In 1957-59 the P1127, Buccaneer, TSR2, Medway Trident and VC10 Super 200 are enough paper planes to be getting on with. Its why I had Sandys say its Lightning or nothing, he's a politician and won't pay for a new fighter when there's already one in production, arguments about capability sound like lies to them.
Ok you get Lightning.
Can we get the steerable nosewheel?
And while it's a bit Soviet in style. It'll work.
Might not be as smooth down amongst the weeds as TSR.2 or Buccaneer.
But good enough.
So now we'll hear again about how it cannot be done, it's not as cheap as the Hunter and it's not the F4 Phantom II.
And we'll hear about magic US loans and how the F4 solves all ills and the absolute need to buy F111.
But frankly you can kill off TSR.2 and not mess around with forced mergers. Let EE, Hawkers and Blackburn live. The rest die off if they've nothing worth buying.
Ok you get Lightning.
Can we get the steerable nosewheel?
And while it's a bit Soviet in style. It'll work.
Might not be as smooth down amongst the weeds as TSR.2 or Buccaneer.
But good enough.
So now we'll hear again about how it cannot be done, it's not as cheap as the Hunter and it's not the F4 Phantom II.
And we'll hear about magic US loans and how the F4 solves all ills and the absolute need to buy F111.
Sure, the whole different brakes thing sounds super dodgy.
Sandys declaring the Lightning as 'it' sounds no more bizarre to me than declaring missiles only is the future. He's made the big call, in the style of his great father-in-law, and that's that!
But frankly you can kill off TSR.2 and not mess around with forced mergers. Let EE, Hawkers and Blackburn live. The rest die off if they've nothing worth buying.
I've read that the industry mergers were as much about airliners as military aircraft, maybe even more in the environment where military aircraft are a dying breed. Only Hawker had the market capitalization approaching what was required for the sorts of contracts Boeing and Douglas were getting, and the 35 VC10s and 25 Tridents ordered in 1958 or so showed that big companies were what was needed.
But frankly you can kill off TSR.2 and not mess around with forced mergers. Let EE, Hawkers and Blackburn live. The rest die off if they've nothing worth buying.
The problem is that the British aircraft companies were too small, most of them were barely big enough to build WW2 level aircraft. Shades of the infamous "two blokes in a shed"...
So they need to merge to have enough funds to get into newer, larger aircraft. Example: The total chunk of the economy represented by aviation companies is 100milGBP. There are somewhere around 25 separate companies involved, so each company only has about 4milGBP available. And planes are getting complex and expensive enough to develop that a company needs at least 25mil and maybe 33mil to be able to do the work. So you need to merge and acquire down to 3-4 total aircraft companies.
Lightning is evolving into the the F3 and FGR1 pretty much like the ones we sold Kuwait and Saudi. Too similar to the F104 it gets no NATO orders. Meanwhile Hawker does good business overseas refurbishing Hunters.
Israel, however, is very interested and in 1964 the Labour Government sells Israel a package of Lightnings and Thunderbird SAMs.
Buccaneer gets its engine sorted and the S2 enters service sooner in both the RAF and RN. W Germany and Italy buy it and a joint anti ship missile Cormorant is developed.
Faced with the issue of long range theatre airpower the Blue Water missile is looked at again. If it can be given a range similar to the new US Pershing 1 the TSR2 will be cancelled.
The problem is that the British aircraft companies were too small, most of them were barely big enough to build WW2 level aircraft. Shades of the infamous "two blokes in a shed"...
So they need to merge to have enough funds to get into newer, larger aircraft. Example: The total chunk of the economy represented by aviation companies is 100milGBP. There are somewhere around 25 separate companies involved, so each company only has about 4milGBP available. And planes are getting complex and expensive enough to develop that a company needs at least 25mil and maybe 33mil to be able to do the work. So you need to merge and acquire down to 3-4 total aircraft companies.
In early 1958 BOAC ordered 35 VC10 with an option for 20 more, which Vickers priced at 1.5-1-75 million pounds each. At minimum thats 52 million pounds and could potentially get up into the 80 or even 90 million pounds mark. Similarly De Haviland/Airco got a 30 million pounds order for 24 Tridents with an option for another 12. These numbers rival the value of the entire industry.
