The US is starting to find itself in the same jam for building warships as the UK was in the 60s.
CVNs are built in smaller numbers over longer times. Maintaining more than about ten modern carriers may be difficult.
Escorts too are now down to one high end (CGX) and one low end (FFG).
One class of SSN and one SSBN cant be built in the numbers of the Cold War.
Managing shipyards will be challenging.
 
Figure out something relatively large for them to build. LHDs, fast carrier supply ships (ammunition&oilers), maybe some new LSTs, Submarine Repair ships, floating drydocks or heavy lift ships, build some icebreakers for polar research, etc.

I think it's not so much the size as the complexity. JB and H&W both built a County class DLG prior to the Fearless class, so if they followed on with CVA01 class each then the only major warship class on the books would be the Type 82 DLG. That's a pretty good order book, plenty of high-end work for over a decade. Swan Hunter launched a County and laid down HMS Bristol pretty much the same day.
 
I think in RN terms a virtuous circle would be Harland & Wolff and John Brown* going straight from building Fearless and Intrepid (as large, complex ships with command facilities) to CVA01 and 02 due to planning for virtually no gap in the work. However I don't know what would then happen at these 2 yards once the CVAs are launched
Ok I'll jump in.

Assuming you commission CVA-01 by 1972 and CVA-02 by 1975 you're now in the need for an LPH or ASW CVL to succeed the Centaurs or ...you build CVA-03....

But considering the staffing limitations for the building, it's more likely CVA-01 commissions '73 to '74 and CVA-02 commissions in '78 to '80.
 
I think it's not so much the size as the complexity. JB and H&W both built a County class DLG prior to the Fearless class, so if they followed on with CVA01 class each then the only major warship class on the books would be the Type 82 DLG. That's a pretty good order book, plenty of high-end work for over a decade. Swan Hunter launched a County and laid down HMS Bristol pretty much the same day.
Most of the ships I listed off would be armed with at least self-defense missiles and guns, plus have sonar... Or would have the equipment installed to test and repair said systems. Only the FRD/Heavy Lift ship is questionable about defenses and repair systems onboard. Even the Icebreaker could be armed. Depends on whether it's an RN ship or it's civilian operated (not sure what the UK terms are, I'm talking about the difference between USS and USNS)
 
the 1957 decision coming right as new R&D money flowed in to produce supersonic planes.
This is the critical hit - the wholesale cancellation of every British supersonic military aircraft program that is a clean sheet of paper, as opposed to an airframe-limited development of an experimental test-bed.

By the time TSR.2 comes along, there's a government agenda of amalgamation lying on top of the project; and the interference, mission creep and mismanagement there take things to a whole new level. One new project takes on all the R&D risks, some of which are imposed from outside (e.g. the Government overruling the manufacturer on the choice of engine, with all the consequences that follow) and it's not surprising that the costs go up and up.
 
There is a competent industrial policy with shipbuilding.

Look at what Japan does. They design a ship and have a few of that type made (number depending on displacement), with two different shipbuilders alternating production for however many hulls are getting built. As soon as those first contracts are signed, they start designing the follow on class. So basically the two yards always have a ship of whatever type under construction, and are always busy. No lapses in production, no layoffs, no stupidity.

Need 10x ASW frigates? No problem, they'll be built over ~10 years, and by the time the last ASW frigate comes off the slipway the first one can be sold off to another country because their successor class is designed and ready to build.
Yes, that does make a lot of sense Scott Kenny. But then again, both the Japanese [as the Sth Koreans] political system and it's society seems to have a good and practical social contract when it comes to it's defence vs profits for corporations.....

Regards
Pioneer
 
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Ok I'll jump in.

Assuming you commission CVA-01 by 1972 and CVA-02 by 1975 you're now in the need for an LPH or ASW CVL to succeed the Centaurs or ...you build CVA-03....

But considering the staffing limitations for the building, it's more likely CVA-01 commissions '73 to '74 and CVA-02 commissions in '78 to '80.

I'd think that in order to create a virtuous circle, which incidentally was what Britain did in the pre WW1 Dreadnought race, the CVAs could (and should?) be built almost simultaneously. This was what happened to both 4 ship batches of the Counties, and the Fearless class.

