Bradley Replacement - XM30 MICV

[lastdingo]

I go on china defense forums just to feel what it's like living in the early 80's as an Western military enthusiast had we had internet.

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2011/01/most-advance-amphibious-armor-vehicle.html

The Chinese know how to bring new AFVs into service, but they sure are confused about what appropriate camouflage schemes are.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

The U.S.Army and USMC have failed in every single armoured combat vehicle and battlefield helicopter program that wasn't about mere road-bound MRAPs or a modification of an existing (typically foreign) design after they introduced the Abrams/Bradley/Apache/Blackhawk generation of vehicles in the 80's (and '70) that had its roots in the relatively tight budgets of the 70's.
Even that generation had major development hiccups (especially the Abrams and Bradley, but to not rest the AH-64 on the dynamic design of the H-60ß series for commonality was quite a mistake as well). The Pentagon bureaucracy is hard-pressed to get a light scout helicopter based on an existing helo type right. They are incompetent at big ticket development program execution.

I've seen program after program both of the USMC and U.S.Army for new AFVs and to pay attention was a waste of time every single time.

This program will almost certainly amount to nothing else but waste of taxpayer money just as were FCS, GCV, Crusader, FSCV, Comanche, RST-V, LVA, LVT(X), AAAV and EFV.
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2014/08/will-marine-corps-apc-racket-ever-end.html

Past stupidity is no excuse to stop trying. Not all of the programs you mentioned were ended due to technological hurdles that had to be overcome. Many times it was a change in doctrine or strategy as it was with the questionable decision to cancel the Comanche.

Regarding EFV it was nothing more than AAAV re-branded. If the Marines even get the "interim" ACV 1.0 they want it will be an improvement over having no amphibious APC to replace the ancient AAVP-7A1.

There is no valid reasons why NGCV need fail or why we can't field multiple new AFVs in the coming years if the DoD and Washington DC in general wasn't so filled with so many incompetent people.

 

[lastdingo]

Yetthose people are incompetent, thus the program will be a waste of money and paying attentiton to it is a waste of time.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Yetthose people are incompetent, thus the program will be a waste of money and paying attentiton to it is a waste of time.

Well this is a forum mostly covering projects that never entered service and often never left the drawing board so it's worth paying attention to in that regard.

OMFV does have a few functional prototypes already which is more progress than the XM1206 ICV made as far as I know.

 

[GARGEAN]

It might lead to an MBT with better protection as well, with the engine forward, rather than rearward. It seems to have worked quite well for the Israelis with their Merkava MBT.

Always wondered why this myth is still alive... Engine in front not increases protection, it decreases it.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Decreases protection, how?

 

[GARGEAN]

Decreases protection, how?

By shifting big chunk of mass forward thus preventing big loading of forward suspension by increasing armor thickness. By creating need of service access to engine thus limiting mass of armoring plates (at least in case of Merk, less so in case of M1-style hull). Engine block itself provides little to no protection, despite common belief, plus increases chances of mobility kill with forward hull penetration drastically.

 

[Rickshaw]

It might lead to an MBT with better protection as well, with the engine forward, rather than rearward. It seems to have worked quite well for the Israelis with their Merkava MBT.

Always wondered why this myth is still alive... Engine in front not increases protection, it decreases it.

How so? You increase the mass of metal between the crew compartment and the outer hull...

 

[Colonial-Marine]

When the original Merkava I was being designed composite armor was largely unproven in the west and Israel probably didn't yet have the necessary manufacturing capability for it. Putting the engine in front effectively provided a form of spaced armored against HEAT munitions at the expense of losing mobility if hit in that location. However this configuration doesn't leave much room under the glacis plate for a large thickness of armor. So even though Israel has introduced composite armor on later Marks of the Merkava there isn't much room for it in that location.

In-theory the Russians could have had the engine at the front of the T-14 MBT like its sibling the T-15 IFV does. Yet they chose to have the engine in the rear and I'm sure they had good reasons for that.

 

[GARGEAN]

How so? You increase the mass of metal between the crew compartment and the outer hull...

As I said: you trade mass of proper RHA+composite for soft engine steel which occupies only part of LoS (engine is kinda hollow).

 

[dan_inbox]

Merkava I .... Putting the engine in front effectively provided a form of spaced armored against HEAT munitions at the expense of losing mobility if hit in that location.

Well, Israelis do prefer a mobility kill than a crew kill. They'll choose this trade off any day.

 

[Rickshaw]

How so? You increase the mass of metal between the crew compartment and the outer hull...

As I said: you trade mass of proper RHA+composite for soft engine steel which occupies only part of LoS (engine is kinda hollow).

