Matej said:I am not so old so did any other commercial plane in the history have the same amount of problems? It seems to me that A380 problems are in general the same as the B747 had after its introduction, but 787 seems to be really special. I am looking forward how the Airbus will manage its A350 XWB and if it has the same delays.
Edit: I forgot to ask one more general question: should it be a good idea to make some risk-reduction decisions before launching such a groundbreaking program? For example to build some 777 prototype with the full-composite airframe, test it (like X-55), then allocate the smaller share of the subsystems from the current production planes to the foreign suppliers (like to give the contract for the rear fuselage and tails of the 737 to the Japan and test if the deliveries and the quality works) and only then start to attract the customers to launch 787 like program?
Boeing intends the Dreamliner to lift off in 2007 and enter service the following year. The assembly line will be located in Everett, where Boeing builds the 777, 767 and 747, but most of the work will be done elsewhere. Specially modified 747s, with bulging upper bodies and side-hinged tails, will bring fully assembled wing and body pieces into Everett from suppliers around the world: The entire wing, for example, will be built in Japan. The assembly line will move at double-quick time. It may take as little as three days to click a 7E7 together.
Yet Fancher said the feedback he receives is that employees are "proud to be part of an adventure like this."
Matej said:That's an interesting article. The predictions are always nice:
LOL
I have read the interesting analysis (cant find the source at the moment), that after the 787, the A350 XWB will be the last "experiment" of the fast moving all new development, excused by the (planned) lower costs and shorter (planned) development time. If it fails too, all the manufacturers will be forced to return to the old scheme where the development of the new airliner takes at least 10 years.
...
The 787 outsourcing strategy was put place in 2003 by then-Boeing Chairman Harry Stonecipher, who was ousted in 2005, and Commercial Airplanes Chief Alan Mulally, now chief executive at Ford.
"It's easy to look in the rear-view mirror and see things that could have been done differently," Albaugh said. "I wasn't sitting in the room and I don't know what they were facing."
And yet, at least one senior technical engineer within Boeing predicted the outcome of the extensive outsourcing strategy with remarkable foresight a decade ago.
Albaugh and other senior leaders within Boeing may be belatedly paying attention to a paper presented at an internal company symposium in 2001 by John Hart-Smith, a world-renowned airplane structures engineer.
...
In Hart-Smith's analysis, the seeds of Boeing's outsourcing ideas grew out of the McDonnell aircraft business, which focused on military-airplane programs. On the military side of the business, the U.S. government was the major, often the only, customer and it funded development costs in full.
"The military approach didn't require you to risk your own money," Hart-Smith said. "That was the McDonnell Douglas mentality."
He blamed that attitude for the major outsourcing on the MD-95 and proposed MD-12 programs, the failure of which led to the decline of Douglas' commercial-airplane business in California.
The same ideas were transferred to Boeing with the McDonnell Douglas merger and led directly to the 787 outsourcing strategy, he said.
...
Taken to its extreme conclusion, Hart-Smith said mockingly, the strategy of maximizing return on net assets could lead Boeing to outsource everything except a little Boeing decal to slap on the nose of the finished airplane.
Though most of the profits would be outsourced to suppliers along with all the work, and all the company's expertise would wither away, the return on investment in a 25-cent decal could be 5,000 percent.
...
And despite what Hart-Smith has heard on the grapevine, no one from Boeing's leadership has actually called him up to talk about his analysis.
While routes from Tokyo to destinations such as San Jose and San Diego are not considered “trunk,” they are exactly what Boeing hoped to see happen when its program goals morphed from the Sonic Cruiser to the 7E7 a decade ago. Other newly announced 787 routes falling into the “secondary city” or “long, thin” category include JAL’s nonstops to Boston in April and Helsinki in March 2013. In addition, United Airlines—which will take its first six 787s by year-end—has announced plans to operate between Houston and Auckland, New Zealand.
Overall, Boeing’s network analysis group has forecast the potential for up to 450 new city-pairs that could be created as a result of the 787-8’s particular combination of size, range and operating economics. While the 787 may not open the floodgates on long, thin routes in the same way as did the 767 on shorter transatlantic routes after winning ETOPS clearance more than a quarter of a century ago, these initial 787 service announcements make for interesting conjecture.
Jim Haas, 787 product marketing director, says the plethora of new long-range, thin routes such as Boston-Tokyo, will be a real test of the aircraft and business model. The key, he says, is that the point-to-point services are expected to attract more high-yield passengers.
In addition, “there are 1,200 aircraft in this category, mostly 767s and Airbus A330s,” he says. “This is the only aircraft to replace them, so essentially it has the market to itself.”
Matej said:The only aircraft to replace them? What is he smoking?
If the Jan. 7 fire on a Japan Airlines (JAL) Boeing 787 at Boston Logan International Airport proved anything to Boeing it was that no amount of exhaustive pre-service testing can guard against the unexpected.
It also showed that the 787 remains under greater scrutiny than any other aircraft. Even with deliveries well under way and the aircraft performing better than specification, the whole company still catches a cold when the program so much as sneezes. Yet even Boeing, seasoned as it is to hard knocks over the 787’s troubled development, seems to have been shaken by the reaction to the latest problem. The smoke had barely cleared before Boeing’s stock began a slide that within hours wiped $2.6 billion from the company’s value.
