces throughout extended ground engagements.”

This is a veritable laundry list of the ways in which the A-10 favorably contrasts with its proposed replacement, the F-35. Without mentioning the F-35 explicitly, Congress is clearly questioning the Air Force’s plan to fulfill its Close Air Support (CAS) duty with the high-tech, over-budget, under-performing fighter … and insisting — now with the force of law and the purse strings attached — that the Air Force begin questioning its own assumptions in this regard.

To underline its seriousness, Congress embedded an additional provision rolling back last year’s compromise measure allowing the Air Force to move 36 A-10s into backup inventory status, which would have allowed the service to move funding and manning elsewhere.

That compromise was enacted as latitude to transition two sequential tranches of 18 aircraft. The Air Force moved the first 18 into backup status over the past year, but this year’s Bill revokes authority to move the second tranche. This draws a red line under what has been done to shelve the A-10 up to this point, and requires every airframe in the active inventory to remain in full operational status with adequate manning.

These provisions can be seen as a consensus in Congress to entirely abandon the Air Force position that it can accomplish its duty to national defense without a dedicated CAS weapon system and community. Most remarkable about this development is how little it reflects stock political calculations rooted in district votes or campaign contributions … and how much it therefore reflects a lucid sense of appropriate risk and capability in national airpower portfolio.

It’s a remarkable moment when Congress can claim the mantle of mission focus. It’s only possible in this case because of the Air Force’s persistent allergy to honest, on-the-merits discussion of its own mission.

This final conference version of the Bill is expected to sail through Congressional approval in both chambers — though opposition can’t be completely ruled out — and make its way to the White House for signature, where it is unlikely to trigger a veto and even less likely to trigger one on these grounds.

This means that once again, a cobbled coalition of legislators, practitioners, commentators, and concerned citizens, acting without the sponsorship of a major defense contractor and traveling exclusively on the rails of strong arguments, have thwarted a plan to gap America’s defense for the sake of political expediency.

No doubt the shenanigans will re-commence after a short respite, and little doubt the same re-warmed rhetoric and emotional rattle-tossing will attempt to obscure bad arguments and worse ideas. But perhaps this rebuke will jar the service and its leaders into fresh thinking and a more fulsome debate.

Either way, it looks like the Hawg will continue to rage for the foreseeable future, and that’s good news for American defense and those who engage in it.

 

[Triton]

“Deeply Disturbing”: Senate Demands Answers as Air Force Attempts Back Door A-10 Retirement
By Tony Carr|October 10th, 2015

Flanked by nine fellow Senators, Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) sent a strongly-worded letter to Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James on Friday. In the letter, the group excoriates the service for taking “steps inconsistent with Congressional intent” with respect to the A-10 fleet, and orders James to provide a written explanation by the end of this month.

At issue: the Air Force’s brazen flouting of both the letter and spirit of public law as it resists a legislative mandate to continue operating the A-10 for the foreseeable future, in this case by taking three specific actions contrary to restrictions in last year’s defense authorization.

First, the Air Force has decreased depot maintenance funding by 40%, significantly slowing the rate at which A-10 airframes are periodically refurbished, inspected, and modernized. According to the Senators, this jeopardizes the availability of sufficient A-10 airframes to meet current and forecast combatant commander requirements — something to which the service has stipulated in a previous written response to Ayotte’s office.

The Air Force has previously cited its plan to retire the A-10 as its rationale for the decision to slash depot funding. This most recent letter wholeheartedly rejects that rationale, scolding James that:

“Based on Congress’ explicit, bipartisan, and repeated rejection of the Air Force’s efforts to prematurely divest the A-10, this reduction in A-10 maintenance funding is clearly inappropriate and short-sighted.”

The Senators are also concerned at the service’s deliberate failure to maintain sufficient airframes in serviceable status, which has caused the A-10 weapons school to borrow jets from the collocated test squadron at Nellis Air Force Base. Robbing Peter to pay Paul in this way hampers the test community’s ability to “conduct testing necessary to maintain the health, modernization, and readiness of the A-10 fleet.” Based on the Air Force’s underhandedness in the squabble over the A-10, legislators understandably see this move as a cynical attempt to make the A-10 less relevant to combatant commanders, thereby dulling demand for its services.