All this was at a time when the government believed that Hawker Siddely was the only company that approached the required market capitalization. This must be close to accurate since BAC was a 40-40-20 merger that then bought Hunting but Hawker Siddely seems to have bought Folland, then De Havilland and Blackburn.
In early 1958 BOAC ordered 35 VC10 with an option for 20 more, which Vickers priced at 1.5-1-75 million pounds each. At minimum thats 52 million pounds and could potentially get up into the 80 or even 90 million pounds mark. Similarly De Haviland/Airco got a 30 million pounds order for 24 Tridents with an option for another 12. These numbers rival the value of the entire industry.
All this was at a time when the government believed that Hawker Siddely was the only company that approached the required market capitalization. This must be close to accurate since BAC was a 40-40-20 merger that then bought Hunting but Hawker Siddely seems to have bought Folland, then De Havilland and Blackburn.
Not really.
What's needed is those that can fold up inside their conglomerates should, those that specialise should and government should allow assets and personal to transfer. Otherwise let them go.
The Mirage III was supported by the AdA and French government, bought in numbers as the centrepiece of the ADA force structure and marketed aggressively on the world market. This makes people today overlook it's limitations as if they didn't exist.
In contrast the Lightning was begrudgingly kept in the face of a policy geared toward missiles, deliberately not marketed in its early years, kept on the drip feed for updates and constantly being threatened with withdrawal despite it lasting until 1988. This makes everyone hyper aware of every downside, real or perceived.
One small question - why champion the DH.121 when the Bristol 200 nearly hooked a PanAm order in 1958? We have a ready made 727 rival right here (though Boeing going to fight like hell to grab that contract).
On exports and values, here's a table I drew up for my dissertation a decade ago:
A large proportion of exports comprised second-hand and refurbished aircraft and engines, amounting to £20.8 million in 1963. Exports to the Dollar Area peaked in 1961 at £60.7 million, declining to £20.6 million the following year. Sterling Area exports peaked at £50.5 million in 1959 but fell to £22.8 million in 1962. Both falls were lower than the pre-1959 values.
My conclusion was that rationalisation and diversification was having the opposite effect to that intended - i.e. creating larger companies with more financial resources to design aircraft to win exports.
You can see that by 1960 exports continually fell until 1965 (as I pointed out before, no new jet airliners appeared until 1962-63 in prototype form) - although in 1969 it would peak again at £304.7 million which was a massive success (though this is post-devaluation), the world trade share peaked in 1959 then rapidly fell away. No new fighters/bombers post-Sandys immediately trims home military orders which flat line. Value of UK orders stays relatively stable but that's reflecting higher list prices/inflation on smaller quantities. Profits also fall and state aid grows in proportion.
That profits fell is hardly surprising when you consider that in this period Hawker Siddeley alone spent almost £16 million acquiring de Havilland, Folland and several electrical and diesel engine manufacturers and large Canadian investments including Avro Canada and steel and coal interests.
Sources for the table were:
Export and total U.K. order value data compiled from, Cmnd 2853, 120; Hartley, ‘Export Performance’, 82.
Military order value data compiled from, Air Estimates 1957-58, HC 137 (London, 1957), 114; Air Estimates 1958-59, HC 84 (London, 1958), 112; Air Estimates 1959-60, HC 72 (London, 1959), 100; Air Estimates 1960-61, HC 91 (London, 1960), 100; Air Estimates 1961-62, HC 95 (London, 1961), 94; Air Estimates 1962-63, HC 97 (London, 1962), 106; Air Estimates 1963-64, HC 112 (London, 1963), 16; Defence Estimates 1964-65, HC 82 (London, 1964), 148.
Profit data is from, Cmnd 2853, 128-129.
Treasury Issue data is from, Hastings, Murder of TSR.2, 133.
I apologise, this has undoubtedly already been spoken about before, but would there be scope for a single bigger/higher thrust turbojet to replace the two Avon engine arrangement in such a revised EE Lightning?Regardless of whether they are staked or side-by-side, the two-engine arrangement are costly in maintenance and weight.....
