Boeing 787 Dreamliner

If it is dodgy components behind the 787 problems then surely Boeing should have checked and double checked them before installing said components into the Dreamliner in the first place, it is now going to cost Boeing money to replace the components.
 
If it is dodgy components behind the 787 problems then surely Boeing should have checked and double checked them before installing said components into the Dreamliner in the first place, it is now going to cost Boeing money to replace the components.

How do you tell? If the deviation from requirement is in heat treatment, say, or something else not visible to the naked eye, then it's very difficult to pick up short of doing a full tear-down in a lab. And you simply can't do destructive testing on every part. There has to be some acceptance testing, but there are going to be issues that can get past that. You have ultimately to trust that your subcontractor is holding to the agreed specification, and that their QA are monitoring that. Your QA can do periodic audits to confirm that everything is proceeding along agreed lines, but you can't do that constantly.

And breaches can happen without anyone knowing. If the sub-contractor genuinely believes their parts are in spec, and it's not an obvious deviation, then it's very difficult to catch that.

There are also the rare cases where the sub-contractor is fully aware they are out of spec and are deliberately concealing it - such as with that Japanese passenger seat supplier a few years back.
 
If it is dodgy components behind the 787 problems then surely Boeing should have checked and double checked them before installing said components into the Dreamliner in the first place, it is now going to cost Boeing money to replace the components.

How do you tell? If the deviation from requirement is in heat treatment, say, or something else not visible to the naked eye, then it's very difficult to pick up short of doing a full tear-down in a lab. And you simply can't do destructive testing on every part. There has to be some acceptance testing, but there are going to be issues that can get past that. You have ultimately to trust that your subcontractor is holding to the agreed specification, and that their QA are monitoring that. Your QA can do periodic audits to confirm that everything is proceeding along agreed lines, but you can't do that constantly.

And breaches can happen without anyone knowing. If the sub-contractor genuinely believes their parts are in spec, and it's not an obvious deviation, then it's very difficult to catch that.

There are also the rare cases where the sub-contractor is fully aware they are out of spec and are deliberately concealing it - such as with that Japanese passenger seat supplier a few years back.

I hope that Boeing launches an investigation into the problem and gets to the bottom of the issue and if Leonardo did conceal the problems with the components then Boeing should contact their lawyers as soon as possible.
 

I hope that Boeing launches an investigation into the problem and gets to the bottom of the issue and if Leonardo did conceal the problems with the components then Boeing should contact their lawyers as soon as possible.
The problem was MPS not Leonardo, MPS don't have a contract anymore.
 
I read quite some time ago, might have been on here, that this was Boeing's business model. All the real work done by sub-contractors, Boeing just throw the parts together, paint 'Boeing' on the result, and take the money . . .

Any aerospace project is necessarily going to have a big supply chain. But what we might be seeing here is a consequence of Boeing aggressively squeezing their supply chain to drive costs down, which has been drawing complaints for a few years now. The problem this creates if you're a small supplier way down the chain is you have a whole series of higher tier subs, all trying to squeezet their subcontractors as a result, and for the little shop with small margins that can force them to look for cheaper ways to produce their parts, and the potential for not realising when they go out of spec (or being so desperate they hope no one will notice). Their QA should catch it, as should the QA departments of each contractor all the way up to Boeing internal QA, but if they're all being driven by management to produce work quicker and cheaper, then something will inevitably slip through.

No, it's more fundamental than that. Annoyingly, I can't find the reference again, but as I recall, it's something known as RONI, Return On Net Investment.
The idea is, you as the Prime, put as much of the actual manufacturing work as possible out to sub-contract. This means that the investment needed to do the work is borne by the subs, and not by you, the Prime. As Prime, you do the minimum amount of work possible to produce the finished product (ideally, just putting your name on it, as I alluded to above), then charge the customer and take the profit.
Since your investment is low, your profit is high, even allowing for paying the subs, thus the Bean Counters, and the Markets are happy, and your Share Price goes up . . .
Of course, the downside is that by not doing the actual work in-house, you have no real control over quality . . .

cheers,
Robin.
 