But the most egregious of the Air Force’s questionable actions is its violation of restrictions embodied in Section 134 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which permitted the service to move 18 A-10s from primary to backup inventory status, or “BAI.” The provision permitted the Air Force to fly select airframes less frequently, and to reduce its overall maintenance and operational resource commitment to the A-10 fleet accordingly.

But it seems the Air Force exceeded that authority, and the Senate has taken notice.

According to the Ayotte letter, a memo signed in May of this year by Lt. Gen. John Cooper placed the 18 BAI A-10s into a different status known as “XJ.” This status removes the designated A-10s completely from the active inventory and prevents them from being flown at all. This is clearly at odds with Congressional intent that the airframes be periodically operated, and it guarantees their condition will progressively degrade, at some point making it impractical to re-activate them into the inventory. In other words, it’s a death sentence for 18 A-10s Congress forbade from being retired and directed be kept available in the event they might be needed. As the Senators point out in their letter, this isn’t a semantic difference. It’s a clear violation of the intent of Congress.

I would go a step further and argue that unless the Air Force can explain how it ended up clearly outside of constraints imposed in the NDAA, this is a violation of public law and should be regarded as such for purposes of discipline and accountability. This type of lawlessness is one of the lurking dangers of an overgrown federal government and cannot be countenanced. When executive agencies believe they can hide behind the complexity of the modern administrative state to thwart the power-checking legal authority of a coordinate branch of government, we have reason to be anxious that the separation of powers doctrine holding our government in balance is in danger of rupturing, making legal authority essentially meaningless. This can’t be tolerated, for the stakes attached far exceed the narrow objectives of the current cohort of generals and executives perched atop the air service at a difficult and politically important moment in the history of national defense.

As an interesting side note, the letter is addressed only to Secretary James, omitting Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh and making no reference to service’s uniformed leader. For observers of the A-10 debate, it wouldn’t be difficult to imagine that the drafters saw no point in inviting Welsh into this particular discussion. His past statements and decisions have greatly injured his credibility on Capitol Hill when it comes to the A-10. His omission does, however, add a little more relevance to rising questions about Welsh’s ability to effectively represent the interests of the Air Force in Congress.

The most salient point made clear by this letter is that despite a steady tide of embarrassments, repudiations, and political setbacks, the Air Force is not getting the message when it comes to the A-10. Even with the incredibly strong (some might say stern) language in this year’s NDAA prohibiting divestment of the A-10 and requiring actions to field a replacement before retirement can be contemplated, the service continues to thumb its nose at Congress, self-inflicting reputational damage in the process.

No matter how James answers this latest volley, the damage is done. Congress is likely to go even further in its next iteration to more tightly constrain the Air Force on this issue, which will further fracture service credibility while disrupting the legislative-executive cooperation and comity needed to lubricate the wheels of national defense.

 

[Triton]

"A-10s Are Heading Back to War, This Time In Syria"

Source:
http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/10/a10s-are-heading-back-war/122961/?oref=d-mostread

 

[fightingirish]

...A brand-new combat airplane may even be in the mix for ACC. Welsh, in a press conference, told reporters, “I think eventually we need a new close air support airplane,” notionally called the A-X, which would replace the A-10, now more than 40 years old. He described the new aircraft as a “CAS platform that is cheaper to operate” than the A-10, “has better weapons capability, is more responsive, can operate in a low-threat environment, and operate extremely successfully.” It would operate in a “high-low mix” with the F-35, which would perform CAS in contested airspace, where its stealth, speed, and electronic warfare would allow it to survive in ways the A-10 cannot.

Contingencies requiring an inexpensive CAS platform, such as the engagements “we have been in for the last 15 years,” are not likely to go away, said Welsh. “We’re going to be continuing in this vein for a while.” The A-X would be a manned airplane, he added, rather than a remotely piloted aircraft.

Carlisle agreed on the need for a new manned CAS platform, explaining that the A-10 simply lacks the stealthiness, speed, or sensor systems to survive in contested airspace, and is getting too old to be maintained economically for the low-threat mission. He told reporters that the Air Force Research Laboratory is working on new weapons that would make delivering CAS more effective and precise from a new platform....

Source: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/November%202015/The-Air-Force's-Tight-Budget-Shopping-List.aspx

 

[Sundog]

...A brand-new combat airplane may even be in the mix for ACC. Welsh, in a press conference, told reporters, “I think eventually we need a new close air support airplane,” notionally called the A-X, which would replace the A-10, now more than 40 years old. He described the new aircraft as a “CAS platform that is cheaper to operate” than the A-10, “has better weapons capability, is more responsive, can operate in a low-threat environment, and operate extremely successfully.” It would operate in a “high-low mix” with the F-35, which would perform CAS in contested airspace, where its stealth, speed, and electronic warfare would allow it to survive in ways the A-10 cannot.