I apologise, this has undoubtedly already been spoken about before, but would there be scope for a single bigger/higher thrust turbojet to replace the two Avon engine arrangement in such a revised EE Lightning?Regardless of whether they are staked or side-by-side, the two-engine arrangement are costly in maintenance and weight.....
We're told in this AH no new aircraft designs. Lightning is 'it'.
Which means that the logical assertion of side-by-side or single large engine variations and presumably thst includes P.8 with it's better layout, all which be easier to maintain and possess more scope for improvement. Be all excluded.
Which is frankly nuts.
Because the likes of F.177 and F.155 were better solutions.
And in short order post '57 the Fighter element crept back through OR.346 until Sandys prohibition was quietly dropped for AW.406 and beyond.
One small question - why champion the DH.121 when the Bristol 200 nearly hooked a PanAm order in 1958? We have a ready made 727 rival right here (though Boeing going to fight like hell to grab that contract).
Because in the event the Trident made it to production, not the Bristol 200. In addition Bristol merged into BAC and BAC had the VC10 and BAC 1-11 so isn't short on airliners.
I apologise, this has undoubtedly already been spoken about before, but would there be scope for a single bigger/higher thrust turbojet to replace the two Avon engine arrangement in such a revised EE Lightning?Regardless of whether they are staked or side-by-side, the two-engine arrangement are costly in maintenance and weight.....
Such a 'change' would mean an entirely new aircraft, not a development of the Lightning as it was flying in 1957 and on order to the tune of 20 F1 and 30 F1A.
This is different to the Trident and VC10 changes as they were original designs proposed by the manufacturers that were changed by BEA and BOAC executives after they were ordered.
Lightning is evolving into the the F3 and FGR1 pretty much like the ones we sold Kuwait and Saudi. Too similar to the F104 it gets no NATO orders. Meanwhile Hawker does good business overseas refurbishing Hunters.
Israel, however, is very interested and in 1964 the Labour Government sells Israel a package of Lightnings and Thunderbird SAMs.
Buccaneer gets its engine sorted and the S2 enters service sooner in both the RAF and RN. W Germany and Italy buy it and a joint anti ship missile Cormorant is developed.
This brings up an interesting subject, who might buy these British aircraft if the British government wasn't so psychotically adverse to British industry.
I don't know about no NATO members buying the Lightning, West Germany was pretty keen in working with Britain on the SR177 so maybe that could transfer to the Lightning. In any case the window for the Lightning to sell to advanced countries like NATO or Australia is in the early 60s when its only competing with the F104 and Mirage III, then its superior radar and missiles are a point of difference. Once the phantom is released for export to NATO etc in about 1965 the Lightning is eclipsed and won't sell. It would last longer on the rest of the world market, Iran was the first export customer for the F4D which was delivered from 1968, so it might sell until about then.
Of course all of this is dependent on the deals and political situation of the customer. The Lightning and Red Top are more expensive than the F104/Mirage and sidewinder so the buyers will have to want what the British are offering.
A package of Lightning and Buccaneer might sway the German military. But not outbid Lockheed's persuasion of their politicians. The Dutch similarly.
However had Lockheed become exposed for some reason.....
Marinflieger really liked the Buccaneer....
Though US dual key nuclear weapons could be the deal breaker.
Norway?
Sweden might opt for subsystems on late Draken production. But the prize would be selling Buccaneers. A potent problem for Soviet control over the Baltic.
Integration of Swedish Anti-ship Missiles would have interesting consequences.
Denmark possibly....?
Italy potentially?
Greece?
Lybia before the King fell.
Australia might become convinced...
Offering Centaur might shift that decision. on Buccaneers that is.
The Shah might, but a lot of rumour lurks around him to the point no one can believe he was buying everything people say he was. That said Lightning is the only pre-Phantom aircraft able to threaten high and fast bombers and reconasense aircraft from the USSR.
