Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

[galgot]

Shirley it would be just as cheap or cheaper to completely junk the 737 max program and replace it with other aircraft in the company. Why the big issue when they have alternatives? Boeing are steadily shooting themselves in the foot, one toe at a time.

Sorry but, what alternatives do they have at hand ?
(And don't call me Shirley)

 

[Foo Fighter]

Sorry, Baldric I humbly appologise, I thought Shirley was in the room. The 767 could quite easily have covered the stretch 737 parameters without the engine relocation or any other "adjustment's" for safety. I now find Boeing saying they will not build more 767. Darn shame really.

Apparently the 787 is also in with a shout to do the job.

 

[galgot]

It's an entirely different of kind of flying altogether...
The 737 compared to the 767 or 787 i mean.

 

[kitnut617]

Shirley it would be just as cheap or cheaper to completely junk the 737 max program and replace it with other aircraft in the company. Why the big issue when they have alternatives? Boeing are steadily shooting themselves in the foot, one toe at a time.

Sorry but, what alternatives do they have at hand ?
(And don't call me Shirley)

I think that should be 'surely' ---

 

[DWG]

Shirley it would be just as cheap or cheaper to completely junk the 737 max program and replace it with other aircraft in the company. Why the big issue when they have alternatives? Boeing are steadily shooting themselves in the foot, one toe at a time.

Every airliner is very specifically optimised to a particular passenger load, takeoff weight and range (all of which interact). Flying any aircraft on a sector it isn't designed for is basically throwing bundles of money onto a bonfire. Boeing sell (and build) far more 737s than any other aircraft, by roughly a factor of ten, and there is precisely one aircraft able to take its place in terms of configuration and production volume - the Airbus A320 family. Nor can Boeing revert to the 737 NG generation, because that would hand Airbus an unbeatable economic advantage of several percent in every sales campaign, where they would be competing the 2015 and later A320 Neo vs the early '90s 737 NG. Just look at the way Airbus hammered 737 sales when the A321 Neo beat the Max to market by a year.

 

[kitnut617]

I'd say that the 767/787 also couldn't go to the majority of regional airports that the 737 serves. When I was at YYC, I saw that the 767/787's carried huge amounts of cargo which they couldn't do at the regionals, so would be under utilized --

 

[Grey Havoc]

I think that should be 'surely' ---

Airplane joke.

 

[Grey Havoc]

 

[galgot]

Yes, they don't have another design to compete with the A320 on this specific sector.
I hope for them they do their account well, cause with the numbers of airlines who bought the MAX that can't fly it, while the production line still running, plus the possible law suite to come, it could cost in the end very much more than what they are still trying to spend on software corrections… and changing names.
And even if these software corrections are finally approved by the FAA , and the Euros and Asians certifications bodies (and now they will look very carefully …), it could still be temporary before they finally have to change the plane design to address that pitch up behavior.
And that is, maybe changing the tailplane --> lot of testing --> new certification --> new type rating for all pilots --> a lot of money.

 

[kitnut617]

I think that should be 'surely' ---

Airplane joke.

Oops, never watched it, went right over my head ----

 

[Grey Havoc]

On a more serious note:

Boeing takes $5bn hit over grounding of 737 Max

The charge will wipe out profits, but Boeing says it hopes the aircraft will resume flying this year.

www.bbc.com

 

[DWG]

Southwestern and American join UAL in pulling 737 Max from schedules until November. Meanwhile Ryanair says it expects a 4% hit on its growth for the 2020 financial year (ie next year, never mind this year) due to delayed deliveries.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/19/boeing-max-737-delay-return-airlines-november

 

[Colonial-Marine]

So have the heads started to roll at Boeing yet?

 

[DWG]

Who would you axe?

The problem arguably starts with the insistence that the Max has to be type-rating compatible with the NG, but that's a legitimate commercial decision, fixing that needs cross-industry/regulator attention, rather than blame within the Boeing management tree.