Hollow or not, it still stops most chemical warhead attacks and slows most APFSDS attacks. The engine represents mass and distance from the crew. It seems to have worked effectively in the Merkava. By placing the engine forward you improve the balance of the vehicle with the turret to the rear.

 

[Foo Fighter]

It also allows for easier replenishment and ingress/egress and casualty retrieval. Gun depression can be an issue though.

 

[GARGEAN]

How so? You increase the mass of metal between the crew compartment and the outer hull...

As I said: you trade mass of proper RHA+composite for soft engine steel which occupies only part of LoS (engine is kinda hollow).

Hollow or not, it still stops most chemical warhead attacks and slows most APFSDS attacks. The engine represents mass and distance from the crew. It seems to have worked effectively in the Merkava. By placing the engine forward you improve the balance of the vehicle with the turret to the rear.

How many times Merk was shot at with full power APFSDS?
As for balance - just plain wrong.

 

[dan_inbox]

How many times Merk was shot at with full power APFSDS?

Merkava Mk1 fought T-72s in the Bekaa valley in 1982.
Dunno what ammo the Syrians were using, but they lost at least eight T-72s while causing zero Merkava loss.

 

[GARGEAN]

Merkava Mk1 fought T-72s in the Bekaa valley in 1982.
Dunno what ammo the Syrians were using, but they lost at least eight T-72s while causing zero Merkava loss.

I would say that this is hardly representative data, cuz at first too low to see statistics, at second no data about Merk penetrations and if they were at all, at third info about if that battle really occured is murky.

 

[Rickshaw]

How so? You increase the mass of metal between the crew compartment and the outer hull...

As I said: you trade mass of proper RHA+composite for soft engine steel which occupies only part of LoS (engine is kinda hollow).

Hollow or not, it still stops most chemical warhead attacks and slows most APFSDS attacks. The engine represents mass and distance from the crew. It seems to have worked effectively in the Merkava. By placing the engine forward you improve the balance of the vehicle with the turret to the rear.

How many times Merk was shot at with full power APFSDS?
As for balance - just plain wrong.

Apart from testing? Unsure. You seem to be assuming that the Israelis wouldn't have tested this design concept before implementing it on their main MBT. Why?

 

[GARGEAN]

Apart from testing? Unsure. You seem to be assuming that the Israelis wouldn't have tested this design concept before implementing it on their main MBT. Why?

No, I am assuming that Israelis were pursuing different goals than most tank schools in other counties. And that those goals might be unfitting for others.

 

[dan_inbox]

Merkava Mk1 fought T-72s in the Bekaa valley in 1982.
Dunno what ammo the Syrians were using, but they lost at least eight T-72s while causing zero Merkava loss.

I would say that this is hardly representative data, cuz at first too low to see statistics, at second no data about Merk penetrations and if they were at all, at third info about if that battle really occured is murky.

Sure. Nobody should let facts get in the way of their opinion.

 

[GARGEAN]

Merkava Mk1 fought T-72s in the Bekaa valley in 1982.
Dunno what ammo the Syrians were using, but they lost at least eight T-72s while causing zero Merkava loss.

I would say that this is hardly representative data, cuz at first too low to see statistics, at second no data about Merk penetrations and if they were at all, at third info about if that battle really occured is murky.

Sure. Nobody should let facts get in the way of their opinion.

Definitely. Like "fact" that nation with no tank school per se with first try implemented OMG SO GENIUS solution which nations with close to century experience never fielded in MBTs and even more strangely never tried to implement even for today... Israelis must have some space magic which is unobtainable for all other nations...
Or they just made their own tank for their own requirements which are not fitting for other armies...

 

[Capthale]

Merkava Mk1 fought T-72s in the Bekaa valley in 1982.
Dunno what ammo the Syrians were using, but they lost at least eight T-72s while causing zero Merkava loss.

I would say that this is hardly representative data, cuz at first too low to see statistics, at second no data about Merk penetrations and if they were at all, at third info about if that battle really occured is murky.

Sure. Nobody should let facts get in the way of their opinion.

Definitely. Like "fact" that nation with no tank school per se with first try implemented OMG SO GENIUS solution which nations with close to century experience never fielded in MBTs and even more strangely never tried to implement even for today... Israelis must have some space magic which is unobtainable for all other nations...
Or they just made their own tank for their own requirements which are not fitting for other armies...

 

[Capthale]

I still think they should split the fighting vehicle and add more ampv to fight along side armbed with a crow mounted 30 mm stay behind the Bradley’s and dismount when necessary

 

[Rickshaw]

Apart from testing? Unsure. You seem to be assuming that the Israelis wouldn't have tested this design concept before implementing it on their main MBT. Why?