Contingencies requiring an inexpensive CAS platform, such as the engagements “we have been in for the last 15 years,” are not likely to go away, said Welsh. “We’re going to be continuing in this vein for a while.” The A-X would be a manned airplane, he added, rather than a remotely piloted aircraft.

Carlisle agreed on the need for a new manned CAS platform, explaining that the A-10 simply lacks the stealthiness, speed, or sensor systems to survive in contested airspace, and is getting too old to be maintained economically for the low-threat mission. He told reporters that the Air Force Research Laboratory is working on new weapons that would make delivering CAS more effective and precise from a new platform....

Source: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/November%202015/The-Air-Force's-Tight-Budget-Shopping-List.aspx

OK, I've stopped laughing now. A plane in the Air Force inventory to perform CAS that is cheaper to operate than the A-10? Those comedians! Unless they're talking about something like the Scorpion. But I'll believe that when they actually buy them and place them in service. It's definitely cheaper to operate, but I doubt it's anywhere near as survivable as an A-10.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Propfan & single engine would reduce the costs a lot.

Forward deploy keeps flight time down, response time low, sortie rate high, and costs down.

Load it up with the F-35's 25mm and lots of ammo

Load it up with lots of low-cost pgms like APKWS, LOGIR, LZuni, etc.

 

[DrRansom]

If we look at the A-10's high vulnerability flight pattern, low altitude engagement of forces, an attack path motivated by improved situational awareness, decreased time to re-attack, higher accuracy with cheaper weapons, and weather considerations, then won't any replacement require some element of armoring?

Most forces will have some means of ground fire, so any A-10 replacement will need to handle small-arms and older generation MANPADs, even if it will only be in a low-threat environment. This alone means that the basic armored layout of the A-10 will have to be replicated.

 

[donnage99]

Compared to the teens series (and their replacement, f-35), the A-10 fill a small niche. However, this niche is vital and irreplaceable. The ability to operate low and slow right on top of the battlefield is extremely important tactically and psychologically. The A-10's unique gun is cleared for engagement at a much more relaxed requirements (can be fired much closer to friendly forces) to any bomb in the US inventory dropped from fixed wing. That means that losing the a-10 means losing a capability that cant be filled even partially with anything else. And we may be talking about a capability that directly effect the lives of soldiers on the ground. So the whole argument from the air force of "look at the number of sorties it has compared to the f-16" is bullshit. I mean, how many times we have dropped nuclear bomb in comparison to conventional ones? Does that mean it has less relevance now?

 

[kaiserd]

Compared to the teens series (and their replacement, f-35), the A-10 fill a small niche. However, this niche is vital and irreplaceable. The ability to operate low and slow right on top of the battlefield is extremely important tactically and psychologically. The A-10's unique gun is cleared for engagement at a much more relaxed requirements (can be fired much closer to friendly forces) to any bomb in the US inventory dropped from fixed wing. That means that losing the a-10 means losing a capability that cant be filled even partially with anything else. And we may be talking about a capability that directly effect the lives of soldiers on the ground. So the whole argument from the air force of "look at the number of sorties it has compared to the f-16" is bullshit. I mean, how many times we have dropped nuclear bomb in comparison to conventional ones? Does that mean it has less relevance now?

The advantages for the A10 you have cited are very very niche.
Simply put in the future operating slow and low over the battlefield will be death, as even less sophisticated opponents develop their capabilities (proliferation of advanced shoulder launched SAMs etc). Such niche hazardess roles will be better left to intentionally less expensive UAVs, perhaps with a very small niche role for COIN type aircraft like the Super Tucano.
Even the US army recognises this re: the future of their helicopter fleet with focus on tilt-rotors and other higher speed configurations for the eventual Blackhawk and Apache replacements.
Right now the A10, F16 and other jets in the close support role are primarily medium altitude bomb-trucks using advanced targeting pods and precision munitions from what would have previously been considered stand-off range. In that context the A10's unique capabilities are a lot less important than they used to be.
There seems to be a lot of miss placed sentiment in this regard, personally I'd like a smaller niche fleet of A10s continue on for longer but I understand the US airforces reasoning re: the A10.