What I want to know is how quickly can ships be laid down after the previous one is launched? JB laid down Hampshire in March 59 and launched March 61, laid down Intrepid in Dec 62 and launched June 64. H&W laid down Kent in March 60 and launched in Sept 61, laid down Fearless in July 62 and launched in Dec 63.

Does this mean H&W could lay down a CVA in 1964 and JB in 1965?
 
Keep telling Treasury that this is a Jobs Program that happens to produce a ship every year or two as a side benefit.
You can't sell it to Treasury that way. You might be able to get Cabinet to overrule the Treasury's general objection to spending money on those grounds, but you'd be competing with everything else that provides employment.

In OTL, preventing unemployment in traditional industries was something the government was willing to spend money on. But not too much of it.
hat I want to know is how quickly can ships be laid down after the previous one is launched?
If the slipway is clear, and the drawings are available? Pretty quickly. If you're really in a hurry, the ways don't need reconfigured, and you've been able to start cutting steel ahead of time, it can be done in days to weeks.

There's a real risk in shipbuilding strategy - a 'big bang' shipbuilding strategy of the kind the UK prefers gets you comparatively efficient shipbuilding, but the capability atrophies between programmes and you have to pay to rebuild it. The 'slow trickle' approach favoured by France and Japan is less efficient, so the ships are comparatively more expensive, but the capability is sustained. Once you account for different economic environments, there's apparently very little to choose between the two in overall cost.

Option three, 'build lots of freaking ships', lets you get both efficient shipbuilding and a sustained workforce. Unfortunately, it isn't really viable for many countries.
Only the FRD/Heavy Lift ship is questionable about defenses and repair systems onboard. Even the Icebreaker could be armed. Depends on whether it's an RN ship or it's civilian operated (not sure what the UK terms are, I'm talking about the difference between USS and USNS)
UK practice has generally been that ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary aren't armed in peacetime, but some have had provision for armament to be embarked (and operated by a Naval Party) during wartime. Somewhat notoriously, the FORT class replenishment oilers were designed to carry Sea Wolf, and FORT VICTORIA actually had some of the equipment installed.

The ice patrol ship has always been naval-operated, as has the hydrographic squadron. That's apparently one of the niche capabilities the UK has that the USN values - the UK's survey ships can go places the USNS ones can't without greater risk of interference.
 
If the slipway is clear, and the drawings are available? Pretty quickly. If you're really in a hurry, the ways don't need reconfigured, and you've been able to start cutting steel ahead of time, it can be done in days to weeks.

There's a real risk in shipbuilding strategy - a 'big bang' shipbuilding strategy of the kind the UK prefers gets you comparatively efficient shipbuilding, but the capability atrophies between programmes and you have to pay to rebuild it. The 'slow trickle' approach favoured by France and Japan is less efficient, so the ships are comparatively more expensive, but the capability is sustained. Once you account for different economic environments, there's apparently very little to choose between the two in overall cost.

Option three, 'build lots of freaking ships', lets you get both efficient shipbuilding and a sustained workforce. Unfortunately, it isn't really viable for many countries.

I think a shipbuilding virtuous circle, while achievable, would be different and a lot less natural than an aviation one. While supporting the Lightning building the bigger airliners etc would have positive spinoffs from a business perspective a virtuous circle in Naval shipbuilding would require deliberate planning on the Government's part to get the desired result.

That said the RN was big enough through the 70s and into the 80s that there shouldn't be a problem building a County and Fearless as a way to grown the selected yards to be able to build a pair of CVAs without crippling the rest of the industry.

The big losers would be Swan Hunter and Vickers, who built the Invincibles in the 70s, but this could partly be covered by the Type 82s because the RN will need at least 5 of them.
 
If the RN got Type 82 right then it would be more possible.

Essentially get ASWRE C-band 3D radar, a two computer ADAWS. Make Sea Dart VLS and drop the ability to swap torpedo for nuclear depth charge on Ikara. Oh and bite the all GT bullet.

Otherwise on a cost to capability view the Cruiser was more efficient.
 
If the RN got Type 82 right then it would be more possible.

Essentially get ASWRE C-band 3D radar, a two computer ADAWS. Make Sea Dart VLS and drop the ability to swap torpedo for nuclear depth charge on Ikara. Oh and bite the all GT bullet.

