No doubt Russians have the technical and economic capabilities to build several carriers even in the Ford class. The point is they do not have anywhere a surface fleet to be deployed around them and that itself is an effort far more expensive and resource intensive that the construction of few very large ships. There are no active programs to build any surface combatant larger than a frigate. I can see one or two midsize STOBAR in a two decade timeframe but nothing more and mainly as a propaganda and prestige tool more than an asset with a defined strategic role.

I would mostly agree.
Russia, as befits the world's largest country, has always been a land-based power, and latterly of course, aviation.
Only under Gorshkov in the old USSR was the navy really ramped up, if one excludes the ever present impressive submarine component.

I do believe, however, that there would be a real life role for a couple of Russian carriers in the future.
We live in a world where resources are finite, where bulk trade and goods movement happens mostly at sea.
There is certainly space for a Russian expeditionary or deterrent force, overseen and protected by a carrier, to protect their interests.
This does not mean large multiple carrier led fleets as the US operates, or presumably where China is headed.
I think the cost/benefit of that makes no sense for Russia.
But 2 midsize carriers, say, probably does make sense for Russia in the future. Yes, for prestige, but also for the potential to influence, and project in a limited fashion. A single carrier escorted by a couple of Gorshkovs, perhaps a cruiser, one of the large Universal Amphibious Assault ships now being constructed, and a SSN as an expeditionary force would be quite achievable in the future, and not break the bank.
In fact, they have nearly all that now, sans the Assault Ships still in construction.

In my humble opinion, it is this very same reasoning why they are busy building the two 40 000t Amphibious flat decks laid down in the first place.
Russia doesn't have as many airbases scattered around the globe as the US does, for example.

A carrier led force doesn't necessarily have to be designed for carrier fleet vs carrier fleet ala the Pacific War in WW2.

So I am mostly in agreement with you.
 
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Every year in the 80s the Reagan Administration started publishing a glossy book called "Soviet Military Power" with rather badly drawn images of Russian weapons derived from satellite photos.
It routinely warned of the impending arrival of a genuine carrier to follow on from the Kievs which were seen as more heavily armed versions of the Brits' Invincibles.
The Chinese and Russian navies are as far away from deploying even a Midway sized carrier with cats, traps and strike aircraft as the Sovs were in the 80s.
To some extent as land powers this is quite understandable. Neither have any experience of modern naval combat on the high seas.
The USN and its key allies have worked together in realistic exercises and in some cases combat for seventy years! Carrier air power with actual carriers has played a key role throughout these years.
China's rulers are keen to acquire the clout that their economic progress over the last 25 years has earnt them. I dont think that a few air capable ships is too much to begrudge them. And the West's over 50 SSNs at sea have to have something to try and sink.
 
Well, the Kuznetsov was laid down in 1982, and her sister ship in 1985.
The larger catapult equipped follow on design, the 85 000 tonne Ulyanovsk, was ordered in 1986, and laid down in 1988.
So, in fairness, the warnings of an impending proper carrier fleet were correct, as nobody could foretell then that the USSR was going to collapse before completion.

I agree that China's economic rise, coupled with its role as a raw material importer and finished product exporter, all but assures the rise of their navy onto a global stage, which means multiple carriers.
 
What I find interesting is that the Soviets laid down 2 Kuznetsov carriers.
This was followed by the larger, catapult equipped Ulyanovsk.
So the Kuznetsovs in my mind were, as others have stated above, a very sensible stepping stone that would probably then have been eventually relegated to either training or fleet support roles.

China is mimicking this plan exactly and precisely so far.
2 Kuznetsov types, and now a larger follow on catapult equipped carrier.
I guess it's a sensible way to go about it.
 
One carrier does not a fleet make... (ok the RN and French Navies now make do with only one but they have built more).
I am not sure that it was just the end of the Cold War that killed off Ulyanovsk. The submarine lobby in Russia as in the RN knew how vulnerable carriers were to being disabled.. You dont need to sink a carrier just prevent it flying its airgroup.
 
I'm aware Russia is preserving its ability to build and maintain such ships; I posted the dry dock under construction that will handle the refit (I suspect the picture is old and the doc is largely complete now). I however have little faith in a follow on class after Kuznetsov, even a singular replacement. I'm also not going to assume Kuznetsov re-enters service (though clearly that is the intent at the moment) based on the very protracted refit of the cruiser Nakimov. Aircraft carriers seem to very much be a prestige project for Russia compared to much more functional nuclear submarines of several types being built, and as such I'd be surprised if refit of Kuz wasn't the first spending cut should priorities change. As I said, time will tell.
 