India might be persuaded and buy a license to build, as Lightning is much more potent against Chinese bombers Again a Centaur class CV might sway the cause on Buccaneers
South Africa, might have opted for Lightning over Mirage III, as it was, they ordered Buccaneers.
Centaur could only operate Sea Vixens so it would have to be Victorious or Hermes.
The Shah was in fact pretty shrewd. At the time he might have bought Lightnings he was buying F5s to get his air arm up and running and take advantage of favourable US terms.
Israel for both Lightning and Buccaneer would be a strong possibility even though it had French aircraft as after 67 these were cut off. Both UK parties supported Israel.
Something to note with regards to exports, the RAF replaced the survivors of the 47 F1 & F1A it received with F3s and F6s when they become available from the mid 60s. These could be candidates for cheap exports if retrofitted with some stuff from the mid-late 60s parts bin, the likes of Jordan got a sqn of ex USAF F104A in 1967 for example.
Iran's a strange one, as it really didn't start modernization until the mid 60s. It received its first 13 F4 A/B in 1965 (of 128 by 72) and its first 16 F4D in 1968, until then it had Sabres. I don't know if the Lightning could slot in there.
Iraq might be a candidate, it had a pro Western coup in November 1963 and bought 41 upgraded Hunters in 1963 and 64, followed by 53 Mig 21s in 3 types 1966-67 before another coup changed the government to pro Soviet in 1968. Perhaps if some used and updated Lightnings were in the mix Iraq could be a customer in 1963-68.
Israel for both Lightning and Buccaneer would be a strong possibility even though it had French aircraft as after 67 these were cut off. Both UK parties supported Israel.
Israel bought 72 Mirage IIICs in 1962, but only 8 launchers for 15 R530s. Its hard to picture today but in the 60s Israel wasn't an early adopter of technology, all their Mirage air to air kills in 1967 were with guns and it didn't adopt the sidewinder for Mirages until the Aim9D in 1969.
In 1966 Israel ordered 50 Mirage 5s and Its first A4s, both of which were built by 1968 but the Mirages were not delivered and the money refunded. 1968 Israel ordered the Phantom for delivery in 1969.
Maybe Lightnings could replace the Mirage IIIC buy in 1962, although it might be without the AAMs initially or a mix of AAMs and guns/rockets in the detachable weapons pack. Given the 1966 orders were primarily for ground attack aircraft and the Phantom was used as both a fighter and long range strike perhaps the Buccaneer could slot in there somewhere instead, but Israel would still need more fighters and lighter ground attack aircraft, maybe P1127 Harriers.
Edit. There were riots at British embassies in the Middle East when word got out about the Israeli Chieftain cooperation deal. Any sales to Israel would have to be significant enough to overcome this opposition.
The UK Government needed to have their version of the "Last Supper" conference the U.S. held...but around 1948. Consolidate the industry to 2-4 companies with the resources to execute more complex programs.
But I think the big problem was on the avionics side of the house. The UK was strong on the powerplant side, OK on airframes, but the avionics side was really lacking.
The issue I have with earlier industry consolidation, and it might be wrong, is that prior to about 1957 it was assumed WW3 would be like ww2 involving mass production of weapons. In that circumstance having a lot of aircraft factories means production can be expanded quickly. At about 1957-59 many countries realised they'd have no hope of replacing losses of something as complex as a lightning from new production. High intensity wars would have to be fought with what was in the inventory. In this situation the US changed tank production from many dispersed facilities to a single efficient supplier. The same applies to Aviation factories i suppose.
This brings up an interesting subject, who might buy these British aircraft if the British government wasn't so psychotically adverse to British industry.
So if big production of the Lightning doesn't do much for the TSR2, how does the TSR2 getting built in numbers effect the tactical aircraft developed in the 70s?
Given the RAF would have to replace maybe 16 sqns of Lightning they would need some 300+ aircraft is that enough to go it alone? If not how many partners would Britain need?
Why not briefly examine the other main contenders to OR.339?
The strongest case outside of EE and Vickers-Supermarine, is Avro and it's mostly their design that forms the basis of HSA's final serious bid.
This doesn't change the problems as such with TSR.2......but it might allow a easier path to an AD Variant.