Otherwise on a cost to capability view the Cruiser was more efficient.

What's the go with that radar? Would more Type 984s gives the industry more momentum to deliver it? Is it as good as the T984?

I agree more or less about the swappable Ikara, just load one or two with a nuclear depth charge and be done with it.

The VLS Sea Sart would be the next step, the initial ones would be on launchers.

Please elaborate on the Cruiser thing?
 
What's the go with that radar?
Broomstick (Type 988) was effectively a Ministerial override for political reasons (EEC) and a reciprocal deal (Sea Dart) with the Dutch.
ASWRE was developing this set as a concept for Frigates and Destroyers and tied to ADAWS should have alleviated demands on TIR (possibly TIA target Illuminating aerial) sets. Avoiding the need for development of large heavy power hungry sets such as was developed in Type 909 Desertcar.

ASWRE felt their aerial and transmission was much better than the Dutch effort and even suggested Broomstick in the S-Band, but with their aerial. Overruled to ganer favour from an EEC member.
Would more Type 984s gives the industry more momentum to deliver it?
Not sure, probably not. This is more the result of Small Ships Surveillance Radar. This may have been designated Type 966, though that is used later for something less impressive.
While the successor to Type 984 was Type 985 and that was heading towards a four fixed faced PESA system and massive demands on computers. Similar in part to SCANFAR. This is where ADAWS has it's roots to handle such data.

Type 984 was the realisation of cutting edge technology....of the late 1940s, built in the 1950s and fully in service by the 1960s.
Is it as good as the T984?
If ASWRE be right (and I've no reason to doubt them) then sort of Yes. Or more accurately, it's a much lighter set delivering 3D picture into fully digital ADAWS on Ferranti computer(s).
Similar to US efforts mixing electronically scanning in elevation and mechanical scanning through rotation.
elaborate on the Cruiser thing?
At one point evaluation showed the Type 82 was less efficient per person and per Pound than a twin Sea Dart cruiser with helicopter facilities. Admiralty nearly cancelled Type 82 in favour, but other events intervened.
Besides pursuing the Cruiser would open the temptation for NIGS (a vaguely Typhon-esque system). Which could collapse the effort.

Though you get fewer CG than DDG, per force (CVBG, SAG, etc...) it's more efficient cost wise and much more capable.
RN was in a bind over personnel numbers and costs. Trying to balance automation and new technologies to cut crew numbers while trying to find affordable ships in large enough quantities.

This is why Type 82 went from intended large scale production to just 8 and ultimately just one and Type 42 developed.

Cutting steam out and going COGAG saved on crew numbers.
Cutting the launcher and magazine handling system by going VLS cuts crew numbers again...less maintenance.
Cutting the 909 as we know it for TIA saves too.

Yes you don't get the Dutch happy who then ditch Sea Dart for Standard anyway. But you do get a 3D set and ADAWS on frankly as many ships as possible and that does set up a virtuous circle.
 
I’m all in favour of Britain retaining control over its development destiny for as long as possible, and since the Dutch withdrew from the Sea Dart and Britain didn’t get into the EEC in the 60s then I’m all for the alternative. That said, I don’t know if be as optimistic as thinking it will replace the Type 909s, especially in its early iterations.

IIUC the solid state Type 984 was individually a better radar than the Type 988, with its multiple feed-horns, luneberg lens and comprehensive stabilisation, but those things meant it could only be fitted to carriers. In contrast the Type 988 (and presumably the ASWRE 3D radar) could be fitted widely through the fleet, giving a Task Force a better 3D radar picture than a single solid state Type 984 could.

Like planes I’m not one for ‘paper’ ships, particularly to address human problems like budgets or politics. (CVA01 is not a paper ship because long-lead items to the value of 3.5 million pounds were on order by Jan 1966.) However I can imagine that the cost of the Type 82s will limit their numbers to 4-6 and Type 42s will be built, it’s not as if every Sea Dart ship needs command facilities after all; ideally they’d be built to the longer-hull Batch 3 spec from the start.
 
