Cold Warriors: The Essex Class in the Cold War

[CV12Hornet]

(Btw, why was SCB-125 limited to 15 - or 16 - Essex when a few more hulls were available ? how about pushing the upgrade number to 20 ?)

Because only 15 Essexes were upgraded to SCB-27 standards and the ones that weren't didn't need angled decks - Franklin and Bunker Hill had been sitting in reserve and no one knew what to do with them; Leyte, Tarawa, and Philippine Sea were converted to CVS work instead; Boxer, Princeton, and Valley Forge were acting as LPHs; and Antietam had gotten an angled deck as a testbed.

Only 15 Essexes were upgraded to SCB-27 standards because the USN didn't think it needed more than that. The 9 SCB-27As were upgraded as part of the 12-carrier goal pre-Korea; post-Korea the 6 SCB-27Cs were tacked on so that, with the Midways, Forrestals, and first two Kitty Hawks they could form the 15-ship attack carrier force pending construction of nuclear carriers.

 

[Rule of cool]

At the time Midway started her SB-101.66 the F-111B had not yet been cancelled, so VFX hadn't even been started.

When FDR started her SCB-103.68 the F-111B had been cancelled, but the RFP for VFX was only issued in July - the same month work began on FDR.

So it would have taken an earlier assessment of the F-111B as "too big & heavy for the Midways".


VFAX was originally for a low-cost complement to the F-111B (to replace the only F-4 Phantom, as the A-7 was just entering production), but with the USN not liking the F-111B it grew in size and complexity - eventually being redefined to the VFX specification that produced the F-14.

No RFP for VFAX was ever issued before the program shifted to an F-111B replacement.


VFAX was revived in the 1970s for a F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair replacement, but that is out of the scope of something the Midway class modernizations could be planned around.

I don't know about anyone else, but I rarely think about the the symbiotic relationship between carriers and their planes in the USN the way I do for the RN and every other carrier operator. The USN has huge, fast ships, powerful catapults, heaps of planes and therefore no problems.

But here's a problem, from late 1962 to mid 1968 the future of USN carrier fighters was the F111B. Until the VFAX idea was floated in about 1966 without the F111B a carrier would only be able to operate fighters until the F4 left front-line service, which the F111B was planned to make happen.

By extension if the Midways aren't refitted to operate the F111B then after far as people in the 1960s were concerned these ships were only useful until the late 70s or so. Cancelling the F111B and merging the FDAF and VFAX into the VFX and selecting the (awesome) F14 doesn't really solve this problem; IIUC the F14 needed similar carrier capabilities to the F111B.

It wasn't until about 1973 with the resurrection of the VFAX and linking it to the USAF LWF that the C11-1 catapult equipped CS and FDR would have a fighter in their future, with the caveat that IIUC only 2 USN F4 sqns converted to Hornets. Of course by then it was almost too late for the FDR, her refit removed the waist C11-2 without replacement, but the CS with her 3 x C11-1 could soldier on with USMC F18 fighter sqns.

In a related note, the much improved TF41 powered A7E appeared just as the FDAF and VFAX were being merged into the more 'pure fighter' VFX. I suspect this re-baseline of the light attack capability removed the urgency from any attack requirement in the VFAX, allowing it to become the VFX and kick the 'attack' can down the road to be sorted out at a later date.

 

[Pioneer]

The FJ-4B was in front-line service until 1962 (year of its last carrier deployment, aboard USS Hancock CVA-19), and with the reserves for a few more years.

A radar-equipped night fighter version of the two-seat F9F-8T (TF-9J after Nov 1962) was proposed by Grumman in 1955. It was to have carried an AN/APQ-50 radar and was to have been equipped with an all-missile armament. However, the performance was considered insufficient to warrant production.

In 1961, Grumman proposed a modernized version of the F9F-8T with updated systems and a Pratt & Whitney J52 turbojet in place of the J48. However, the Navy selected the Douglas TA-4F instead, and the updated two-seat Cougar project was abandoned.