From a selfish Western perspective I would quite like the Russians to get Kuznetzov back into service and even build a new class of carrier.
Operating such a ship in international waters gives Russia a sense of self esteem independent of the regime that runs it. Tracking and interacting with the ship and its airgroup is the best training our and other countries' forces can get.
And then who knows one day she may operate with us in a UN or other multilateral ops.
 
No doubt Russians have the technical and economic capabilities to build several carriers even in the Ford class. The point is they do not have anywhere a surface fleet to be deployed around them and that itself is an effort far more expensive and resource intensive that the construction of few very large ships. There are no active programs to build any surface combatant larger than a frigate. I can see one or two midsize STOBAR in a two decade timeframe but nothing more and mainly as a propaganda and prestige tool more than an asset with a defined strategic role.

I would mostly agree.
Russia, as befits the world's largest country, has always been a land-based power, and latterly of course, aviation.
Only under Gorshkov in the old USSR was the navy really ramped up, if one excludes the ever present impressive submarine component.

I do believe, however, that there would be a real life role for a couple of Russian carriers in the future.
We live in a world where resources are finite, where bulk trade and goods movement happens mostly at sea.
There is certainly space for a Russian expeditionary or deterrent force, overseen and protected by a carrier, to protect their interests.
This does not mean large multiple carrier led fleets as the US operates, or presumably where China is headed.
I think the cost/benefit of that makes no sense for Russia.
But 2 midsize carriers, say, probably does make sense for Russia in the future. Yes, for prestige, but also for the potential to influence, and project in a limited fashion. A single carrier escorted by a couple of Gorshkovs, perhaps a cruiser, one of the large Universal Amphibious Assault ships now being constructed, and a SSN as an expeditionary force would be quite achievable in the future, and not break the bank.
In fact, they have nearly all that now, sans the Assault Ships still in construction.

In my humble opinion, it is this very same reasoning why they are busy building the two 40 000t Amphibious flat decks laid down in the first place.
Russia doesn't have as many airbases scattered around the globe as the US does, for example.

A carrier led force doesn't necessarily have to be designed for carrier fleet vs carrier fleet ala the Pacific War in WW2.

So I am mostly in agreement with you.
A very realistic and reasonable scenario
 
One carrier does not a fleet make... (ok the RN and French Navies now make do with only one but they have built more).
I am not sure that it was just the end of the Cold War that killed off Ulyanovsk. The submarine lobby in Russia as in the RN knew how vulnerable carriers were to being disabled.. You dont need to sink a carrier just prevent it flying its airgroup.
It really depends on the operational role you assign to the carrier. In the case of the Soviet Navy the carriers would be at the center of a bastion protecting the SSBN that would mean around hefty of cruisers, destroyers, SSN and SSK and in the range of land based aviaton. If a NATO submarine was to reach an attack range for the carrier that would have limited importance for the Soviet because in that case it is problable that most of their fleet would have been destroyed.
 
Large-scale models of aircraft carriers "Liaoning" and "Shandong"
 

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A great comparison made by @AkelaFreedom and posted at the SDF: "For comparison, satellite imagery - Type 075 LHD, Shandong and Liaoning. The same pier and height." But at least for the Liaoning, it seems to be not "the same pier"! Or am I wrong?

Anyway a great comparison.


1619422515842.png
 
Deino, I think your post has ended up in the wrong thread (there is a bit of a posting glitch going around at the moment).
 
Some people may not know that the ship was not notified to the Central Military Commission when it was bought, until the central people found an aircraft carrier in the bill when they received the report and checked the accounts·····
 
The initial purchase was internationally reported as being by the CEO of a Chinese gambling resort, for use as a floating hotel/casino.

It was only after its arrival in China that it suddenly became PLAN property.

Mission impossible: How one man bought China its first aircraft carrier​

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/arti...how-one-man-bought-china-its-aircraft-carrier
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/arti...le-ii-battle-get-chinas-aircraft-carrier-home

Minnie Chan minnie.chan@scmp.com
PUBLISHED : Sunday, 18 January, 2015, 10:44pm
UPDATED : Monday, 19 January, 2015, 8:57am

Xu Zengping reveals for the first time the negotiations behind buying the Liaoning for the PLA Navy - and the secret behind its engines

It was a mission like no other. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, one businessman armed with cash and a casino cover story scooped the world to buy the unfinished hulk of a Ukrainian aircraft carrier that would become the centrepiece of the PLA Navy.