Stating it for the record, though I'm pretty sure everyone has guessed already:

I don't have a preference for WHAT gets built, as long as it gets built REASONABLY. Plan things out to keep the yards busy. If you don't have a new design worked out yet, make a Batch 2 of what you already have, maybe with a new radar/missile suite or a new sonar suite.

20 year ship lifetime, 10 years as front line service and then 10 more years in less critical roles. Then sell the ship off to someone else.
 
The RN kept the Type 12 Leander class in production for longer and ordered the Type 21s to keep industry going while the new Type 22 was being developed.
You have only to compare the armament of the Type 22 (Seawolf and Exocet) with the Type 12 (Gun, Limbo and Seacat) to see the leap, but it took twenty years!
The US by contrast had the same armament more or less on the new Spruances as it did on the Knox class (newer gun system but otherwise ASROC and BPDMS).
The RN then converted Leanders to take Ikara or Exocet and in some ships Seawolf.
Despite cuts by the mid 1980s the RN had three CVS, a decent number of T42 and T22 plus T21s and converted Leanders. It also had far more SSN than France. The new T23 was ordered and has proved to be as long lived as the Sumner, Gearing FRAMs in the postwar USN.
So unless the sclerotic UK economy is changed it is hard to do better.
 
The RN kept the Type 12 Leander class in production for longer and ordered the Type 21s to keep industry going while the new Type 22 was being developed.
You have only to compare the armament of the Type 22 (Seawolf and Exocet) with the Type 12 (Gun, Limbo and Seacat) to see the leap, but it took twenty years!
The US by contrast had the same armament more or less on the new Spruances as it did on the Knox class (newer gun system but otherwise ASROC and BPDMS).
The RN then converted Leanders to take Ikara or Exocet and in some ships Seawolf.
Despite cuts by the mid 1980s the RN had three CVS, a decent number of T42 and T22 plus T21s and converted Leanders. It also had far more SSN than France. The new T23 was ordered and has proved to be as long lived as the Sumner, Gearing FRAMs in the postwar USN.
So unless the sclerotic UK economy is changed it is hard to do better.

I was thinking about this today.

The RN built the diesel powered Type 41 & 61 in the mid-late 50s, the COSAG Type 81s in the late 50s early 60s and Type 12 Whitby, 12M Rothsay and 12I Leander class frigates from the early 50s right through the 60s. The RN found that the Type 12 had a breakthrough in the steam plant as well a innovative hull that gave it the range of the diesels but with full 30kt performance, quietness and twin shafts at a significantly lower cost than the Type 81s despite it's single shaft. As such they dropped plans for more Type 41/61/81 in order to develop the Type 12 to it's practical limits, because they knew for a fact it was better.

The Type 21 was initially seen as a replacement for the Type 41/61/81, a cheap GP ship with a small crew well suited to the Persian Gulf or Caribbean.

I agree that its good to have a decent amount of Type 42s, Type 22s and SSNs, but that's not where the RN's problems lie. The problem was that the RN had a good sized fleet carrier force and the ability to maintain a significant force right through the Cold War at a reasonable price, but threw it away. This is where a virtuous circle for the RN and shipbuilding is harder and less organic than it is for the RAF and aviation industry. That said the RN was an early adopter of Gas Turbine propulsion, which was a game changer for navies.
 
If the RN got Type 82 right then it would be more possible.

Essentially get ASWRE C-band 3D radar, a two computer ADAWS. Make Sea Dart VLS and drop the ability to swap torpedo for nuclear depth charge on Ikara. Oh and bite the all GT bullet.

Otherwise on a cost to capability view the Cruiser was more efficient.
Zen,
Do you think all this might fit on a stretched Type 42 hull? Say Batch 3 sized?
Type 82 is impressive but feels overly large in all respects for what it offered - especially with clunky steam.
 
Zen,
Do you think all this might fit on a stretched Type 42 hull? Say Batch 3 sized?
Type 82 is impressive but feels overly large in all respects for what it offered - especially with clunky steam.
Well this all depends on when government backs ASWRE on their concept for SSSR, which I hypothesise was designated as Type 966, but to avoid confusion I label 'Bookkeeper' (not official, just a name I conjured up).

Had this happened in the early 60’s, this might sway the process to stick to the concept of a AAW Frigate, and thus the chief debate might be between a copy of the RAN Ikara setup and a more substantial arrangement as per OTL Type 82.

