Continuing relevance of the A-10 Warthog today and tomorrow?

[marauder2048]

IIRC, FY 2019 is about the time that the FW APKWS II is (was?) supposed to IOC on a number of aircraft. That system has the potential
to be a great CAS leveler; cheapish, longer range (permits shallow dive angle launches above MANPAD and AAA altitudes) and more accurate than the GAU-8 with a variety of warhead, rocket motor and fuzing (e.g. airburst) options.

 

[jsport]

IIRC, FY 2019 is about the time that the FW APKWS II is (was?) supposed to IOC on a number of aircraft. That system has the potential
to be a great CAS leveler; cheapish, longer range (permits shallow dive angle launches above MANPAD and AAA altitudes) and more accurate than the GAU-8 with a variety of warhead, rocket motor and fuzing (e.g. airburst) options.

and the A-10 could carry and fire more of them then any other in or near service tactical aircraft.

 

[Jeb]

IIRC, FY 2019 is about the time that the FW APKWS II is (was?) supposed to IOC on a number of aircraft. That system has the potential
to be a great CAS leveler; cheapish, longer range (permits shallow dive angle launches above MANPAD and AAA altitudes) and more accurate than the GAU-8 with a variety of warhead, rocket motor and fuzing (e.g. airburst) options.

and the A-10 could carry and fire more of them then any other in or near service tactical aircraft.

Just imagine what it could do if it had a swept wing, afterburning engines, and no GAU-8!


It'd be an A-7F.

 

[Triton]

"USAF issues RfI for A/OA-10A re-winging"
Gareth Jennings, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
18 September 2015

Source:
http://www.janes.com/article/54629/usaf-issues-rfi-for-a-oa-10a-re-winging

The US Air Force (USAF) has issued a request for information (RfI) to industry for the re-winging of an undisclosed number of Fairchild-Republic A/OA-10A Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft.

The RfI, which was posted on the Federal Business Opportunities website on 17 September, is to gather comments and potential sources for production of new wing assemblies for the A/OA-10A to support operational requirements through 2021.

Final vendor RfI responses are expected by close of business on 2 November, with an Industry Day to be held at Hill Air Force Base in Utah on 17 November.

The USAF is already involved in an effort to re-wing 173 of its approximately 300 A-10s (plus options for 69 more), with Boeing the prime contractor.

Despite the air force's stated aim to retire the aircraft to free up resources for the introduction into service of the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), it continues to award contracts under the A-10 Thunderbolt Lifecycle Program Support (TLPS) programme to keep the aircraft viable through to 2028 and beyond.

With the current Boeing-led re-winging programme part of this wider TLPS, the USAF looks set to complete the project given that it is already so far along. In June Boeing said that 105 wingsets had been completed and delivered back to the USAF, with the contract set to run through to the first quarter of 2017.

 

[Triton]

"Request for Information: New A-10 Wing Assembly Production"
(Source: US Air Force Material Command; issued Sept 17, 2015)

This announcement constitutes an official Request for Information (RFI). This is not a Request for Proposal (RFP) or an Invitation for Bid (IFB), nor is it to be construed as a commitment by the government. The government does not intend to make an award on the basis of this RFI or otherwise pay for the information solicited herein.

1. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this RFI is to gather comments and potential sources for production of new wing assemblies for the A/OA-10A to support operational requirements through 2021.

The benefits of having replacement structural assemblies is to mitigate the increasing inspection and repair costs necessary to maintain aging structural items. (…/…)

B. Overall goal:
• Estimated production of approximately 10-25 ship sets per year at a production rate of approximately 1-2 wing assemblies per month

• Drop-in replacement

C. Industry/Government Partnering:
• An integrated Industry/Government team will work together throughout this program providing a free flowing exchange of information. (…/…)

4. Industry Day:
The government intends to hold an industry day at Hill Air Force Base. The tentative date for this event is 17 November 2015. Additional details regarding this industry day will be provided to interested parties in the coming weeks. If interested in attending this event, please contact the Contracting Officer listed below. Interested parties will be required to provide a list of employees who will be attending the industry day as well as each employee’s job title.