No, I am assuming that Israelis were pursuing different goals than most tank schools in other counties. And that those goals might be unfitting for others.

That is not what you are implying with your effort to downplay the Merkava for what it is. It is an interesting alternative to the normal driver-turret-engine design and was made for reasons the Israelis held important. The rear turret position has problems with stabilisation but as the Merkava wasn't actually designed to fire on the move, that is OK from their perspective. What is important that they have designed the vehicle to provide improved protection to the tank crew. Something which you are being rather dismissive of.

 

[dan_inbox]

Something which [Gargean is] being rather dismissive of.

...with very borderline innuendos, too. Rather smelly.

 

[John21]

The issue is that in terms of Ground Forces vehicle design(Everything from trucks to tanks)....we haven’t really come up with anything new/original/groundbreaking(that wasn’t a paper or PowerPoint and came to nothing) for 40 years. Everything after the 1980s has been either foreign designed(with refinements and production here in the States), or just refurbishments and revamps of vehicles already in service(Be it Military or commercial).

Do we even have the needed capability anymore to put into design and production the 5-10 thousand plus Abrams and Bradley replacement vehicles over a sane timescale?

 

[Colonial-Marine]

The issue is that in terms of Ground Forces vehicle design(Everything from trucks to tanks)....we haven’t really come up with anything new/original/groundbreaking(that wasn’t a paper or PowerPoint and came to nothing) for 40 years. Everything after the 1980s has been either foreign designed(with refinements and production here in the States), or just refurbishments and revamps of vehicles already in service(Be it Military or commercial).

Do we even have the needed capability anymore to put into design and production the 5-10 thousand plus Abrams and Bradley replacement vehicles over a sane timescale?

If we no longer possess that sort of capability then what is a large portion of the hundreds of billions we (rightfully) spend on defense actually going towards? Smaller countries with far less to work with like South Korea, Japan, and Israel continue to come up with new AFV designs and actually get them fielded. The continued failure to do so on our part is simply unacceptable.

I do think it's concerning that what we're seeing on offer for the M2 and M3 replacement are derivatives of foreign existing designs and nothing exactly "new" but it seems they can still offer some significant improvements in capability.

My immediate question is what happened to hybrid-electric drive and other features that industry has been talking about for the past 20 years?

 

[jsport]

The issue is that in terms of Ground Forces vehicle design(Everything from trucks to tanks)....we haven’t really come up with anything new/original/groundbreaking(that wasn’t a paper or PowerPoint and came to nothing) for 40 years. Everything after the 1980s has been either foreign designed(with refinements and production here in the States), or just refurbishments and revamps of vehicles already in service(Be it Military or commercial).

Do we even have the needed capability anymore to put into design and production the 5-10 thousand plus Abrams and Bradley replacement vehicles over a sane timescale?

If we no longer possess that sort of capability than what is a large portion of the hundreds of billions we (rightfully) spend on defense actually going towards? Smaller countries with far less to work with like South Korea, Japan, and Israel continue to come up with new AFV designs and actually get them fielded. The continued failure to do so on our part is simply unacceptable.

I do think it's concerning that what we're seeing on offer for the M2 and M3 replacement are derivatives of foreign existing designs and nothing exactly "new" but it seems they can still offer some significant improvements in capability.

amen brother

 

[jsport]

Major combat vehicle player won’t play in US Army’s optionally manned fighting vehicle race

The Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle competition will heat up later this year, but there's one major player in combat vehicles who won't be jumping into the game.

www.defensenews.com

At least BAE is honest enough to avoid the short termism of the current 'off the shelf' effort. IMHO the current program is a waste and will fail when folks realize it will be an expensive incremental gain. A 10x gain as mentioned in the article shouild be the goal and that may yet still be a large heavy vehicle but iy will survive reguardless of APS developments. APS advancements are just a bonus.

 

[jsport]

On about 38: 38 Dr Phil Karber talks about why a heavy IFV is a demand for survival, As he states 10yrs was spent on a concept. Too many threats for COTS or a lighter vehicle to survive. Air Mobility will have to be secondary. If your not there when it starts your unlikely to get there anyway.

 

[jsport]

U.S. Army’s top research center unveils Robotic Combat Vehicle

The U.S. Army CCDC Ground Vehicle Systems Center has unveiled an ambitious project of Mission Enabler Technologies-Demonstrator (MET-D) vehicles that includes and newest Robotic Combat Vehicle (RCV) on M113 surrogate platform. The demonstrator leverages the latest technology in cameras, data...

defence-blog.com

If Bradley upgrades are so dead why this display? Need to upgrade Bradley until real survivable vehicle (yes from 60 t and up) is ready.