Now, what would replacing the Pratt & Whitney J48-P-8A turbojet (rated at 7,250 lb.s.t. dry and 8,500 lb.s.t. with water injection for take-off only) with a Pratt & Whitney J52-P-8A turbojet (rated at 9,300 lb.s.t) or even a J52-P-6A (8,500 lb.s.t. dry) do for performance (climb rate, top speed, etc)?

I have a good idea what the lower fuel consumption (.86 lb fuel/lb thrust/hr vs 1.16 lbf/lbt/hr for the J48) would do for its range... and fitting it with the APQ-50, allowing it to find a place aboard CVSs for CAP - that might perhaps allow it to continue in deployed service long after its historic 1959 withdrawal to reserve squadrons (where the historic F-9Js & AF-9Js [F9F-8Bs] served just as long as the AF-1Es [FJ-4Bs]).

Sorry, but revisting this previous post, and I apologise, a little off topic, but given the issues/concerns of safely with not being able to operate the two-seater Douglas TA-4G Skyhawk from the RAN's carrier HMAS Melbourne (Majestic-class). Do you think a 'hypothetical' two-seat night fighter derivative of the F9F-8T would be able to operate from HMAS Melbourne?

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Archibald]

I don't know about anyone else, but I rarely think about the the symbiotic relationship between carriers and their planes in the USN the way I do for the RN and every other carrier operator. The USN has huge, fast ships, powerful catapults, heaps of planes and therefore no problems.

But here's a problem, from late 1962 to mid 1968 the future of USN carrier fighters was the F111B. Until the VFAX idea was floated in about 1966 without the F111B a carrier would only be able to operate fighters until the F4 left front-line service, which the F111B was planned to make happen.

By extension if the Midways aren't refitted to operate the F111B then after far as people in the 1960s were concerned these ships were only useful until the late 70s or so. Cancelling the F111B and merging the FDAF and VFAX into the VFX and selecting the (awesome) F14 doesn't really solve this problem; IIUC the F14 needed similar carrier capabilities to the F111B.

It wasn't until about 1973 with the resurrection of the VFAX and linking it to the USAF LWF that the C11-1 catapult equipped CS and FDR would have a fighter in their future, with the caveat that IIUC only 2 USN F4 sqns converted to Hornets. Of course by then it was almost too late for the FDR, her refit removed the waist C11-2 without replacement, but the CS with her 3 x C11-1 could soldier on with USMC F18 fighter sqns.

In a related note, the much improved TF41 powered A7E appeared just as the FDAF and VFAX were being merged into the more 'pure fighter' VFX. I suspect this re-baseline of the light attack capability removed the urgency from any attack requirement in the VFAX, allowing it to become the VFX and kick the 'attack' can down the road to be sorted out at a later date.

And that's the reasons that make the Mirage G almost perfect for the first VFAX. It has the VG wing and the TF30 (minus the god awful compressor stalls), which make it de facto a smaller brother to the F-111B and Tomcat. It weighed 15 mt to 20 mt and could touchdown at 108 kt, as verified during its trials. It was a two seater like the F-111B, Tomcat or Phantom. It's TF306E provided 10300 kg of thrust.

And we know from Liébert & Buyck that both Dassault and the USN realized this, circa 1967-1969... the Mirage G almost got its "international test squadron" similar to the P.1127 a few years before. The USN wanted three airframe to be intensively flight tested at Patuxent.

Unfortunately, the VFAX / VFX-1 / VFX-2 chain of events is not favorable to Mirage G. While VFAX was to be a low end to the F-111B (and thus the Mirage G might fit) VFX-1 & VFX-2 was a different story... it became "Tomcat with TF30" ( = VFX-1) then "Tomcat with better engine" (= VFX-2).

Bottom line: after the F-111B disaster, top emergency was the Tomcat, because "air defense of the fleet".
The "VFAX low-end" to it was put on the backburner until 1971, when SecDef found than an all-Tomcat USN & USMC fighter fleet would just be eye-watering expensive. This got VFAX back the next year, only to be whacked by NATF, that is "pick your LWF from the USAF one: YF-16 or YF-17". The end result, of course, being the Hornet and its, eeeerhm, controversial range.