5. Closing Date: Final vendor RFI responses are expected by close of business
02 November 2015. (end of excerpt)

Source:
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/167061/usaf-issues-rfi-for-new-a_10-wing.html

RFI:
https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=8dd90041f90172f9bf9a5ade1619ab7d

 

[cluttonfred]

Could we use a modern replacement for the A-10 to take advantage of low-cost, high-accuracy precision-guided munitions like the FW APKWS II without the need for a great big tank-busting cannon? You betcha! Is the answer the F-35 or any other supersonic jet fighter? No way.

Take the design principles of the A-10 (armor protection, redundancy, survivability, low speed to allow effective visual identification of targets) and combine them with stealth (visual, aural, radar and infrared), modern avionics and ergonomics in a new blank-sheet design and you could produce an aircraft half the size of the A-10, stealthier, quieter, cheaper to operate and maintain, with greater range and endurance and even more effective at everything except direct fire tank-busting.

What are the odds of the Pentagon actually pursuing such an approach? Zero.

 

[Void]

Take the design principles of the A-10 (armor protection, redundancy, survivability, low speed to allow effective visual identification of targets) and combine them with stealth (visual, aural, radar and infrared), modern avionics and ergonomics in a new blank-sheet design and you could produce an aircraft half the size of the A-10, stealthier, quieter, cheaper to operate and maintain, with greater range and endurance and even more effective at everything except direct fire tank-busting.

This would make a great DARPA pitch.

;D

But in reality inserting most of the technologies that make modern aircraft expensive and maintenance intensive will not make it cheaper!

 

[cluttonfred]

This would make a great DARPA pitch.

;D

But in reality inserting most of the technologies that make modern aircraft expensive and maintenance intensive will not make it cheaper!

Thanks, but I am not sure that I agree with your last point. I bet that a commercial-off-the-shelf turbofan, stealthy composite structure, and modular digital avionics would be less expensive in maintenance time and difficulty than the 1970s technology that underlies the A-10. But do note that I said, "to operate and maintain" and didn't mention purchase price. ;-)

 

[Jeb]

Could we use a modern replacement for the A-10 to take advantage of low-cost, high-accuracy precision-guided munitions like the FW APKWS II without the need for a great big tank-busting cannon? You betcha! Is the answer the F-35 or any other supersonic jet fighter? No way.

Take the design principles of the A-10 (armor protection, redundancy, survivability, low speed to allow effective visual identification of targets) and combine them with stealth (visual, aural, radar and infrared), modern avionics and ergonomics in a new blank-sheet design and you could produce an aircraft half the size of the A-10, stealthier, quieter, cheaper to operate and maintain, with greater range and endurance and even more effective at everything except direct fire tank-busting.

What are the odds of the Pentagon actually pursuing such an approach? Zero.

Why not make it nuclear fusion powered while we're at it?

 

[cluttonfred]

Sorry, but nothing I suggested is especially out of the ordinary in 2015. Did I misunderstand your point?

 

[RobertWL]

Outside of the hated of anything thats slow and flies low.. You might as well put out a requirement for a flying saucer with a 30mm Avenger Cannon, Fusion power, transporter beams, and fuzzy dice because we'll be lucky if the systems we're developing now make it. So if you're going to dream, dream big.

 

[John21]

That vid on the previous page sure hit me in the gut. :'( I wish the best for the future of the A-10, with these new contracts I'm hoping the Air Force May have gotten over(at-least a little bit), their attempts to prematurely retire the Warthog. I thought it was cool that "call of duty: Advanced warfare gave a homage to the A-10, with a future version serving in the 2060s.

 

[Jeb]

Sorry, but nothing I suggested is especially out of the ordinary in 2015. Did I misunderstand your point?