I hope that Boeing launches an investigation into the problem and gets to the bottom of the issue and if Leonardo did conceal the problems with the components then Boeing should contact their lawyers as soon as possible.
The problem was MPS not Leonardo, MPS don't have a contract anymore.

Thanks for the info DWG, It's good to see that Boeing acted quickly and MPS no longer have a contract with Boeing supplying parts for the 787.
 

No, it's more fundamental than that. Annoyingly, I can't find the reference again, but as I recall, it's something known as RONI, Return On Net Investment.
The idea is, you as the Prime, put as much of the actual manufacturing work as possible out to sub-contract. This means that the investment needed to do the work is borne by the subs, and not by you, the Prime. As Prime, you do the minimum amount of work possible to produce the finished product (ideally, just putting your name on it, as I alluded to above), then charge the customer and take the profit.
This is a much wider issue than with just Boeing, it's why outsourcing is so big. I suspect the metric you're thinking of is Return on Net Assets. Another one of the accountancy metrics is earnings per employee, which is why managers can be so eager to outsource a department, because their headcount will go down, earnings per headcount will go up and they'll look good, even if their overall costs go up (yes, this is stupid, but they'll get their bonus).

However the model doesn't entirely work in aerospace because of the legal responsibilities for being prime and because the investment to launch an aircraft is so high. And particularly because of the complexity of aerospace assembly. Boeing may get entire 737 fuselage barrels delivered from Spirit (which is an example of this as Spirit used to be part of Boeing), but it then has to add cockpits, interiors, wings, tail, engines, and run all the wiring, which means it's still a manpower and investment heavy task. The original 787 project manager may have declared he wanted the aircraft to snap together like lego, but the reality got him fired. Even with all the outsourcing they did on 787 (wing, horizontal tail, aft fuselage) they still had to build the Boeing South Carolina plant and recruit the 7000 people to man it. I couldn't find a figure for how much the SC plant cost overall, but just buying out Vought from their joint venture covering one of the two plants cost them $1Bn.

As for primes not having any control of sub-contractor quality, you've clearly never had the pleasure of spending a week with customer QA leaning over your shoulder saying "and now show me your records of how you implemented requirements change X" ;)

The article below has a pretty scathing critique of Boeing* management, 787 development, and how they fell into the thrall of the cult of RONA:

https://newrepublic.com/article/154...-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution

* Well actually MD management, who ran their own company into the ground, and then engineered a Boeing takepover that ended with them running Boeing, and promptly set about ru(i)nning Boeing the same way.
 
This is a much wider issue than with just Boeing...

According to Gene Kranz in his book Failure Is Not an Option, "When reporters asked Shepard what he thought about as he sat atop the Redstone rocket, waiting for liftoff, he had replied, 'The fact that every part of this ship was built by the lowest bidder.'

The problem is, with a profit motive, unless it's actively regulated/checked/tested, eventually someone is going to cut a corner just a little too fine.
 
I am not sure of that. You generally don't want your part of the design being the single point of failure.

Then obviously, there is malpractices or incompetence but that does affect every form of business.

Profits motivate also more evenly across a team the amount of work pushed forward in any single laps of time. There ain't no Rapid design in the public service! (exaggeration obviously)
 
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he article below has a pretty scathing critique of Boeing* management, 787 development, and how they fell into the thrall of the cult of RONA:

https://newrepublic.com/article/154...-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution

* Well actually MD management, who ran their own company into the ground, and then engineered a Boeing takepover that ended with them running Boeing, and promptly set about ru(i)nning Boeing the same way.

RONA. That was it. Thanks also for your post, most enlightening . . .

cheers,
Robin.
 
What was the woman’s name at Boeing that said they didn’t need engineers anymore?
 

TLDR: “The FAA has received a report indicating that damage was found during overhaul on multiple inlets around the [engine anti-ice] duct within the inlet aft compartment,” says the proposed rule. “After investigation, it was found that the seals between the inner and outer ducts, and between the outer duct and the aft compartment, were missing.”

It's not clear from the article whether the seals were never installed, or disappeared later during operations or maintenance.
 
A technical problem causing the elevator to move resulting in a sharp pitch down? What even might cause the flight control systems to do something like that?
 