Speaking to the media for the first time, the Hong Kong-based businessman at the heart of the undertaking reveals in a two-part series the details of the little-known, behind-the-scenes odyssey to realise China's long-held dream of owning such a warship.

Xu Zengping disclosed that the militarily sensitive original engines of the carrier were intact when Ukraine sold the vessel in 1998. This is contrary to what Beijing told the world at the time.

The "four intact engines had been perfectly grease-sealed" after work stopped on the vessel in 1992, presenting an enticing engineering package for a country seeking a leg up for its military.

It is the first time anyone linked to the deal has confirmed publicly the engines were in place at the time of purchase. Earlier reports said the vessel's power generation system was removed at Ukraine's Nikolayev South Shipyard on the Black Sea along with its electronics and weaponry before Xu bought it in 1998 for US$20 million.
"When I was taken to the carrier's engine room by the shipyard's chief engineer, I found all four engines were brand new and carefully grease-sealed, each of them originally costing US$20 million," Xu said. He said a refit finished in 2011 restored the four engines to operating condition.

What is now called the Liaoning was built on the hull of the partially completed Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier, the Varyag. The Black Sea shipyard was about two-thirds of the way through the vessel's construction when work stopped as the Soviet Union crumbled. The hull languished until Xu made the deal, acting as a middleman for interests within the PLA Navy.

Xu said the shipyard agreed to sell the vessel because of the political turmoil that had left it in dire financial straits.

"The Chinese side deliberately released false information about the removal of the engines to make it easier for Xu and the shipyard to negotiate," a source familiar with the deal told the South China Morning Post.

Western media also reported that the United States pressured Ukraine to remove everything on board the carrier, selling only the hull to the Chinese buyer, the source added.

A retired PLA Navy colonel said it was "very likely" that the Liaoning was still using the original Ukrainian engines. "The Ukrainian engine technology is better than China's," the retired officer said. "It's my understanding that our navy later sought help from Ukraine to get the carrier engines, which had been sealed up for years, up and running."

Buying the carrier was just the start. It took another four years to tow it from Ukraine to Dalian in Liaoning province, and more than a decade to fit it out.

Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Dong said that after years of negotiations, the Black Sea shipyard also transferred their engine technology to China's Harbin Turbine Company, a manufacturing plant specialising in military boilers, turbines and steam equipment.

There were signs that the engines had been improved.

"The original propulsion system designed for the Liaoning was the same as that of the Russian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier with a top speed of 32 knots. But the Liaoning is 6,000 tonnes heavier, so logically it would be slower," Wong said. "But recent sea trials showed the Liaoning's top speed was as fast as 32 knots, indicating its propulsion system has been upgraded."

The carrier was renamed Liaoning when it was formally delivered to the PLA in September 2012 and so far has been used only for training.

Its pennant number - a type of naval identification - is 16. "Do you know why the Liaoning has been numbered 16?" Xu asked. "It was because we spent 16 years getting the job done, from making the deal to rebuilding it."
 
This is from the second link in the previous post.

Mission impossible II: the battle to get China's aircraft carrier home​

PUBLISHED : Tuesday, 20 January, 2015, 1:19am
UPDATED : Tuesday, 20 January, 2015, 5:46pm

After sealing deal for China's first aircraft carrier, Xu Zengping had a new challenge: taking it home

Hong Kong-based businessman Xu Zengping pulled off the unlikeliest of military coups in 1998 - he convinced a Ukrainian shipyard to sell him an unfinished Soviet aircraft carrier for US$20 million. Xu, a former member of the Guangzhou Military Command basketball team, had been approached by naval officials to buy the carrier on China's behalf but he had to do it with his own money and without the support of Beijing.

Xu sealed the deal over several days of alcohol-soaked negotiations and by April 30, 1999, with the final payment made, the massive vessel was his - he just had to get it home to China.

HOMEWARD BOUND
The Ukrainian shipyard had made it clear that it had no responsibility to get the carrier from the Black Sea to China. It was Xu's problem to get the vessel through to the Atlantic and onwards to its new home port of Dalian in Liaoning province.

Xu's team enlisted International Transport Contractors' (ITC) Netherlands firm to tow it all the way, and on June 14, 1999, four months after the final payment, the crew and the ITC's Sable Cape tugboat weighed anchor. It was plain sailing until they reached the Bosphorus Strait, Turkey's maritime boundary between East and West.

Relations between China and the United States had taken a downturn in the weeks before Xu's crew had left port. On May 7, the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Nato air war over Yugoslavia, igniting anti-American protests in China.