You're asking for an airframe that's half the size of an A-10, but with more range and endurance (e.g. more fuel), with the Hog's designed-in redundancy (two engines, etc.), and stealthy, which requires internal weapons, and with modern avionics (by which I assume you mean sensors...radar? IR?). Where do you plan to fit all this stuff in a frame that's half the size of the Warthog?

 

[Machdiamond]

I agree with cluttonfred, what he is proposing is completely reasonable.

 

[cluttonfred]

You're asking for an airframe that's half the size of an A-10, but with more range and endurance (e.g. more fuel), with the Hog's designed-in redundancy (two engines, etc.), and stealthy, which requires internal weapons, and with modern avionics (by which I assume you mean sensors...radar? IR?). Where do you plan to fit all this stuff in a frame that's half the size of the Warthog?

Thanks, Luc.

Jeb, the A-10's Avenger cannon alone (including ammunition and feed) weighs over 4,000 lb, plus it can carry 16,000 lb of external stores. A modern version could have 1/4 or the stores capacity and still come out on top, and engines have improve a bit since then as well.

 

[Jeb]

If you say so. I'll look forward to seeing the drawings.

 

[lastdingo]

Look at the Ares if you want a smaller A-10!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zG9LlHcX8lg



No, seriously. Low & slow is not desirable.
It would only provoke the use of many ManPADS - and in light of DIRCM laser beam rider ManPADS.

 

[cluttonfred]

Look at the Ares if you want a smaller A-10!


No, seriously. Low & slow is not desirable.
It would only provoke the use of many ManPADS - and in light of DIRCM laser beam rider ManPADS.

The Ares is probably a little too small, but the principle of a small, agile aircraft making an efficient, low-cost tool and a difficult target is certainly sound. The MANPADS threat is overestimated and, like anything, is a constantly-evolving game of measures and countermeasures.

For context, if this list is correct -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_combat_losses_of_United_States_military_aircraft_since_the_Vietnam_War -- then a total of seven A-10s were shot down between 1991-2011, all but one shot down more recently in Iraq were lost during the 1991 Gulf War against a very high concentration of MANPADS and other air defense systems. One was actually a write off that managed to limp back to a friendly airfield. Two were shot down by MANPADS, two by larger vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft missile systems, and two by unknown ground fire. Only two of the pilots were killed, the rest either managed to crash land or ejected.

Another Wikipedia source -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II#Gulf_War_and_Balkans -- gives the total number of shoot-downs and write-offs as seven, but also notes the following numbers for A-10 operations in the 1991 Gulf War:

The A-10 was used in combat for the first time during the Gulf War in 1991, destroying more than 900 Iraqi tanks, 2,000 other military vehicles and 1,200 artillery pieces.[5] A-10s also shot down two Iraqi helicopters with the GAU-8 cannon. The first of these was shot down by Captain Robert Swain over Kuwait on 6 February 1991, marking the A-10's first air-to-air victory.[77] Four A-10s were shot down during the war, all by surface-to-air missiles. Another three battle-damaged A-10s and OA-10As returned to base but were written off, some sustaining additional damage in crash landings.[78][79] The A-10 had a mission capable rate of 95.7 percent, flew 8,100 sorties, and launched 90 percent of the AGM-65 Maverick missiles fired in the conflict.[80] Shortly after the Gulf War, the Air Force abandoned the idea of replacing the A-10 with a close air support version of the F-16.[81]

Any way you slice it, "low and slow is not desirable" in light of the MANPADS thread does not seem to be a valid argument.

EDITED - Corrected the number of A-10 losses to seven in include one from Iraq in recent years.

 

[lastdingo]

Name an effective countermeasure for a slow aircraft against a laser beam rider missile fired within the engagement envelope.

 

[cluttonfred]

Name an effective countermeasure for a slow aircraft against a laser beam rider missile fired within the engagement envelope.