In other words Type 82 would be closer to Type 81 instead of becoming more like a County Class Successor.

Had this happened in the mid 60’s, we might see the Type 42 AAW only concept instead and so the debate would move over to the ASW Frigate and the GP Frigate.

However.....
In all this if we're talking 1957 as our POD ....then it's become my contention that the polyrod guidance system of Sea Dart began as a MkIII upgrade of Seaslug. The whole process was lured down the rabbit hole of NIGS Type 985 etc...

Avoid that, focus on the moderately radical Seaslug MkIII with SARH and autopilot or command guidance....and implement on County Class.
 
Hang on, your 'Bookkeeper' radar isn't a direct swap for the planned Type 988 and actual Type 965 & Type 992 fitted to the Type 82, but requires a different ship? Why? What fills the light cruiser requirement the RN had?

The RN arrived at the Type 82 by careful consideration of their requirements, I recall reading that even the number 8 was arrived at by the requirement for a TAU to have a Type 82 spare from the TF AAW task to command a submarine hunt. The RN needs its Type 82 to have a better radar, as was planned with the Type 988, not an entirely different ship.
 
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Hang on, your 'Bookkeeper' radar isn't a direct swap for the planned Type 988 and actual Type 965 & Type 992 fitted to the Type 82, but requires a different ship? Why? What fills the light cruiser requirement the RN had?
Type 82 is a GP Sloop in origin and becomes a GP Destroyer. Toting AAW (Sea Dart), ASW (Ikara and originally Limbo) and a GP gun. With limited facilities to land a small helicopter.
The use of Type 988 Broomstick, Type 909, Sea Dart and a more sophisticated Ikara installation along with COSAG results in a 6,000ton Destroyer.
Which is to say a ship as big as a light cruiser built to destroyer standards.

It's not a different ship in that sense to switch to 'Bookkeeper', VLS Sea Dart, COGAG and a lighter Ikara installation. Just a bit cheaper, lighter and requiring less crew. Which may make the difference in running off substantial numbers and avoid the fiasco of having to make numbers up with more limited ships.

The Cruiser option, was to field Sea Dart (originally Seaslug) and helicopter facilities for GP and ASW. As a Cruiser it would have higher standards of protection, endurance and self repair, alongside command facilities.

Only the Cruiser could conceivably mount Type 984. Though if you don't try to fit twin automatic 6"/L50 guns, I think this might stay below 10,000tons.

Though..... I'm told there was some speculative proposal for a smaller Type 984 possibly in a different band?
Somewhere on this site someone mentioned that.....
 
Type 82s had command facilities, that pushes up the size of the ship as well as the crew. In addition while the genesis might have been a sloop the class became the main aircraft carrier escort, which requires a bigger ship rather than a smaller one to get the range and habitability.

I think you're a bit harsh on the Type 82 for not pushing the tech boundary. Bristol was the first ship with twin olympus GTs, while 2 RN classes had GTs previously the USN didn't go to big GTs until 1972 and 75. Similarly the U.S. didn't go to VLS until 1985, so the RN can't be blamed for sticking with launchers 18 years beforehand.

I think what the RN needs is a better radar than the Type 965/992 combination they got after the 988 was cancelled, rather than any radical rethink of ship types.
 
Well you can have better radar with ASWRE C-band 3D, which I call Bookkeeper.

And you can have it on Type 82, even if you cancel the rest for Type 42 which will mount this alternative radar just fine. So no Type 965 AKE. Not getting stuck with 2d sets based on early 50's technology.

And with it you ditch the cost of Type 909 Desertcar and cheaply get TIA sets instead which makes the Sea Dart ADAWS closer to US Standard.

And the beauty of this is it's much lighter than Broomstick.
Resulting in single face sets on Frigates, twin face sets on Destroyers and enlarged aerial versions on Cruisers and Carriers.
Rolled out in bulk across the modernising fleet from the late 60s to the 80's. Which is actually a win for the RN!
We're talking maybe 50 sets in variations here, maybe more.

Shorn of the restrictions of Type 909, and with this 3d set, Sea Dart can more easily upgrade in the 70's to 80's. MkII becomes a far more practical proposition.