They are examining the possibility the pilot adjusting their seat caused a short circuit inducing the dive.
I read that as: one possibility is it was the pilot moving his seat, and another is a short circuit, not that one caused the other.

I have seen someone moving their seat cause a short circuit, but that was someone rolling his office chair back across a power cable.
 
it geht worst
John Barnett was found Dead in His home

Not in his home. Minor detail, but the circumstances raise even more questions in some ways.

He had been due to undergo further questioning on Saturday. When he did not appear, enquiries were made at his hotel.

He was subsequently found dead in his truck in the hotel car park.
 
I read that as: one possibility is it was the pilot moving his seat, and another is a short circuit, not that one caused the other.

I have seen someone moving their seat cause a short circuit, but that was someone rolling his office chair back across a power cable.

I read it as they know for certain the seat movement caused the nose down, but they arent sure how it did with a short circuit being a possibility. Seems to be the gist of similar articles too. Wording also seems to impy that while the pilot caused the seat movement it wasnt an intentional action.
 
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That is extremely disturbing. The answer if true makes it even weirder. My family has strong ties to Boeing all the way back during ww2 when my grandma worked there. Multiple relatives of the next generation worked there. It was a point of pride and they made good money. This company is not at all related to Boeing of generations past.
 
So some more details on that seat thing, apparently it was a flight attendant accidentally touched the pilot seat controls and the pilot was thrown forward with force and was then pinned against the controls by the seat. They think there might have been a short circuit in the seat adjustment control and are telling airlines to inspect the switch and repeating an earlier safety bulletin that:
"closing a spring-loaded seat back switch guard on to a loose rocker switch could potentially jam the switch"

Some video showing dodgy switch.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRF1YTVJ1Q4
 
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Had the context not been that irrational with Boeing in the news mainstream, this story would have been a non-issue much sooner.

Obviously, the fact that a passenger reported the pilot claiming an in-flight FMS failure didn't help. But should not aviation journalists filter a bit the claim of their sources?

Lastly, it would be interesting to know if/why the seat travel cannot be countered by a firm stand on the lower front pannel or appropriately placed foot holding surface. (And why this switch cover was not better designed with a bump?)
 

They are examining the possibility the pilot adjusting their seat caused a short circuit inducing the dive.
Honest, officer…it was a mistake anyone could make…instead of my foot hitting the brake—I turned on the radio.

Pilot gets glass cockpit—co-pilot side has only gauges and 1970’s tech.

Who needs terrorists when you have the seat from John Carpenter’s “Christine?”
 
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Honestly I don't bit it. That the yoke is forced frwrd by more than 35lb to bypass the autopilot just with the pilot being inadvertently moved on his seat. So, I try to figure him/her having a dinner tray that is forced against the yoke but still... 35lb force??
 
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The incident may have resulted from a flight attendant accidentally activating a switch on a cockpit seat.
I know its serious business, but such a silly incident - could be straight out of Airplane !

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LATAM_Airlines_Flight_800
It has also been reported that the inadvertent movement of a pilot's seat possibly caused the incident. A flight attendant could somehow have activated a covered rocker switch on the back of the pilot's seat. If the cover was loose, pressing on it would be enough to activate the switch underneath when it otherwise normally wouldn't have. The activation of this switch would have slowly moved the seat forward into the control yoke, resulting in the nose down attitude, according to US industry officials.

Surely, they can't be serious ?

I have this vision of Captain Clarence Over being crushed and suffocated against his control yoke: by Otto the inflatable pilot, inflated by mistake since there is still a human pilot at the controls. As silly as Frank Drebin shooting his own car after the airbag got it rolling.

But I digress...
 
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Pure speculation on my part but for the US Boeing is probably “too big to let fail” as they say what are the possibilities in terms of fixing the company?
It's hard to gauge potential paths forward until we know more about the leadership. Short of nationalizing the company, there's little that can be done from outside beyond putting them under heavy scrutiny. The board needs to not just hire the correct CEO, but support a wholesale move back to the engineers-and-customers focus which built the company. Rearranging deck chairs while keeping on the "Stock Price Uber Alles" course won't cut it.
 
Dreamliners don't have winglets, they have raked wingtips which look different. Any ideas as to what A/C type this is?

1730232076345.jpeg
 

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