Hmmm, let's see...optical sensors to detect the incoming lasers, active countermeasures to blind the missile's seeker with a powerful light the same wavelength as the detected laser, a counter-laser to blind the human operator and/or the optical tracker on the launcher, smoke or chaff to block the incoming laser signal and many more exotic solutions that are within the realm of possibility but not yet technically feasible.

The point is that the proponents of high speed, high dollar jet fighters have been predicting the end of low-and-slow ground attack and close air support since the Korean War and have been proven wrong every single time. In Korea, they brought back the Corsair and other WWII fighters, by Vietnam they had to turn to the Skyraider, in the Gulf War the A-10 proved invaluable and continued to do so in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Syria. Are you more likely to get hit by ground fire (small arms, AA guns, SAMs, etc.) in an A-10 doing its job down in the mud than in a fast mover at 20,000 feet? Of course you are. But you are also far more likely to make it home from such a hit in an A-10 than just about anything else. And the A-10 pilots, and the ground troops that owe their lives to them, wouldn't have it any other way.

Read this article and tell me what other aircraft could have accomplished the same mission: http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/466762/bagram-pilots-save-60-soldiers-during-convoy-ambush.aspx

Could we use a worthy modern successor to the A-10? You betcha. But in the meantime, nothing else comes close.

 

[Void]

Even if the losses in the Gulf War were small, the losses suffered by low altitude aircraft still compared very unfavorably to losses suffered by aircraft at higher altitudes. Like it or not it is not politically acceptable in the 21st century to lose manned aircraft, which makes low altitude flight inherently unattractive. Losing even one pilot in a low intensity "stability" mission would potentially endanger the entire mission.

You can bet if an A-10 was shot down flying low over Syria and the pilot ended up "starring" in an ISIS video the politicians who sing the A-10s praises now would make themselves scarce.

 

[jsport]

Even if the losses in the Gulf War were small, the losses suffered by low altitude aircraft still compared very unfavorably to losses suffered by aircraft at higher altitudes. Like it or not it is not politically acceptable in the 21st century to lose manned aircraft, which makes low altitude flight inherently unattractive. Losing even one pilot in a low intensity "stability" mission would potentially endanger the entire mission.

You can bet if an A-10 was shot down flying low over Syria and the pilot ended up "starring" in an ISIS video the politicians who sing the A-10s praises now would make themselves scarce.

been a goin on for awhile there mister.
http://www.stripes.com/news/a-10s-deployed-to-take-on-the-islamic-state-1.316187

 

[kaiserd]

I may have missed the point but haven't modren (Sniper etc) targeting pods all but totally eliminated the need to fly low & slow for any sustained period? And even if they hadn't wouldn't it be suicide anyway?

In that context it more comes down to perception; your own troops may feel more protected and your enemy potentially may feels more threatened because they can see and hear the A10.

Beyond potential changes of behavior by your enemy in such a scenario the A10 is really just like any other medium altitude paveway/jdam carrier, with some trade-off versus a F16 in terms of speed versus endurance (but the latter factor is far more impacted by tanker support rather than differences between the 2 platforms). And in terms of comparison with a F15E or a B1B the A10 doesn't come out well.

To be blunt right now the A10 is a useful CAS asset against opponents with very limited capabilities at shooting back; in that context it still won't be risked at ultra low level because of the threat of a lucky hits with AAA or a shoulder mounted SAM. Hence any advantages versus, say, a F16 will be very limited.

Going forward against any opponent with minimal modren fighters and/or SAM's the A10 rapidly becomes a death trap a kin to a Fairey Battle in 1940. The A10 has served very well but it has been very lucky that its main recent theaters have been very benign in this regard.

Beyond a possible purchase by the US airforce of a small number of turboprop COIN type aircraft like the Super Tucano dedicated for very low intensity conflicts, and/or possible use of the Reaper in a similar role, there will be clearly no new CAS dedicated aircraft for the US forces.
The A10 will be replaced by the F35 with potential for limited numbers of low-cost compliments for the ever reducing list of potential opponents with next to no air defense capabilities.
Talk of new "stealthy" A10's is really embarrassing for all concerned and can only be pandering to politicians and old military men by telling them what they want to hear in a cynical "support the troops" move.