So the windows of opportunity for the Mirage G (taken from Friedman "Fighters over the fleet") would be
1- VFAX the first: 1965 to F-111B canellation
2- VFAX the second: 1971-1973

As far as the Mirage G is concerned unfortunately it has the timing all wrong (the lone plane flew from November 1967 to January 1971)

 

[Rule of cool]

Sorry, but revisting this previous post, and I apologise, a little off topic, but given the issues/concerns of safely with not being able to operate the two-seater Douglas TA-4G Skyhawk from the RAN's carrier HMAS Melbourne (Majestic-class). Do you think a 'hypothetical' two-seat night fighter derivative of the F9F-8T would be able to operate from HMAS Melbourne?

Regards
Pioneer

I think the TA4G could physically operate from Melbourne, but with only 2-4 available the RAN didn't want to risk crashing them. Instead they organised the training syllabus so A4G pilots first landed on Melbourne in the far more numerous single seaters.

 

[Pioneer]

I think the TA4G could physically operate from Melbourne, but with only 2-4 available the RAN didn't want to risk crashing them. Instead they organised the training syllabus so A4G pilots first landed on Melbourne in the far more numerous single seaters.

Thanks mate!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[BlackBat242]

Sorry, but revisting this previous post, and I apologise, a little off topic, but given the issues/concerns of safely with not being able to operate the two-seater Douglas TA-4G Skyhawk from the RAN's carrier HMAS Melbourne (Majestic-class). Do you think a 'hypothetical' two-seat night fighter derivative of the F9F-8T would be able to operate from HMAS Melbourne?

Regards
Pioneer

Yes, it would do well I think. The F9F-6/8 Cougars operated just fine from the Lake Champlain CVA-39 in 1955 (she got SCB-27A August 1950-September 1952 - she was redesignated CVS-39 in August 1957). The swept-wing Cougar was considered easier to operate from carriers than the straight-wing F9F-2/5 Panthers.

This was a straight-deck carrier with H-8 hydraulic catapults that were about the same end-speed for the same weight as the BS4 catapult on Melbourne - but over a longer run (190' vs 104'), so the airframe structure around the catapult bridle fittings would likely need to be strengthened for the faster rate of acceleration of the BS4.

The F9F-8T (TF-9J from 1962) operated just fine from any Essex class carrier for many a year, and with a J52 its take-off, climb, altitude, and speed would improve appreciably.


The real issue with the TA-4F and Melbourne was that the RAN did not accept that in the event of a missed wire bolter that there was enough angle deck run for the elevators of the TA-4G (RAN version of the TA-4F) to bring the nose (longer and heavier than for the single-seat A-4G) back up to provide lift while the aircraft re-accelerated to flying speed.

This seems strange to me, as the "last wire to angle front edge" distance of Melbourne was 315" and that of the SCB-125 Essexes was 300'... and the USN flew TA-4Js (lightened -Fs with a lower-power engine) from US Lexington CVT-16 (AVT-16 from 1978) from 1969 to 1991!

Perhaps it was a difference in "acceptable risk" standards of the two navies.
The 7-knot difference in ship max speed in favor of the Essex class might have something to do with it as well.


Here are photos of the night-fighter test F9F-8T 146425 with APQ-89 at Armitage Field, NWC China Lake 14 Sept 1961:








However, when the RAN brought HMAS Vengeance back to the UK in 1956 to pick up the just-completed HMAS Melbourne (the whole crew just walked off one carrier and on to the other) they also picked up 39 De Havilland FAW-53 Sea Venoms - so they already had a capable 2-seat night fighter. The Cougar might be more maneuverable, but I'm not sure.

The F9F-8T night fighter lost all of its cannon in gaining the radar (its only air-air weapon was to be 4 AIM-9 Sidewinders) - the FAW-53 had 4 x 20mm cannons and 8 unguided rockets.

Fitting Sea Venoms for AIM-9s would be a lot easier than making a gun pod for the Cougars (or adding a fairing for 1 or 2 x 20mm cannon) and dealing with whatever flight changes that would introduce.









One AIM-9 per rack would do just fine - 4 to match the Cougar's load:

 

[Pioneer]

Yes, it would do well I think. The F9F-6/8 Cougars operated just fine from the Lake Champlain CVA-39 in 1955 (she got SCB-27A August 1950-September 1952 - she was redesignated CVS-39 in August 1957). The swept-wing Cougar was considered easier to operate from carriers than the straight-wing F9F-2/5 Panthers.