Come something like the Falklands War and lives will be saved.

This makes an actual case for the MkII not just for the RN, but as a Bloodhound Successor.
Funding that makes other options like Anti-ship Sea Dart possible.

As for VL.....to quote myself from the Seaslug thread.
Amazing that one can read a chapter peruse the margin note and still miss things. Only to catch up later.
Seaslug MkI was originally refered to as a test vehicle for the guidance system in 1945.
During this early phase the intended system was to launch vertically.
In '47 the pressing need drove to have prototype ready for service by '57.

A later note if the missile magazine and handling system was thst devised for the abortive Cruisers.
The Destroyer design group wanted the vertical arrangement albeit horizontal storage. But no resources for a separate magazine snd handling system....
 
I was thinking about this today.

The RN built the diesel powered Type 41 & 61 in the mid-late 50s, the COSAG Type 81s in the late 50s early 60s and Type 12 Whitby, 12M Rothsay and 12I Leander class frigates from the early 50s right through the 60s. The RN found that the Type 12 had a breakthrough in the steam plant as well a innovative hull that gave it the range of the diesels but with full 30kt performance, quietness and twin shafts at a significantly lower cost than the Type 81s despite it's single shaft. As such they dropped plans for more Type 41/61/81 in order to develop the Type 12 to it's practical limits, because they knew for a fact it was better.
Type 12 is pretty much concurrent with the Type 41 & 61 (in fact initially all 3 were to share the same hull and powerplant). Type 81 is descendants of the early 1950s Common Hull Frigate (a follow on to the Type 17 and 42 Third Rate Frigates), and Leander is in turn a follow on to the Type 81 (early designs were in fact partly based on the Type 81).
 
I think the big S-Band radar ASWRE to compete with Broomstick is better, longer ranged, slightly better performing frequency for that range. Type 909 will exist regardless, Sea Dart needs an illuminator.
 
Type 909 will exist regardless, Sea Dart needs an illuminator
Yes and No.
A Type 909 will exist, but if you have accurate enough target data from the 3D set, you don't need what was developed. Which is compensation for less accurate target data from S-Band 3D sets and the use of 2D sets initially....which drifted into very few 3D sets by the 80's.

ASWRE compensate for S-Band by offering their aerial in much larger form. Which carries weight penalties and other limitations on ship design.
 
Yes and No.
A Type 909 will exist, but if you have accurate enough target data from the 3D set, you don't need what was developed. Which is compensation for less accurate target data from S-Band 3D sets and the use of 2D sets initially....which drifted into very few 3D sets by the 80's.

ASWRE compensate for S-Band by offering their aerial in much larger form. Which carries weight penalties and other limitations on ship design.
Having checked some of @JFC Fuller 's posts on ASWRE radars, one of the reasons why C-Band was initially selected was the belief that the S-Band frequency was getting too crowded at sea, and greater frequency diversity would complicate jamming. This good from a 1950s perspective, and the US had a similar frequency diversity program at the same time, but with greater knowledge of Soviet ESM capabilities and Hull-to-emitter correlation, this previous policy was reversed, and so the US settled on a limited number of sets and frequencies. I think this justifies the ASWE's S-Band radar.

Certainly when selecting frequencies for Aegis, the US settled on S-Band for it's better long range performance, and if this is going to be the future long-range 3D radar of the fleet, aboard fleet carriers and AAW escorts, I would prefer S-Band's better range, and it helps important assets like the carriers and AAW escorts blend in amongst US SPS-48s and legacy Type 992s.
 
Type 12 is pretty much concurrent with the Type 41 & 61 (in fact initially all 3 were to share the same hull and powerplant). Type 81 is descendants of the early 1950s Common Hull Frigate (a follow on to the Type 17 and 42 Third Rate Frigates), and Leander is in turn a follow on to the Type 81 (early designs were in fact partly based on the Type 81).

Sure, but the RN didn't develop the Type 12 all the way to the Leander out of stupidity or a lack of options. They had other designs in service and production and the Type 12 turned out to be superior in practice.
 