If it's the decision to go for a singly redundant system for MCAS, then you need to understand why that got through review, which means you're looking at not just fairly low level management, but that it actually spreads out across the whole MCAS engineering and QA teams, and anyone from FAA who was in the review meetings, because I can't believe no one raised concerns over single redundancy. Sacking them isn't actually going to fix anything, we need to understand why this happened and wasn't stopped.

Where you might look for consciously less than ethical behaviour is in the corporate response to the first crash, and later to the second crash, and the corporate media department pushing the idea it was the pilot's fault (not to mention some extremely dodgy dealing around Boeing's insurers' behaviour towards Lion Air victim's families), but that's not not actually going to fix the problems that led to the crash. And the people involved will probably say "but that's my job".

 

[Desertfox]

I think the problem goes even further back to the decision to go with a 737 MAX over a clean-sheet 797. Whoever decided to go with a 50 year old design reaching its limits over a new plane is ultimately responsible for the whole debacle.

 

[DWG]

I think the problem goes even further back to the decision to go with a 737 MAX over a clean-sheet 797. Whoever decided to go with a 50 year old design reaching its limits over a new plane is ultimately responsible for the whole debacle.

Unfortunately, that would be the airlines.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I think it more correct to suggest that Boeing AND the airlines share responsibility. It takes more than one side to tango. As in any business it will come down to acceptable risk and both parties agreed to accept the level of risk they saw around the project, if they did not predict the outcome it is no more than any other project extant or concluded.

 

[TomcatViP]

I completely disagree with the notion that the MAX endeavor presented an unacceptable level of risk. The plane has only a very benign level of fight automation, what mean that it's a plane flying safely hundreds of thousands of hours per year directly in the hand of thousands of different pilots with various level of aptitudes around the world. That does not sound like a failed or risky design in my book or trough the filter of risk analysis.
The MAX met a problem that failed regulation policies help to surge dangerously to this level (pilot training and absurd Pitot tube data feeding) and, because it's designed with confidence in the crew behavior and sensor design level, help to surface, sadly (but it's a pattern recently) with a tragic loss of hundreds of innocent lives.

Make no mistake,a fully FCS walled airplane like an A320 would or have me[e]t a similar problem in a more intricate way due to more complex relation b/w pilot input and FCS.

Instead of seeing this tragic event only trough the glasses of profit making and corporate bonus, the industry should side with Boeing and ask for better and rigorous application of flight regulation down to the level of detail that is expected. Never both those rather idiotic occurrences should have been left the odd to happen. It's a sign of a dysfunctional industry in general (airframer, subcontractor, airlines and regulator) that that had surfaced simultaneously.

 

[DWG]

I think it more correct to suggest that Boeing AND the airlines share responsibility. It takes more than one side to tango. As in any business it will come down to acceptable risk and both parties agreed to accept the level of risk they saw around the project, if they did not predict the outcome it is no more than any other project extant or concluded.

In the early to mid Teens Boeing and Airbus both tried to interest the airlines in replacements for their single aisle designs, the airlines were unenthusiastic. When offered warm-overs of the 737 And A320 with new-generation engines they leapt on the ideas. Essentially the airlines didn't want to move to a new design because of associated costs - new parts infrastructure, new maintenance infrastructure, pilot training costs - which would be much smaller with a warmed-over in-service design, which would also give them most of the expected efficiency improvements.

Boeing and Airbus couldn't proceed with the new designs if the market wasn't there, so it really is down to the airlines.

 

[DWG]

The plane has only a very benign level of fight automation

We've consistently seen accident stats fall as cockpit automation increases, so 'benign' isn't the word I would have chosen.

 

[TomcatViP]

true. it was an hazardous choice of word. But let's not mix automation and FCS. My coffee machine has some kind of automation (timer) but still doesn't take my mug out of my hands.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Boeing did not HAVE to produce the max, they could have just informed everyone that the project had risks and required various airframe changes, one of those being the engines and control systems and waited for new model orders. That there is an inherent risk in any such program was known to both sides. Hindsight is 20:20 obviously but the two sides are hardly new to this.