This was a straight-deck carrier with H-8 hydraulic catapults that were about the same end-speed for the same weight as the BS4 catapult on Melbourne - but over a longer run (190' vs 104'), so the airframe structure around the catapult bridle fittings would likely need to be strengthened for the faster rate of acceleration of the BS4.

The F9F-8T (TF-9J from 1962) operated just fine from any Essex class carrier for many a year, and with a J52 its take-off, climb, altitude, and speed would improve appreciably.


The real issue with the TA-4F and Melbourne was that the RAN did not accept that in the event of a missed wire bolter that there was enough angle deck run for the elevators of the TA-4G (RAN version of the TA-4F) to bring the nose (longer and heavier than for the single-seat A-4G) back up to provide lift while the aircraft re-accelerated to flying speed.

This seems strange to me, as the "last wire to angle front edge" distance of Melbourne was 315" and that of the SCB-125 Essexes was 300'... and the USN flew TA-4Js (lightened -Fs with a lower-power engine) from US Lexington CVT-16 (AVT-16 from 1978) from 1969 to 1991!

Perhaps it was a difference in "acceptable risk" standards of the two navies.
The 7-knot difference in ship max speed in favor of the Essex class might have something to do with it as well.


Here are photos of the night-fighter test F9F-8T 146425 with APQ-89 at Armitage Field, NWC China Lake 14 Sept 1961:

View attachment 732648

View attachment 732649

View attachment 732650


However, when the RAN brought HMAS Vengeance back to the UK in 1956 to pick up the just-completed HMAS Melbourne (the whole crew just walked off one carrier and on to the other) they also picked up 39 De Havilland FAW-53 Sea Venoms - so they already had a capable 2-seat night fighter. The Cougar might be more maneuverable, but I'm not sure.

The F9F-8T night fighter lost all of its cannon in gaining the radar (its only air-air weapon was to be 4 AIM-9 Sidewinders) - the FAW-53 had 4 x 20mm cannons and 8 unguided rockets.

Fitting Sea Venoms for AIM-9s would be a lot easier than making a gun pod for the Cougars (or adding a fairing for 1 or 2 x 20mm cannon) and dealing with whatever flight changes that would introduce.

View attachment 732652

View attachment 732653

View attachment 732654

View attachment 732655

One AIM-9 per rack would do just fine - 4 to match the Cougar's load:

View attachment 732657

View attachment 732658

Thanks heaps BlacBat242, very helpful, informative and encouraging!

Regards
Pioneer

 

[James1978]

Eh, Victorious and Midway were botched in very different ways. Victorious was botched because it took way too long, cost way too much, all for a ship way too small and incapable. Midway was botched because the ship was genuinely unsafe afterward.

Can you expand on the unsafe bit?

 

[SSgtC]

Can you expand on the unsafe bit?

The enlarged flight deck and expanded blisters made her horrifyingly unstable in any kind of a sea. It was so bad that it was predicted that if she rolled more than 24 degrees, she would keep going and end up capsizing. In 88, she damn near did capsize in the Sea of Japan when she rolled 26 degrees during a storm. There were very real concerns about her stability following her 101.66 refit.

 

[Rule of cool]

IIUC the Midway had a permanent list after her 101 refit, which is less than ideal.

 

[SSgtC]

IIUC the Midway had a permanent list after her 101 refit, which is less than ideal.

That's not great, but not awful either. The Nimitz class all also had permanent lists

 

[_Del_]

My recollections (and I am hardly an expert on this subject, and am always happy to learn more) was that the complaints were mostly that Midway's flight deck and hanger deck needed to be closer to the water than on the Essex class for stability reasons, and that working forward on the open bow areas in any heavy seas resulted in very wet decks with sea spray. They got hurricane bows and blisters in one of the 50's retire and it was considered adequate, though not great, stability-wise. The later refit in '86 was the one that greatly increased the GM and gave her the pronounced stability problems and nickname.

The above is just my recollection, but I'm wondering if some of the history is getting conflated (and, also, how adequate my memory is!).