However....
The only way to get large numbers of TSR.2 is frankly to suck up the fact Vickers-Supermarine's preference for the Single Engined Type 571 is the best way forward.
Which means less multirole capability per plane and less ability to replace V-Bombers. But more achievable 'limited mission set' aircraft.
Essentially Strike, Attack, Recce,
and maybe EW in seperate aircraft One could easily see F105 avionics packaged into SE Type 571. As this is essentially a slightly shorter F105 type aircraft with better STOL characteristics.
But it does mean more ability to run off a 'lightweight' option for MRI Strike. Since this is mostly just reduced fuel load and at a stroke unifies maintenance and support with the LRI fleet.
That being some 200 to 150 LRI and 150 to 200 MRI.
And it does provide a potential Carrier strike platform. As this is eminently suitable for navalisation.
And rather like with Mirage F2 fusilage forming the basis of Mirage G. So SE Type 571 fusilage might form the basis of a VG effort.
Because in the event the Trident made it to production, not the Bristol 200. In addition Bristol merged into BAC and BAC had the VC10 and BAC 1-11 so isn't short on airliners.
Only after it had been put through the tumble dryer on full heat and came out shrunken.
Your opening gambit was:
Not allowing BOAC and BEA to demand the shrinking of the Trident and VC10 airliners, so HSA and BAC build these airliners to the specs they thought would sell: Medway sized Trident and VC10 Super 200.
Well, Bristol had a design that wasn't too small, that PanAm liked enough to show serious interest and which the government wanted to force BEA to buy.
But BEA's chairman was in cozy with DH so brought the Trident instead (he is on record saying he only wanted a DH aircraft) and then the ticket sales took a dive and they started the hack job.
At least buying the Bristol 200 gives some ammo to tell BEA to calm down as they can point to PanAm's order and say "that's what a real airline wants, that's what we're building".
In reality they did buy thousands. After also paying for their development (usually entirely) and gifting them IP and access to infrastructure and technical support in the process of doing so.
The 50s and 60s were very different compared to today.
Yes. I learned recently (Liébert & Buyck F1 book) that the Mirage G was specifically designed as a VG wing Mirage F2. I was also reminded that Sukhoi turned Su-7 derivatives into VG aircraft.
The Supermarine 570 - 580 series could have done a similar job.
In reality they did buy thousands. After also paying for their development (usually entirely) and gifting them IP and access to infrastructure and technical support in the process of doing so.
The 50s and 60s were very different compared to today.
Why not briefly examine the other main contenders to OR.339?
The strongest case outside of EE and Vickers-Supermarine, is Avro and it's mostly their design that forms the basis of HSA's final serious bid.
This doesn't change the problems as such with TSR.2......but it might allow a easier path to an AD Variant.
However....
The only way to get large numbers of TSR.2 is frankly to suck up the fact Vickers-Supermarine's preference for the Single Engined Type 571 is the best way forward.
Which means less multirole capability per plane and less ability to replace V-Bombers. But more achievable 'limited mission set' aircraft.
Essentially Strike, Attack, Recce,
and maybe EW in seperate aircraft One could easily see F105 avionics packaged into SE Type 571. As this is essentially a slightly shorter F105 type aircraft with better STOL characteristics.
But it does mean more ability to run off a 'lightweight' option for MRI Strike. Since this is mostly just reduced fuel load and at a stroke unifies maintenance and support with the LRI fleet.
That being some 200 to 150 LRI and 150 to 200 MRI.
And it does provide a potential Carrier strike platform. As this is eminently suitable for navalisation.
And rather like with Mirage F2 fusilage forming the basis of Mirage G. So SE Type 571 fusilage might form the basis of a VG effort.
Sure, but that's not what the RAF wanted, nor were the RAF wildly out of tune with the rest of the world since the USAF, USN, AdA and RAAF all got aircraft in a similar class. In addition the TSR2 actually flew, it's not a paper plane.