The RN takes a major turn in 1966 from being a colonial policing force to focussing on the Soviet threat to US/Canadian reinforcement of NATO across the N Atlantic and protecting Norway as its northern flank.
A coherent force of Air Defence (T42) and ASW (Ikara Leanders and T22) is formed around the new Command Cruisers with their Seakings working with the new SSNs and RAF maritime Comets (Nimrod).
As a bonus it proves possible to keep Ark Royal and her fixed wing airgroup in service until 1979 instead of 1972 as planned originally.
Sea Harrier and the Ski-jump evolve as the Invincibles are built in the 70s.
No British carrier could offer the capability of a Nimitz or Forrestal so it was sensible not to try. France does its best with the DeGaulle but look at the impact on SSN numbers and the escort fleet.
Both T42 and T22 are closely tailored to the N Atlantic. The T23 replaces the Leander class and T21s with a modern frigate.
 
Found it!
And by Hood too.

There is no mention of 'Trackwell'. There is mention in the article of a Type 983/983 replacement for fighter direction in 1953, described as a "mini-984" with a V-beam. Since 'Trackwell' doesn't seem to need a 992Q TI radar its possible its an outgrowth of this 'mini-984' concept?

And relevent thread

Posts by JFC Fuller post 19, 22, 29.
S-Band version of ASWRE aerial and technology.
16 ft 6" aerial weighing 12 tons
 
The RN takes a major turn in 1966 from being a colonial policing force to focussing on the Soviet threat to US/Canadian reinforcement of NATO across the N Atlantic and protecting Norway as its northern flank.
A coherent force of Air Defence (T42) and ASW (Ikara Leanders and T22) is formed around the new Command Cruisers with their Seakings working with the new SSNs and RAF maritime Comets (Nimrod).
As a bonus it proves possible to keep Ark Royal and her fixed wing airgroup in service until 1979 instead of 1972 as planned originally.
Sea Harrier and the Ski-jump evolve as the Invincibles are built in the 70s.
No British carrier could offer the capability of a Nimitz or Forrestal so it was sensible not to try. France does its best with the DeGaulle but look at the impact on SSN numbers and the escort fleet.
Both T42 and T22 are closely tailored to the N Atlantic. The T23 replaces the Leander class and T21s with a modern frigate.

In 1966 the decision was to pull out of EoS by 1975, while CVA01 was cancelled Ark Royal was refitted for Phantoms and enough were acquired to equip Ark, Eagle and the HQ sqn. It wasn't until 1968, after devaluation, that the pivot to Europe really began.

Nor was the RN a 'colonial policing force', rather Britain participated in the Cold War EoS with the CENTO and SEATO organisations as part of a broader western coalition.

In any case the 1966 and 1968 dates were affected by the vicious cycle Britain found itself in by the mid 60s with regards of Defence procurement. It's no accident that the 1975 end date for EoS was set just as Britain needed to buy a couple of carriers, similarly the 1968 decision to pull out EoS by 1971 occurred just as the F111K was getting too expensive and the French had withdrawn from AFVG. A virtuous circle would present the relevant government with a different set of circumstances in which to make decisions.

Nor was the path taken by Britain from 1966-68 seen as a good one in hindsight, the RN spent decades trying to claw back the strike capability that was lost. It started in 1975 with the development of the Sea Harrier and culminated in the removing of the Sea Dart to provide a bomb magazine for RAF Harriers.
 
Not nearly as much as having 212 seats when the competition has 189. However it might make paying the 10-15% price premium the Plowden report mentioned a bit easier to swallow.
Going back a ways here (and distracting from an interesting naval discussion) but we ran some numbers on this over on AH.com a while back. (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...on-sanity-options.510660/page-4#post-21966362)

It appears we started with a cost put forward from a BBC series quoting a Vickers document. The document apparently showed the VC-10 cost per seat-mile as £4.24 while the 707’s was £4.10. We then used this to extrapolate the cost per seat-mile of the Super 200 VC-10 with 212 seats. We weren’t sure if the stated cost was referring to the base VC-10 with 151 seats or the Super VC-10 with 174 seats. So we calculated both. But we later figured the numbers seemed more reasonable if the initial value referred to the Super VC-10.

Regardless, if you assume that the costs of running the 212 seat version are the same as that of the smaller version then the cost per seat-mile of the Super 200 would either be £3.02 or £3.48, depending on which version the initial cost applied to. Considerably lower than the 707.