She seemed quite stable when I was on deck (in harbour, moored as a museum ship)

 

[_Del_]

Went fishing for pics of water over the bow and found these among a host of others at the following website: https://midwaysailor.com/midway1980/rocknroll.html

Following from the infamous typhoon incident:

 

[uk 75]

If there had been no Vietnam War would the Essex class have received Vikings and Seakings in the 70s?
If they had, would the US Navy have gone on to order new ASW carriers?

 

[Rule of cool]

I'm wondering if some of the history is getting conflated

It often does, because countries often have multiple goes at the same thing. For example there were 2 VFAX programmes, only a few years apart.

 

[SSgtC]

If there had been no Vietnam War would the Essex class have received Vikings and Seakings in the 70s?
If they had, would the US Navy have gone on to order new ASW carriers?

More than likely. The Viking was designed specifically for operation off the Essex class with their folding vertical stabilizer.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If there had been no Vietnam War would the Essex class have received Vikings and Seakings in the 70s?
If they had, would the US Navy have gone on to order new ASW carriers?

More than likely. The Viking was designed specifically for operation off the Essex class with their folding vertical stabilizer.

At one point the USN wanted 15 CVA & 6 CVS in 1975. IIRC from Friedman each CVS was to have 20 Vikings and the 187 S-3As bought were to have been sufficient to support a front-line of 120 in 12 squadrons of 10.

The 6 CVS would have been SCB.27C Essex class ships and/or a new class of CVS designated SCB.100. The Essex class would have been ex-CVAs which became CVSs as more super carriers joined the fleet. However, one of the reasons why that didn't happen was that the the SCB-27C Essexes wore out faster than expected due to their Vietnam War service.

Whether Congress would have provided the money if the Vietnam War hadn't happened is another matter.

 

[Rule of cool]

At one point the USN wanted 15 CVA & 6 CVS in 1975. IIRC from Friedman each CVS was to have 20 Vikings and the 187 S-3As bought were to have been sufficient to support a front-line of 120 in 12 squadrons of 10.

The 6 CVS would have been SCB.27C Essex class ships and/or a new class of CVS designated SCB.100. The Essex class would have been ex-CVAs which became CVSs as more super carriers joined the fleet. However, one of the reasons why that didn't happen was that the the SCB-27C Essexes wore out faster than expected due to their Vietnam War service.

Whether Congress would have provided the money if the Vietnam War hadn't happened is another matter.

Do you know when this was the plan? Its interesting how plans evolve and interact with emerging technologies and the like.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Do you know when this was the plan? Its interesting how plans evolve and interact with emerging technologies and the like.

The 1960s. I can't be more specific without re-reading my notes.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Do you know when this was the plan? Its interesting how plans evolve and interact with emerging technologies and the like.

IIRC (I've written this umpteen times here & on alternatehisory.com) the P-3 Orion made the CVS force obsolete in its existing role, but they found a new role, which was providing an A/S screen for the attack carriers, whose speed had made them invulnerable to attack by Soviet diesel-electric submarines but were vulnerable to attack by the growing number of Soviet nuclear powered submarines. Six were required to allow two to be forward deployed at all times, one in the Mediterranean and one in the western Pacific.

 

[Rule of cool]

The 1960s. I can't be more specific without re-reading my notes.

That'd be right, the US had some gnarly plans in the 50s and 60s. At one point they were going to build and Enterprise class CVAN every FY, they every 2nd FY, but when they actually laid down the ship it was the conventionally powered USS America.

 

[isayyo2]

That'd be right, the US had some gnarly plans in the 50s and 60s. At one point they were going to build and Enterprise class CVAN every FY, they every 2nd FY, but when they actually laid down the ship it was the conventionally powered USS America.

From our Alt 60s US Navy thread, which definitely needs to be revitalized

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/alt-60s-us-navy.37487/#post-466429

 

[BlackBat242]

Went fishing for pics of water over the bow and found these among a host of others at the following website: https://midwaysailor.com/midway1980/rocknroll.html

Following from the infamous typhoon incident:

The top two were in the north Pacific... which can get pretty gnarly.