The event centered on a lithium ion battery unit, located in the aft electrical/electronics (E/E) bay, which is designed to start the auxiliary power unit (APU) and provide back-up lighting power. The JAL 787, which was delivered to the airline on Dec. 20, had been on the ground for about 25 min. when smoke was detected in the cabin. Airport firefighters responded and, according to the National Transportation Safety Board which is investigating the event, “detected a fire in the electronics and equipment bay near the APU battery box. The fire was extinguished about 40 minutes after arrival of the first rescue and fire personnel.”
The fire caused a furor not only because it was the latest in a series of electrical system-related issues to dog the 787 in recent weeks, but also because it concerned the lithium ion battery, the use of which was flagged by the FAA in 2007 as a special condition for certification. Earlier issues included problems in a power distribution panel that forced the diversion of a United Airlines 787 to New Orleans on Dec. 4, as well as similar electrical system-related issues later reported by Qatar Airways and LAN Airlines.
However for all the attention given to these and other early in-service problems, such as leaks in the fuel system addressed by a recent FAA airworthiness directive, Boeing maintains that the 50-strong 787 fleet is performing to a similar reliability level as the Boeing 777 was at this early stage in its service life. It also says the 787’s dispatch reliability rates are better than for some other early Boeing model fleets. The company also says the number of electrical system-related issues appears to be worse than it is simply because the 787 has a disproportionately higher number of electrical systems than other models.
Stargazer2006 said:Compare this to the near flawless record of the highly innovative and groundbreaking Airbus A380,
Stargazer2006 said:SEVEN failures in two weeks? That's not bad, that's terrible. Especially for an aircraft with such a conservative design, and one that was already delayed by three or four years in its development phase...
Compare this to the near flawless record of the highly innovative and groundbreaking Airbus A380, and that's more than a facepalm for Boeing... it's like Dr. T's 1000 hands doing a facepalm at once! ;D
blackkite said:Hi next one. Battery!!
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20130117_22.html
SlowMan said:blackkite said:Hi next one. Battery!!
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/20130117_22.html
The fires are caused by the lithium ion battery supplied by GS Yuasa, a Japanese battery maker.
Lithium Ion batteries specialized by Japanese are inherently less stable but cheaper than Lithium Polymer batteries specialized by Koreans, this is why most US and European brand EVs use Korean Lithium Polymer batteries while Japanese automakers stick with local batteries by local suppliers.
Just replace the GS Yuasa's battery with a Lithium Polymer battery and the problem will be gone.
There is no non-Korean lithium polymer battery maker. This is a closely guarded secret as it came from the Korean government lab and the Korean battery companies that received the tech from the government signed a non-disclosure agreement, so only Korean vendors can mass-manufacture this type of battery.Dragon029 said:Apparently GS Yuasa sources their cells from China anyway; I wouldn't be surprised if the Koreans do to.
The safety of Lithium Ion vs Lithium Polymer has been well documented in the automotive world where there is an intensive effort to build EVs worldwide. Lithium Polymer types are far more stable and durable than Lithium Ion types.but LiPo batteries in particular are far more eager to burst into explode into flames.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/elon-musk-boeing-787-battery-fundamentally-unsafe-381627/Elon Musk: Boeing 787 battery fundamentally unsafe
...Both Boeing and Tesla use batteries fueled by lithium cobalt oxide, which is among the most energy-dense and flammable chemistries of lithium-ion batteries on the market. While Boeing elected to use a battery with a grouping of eight large cells, Tesla's batteries contain thousands of smaller cells that are independently separated to prevent fire in a single cell from harming the surrounding ones.
"Moreover, when thermal runaway occurs with a big cell, a proportionately larger amount of energy is released and it is very difficult to prevent that energy from then heating up the neighboring cells and causing a domino effect that results in the entire pack catching fire," says Musk.
An aerospace-capable version of Tesla's battery has been developed for use in SpaceX's Falcon 9 space launch vehicle. SpaceX, also owned by Musk, competes with Boeing/Lockheed Martin joint venture United Launch Alliance for customers. Boeing has thus far declined offers of assistance from Tesla and SpaceX, says Musk...
With the myriad of options available to 787 customers (everything from engines to interior lighting), I'm simply god-smacked that there is no alternative for something as modular as a battery. The bays in which the things are installed appear to provide some flexibility with regard to physical size and shape (to my untrained eye anyways).Boeing Batteries Draw Criticism As Dreamliner Probe Continues
...The relatively simple looking design of the Boeing battery, manufactured by the Japanese firm GS Yuasa, immediately caught the attention of lithium-ion battery expert Dr. K.M. Abraham. Abraham has been researching and producing lithium-ion batteries since 1976 and says proper design is critical for both power output and safety.
“It did not look like a sophisticated battery pack to me” Abraham said of his first impression after seeing a photo of a Dreamliner battery. The 32-volt Boeing battery uses eight 3.7 volt cells housed in a single metal container.
The manufacturing process is also a major concern, according to Abraham. The 18650 cells used by Tesla and others experienced quality control problems early on, and it was more than a decade before the design and manufacturing was refined. These days, failure rates are extremely low — less than one in a million, said Abraham. He agrees the design used by Tesla reduces the chance of a thermal runaway resulting in a larger event.
“They use a smaller cell approach, but I think it is a much safer way of doing that,” he said of Tesla. “They use a modular construction. Once a cell goes, it is isolated, there is no large runaway...”