Boeing 737 MAX family NEWS ONLY

[Scott Kenny]

Memo from: Marketing
to: Mr. Kenny

You are once again reminded that is a feature, not a bug. (Particularly for the lawyers.)

Hey, I said it was exciting! Isn't excitement good?

Sure, but I just don't believe that the plate thikness doesn't matter at all. There must be enough distance to the edge, so that the plate material offers sufficient strength in relation to the rivets, however, it is clear that this strength also relates to the thikness.

Jeez, been a long time since I dug through FAR43, but IIRC plate thickness determines rivet shank diameter, which then gets applied to your edge distances and hole spacing.

 

[DWG]

Separate 737 Max engine anti-ice system issue prompts FAA action

The Federal Aviation Administration has taken action to address another issue involving the anti-ice system on Boeing's 737 Max, after Boeing notified the regulator that a fault could render the system inoperative.

www.flightglobal.com

TLDR: 205 US register 737 Maxes where engine anti-ice may fail if the standby power system control unit does. Apparently Boeing issued a service bulletin in Nov 22, which FAA is now making mandatory.

“a potential single point of failure exists” *headdesk*

 

[Arjen]

“This is not an immediate safety of flight issue and the fleet can continue operating safely.”
Of course, because the past few years have taught us Boeing's management reliably puts safety first. Right?

 

[WatcherZero]

Ed Clark, vice president of the MAX program and General Manager at the Renton facility has been sacked by Boeing, he will be replaced by Katie Ringgold, VP of 737 Delivery Operations.

Boeing replaces head of troubled 737 Max program

Boeing replaced the head of its troubled 737 program after a fuselage panel blew midair during an Alaska Airlines flight last month.

www.cnbc.com

He only became VP after the 737 MAX previous grounding was lifted but had previously served in both the Chief Mechanic and the Chief Engineer positions on the MAX program.

 

[DWG]

he will be replaced by Katie Ringgold, VP of 737 Delivery Operations.

Sounds like the board's still prioritising deliveries above all else.

 

[Mark Nankivil]

Sounds like the board's still prioritising deliveries above all else.

Bean counters win again. Dump the engineer and put in a sales/delivery person....

Any way you look at it, this is the end of the long 737 run. Boeing has no choice, and customers surely won't ask for another 737 variant. Don't see any evidence that they are even working towards the next design. Sad....

Enjoy the Day! Mark

 

[publiusr]

Yikes!

Boeing 757 Wing Coming Apart Forced Emergency Landing | NextBigFuture.com

Kevin Clarke was among the 165 passengers aboard the Boeing 757-200 on the flight Monday from San Francisco to Boston when the right wing appeared to start

www.nextbigfuture.com

What do we know of Katie?

 

[Scott Kenny]

What do we know of Katie?

Nothing, other than her being responsible for ensuring delivery, not quality.

 

[MihoshiK]

What do we know of Katie?

Nothing, other than her being responsible for ensuring delivery, not quality.

Actually:

Chief of Boeing Renton plant ousted in wake of Alaska Flight 1282 blowout

The moves at Boeing come more than a month after a Renton-assembled MAX 9 saw a fuselage panel failure on an Alaska Airlines flight departing Portland.

www.seattletimes.com

His successor Ringgold has business degrees. However she began her aviation career performing avionics systems maintenance and troubleshooting on C-130 cargo aircraft in the U.S. Air Force.

Ringgold joined Boeing in 2011 at the company’s North Charleston, S.C., production facility, where she rose to become a senior quality manager.

She transferred to the Puget Sound region in 2019, where she was responsible for jet deliveries from all Boeing Commercial Airplanes delivery centers in Seattle, Everett, North Charleston and Zhoushan, China.

She then became vice president of 737 delivery operations with responsibility for deliveries to customers from Seattle, as well as pre-delivery flights in Renton and oversight and care of the parked MAXs stored at Moses Lake, Seattle’s Plant 2 and San Antonio

So she's got a background of both aircraft maintenance in the USAF, and QC with Boeing before going on to being responsible for deliveries.

 

[fightingirish]

Thanks, I wish her success and fortune, because I hope, that a successor for the Boeing 737 / 757 /NMA will be presented before 2030.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Actually:

Chief of Boeing Renton plant ousted in wake of Alaska Flight 1282 blowout

The moves at Boeing come more than a month after a Renton-assembled MAX 9 saw a fuselage panel failure on an Alaska Airlines flight departing Portland.

www.seattletimes.com

So she's got a background of both aircraft maintenance in the USAF, and QC with Boeing before going on to being responsible for deliveries.

Good, I hope she's still got her "QA brain" going and not her "delivery/marketing brain".

Boeing cannot afford to NOT put a QA monster in charge of the 737 line.