 

[sferrin]

Compared to the teens series (and their replacement, f-35), the A-10 fill a small niche. However, this niche is vital and irreplaceable. The ability to operate low and slow right on top of the battlefield is extremely important tactically and psychologically. The A-10's unique gun is cleared for engagement at a much more relaxed requirements (can be fired much closer to friendly forces) to any bomb in the US inventory dropped from fixed wing.

A lot of feel-good assumptions there that don't seem to have any basis in reality. While it might seem romantic to the white scarf and goggles crowd to be able to have a bullet magnet circling the battlefield you'd only do it if there was absolutely nothing else. Fortunately that is not the case today. And as for the "can be fired much closer to friendly forces" you might want to check out the A-10s friendly fire record.

 

[lastdingo]

Indeed, I thought the "fratricide" pro-A-10 argument was dead years ago after the attack on the very uniquely-looking USMC AAV-7s getting strafed by an A-10 pilot repeatedly, in good visibility and IIRC even open country.

 

[Jeb]

Indeed, I thought the "fratricide" pro-A-10 argument was dead years ago after the attack on the very uniquely-looking USMC AAV-7s getting strafed by an A-10 pilot repeatedly, in good visibility and IIRC even open country.

Forgot about that one...

Hmm, I wonder how a purely gunship version of a S-97 Raider would do? Cross-breed a Raider with an Apache, turn it into something like a Ka-50 with a pusher prop and more hardpoints. I guess that's kind of bringing back the Cheyenne in a way.

 

[TomS]

Sikorsky has looked at it -- I think the drivetrain is more like the Defiant (JMR/FVL-Medium) than S-97.

http://defensetech.org/2011/10/11/sikorskys-next-gen-helos/

And discussed in the big X2 thread here:

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,2768.msg203030/topicseen.html#msg203030

 

[marauder2048]

Compared to the teens series (and their replacement, f-35), the A-10 fill a small niche. However, this niche is vital and irreplaceable.

But that's not CAS; it's CSAR/helicopter escort i.e. a big part of what motivated the A-X requirements in the first place. But those
were drawn from the early Vietnam experience; the late Vietnam experience (when MANPADS and radar guided AAA were increasingly
making their way south) was totally different and much more predictive of the A-10s limitations/losses in GW1/2 and over Kosovo.

The big point is that in the low intensity conflicts, the ROE will nullify any A-10 advantages and in the mid/high-intensity
fight the enemy's weapons will do so.

 

[donnage99]

Fortunately that is not the case today. And as for the "can be fired much closer to friendly forces" you might want to check out the A-10s friendly fire record.

Holds as much logic as "f-117 was shot down, therefore, stealth is shit." Sure, A-10 friendly fire record is high, but has any other aircraft fills in its shoes, friendly fire would have been even higher. There's a reason why the protocols for other types are higher.

 

[cluttonfred]

Sikorsky has looked at it -- I think the drivetrain is more like the Defiant (JMR/FVL-Medium) than S-97.

http://defensetech.org/2011/10/11/sikorskys-next-gen-helos/

And discussed in the big X2 thread here:

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,2768.msg203030/topicseen.html#msg203030

Because of the arbitrary prohibition on fixed-wing combat aircraft operated by the U.S. Army, I think that some sort of rotary wing solution it very likely in the long run. If the S-97 ever makes it into production, then a stripped down attack version makes a lot of sense. There might even be a role for a single-seater with as much armor as it can carry as a CAS platform to complement more conventional two-seat gunships.

 

[Triton]

"Air Force may delay A-10 retirement"
by Kristina Wong - 11/10/15 10:21 AM EST

Source:
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/259645-air-force-may-postpone-a-10-warthog-retirement-for-several-years

The Air Force is considering delaying the retirement of the A-10 Warthog attack aircraft for several years, a top Air Force commander said Tuesday — a move that Congress and troops would embrace.

The Air Force has been trying for years to retire the A-10 — which provides troops on the ground with close air support — in favor of the newer F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but new demands have caused leaders to rethink that plan, said Gen. Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, commander of Air Combat Command.

"We have to retire the airplanes, but I think moving it to the right and starting it a bit later and maybe keeping around the airplane a bit longer is something that's being considered based on things as they are today and what we see in the future," Carlisle told reporters at the Defense Writers Group breakfast.