 

[cluttonfred]

While you may be right about the cynical approach to talking about an A-10 successor, I don't think technology has yet arrived to the point where a standoff and/or remotely piloted solution can provide the same response time, flexibility and impact of an A-10 operating over the battlefield. Maybe in 20 years that will be the case, but we're not there yet. And the numbers just don't add up when painting the A-10 as vulnerable. Even if the loss per sortie numbers might appear to favor the fast movers, I am quite sure that the per loss sortie numbers with ordnance delivered on a ground target is better for the A-10.

 

[kaiserd]

While you may be right about the cynical approach to talking about an A-10 successor, I don't think technology has yet arrived to the point where a standoff and/or remotely piloted solution can provide the same response time, flexibility and impact of an A-10 operating over the battlefield. Maybe in 20 years that will be the case, but we're not there yet. And the numbers just don't add up when painting the A-10 as vulnerable. Even if the loss per sortie numbers might appear to favor the fast movers, I am quite sure that the per loss sortie numbers with ordnance delivered on a ground target is better for the A-10.

Hi cluttonfred - I agree that there hasn't been A10 losses to demonstrate its vulnerability (which we all can be happy about).
However as I other posters have noted the A10 would never be allowed to suffer such losses against any sort of half-functioning modren integrated air defense; it would be kept out of the fight entirely.

Even in less threatening scenarios if the adversary ground forces had any effective modern shoulder launched or mobile SAMs the A10's, like all the other tactical jets, would be stuck at medium altitude using their targeting pods and guided stand-off munitions to stay safe.

I think that gets to part of the root for the emotional attachment to the A10; ground troops like that the A10 is vulnerable like they are, has skin in the game and are likely to bleed like they will (or at least more likely to bleed than the more traditional fighter-jocks of F16s etc).

However the reality is that the A10Cs are now far more the medium altitude bomb trucks (slower, slightly longer endurance F16s) than the low altitude gun-attacker its supports like to picture.
That aircraft is good to have but not indispensable, hence the US air force's move to retire.

 

[quellish]

However as I other posters have noted the A10 would never be allowed to suffer such losses against any sort of half-functioning modren integrated air defense; it would be kept out of the fight entirely.

As would any and all other close air support assets.
From "Conditions for Effective CAS" in Joint Publication 3-09.3 "Close Air Support" :

The conditions for effective CAS are: thoroughly trained personnel with well-developed skills, effective planning and integration, effective command and control (C2), air superiority (especially suppression of enemy air defense [SEAD]), target marking and/or acquisition, streamlined and flexible procedures, and appropriate ordnance.

[/size]If you're doing close air support without air superiority, you're setting yourself up for problems - this is why doing so would be against US doctrine.
[size=12pt]

Even in less threatening scenarios if the adversary ground forces had any effective modern shoulder launched or mobile SAMs the A10's, like all the other tactical jets, would be stuck at medium altitude using their targeting pods and guided stand-off munitions to stay safe.

[font=verdana, arial, helvetica, sans-serif]MANPADS and mobile SAMs have been a threat in every combat deployment of the A-10 since DESERT STORM. As far as I know the threat did not result in the A-10s being restricted to medium altitude, and more than one A-10 has taken a missile strike - and made it home.
[/font]

However the reality is that the A10Cs are now far more the medium altitude bomb trucks (slower, slightly longer endurance F16s) than the low altitude gun-attacker its supports like to picture.
That aircraft is good to have but not indispensable, hence the US air force's move to retire.

No, the reality is that the A-10 crews spend much of their time coordinating between air and ground (JTAC) assets. They carry rockets to mark targets. They coordinate air assets and deconflict aircraft and ordinance.


And when it comes to being "bomb trucks", their survivability enables to do so under the weather and often closer to the enemy than other platforms. In Afghanistan the A-10 at low altitude is often quieter than helicopters.