 

[DWG]

Boeing did not HAVE to produce the max

Boeing could not afford to lose 5 to 10 years of 737 sales to Airbus, which is what they knew would happen if Airbus committed to Neo and they didn't commit to Max. They still ummed and ahhed over it for a year after Airbus, and in Airbus absolutely hammered them on sales, including the launch order with American, who had previously been exclusively a Boeing customer. Even with Max 9 available the A321 Neo was outselling it 5 to 1 while Boeing tried to get the Max 10 ready (originally due 2020).

 

[DWG]

Hadn't seen this before, existing 737 simulators were incapable of simulating the conditions leading to the Max crashes. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019...mulator-software-crashes-190519054206962.html

 

[Foo Fighter]

Boeing did not HAVE to produce the max

Boeing could not afford to lose 5 to 10 years of 737 sales to Airbus, which is what they knew would happen if Airbus committed to Neo and they didn't commit to Max. They still ummed and ahhed over it for a year after Airbus, and in Airbus absolutely hammered them on sales, including the launch order with American, who had previously been exclusively a Boeing customer. Even with Max 9 available the A321 Neo was outselling it 5 to 1 while Boeing tried to get the Max 10 ready (originally due 2020).

They knew there was a risk and chose the sales over the risk. They cannot ignore the fact now but neither can those who bought the muddy aircraft. When you buy a car there is a certain amount of buyer beware involved and the same is true of aircraft. Every project has certain paths/hurdles to overcome and the risk is factored in, if not then they get what they deserve. Project management is hardly new.

 

[DWG]

They knew there was a risk and chose the sales over the risk.

Every aircraft chooses the sales over the risk. All aircraft are built to a mandated level of risk (1*10^-9). Over and above that there's a value in demonstrated reliability that an established design has over an ab initio design. We can be reasonably certain that there are no undiscovered gotchas that the risk analysis missed. Because Max was a reasonably low level of change vs an extremely well known design it actually offered a lower chance of unexpected gotchas than an ab initio design.

 

[Moose]

Lobbing off heads at Boeing would have to start at the top to be effective, and you'd have to do a lot of chopping to clear out the about 20 years of executives pushing the company in the wrong direction. I don't think that's practical, the best we can hope for is that this crisis causes a gradual shift back in the right direction.

 

[galgot]

Thing is, it’s not the actual people responsible for decisions leading to this that will pay, but the guys in the factory if they have to shut the line.
And even if some top heads roll, no worries for these brilliant heads, they usually are hired elsewhere to continue their brilliant cost saving , externalizing , strategies...

 

[Foo Fighter]

They knew there was a risk and chose the sales over the risk.

Every aircraft chooses the sales over the risk. All aircraft are built to a mandated level of risk (1*10^-9). Over and above that there's a value in demonstrated reliability that an established design has over an ab initio design. We can be reasonably certain that there are no undiscovered gotchas that the risk analysis missed. Because Max was a reasonably low level of change vs an extremely well known design it actually offered a lower chance of unexpected gotchas than an ab initio design.

My problem with that is the changes made were hardly simple, changing the whole flight behaviour of the aircraft by changing the balance and line of force for the engines. OK, not the right technical terms, I blame the word finding issues I have there. Point is, the issues were imho, impossible to completely miss and the failures in the design and the software have exaccerbeted the whole issue. Also imho, the carriers must share some responsibility rather than all of it.

 

[DWG]

Now it is obvious that the increased MTOW of the aircraft, enlarged fan diameter and higher mass and thrust of the LEAP-engines were simply to much for the 737 aerodynamics, that were pushed beyond their limits.

Yet Max flew quite happily until the MCAS failed, so the argument the aerodynamics can't cope seems somewhat damned by the evidence.