In the fallout, Turkey, an ally of US-led Nato, would not allow the carrier through the strait. The crew waited a month, but Turkey was adamant and the carrier returned to Ukraine.

"I felt so helpless when the ship was waiting at the mouth of the Bosphorus Strait. At one point, I was prepared for the worst: we would rather have the giant ship go to the bottom of the strait than let it fall into the hands of states hostile to Beijing, like Japan," said Xu.

The vessel languished in the Black Sea port another 15 months before the tide turned in Xu's favour. In Beijing, after years of opposition, the leadership was re-thinking the project. Defence was back on the agenda after the embassy bombing and having an aircraft carrier to fend off US might was more appealing

In April, 2000, then-president Jiang Zemin visited Ankara. He promised to encourage Chinese tourists to visit Turkey and to open up his country's markets to Turkish goods. This did the trick. On August 25, 2001, Turkey decided to allow the carrier through to the Mediterranean.

The carrier headed out again into the Black Sea. The Turkish authorities closed the strait on November 1 to let the carrier and its escort of 11 towboats and 15 emergency vessels through.

But storms snapped the cables connecting the carrier to the towboats, putting the project in jeopardy once again. At one point, the carrier drifted unsecured for four days in the Aegean near Skyros island before the tugs were able to rein it back in.

Over the rest of the year, the carrier and a series of tugs inched their way across the Mediterranean, through the Strait of Gibraltar, and out into the Atlantic. It rounded Africa's Cape of Good Hope, navigated the Strait of Malacca and on March 3, 2002, five tugs towed it into Dalian.

Xu said it was like seeing a "lost son find his way home"."But I didn't feel real relief until it was formally commissioned by our navy 12 years later. The feeling was like finally seeing my child grow up and marry."

BITTERSWEET
It was gratifying but bittersweet for Xu, who was left with a bill for port and towage costs.
"US$20 million was just the auction price of the carrier. In fact, I had to pay at least US$120 million for the deal from 1996 to 1999. But I still haven't received one fen from our government. I just handed it over to the navy."

To raise the cash, Xu had to sell his palatial home on The Peak at 37 Deep Water Bay Road in 1999 and mortgage his 280,000 sq ft property on Peng Chau.

A source familiar with the carrier deal said Xu was saddled with the costs because many of the naval officials who had approached him to take on the mission had either died or were in jail. "Ji Shengde, the former naval intelligence chief, entrusted Xu to do the deal," the source said. "But Ji was sacked and given a suspended death sentence in 2000 for his role in a Fujian smuggling scandal."

As delays and costs mounted, Xu had to liquidate more of his personal assets. He also had to neglect his own businesses.

He had to borrow from Hong Kong acquaintances, including HK$230 million from one friend.
"I spent 18 years paying back the debt in full, with interest, with the last payment clearing this year. I felt relieved because my friend is now 81 years old, and I promised myself I would clear the debt while he was still alive."

LEGAL MINEFIELD
Xu was trapped in several lawsuits as a result of the debts. "It's like I had three army regiments before the deal, but now I'm just left with a cookhouse," he said.

According to China's Carrier, a book published by China Development Press, Xu bargained with the State Council for years over compensation, but Beijing would pay only the US$20 million auction price, insisting Xu could be compensated for other costs only if he provided receipts.

"It's just ridiculous and unfair. How could the Ukrainians give receipts for meals, gifts and stacks of US dollar bills? And how about the other losses in raising the money?" a source familiar with the deal said. Those costs included HK$6 million for a document from the Macau government to support his floating casino cover story to buy the ship.

One of Xu's friends said the carrier bills had plunged Xu into severe financial hardship. "For many years, he had to rely on financial support from his friends. He couldn't even pay for his two sons' education overseas. Fortunately, the two boys won full scholarships from two universities in the US because of their basketball talent."

Xu said the central government refused to pay because "the navy didn't have the budget in the late 1990s because of China's poor economy at that time".

"But that's not a good reason. How could [the Chinese government] launch the 'two bombs and one satellite campaign' in the 1960s? It was the country's most difficult time; many people were starving," Xu said, referring to the national programmes to develop atomic and hydrogen bombs and send the country's first unmanned probe into space.

"China has made enormous economic strides in the past two decades, but the government still fails to use that strength to push the country towards sustainable development, with the defence industry one of the key issues."

But the carrier deal gave Xu some consolation. "Some naval experts told me that my deal helped our country save at least 15 years of scientific research," he said. "I was undaunted and it was my will to fulfill my mission. In the end, it indirectly pushed the central government to change its defence policy."
 

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