Just to provide perspective for the pics above... here is CVA-62 Independence in a bit of a storm in the east Atlantic in 1977 - a bit larger ship whose flight deck is considerable higher above the sea:

 

[BlackBat242]

Of course, even the Med isn't always peaceful... here is Midway off Sicily in 1949:

 

[isayyo2]

Since this thread is such a fantastic collection of minds, I thought I would ask my niche question here...

Why weren't more KC-135B models ordered?
In 1961, 17 TF33-P-9 (no thrust reverser) tankers and 30 freighters were ordered with their freighters arriving not long after in 1962 and the tankers in 1964. The 17 KC-135Bs were ordered to serve as SAC's Airborne Command Post or "Looking Glass" role. The "B" model had improved performance and range from the turbofans, as well as the ability to receive fuel as well to sustain the 24-hour airborne alert mission. In 1965 the KC-135Bs were re-designated as EC-135Cs, and the C-135B fleet, with their prized turbofans, was slowly scattered across many, many specialized roles.

Discounting their specialized command post role, the KC-135B had similar performance of the later KC-135E but some 20-years earlier. I am now baffled that TF33 powered tankers did not appear en-masse during the 1960s with their enhanced performance so evident.

 

[SSgtC]

Since this thread is such a fantastic collection of minds, I thought I would ask my niche question here...

Why weren't more KC-135B models ordered?
In 1961, 17 TF33-P-9 (no thrust reverser) tankers and 30 freighters were ordered with their freighters arriving not long after in 1962 and the tankers in 1964. The 17 KC-135Bs were ordered to serve as SAC's Airborne Command Post or "Looking Glass" role. The "B" model had improved performance and range from the turbofans, as well as the ability to receive fuel as well to sustain the 24-hour airborne alert mission. In 1965 the KC-135Bs were re-designated as EC-135Cs, and the C-135B fleet, with their prized turbofans, was slowly scattered across many, many specialized roles.

Discounting their specialized command post role, the KC-135B had similar performance of the later KC-135E but some 20-years earlier. I am now baffled that TF33 powered tankers did not appear en-masse during the 1960s with their enhanced performance so evident.

My guess would be, at least partially, due to how quickly they were being built by Boeing. Boeing built 732 of them between June, 1957 and January, 1965. Basically, Boeing was cranking out 100+ tankers a year for the Air Force. And they were seen as being an extremely high priority aircraft to support SAC. So I would say that the official reason is that Boeing was ordered not to do anything that would slow production. Kind of a, "perfect is the enemy of good" situation. Better to have a good enough tanker now, than a perfect tanker in 3 years.

And timing would be my other guess. The TF33/JT4D didn't enter service until 1961, or roughly halfway through the KC-135s production run. By that point, having a common airframe and engine was probably seen as a better option than having the increased fuel efficiency of the turbofan.

But eventually, the TF33 was used on the Stratotanker. The KC-135E was reengined with JT4Ds taken off of retired commercial 707s. In all, the Air Force converted over 100 KC-135s to use them. IIRC, the Air Force was the biggest buyer of retiring 707s in the world in order to use them as a spare parts source for the -135 fleet (and as an engine source for both the -135 and B-52).

 

[BlackBat242]

In all, the Air Force converted over 100 KC-135s to use them. IIRC, the Air Force was the biggest buyer of retiring 707s in the world in order to use them as a spare parts source for the -135 fleet (and as an engine source for both the -135 and B-52).

Not to mention the various C-137 variants (designation for 707s in US military service).

 

[Rule of cool]

The TF33/JT4D didn't enter service until 1961, or roughly halfway through the KC-135s production run. By that point, having a common airframe and engine was probably seen as a better option than having the increased fuel efficiency of the turbofan.

This would be my guess. Especially since the military flies it's aircraft a lot less than airlines do so fuel economy is somewhat less important.

 

[Archibald]

The KC-135As were badly underpowered, this caused a few accidents notably in hot climates. Long takeoff runs: but then again, they flew out of SAC runways build for B-36s and B-47s: some of them 13 000 ft long if not more. So maybe they could tolerate KC-135A lack of thrust. Also water injection helped, at the cost of ferrying loads of distillated water at every SAC / tanker base.