"I think if you look at what we'd like to do is probably a couple of squadrons maybe early, because we have F-16s coming out of Hill [Air Force Base], and we'd like to transition A-10s to F-16s in a couple of different places, but I think the majority of it we would move it a couple of years, two to three years, to the right."

Previous Air Force plans sought to retire the Cold War-era plane, also known as the "tank killer," by 2021. Officials argued that the F-35 and other platforms could perform the close air support mission.

Carlisle said factoring into the consideration to delay the A-10's retirement is the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), other military commitments and the slower procurement rate for the replacement F-35.

"One of our challenges today is capacity. If you look at the demand signal that's placed on the United States Air Force across all of our mission areas, the demand signal has gone up, things have changed a bit, obviously we're in Turkey now which we weren't before the fight against ISIL and Daesh," he said using alternate names for ISIS.

"What's happening in Yemen, what's happening in the Horn of Africa, what's happening in Libya, combined with the fact we're not leaving Afghanistan ... for at least one more year there, has all put a greater demand on the capacity of the United States Air Force across all the mission areas," he added.

Congress for years has pushed back against the Air Force's plans to retire the aircraft, Ground troops have long praised the A-10, saying its performance saved lives in battle in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.), member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and strong supporter of the A-10, said she welcomed the news that the Air Force was considering delaying its retirement.

"I've long been pushing to keep the A-10. It's the best close air support platform," she said Tuesday. "I think we need to keep this platform until there's an equivalent...We think our troops need the best close air support platform and the A-10 does that, by the way, as the lowest cost per flying hour."

Carlisle said as Air Combat Commander, he was personally responsible for sending the latest deployment of the aircraft to an airbase in Incirlik, Turkey, as part of the fight against ISIS.

"I will tell you I'm the one that's sending them. So if I have them, I'm going to use them, because they're a fantastic airplane and I'm going to take advantage of them," he said.

"So I will tell you, I have A-10s and I will use them because they are a fantastic airplane. The guys are incredibly well-trained and they do fantastic work in support of the joint war fight," he continued. "They're doing fantastic work and we're very proud of them."

Rep. Martha McSally (R-Ariz.), a former A-10 pilot and squadron commander whose state is home to an A-10 squadron, said consideration to delay the A-10’s retirement was the administration’s “same ploy only in a different disguise.”

“Over the last 3 years, the Administration has already mothballed the equivalent of 4 A-10 squadrons, leaving us with only 9 to carry out the critical missions for which the A-10 is best suited,” she said, referring to the Pentagon's actions short of retiring the aircraft.

"As it has always been, the plan to retire the A-10 ahead of schedule is irresponsible and reckless. No plane in our inventory or under development can match the A-10's unique capabilities to provide Close Air Support - capabilities that are in increasing demand,” she said.

“A-10s are now deployed in the fight against ISIS, in Europe to deter Russian aggression, and along the border with North Korea. We just invested over $1 billion to keep this asset flying until 2028. Until there's a suitable replacement, we absolutely need to keep this life-saving capability in the air."

 

[Arjen]

Defense One: Air Force to Delay A-10 Retirement, Thanks to ISIS

January 13, 2016
By Marcus Weisgerber

After trying to retire the battle-tested Warthog for the past two years, Air Force officials concede that the plane is key to the war on ISIS.

Congress / Air Force

The Air Force is shelving its immediate plans to retire the A-10 Warthog attack plane, which has become critical to the U.S. bombing campaign against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, Pentagon officials tell Defense One.

Air Force officials say they still need to retire the A-10 to make room for newer warplanes, but that the calculus for its sunsetting has been thrown off by commanders’ demands for the Warthog now.

Putting the A-10’s retirement plans on hold is a key policy shift that will be laid out next month when the Pentagon submits its 2017 budget request to Congress, said Pentagon officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the Obama Administration’s spending plan before its official release.

An Air Force spokeswoman declined further comment because the Pentagon’s budget request has not been finalized and publicly released.

Top Air Force officials had already hinted that the A-10 retirement plans might be put on hold due to the planes’ demand in combat.
[...]
Rep. Martha McSally, R-Ariz., a former A-10 pilot who flew combat missions in the 1990s during Southern Watch, also lauded the decision to delay the A-10 retirement.

“It appears the [Obama] Administration is finally coming to its senses and recognizing the importance of A-10s to our troops’ lives and national security,” McSally said in a statement.