 

[jsport]

 

[jsport]

On about 38: 38 Dr Phil Karber talks about why a heavy IFV is a demand for survival, As he states 10yrs was spent on a concept. Too many threats for COTS or a lighter vehicle to survive. Air Mobility will have to be secondary. If your not there when it starts your unlikely to get there anyway.

..up to 65 tons like Namer is necessary..

 

[jsport]

[/QUOTE]

Which OMFV Active Protection System is going to protect against Direct Fire 4th Gen Mini-Nukes?

THE THIRD NUCLEAR AGE: HOW I LEARNED TO START WORRYING ABOUT THE CLEAN BOMB

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1018896.pdf

For Russia, the limited use of nuclear weapons is acceptable, even prescribed in doctrine.38 Russian military doctrine prescribes the first use of nuclear weapons beyond that declared by any other nuclear power.39 Senior Russian military officers advocate for 8 the use of precise, low-yield nuclear weapons in Russian military journals.40 In addition, they openly discuss nuclear weapons use in local and regional conflicts as a balance to weak Russian conventional forces.41 This doctrinally enshrined embrace of the operational use of nuclear weapons becomes even more likely should Russia possess a clean nuclear weapon. Russian military leadership also advocates for nuclear warfighting capability useable across broader conflict spectrum. Former Russian Deputy Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Muravyev advocated for strategic missile systems capable of conducting “surgical strikes” across a spectrum of targets at various ranges and with “minimal ecological consequences.”42 This strategy fits perfectly with low, clean yield FGNW. Considering Russia’s embrace of low-yield fission weapons, access to clean fusion weapons is an additional incentive for use—even on Russian soil.

 

[Moose]

The bids are in, Rheinmetall/Raytheon and GDLS seem to have bid but we don't know if anyone else did. Seems BAE really did sit it out. Hopefully we'll get some data on the vehicles now that the deadline has past, or at least when the down-select happen.

 

[jsport]

The bids are in, Rheinmetall/Raytheon and GDLS seem to have bid but we don't know if anyone else did. Seems BAE really did sit it out. Hopefully we'll get some data on the vehicles now that the deadline has past, or at least when the down-select happen.

Hopefully they are holding fast until the 50-65t survivable new vehicle requirement returns. when folks get off Off the shelf.

 

[Moose]

Not so sure that requirement's coming back all that soon. The robotic combat vehicle and M1 replacement are the second two NGCV priorities after AMPV and OMFV, and at some point someone's gonna start pushing a Stryker replacement. Unless OMFV completely fails to produce a satisfactory vehicle, the Heavy requirement seems to be somewhat far back in line.

 

[jsport]

Not so sure that requirement's coming back all that soon. The robotic combat vehicle and M1 replacement are the second two NGCV priorities after AMPV and OMFV, and at some point someone's gonna start pushing a Stryker replacement. Unless OMFV completely fails to produce a satisfactory vehicle, the Heavy requirement seems to be somewhat far back in line.

yes, but remain hopeful that the Ukraine experience (ie need a heavy veh) stays in mind.

 

[jsport]

Modularity

 

[Moose]

There may only be one qualified bid for OMFV, at least if the Army Futures Command has its way.

What snarled Rheinmetall, for instance, according to sources, was the timeline it needed to get approvals from the local municipal government to transport the vehicle by tractor trailer or rail and then via air.

Sources said that the company had requested a four-week extension to deliver the vehicle to Aberdeen and also offered to hand over the vehicle to the Army under lock and bond in Germany by the Oct. 1 deadline and both were denied.

But a larger issue, multiple sources conveyed, was the clear differences between what the Army acquisition community and what Army Futures Command wanted to do. Sources confirmed that the acquisition side of the house was willing to agree to extensions, for instance, but AFC, who is in charge of rapid requirements development and prototyping efforts ahead of programs of record, insisted the Army must adhere to the schedule.

Industry also expressed concern to the Army over the roughly 100 mandatory requirements, with just six tr

Well...congrats to GDLS and the Griffin III, I guess.

 

[GTX]

I like the fact that the Lynx can fit a full infantry squad in back, I thought Iraq had highlighted how useful that was with the Stryker, Army can't seem to make up their mind.

Interestingly I understand one of the reasons the GDLS Ajax based offering was rejected from the Australian Land 400 Ph3 competition was precisely because of its inability to fit more than 6 troops in the back (and from what I understand even 6 was a squeeze). Differing philosophies for operations I suppose. One could also cynically question the cost difference between buying more, smaller vehicles vs one big one for say a KF41.