All of this is Boeing's doing; nothing to do with an industry-wide issue.

Except grandfathering of changes under an STC, and the ability of pilots to operate across multiple generations of an airliner on a single type rating is by definition an industry-wide issue.

And correcting the situation is incumbent upon Boeing, preferably by terminating the MAX program and launching a new-generation, new-technology, entry-level airliner, that would provide a quantum-leap in economic and environmental performance, and a challenge to Airbus and to future newcomers.

You do understand how much business they would lose (and how many jobs would be lost), if they axed Max and spent five to six years developing a new aircraft? That would mean losing Boeing exclusive markets such as Ryanair, and that business is irreplacable. On top of which building a new single aisle would probably mean axing the NMA for demanding too much of the available design and development workforce, and for parallel development projects being too much financial risk for the company to bear. So that's Boeing screwed not just in the short term, but in the long term too.

 

[DWG]

MAX aircraft flew "normally" only because MCAS operated normally. MAX aircraft cannot fly normally without MCAS operating properly because MCAS is an attempted fix at the discrepancy between the airframe aerodynamic capabilities and the weight and thrust applied to it in the MAX-versions.

This is equivalent to claiming that A320 can't fly because it depends on its fly-by-wire system. Add on stability systems like MCAS are nothing new, we did them for F-14 and A-6 and Nimrod, and probably a bunch more aircraft.

The argument that MAX aircraft might operate normally in commercial operations and at operational weights with average crews, without MCAS operating normally, is damned by the decision to ground MAX aircraft.

The only person I've seen claiming this is you. It's an interesting thought, but I've seen no analysis of what Max flying characteristics are like without MCAS. The decision to ground Max doesn't actually impact on this one way or the other because the aircraft was certified with MCAS. Taking MCAS out would mean recertifying because it's a significant change in the flight characteristics.

I see no evidence that development under a STC might be an industry-wide issue.

The industry disagrees with you:

‘Differences training’ under scrutiny after 737 Max crashes

The recent pair of fatal Boeing 737 Max crashes has cast a light on pilots' type rating training

www.flightglobal.com

Crash victim families seek new type certification for Boeing 737 Max

Families of people who died in the crash of a Boeing 737 Max want regulators to re-certificate it as a completely new aircraft only after crash investigations are completed.

www.flightglobal.com

You do understand that Boeing has decisions and choices to make?

Having worked on two Boeing development projects, ones which redefined the FAA certification process, possibly better than most.

 

[TomcatViP]

This is equivalent to claiming that A320 can't fly because it depends on its fly-by-wire system. Add on stability systems like MCAS are nothing new, we did them for F-14 and A-6 and Nimrod, and probably a bunch more aircraft.

Stability augmentation is old as the swept wing - Aka B-47... IMOHO it's quite unacceptable that pilots rated for large commercial aircraft claim to be unable to cope with it.

Airplane Stability and Control

From the early machines to todayas sophisticated aircraft, stability and control have always been crucial considerations. In this second edition, Abzug and Larrabee again forge through the history of aviation technologies to present an informal history of the personalities and the events, the...

books.google.be

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

I'm no expert but it seems so far the main issues with the MCAS were -

* Optional redundancy in air data sensors, so one hardware failure results in incorrect MCAS actuation.
* Not enough information in training on MCAS (partly as it was not registered as a new type)
* Procedure for failure involves turning off powered control assistance, which may not give pilots enough control authority to recover from the situation MCAS put them in.

The fixes seem pretty simple. Add extra air data sensors for redundancy, provide better training, and stick a button in the cockpit to disengage MCAS in isolation.

 

[galgot]

...provide better training...

Yes, which will be mandatory with any design change (hardware) -> change type rating, but this is not what their clients such as Ryanair or Southwest are willing to pay for, alas... So for now they still try cheaper software corrections. Which I doubt will satisfy the regulators.