“With A-10s deployed in the Middle East to fight ISIS, in Europe to deter Russian aggression, and along the Korean Peninsula, administration officials can no longer deny how invaluable these planes are to our arsenal and military capabilities,” she said.

McSally said the Warthog must stick around “until we know without a doubt we can replace their capabilities.

More at the link.

 

[marauder2048]

Challenging the sentiments (right or wrong) of the Senate Armed Services Committee chairman was probably never going to be a winning strategy. They probably expected him not run again in 2016...

 

[NeilChapman]

The A10 is the equivalent of shooting the enemy in the face. It's personal - where a fast mover is not.
Guys are always going to love this capability - especially when their back is against the wall. It doesn't
just kill the enemy, it projects power, seriously demoralizes the enemy AND invigorates the home team.

The practical question is what is the life-span of the all the platforms we have that fill this role and what
is the cost to keep them flying. I get the AF wanting to focus on the F35. They're critically short of
airframes. The F35 is the "best hope" they have of getting them.

I love the A10 for the reasons specified above. If we're going to keep it, I'd like to see a development
project that addresses the MANPAD threat to the A10 - and really, all our platforms. What is necessary
to add to the platform to protect it from the newest MANPADs like the 9K333 Verba? Can this be done?
Seems like there should be a technology solution not tied to a platform - if that makes sense.

 

[Boxman]

Admittedly this is a bit intangible, but what sort of aircraft/platform would replace the A-10 in the armed-escort "Sandy" role for Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR)?

I could be entirely wrong, but I can't imagine a manned/unmanned bomb truck orbiting the stratosphere over a downed combat pilot would have the same impact in not only kinetically, but also psychologically neutralizing threats to downed aviators and rescue helicopters/tilt-rotors.

Human nature would seemingly suggest to me that a non-discreet (either by sight or sound) aircraft armed with hundreds of cannon rounds and dozens of small rockets (in addition to a few iron bombs) flying over the area would slow an enemy and keep their heads down more so than an unseen platform firing/dropping a couple dozen (perhaps) small PGMs upon those who might oppose such a rescue attempt. This is all supposition on my part. But what might a future CSAR mission into hostile territory look like without an A-10 or similar aircraft?

 

[Avimimus]

I love the A10 for the reasons specified above. If we're going to keep it, I'd like to see a development
project that addresses the MANPAD threat to the A10 - and really, all our platforms. What is necessary
to add to the platform to protect it from the newest MANPADs like the 9K333 Verba? Can this be done?
Seems like there should be a technology solution not tied to a platform - if that makes sense.

Optically guided weapons are vulnerable to jamming and active countermeasures. In addition MANPADs are inherently limited to short ranges, small seekers and small warheads. Improving any area will lead to a decline in other areas.

One possible solution would be to split the weapon between two soldiers during transit and screw on a solid fuel launch booster as a first stage. That would allow saving the main engine for the terminal part of the flight and carrying a heavier seeker. I haven't heard anyone proposing this though.

I could be entirely wrong, but I can't imagine a manned/unmanned bomb truck orbiting the stratosphere over a downed combat pilot would have the same impact in not only kinetically, but also psychologically neutralizing threats to downed aviators and rescue helicopters/tilt-rotors.

A slower circling platform is definitely superior to the A-10 for this... That said you'd want a platform that could deploy quickly as well.

Wanting to use unguided cannons and machine guns with any effect means moving well into Manpad range. This could be solved with guided rounds (although it would be many times more expensive). It is difficult to get sustained fire with anything other than some form of automatic gun... however, there may be other ways to increase psychological impact.

Perhaps the ideal solution would be to have a fast-mover deploy medium sized drones from external hardpoints?

 

[Dragon029]

I could be entirely wrong, but I can't imagine a manned/unmanned bomb truck orbiting the stratosphere over a downed combat pilot would have the same impact in not only kinetically, but also psychologically neutralizing threats to downed aviators and rescue helicopters/tilt-rotors.

Don't forget that fast jets aren't known for being quiet, nor are JDAMs. Even SDB sized munitions are going to turn heads.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKHGaS9Nw7Q

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k42t9IRpaAE

 

[NeilChapman]

Pretty expensive kill shot. What's a Hellfire missile cost? 60-80k?

 

[Avimimus]

Pretty expensive kill shot. What's a Hellfire missile cost? 60-80k?

It was. More like 110k today, 150k for a brimstone. 40k for SDB... still expensive if your goal is to kick up dirt.