The issue I have with earlier industry consolidation, and it might be wrong, is that prior to about 1957 it was assumed WW3 would be like ww2 involving mass production of weapons. In that circumstance having a lot of aircraft factories means production can be expanded quickly. At about 1957-59 many countries realised they'd have no hope of replacing losses of something as complex as a lightning from new production. High intensity wars would have to be fought with what was in the inventory. In this situation the US changed tank production from many dispersed facilities to a single efficient supplier. The same applies to Aviation factories i suppose.
The problem was that the UK's aviation industry didn't have the engineering manpower for the designs of the 1950s and 1960s. The talent pool was large enough to support one or two firms capable of designing a modern aircraft, but that was it. Earlier consolidation would have produced a stronger industry.
And defunding R&D in the late 1940s didn't help at all.
Only after it had been put through the tumble dryer on full heat and came out shrunken.
Your opening gambit was:
Well, Bristol had a design that wasn't too small, that PanAm liked enough to show serious interest and which the government wanted to force BEA to buy.
But BEA's chairman was in cozy with DH so brought the Trident instead (he is on record saying he only wanted a DH aircraft) and then the ticket sales took a dive and they started the hack job.
At least buying the Bristol 200 gives some ammo to tell BEA to calm down as they can point to PanAm's order and say "that's what a real airline wants, that's what we're building".
That sounds like a technical solution to a human problem.
I've read that both DeHavilland and the Ministry of Supply were against shrinking the Medway Trident, but BEA got their own way. Given that the same thing happened with the VC10 I can envisage that the Bristol 200 would be shrunk in the same environment, apparently after the Trident was shrunk Bristol was pushing an even smaller B205.
As for PanAm, apparently they sought proposals from both Bristol and DeHaviland in Jan 58 but the BEA decision was announced in Feb 58 which put paid to the B200.
Therefore the problem isn't with the Trident and Pan Am's lack of interest in it, it's individual airline executives having too much power over the MoS and Industry.
At the point of decision I'm talking about, none of the aircraft be anything but paper and frankly the winner of them became real only after quite a while. Which is what would have happened to any other tendering bid.
Now it's your AH, so unlike certain others I'll leave it at that.
But....
Every aircraft starts as paper....until the 90's.
The problem was that the UK's aviation industry didn't have the engineering manpower for the designs of the 1950s and 1960s. The talent pool was large enough to support one or two firms capable of designing a modern aircraft, but that was it. Earlier consolidation would have produced a stronger industry.
And defunding R&D in the late 1940s didn't help at all.
In the early 50s the British defence policy was the 1957 was the year of maximum danger. My guess is they weighed up a lack of development manpower against the need for mass production in wartime and landed on the latter. After 1957, with the DWP, this calculation was reversed.
No in the early 50's everything got thrown into chaos as Korea kicked off and the Allies feared the Communists had already recovered and this was the opening move on WWIII.
Cascades of money and US loans were released to order off the drawing board as it was believed they needed as much production everywhere as possible ready to roll off in industrial quantities everything for war again.
Come '53 and the money dries up, but the consequences of those orders now haunt the process and often the development of designs having been frozen for production reveal they all needed a lot more development. But it's too late.
By '56 not only Suez and divergence of opinions but economics dictate a major dialing back on conventional forces. Suez delays this and it's '57 when the reckoning comes.
It's literally designed to meet the requirement. Just a more pragmatic approach.
Oh so fashion trumps pragmatism.
At the point of decision I'm talking about, none of the aircraft be anything but paper and frankly the winner of them became real only after quite a while. Which is what would have happened to any other tendering bid.
Now it's your AH, so unlike certain others I'll leave it at that.
But....
Every aircraft starts as paper....until the 90's.
The thing is that whenever it comes to the failure of the TSR2 people offer up technical solutions to what was fundamentally a human problem. The TSR2 did fly, but the RAF couldn't afford the almost total replacement of its combat aircraft in a 5 year period. The plane itself isn't some amazing thing out of Star Wars, its more or less in the same class as the A5, Mirage IV and F111.
What a successful TSR2 project does is get Britain into the digital age. The tactical aircraft that gets developed in the 70s as the Lightning replacement will likey use the data busses and integrated circuits from the TSR2 as well as digital computers with more memory from the start.
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