Now I don’t think the running costs of the Super 200 would actually be the same as the VC-10 or the Super VC-10. They would have to be somewhat higher. But as long as they are not massively higher the Super 200 VC-10 could very possibly be a cheaper aircraft than the 707 outright.
 
Sure, but the RN didn't develop the Type 12 all the way to the Leander out of stupidity or a lack of options. They had other designs in service and production and the Type 12 turned out to be superior in practice.
The Leander is a mostly clean sheet design, it was optimised for Limited War roles outside of the NATO area, like the Type 81, not as a specialised ASW combatant for World War III, which was the case with the Type 12, Type 14 and abortive Type 17.
 
Going back a ways here (and distracting from an interesting naval discussion) but we ran some numbers on this over on AH.com a while back. (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...on-sanity-options.510660/page-4#post-21966362)

It appears we started with a cost put forward from a BBC series quoting a Vickers document. The document apparently showed the VC-10 cost per seat-mile as £4.24 while the 707’s was £4.10. We then used this to extrapolate the cost per seat-mile of the Super 200 VC-10 with 212 seats. We weren’t sure if the stated cost was referring to the base VC-10 with 151 seats or the Super VC-10 with 174 seats. So we calculated both. But we later figured the numbers seemed more reasonable if the initial value referred to the Super VC-10.

Regardless, if you assume that the costs of running the 212 seat version are the same as that of the smaller version then the cost per seat-mile of the Super 200 would either be £3.02 or £3.48, depending on which version the initial cost applied to. Considerably lower than the 707.

Now I don’t think the running costs of the Super 200 would actually be the same as the VC-10 or the Super VC-10. They would have to be somewhat higher. But as long as they are not massively higher the Super 200 VC-10 could very possibly be a cheaper aircraft than the 707 outright.

IIUC it was this seat cost per mile that was behind BOAC shafting the VC10, but if the Super 200 has superior seat per mile costs than the 707 then the whole equation changes. That said the Plowden Report said British airliners were 10-15% more expensive per unit that US planes because of lower production, so the higher initial cost would have to be overcome by superior operating economics. This is where the VC10s popularity and higher load factor in service would work a treat.

I'm under no illusions that this would knock Boeing or Douglas off their perch. Howver 100 extra VC10s would really help BACs bottom line and put it in a very different position with the follow-up of the VC10 and 1-11.
 
What about Army equipment?

While I think the Chieftain Tank should have stayed with the Rolls Royce diesel V8 it was intended to have rather than follow the 1957 NATO multi fuel directive and switch to the Leyland L60 I'm not really seeing how that spins out into much greater things down the line as a result. Sure the Army wouldn't have had to spend a decade on constant 'get well' programmes, and might have won the Dutch order but I can't see it meaning the Army will get an AA tank or a home grown 155mm SP artillery or anything like that.
 
Well if you've read Tony Williams site, you might be tempted in the 60's to develop the 6.2mm round.....

But the US is still going to tell NATO the future is 5.56mm.
Just like they told everyone it was 7.62mm in the 50's.

Tanks throw some interesting alternatives up. Plenty of scope there.

The concept of VL Swingfire on a vehicle wasn't that bad an idea. Just the vehicle suggested was.....not such a good idea.

Funding PT.428 rather than trying get a foot in Mauler only to find it doomed might help. Better use of funds than Blue Water, which was the view of the Chief Scientific Advisor at the time.
 
One virtuous circle thing would be once the Swingfire enters service the Hawkswing variant for helicopter use should be adopted instead of the TOW. That's another example of Britain not pushing its own gear and introducing a second supply chain and support aystem instead.
 
The achilles heel in producing the equipment advocated here is that British companies had poor infrastructure compared with the US and West Germany.
This influenced buyers to choose the volumes they needed from the US where it was affordable as with Sidewinder and TOW.
 
The achilles heel in producing the equipment advocated here is that British companies had poor infrastructure compared with the US and West Germany.
This influenced buyers to choose the volumes they needed from the US where it was affordable as with Sidewinder and TOW.

How much of that is because the British never back anything strongly enough to build up the infrastructure needed to get exports? Its not as if its a mystery that bigger production volumes mean lower unit prices and greater value for money from supply chains.
 

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