 

[TomS]

In Gulf War 1, A-10s started out using low-level tactics but that ended quite quickly and they spent most of the air war up over 8000 feet. They only got the OK to go back down low when the ground war kicked off and they were tasked with actual CAS for forces in contact.

But of course technology has changed quite a lot since 1991.

 

[Triton]

The MANPAD and mobile SAM argument to retire the A-10 doesn't make much sense when General Welsh states that the United States Air Force needs a low-threat CAS platform in the near future. What can the notional A-X do that the A-10 can't? Why can't the A-10 be part of the F-35A low/high mix?

 

[quellish]

In Gulf War 1, A-10s started out using low-level tactics but that ended quite quickly and they spent most of the air war up over 8000 feet. They only got the OK to go back down low when the ground war kicked off and they were tasked with actual CAS for forces in contact.

But of course technology has changed quite a lot since 1991.

The medium altitude rule during DESERT STORM applied to nearly all allied aircraft after the opening days of the war. The primary threat to aircraft at that point was a wall of (unguided) lead at low altitude - but allied aircraft could operate without interference at higher altitudes. Some units still wanted to execute missions at low level - because their aircraft or weapons were optimized for it, etc. - thus the rule.

 

[TomS]

Right. And back then, the A-10 needed to get down low to be most effective. Not so much anymore. It helps for some things, but its not as essential as it used to be.

 

[DrRansom]

I wonder what the affect of the last three US wars occurring in good weather countries has had on the CAS debate.

If it is cloudy, then how does high altitude CAS work?

 

[Void]

been a goin on for awhile there mister.
http://www.stripes.com/news/a-10s-deployed-to-take-on-the-islamic-state-1.316187

You misunderstood what I said. But I'll bite anyways.

I don't see anything about A-10s flying low altitude CAS missions over contested Syrian air space in that story.

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/02/12/Air-Force-confirms-use-of-A-10-in-limited-strikes-in-Syria/4051423769062/

Range was an issue, Carlisle said, "because it's a long way from where they're stationed." But speed is also a problem in what the general called a "contested environment," where the A-10 is "significantly more vulnerable" than other aircraft, such as the F-22, F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighters. "A Jordanian got shot down in Syria -- which was tragic -- and so that is a contested environment," he said, referring to F-16 pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh, who was burned alive by his IS captors earlier this year.
"There's been parts of the country that are more contested than others," Carlisle said. "There's not a line where we say, you know, don't go here. There's operational planning, and we use assets to the best of their ability."

So yes the A-10 is being used... but in a way that is conscious of its limitations in contested air space; the USAF is evidently conscious of how big a disaster it would be for the mission if a US pilot ended up burning in a cage no matter how remote that risk is.

 

[cluttonfred]

That a jet jockey (F-15 pilot in this case) and proponent of fast movers, Herbert J. "Hawk" Carlisle, head of Air Combat Command, downplays the utility of the A-10 is not exactly a black mark, it's what you expect to hear given the source, like asking your electric company for advice about gas stoves.

 

[quellish]

I wonder what the affect of the last three US wars occurring in good weather countries has had on the CAS debate.

If it is cloudy, then how does high altitude CAS work?

Afghanistan certainly has wether, and visual CAS flies under it when possible.

 

[kaiserd]

In the context of the discussions about the A10 I think it is important to think about the wars the US will allow itself to fight in the future.

Do you honestly think that any US president (or any party) will have any appetite to fight committed but somewhat unequipped opponents like, say, an ISIS, with troops on the ground? An even if they wanted to would the US military and political apparatus allow them to so?

Imagine what would happen to any captured troops. Worse than what was inflicted on that poor Jordanian pilot, 1 a day , for weeks on end.

Hence the unreality of scenarios where the A10 comes in low, and damn the risks!
Not only would there be no will to put the A10 and its pilot at such risk, there won't be the will to put troops given the much higher risk for them - hence no troops for the A10 to provide what is presented (somewhat inaccurately) as its unique support.