 

[DWG]

Boeing reported its largest ever quarterly loss ($2.9Bn) and CEO Dennis Muilenburg raised the possibility of slowing or even stopping Max production.

Boeing says it could halt production of 737 Max after grounding

The company lost $2.9bn in the three months to the end of June, compared to a profit of $2.2bn for the same period last year

www.theguardian.com

At some point they'll have to stop production just due to the space required to keep every finished aircraft sitting there. If they've been producing at 42 aircraft a month since the grounding in mid March, I make that about 180-190 aircraft looking for a piece of ramp to sit on, plus however many were already sitting there waiting for delivery. If the aircraft remains grounded until January, as the WSJ predicted, then that would be another 210-50 aircraft on top of that. That's getting towards a full year's production sitting idle.

Even if everything goes smoothly, Boeing can't simply fly those aircraft out the day the grounding is lifted, they need customer checkout flights, and then any remedial actions taken before handover. I think the highest monthly Max deliveries Boeing has previously demonstrated was 61 a month after the engine delivery issues. Worse, depending on how Boeing's been handling the fix and what comes out of the latest problems reported, they may need modifications to fit the finalised redesigned MCAS systems. It's also going to hit the 737 completion centre in Zhoushan with a pile of Chinese Max orders that have been complete but for interiors all descending at once. Unless Boeing can deliver substantially more than 60 aircraft a month, my back of the envelope calculation is that it will take a year and a half to clear the backlog, and several months beyond that if they go ahead with the increase in production rate to 57 a month.

So the whole problem doesn't go away with the lifting of the grounding, clearing that backlog will take a considerable time, potentially well into 2021. And if they're forced to shut down production then it gets worse; the completed backlog stops growing, but the unbuilt aircraft start accruing increasing delays, and that lost time can't be claimed back. At this point I don't think any Max customer will be getting any aircraft to the originally agreed schedule, no matter how far down the line delivery is.

But if Boeing do stop production, then they're likely to start laying off employees, which will cause disruption and ill-feeling in the workforce, and the same will go for all their subcontractors, who are set up for just-in-time delivery of parts for 42 aircraft a month. Boeing can't keep taking parts, one of the features of just-in-time delivery is you don't need the warehouse space for keeping parts, so a stop-work for Boeing is a stop-work for everyone, And if the money isn't coming in, some of those companies might find themselves in a vulnerable financial position, and justifiably aggrieved with Boeing who have been hammering them to increase their capacity and delivery rates for several years.

It's a mess.

 

[Foo Fighter]

The longer they wait to move to a new platform and leapfrog Airbus, the more it will hurt them. All this storage of airframes while continuing production and the new issues coming out all the time is hurting Boeing. This could well finish the company as a force in aviation and break the company up.

 

[Grey Havoc]

BBC take on the story:

Boeing warns it may stop 737 Max production

Planemaker Boeing reports a $3.4bn loss because of the 737 Max crisis as it mulls halting production.

www.bbc.com

 

[DWG]

The earliest Boeing could produce a new short-haul design is around 2030, given they're due to start NMA next year for 2025 entry into service and simultaneous development programmes are unlikely. With Max they have an aircraft that can compete almost equally with A320 Neo, but they currently have no competitor at all in NMA's middle of the market segment given the retirement of 757 and 767. If they kill NMA, they lose MoM sales to A321LR/XLR/A330 Neo, and their only short-term competitor at the bottom of that market is Max 10, originally scheduled for 2020 service entry..

 

[DWG]

Southwest have now said they're taking the Max out of schedules through January 5. And that's on the assumption it gets clearance to fly in November.

Southwest drops Boeing 737 MAX from schedule until January

Boeing on Wednesday said it might need to halt output of the plane. The narrow-body jet -- a fuel-efficient workhorse -- was grounded globally in March after two crashes killed 346 people.

www.seattletimes.com

 

[kitnut617]

What would a 'hardware' fix involve ? To my mind, the aircraft still has to fly safe if the software fails again ---