I am aware that countries do not always get to choose the wars they fight but I assume there would be broad agreement that;
- A risk-adverse airstrikes only (including ever increasing uses of UCAVs) and "supporting" local forces appears to be the only likely palatable model going forward for lower-intensity conflicts
- Need for increasing emphasis on preparation for near peer-to-peer conflicts as potential opponents (China, Russia, their clients and customers) inevitably eat in to the US's military dominance.

Hence for the former type of conflict the A10 would not be in a position to use/demonstrate its unique capabilities (a F16 would be as good if not better within the parameters they would both be used) while for the latter type of conflict the A10 would be an embarrassing liability that just couldn't be used.
Interestingly the same logic could call into question the scope of the utility of US attack helicopters.

 

[LowObservable]

MANPADS are not (so far) a huge threat to fast-jet aircraft, which is why tactical jets don't carry DIRCM. They have MAWS and flares can can evade. Whether this will change with the latest generations (SA-24 and SA-XX Verba and Chinese equivalents) remains to be seen.


From my discussions of OIF/OEF CAS operations over the years, the main influence on operating altitude is the ability to orbit and keep sensors on target. Obviously an FJ has a certain turning circle at the sort of G level that leaves the pilot able to to complex targeting, which means you can't be at 500 feet. Effective sensor range sets a ceiling. So in those cases the A-10's smaller turn radius can be an advantage. The big deal, however, is persistence - A-10s are good at staying on station. Unless you're holding on the ground and need to react quickly over a significant distance (which is what you do in some areas) that's a useful advantage.


The A-10's vulnerability is that it is (by USAF standards) a small standalone fleet. Hence the USAF's desire to get rid of it and move experienced people (maintainers particularly) into the FJ force, to compensate for the vast sucking sound made by a growing force of complex and non-operational jets with a broken logistics system.

 

[DrRansom]

One thing I wonder is why did the USAF send the A-10's to Europe, as opposed to another ground attack squadron. (E.g. F-16s)

Is it force availability or something specific to the A-10 and European theater?

 

[lastdingo]

Name an effective countermeasure for a slow aircraft against a laser beam rider missile fired within the engagement envelope.

Hmmm, let's see...optical sensors to detect the incoming lasers, active countermeasures to blind the missile's seeker with a powerful light the same wavelength as the detected laser, a counter-laser to blind the human operator and/or the optical tracker on the launcher, smoke or chaff to block the incoming laser signal and many more exotic solutions that are within the realm of possibility but not yet technically feasible.

Laser warners don't work because laser beam riders don't need to illuminate the target - the aimpoint can be held off-axis for most of the missile's flight (it even enlarges the engagement envelope). A mere warning is of little consequence within the engagement envelope anyway, since particularly slow aircraft cannot dodge well.

Active countermeasures don't affect laser beam riders because their laser detector looks BACKWARDS (you don't seem to know the entire concept). There's no tell-tale signature giving away the location of the operator either - unless you observe the launch itself, which is going to be near-impossible with modern low signature solid rocket fuels.

Smoke and chaff cannot block the incoming laser signal because once again, it's not about a laser reaching the target, but the laser reaching the missile.

You didn't mention ECM against the proximity fuze, but one of the most famous laser beam rider missiles (Starstreak) uses none such anyway - neither IR nor RF based.

In short: Laser beam riding guidance is considered de facto immune to all known soft kill countermeasures. It's restricted by weather, line of sight and in range, but none of this is a problem for VShorAD or ShorAD unless one assumes ground attack with radar sensors or geographic coordinates only.


edit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beam_riding#Laser_beam_riding

 

[DrRansom]

Wasn't ADATs a laser beam-rider to be almost immune to ECCM?

 

[LowObservable]

Further to the above: If you're at the next threat level up, which is something like Pantsyr, everything is in trouble until the GBAD is put out of action.