 

[DWG]

Can Boeing steady the ship after bumpy start to 2024?

It is clear that Boeing needs to do something to turn around its fortunes, but exactly what that something should be remains a subject of debate among the people who follow and work with the US aerospace giant.

www.flightglobal.com

Good article on the issues with Boeing, including some views from within Boeing articulated at the recent Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance supply chain conference*

“We’ve had so many people who had exited the industry,”** says vice-president of global supply chain Ihssane Mounir. “We had to bring new people in so that we can catch up [to] where we left off right before Covid hit. And with that comes all sorts of challenges.”

Chief among those has been replacing lost institutional knowledge.

“We had a lot of tribal knowledge, and a lot of carried-on knowledge from generation to generation, and then there was a break, and the folks who came in don’t have that benefit,” Mounir says.

You reap what you sow.

Another Boeing exec, their vice-president of supplier quality, said that even losing a single mechanic can cause them problems, which says they're running far too lean an operation. But, he claims Boeing’ s high profile quality issues “don’t represent an overall trend ... [the company’s defect rate has been steady over recent years]."

Steady, hmm, yes, there's definitely been a steady stream of high profile quality issues - 767 FOD, 787 shims, future Air Force 1 tequila bottles, 787 shims, 787 shims again 737 Max you name it. Even if you didn't have any high profile issues, a steady rate isn't what you should be aiming for, all the high end quality systems call for continuous improvement. And Boeing was legally bound to a continuous improvement process as part of a plea deal with the FAA over previous 787 quality issues, though that mandate expired in 2022.

* Which can't have been too comfortable for Boeing as Richard Aboulafia was there calling for wholesale changes at board level.

** Corporate speak for "we sacked them for our convenience and they said 'screw you' when we tried to hire them back, who'da thunk it?"

 

[MihoshiK]

The FAA report is in.

Some choise bits:

• The Expert Panel observed a disconnect between Boeing's senior management
and other members of the organization on safety culture. Interviewees, including
ODA Unit Members (UM), also questioned whether Boeing's safety reporting
systems would function in a way that ensures open communication and
non-retaliation. The Expert Panel also observed inadequate and confusing
implementation of the five components of a positive safety culture (Reporting
Culture, Just Culture, Flexible Culture, Learning Culture, and Informed Culture).
• The Expert Panel found Boeing's SMS procedures reflect the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the FAA SMS frameworks. However, the
Boeing SMS procedures are not structured in a way that ensures all employees
understand their role in the company's SMS. The procedures and training are
complex and in a constant state of change, creating employee confusion
especially among different work sites and employee groups. The Expert Panel
also found a lack of awareness of safety-related metrics at all levels of the
organization; employees had difficulty distinguishing the differences among
various measuring methods, their purpose, and outcomes.
• Boeing's restructuring of the management of the ODA unit decreased
opportunities for interference and retaliation against UMs, and provides effective
organizational messaging regarding independence of UMs. However, the
restructuring, while better, still allows opportunities for retaliation to occur,
particularly with regards to salary and furlough ranking. This influences the ability
of UMs to execute their delegated functions effectively.
• The Expert Panel also found additional issues at Boeing that affect aviation
safety, which include inadequate human factors consideration commensurate to
its importance to aviation safety and lack of pilot input in aircraft design and
operation.

Seems like there's still a lot of room for improvement at Boeing....

 

[TomcatViP]

And at the FAA... Why now and not yesterday?

(I am on the opinion that the craze of the duopoly* is what leads to the present situation... And that an an ICAO creation with the burden of over-regulation).

The scary thing is that we don´t hear much coming from Airbus, except from their recent remarkable commitment to ingest the late Boeing problem in their SMS (see late interview from their CEO).

If we had more actors in the industry, the pressure on quality & Safety will be lower. Unless the FAA/ICAO goes toward a generic airframe** that is customized at a lower level by airframer, there is no safe red line at the end of the game going that direction

*only two giant companies producing the thousands of airliners the world need each year instead of creating an economic system where ´new entrant with legitimate experience can strive (yes, a new LM 1011 or a new Dassault Mercure, a new Embraer Double rows, a striving Bombardier (best design for CFRP airframe) etc...
Of course you gonna run into some problems like that...

**something I suggested years ago as deemed inevitable if we were to continue in the same trend (see Keypub)).

 

[DWG]

The FAA report is in.

Some choise bits:

... Interviewees, including
ODA Unit Members (UM), also questioned whether Boeing's safety reporting
systems would function in a way that ensures open communication and
non-retaliation. ...

... Boeing's restructuring of the management of the ODA unit decreased
opportunities for interference and retaliation against UMs, and provides effective
organizational messaging regarding independence of UMs. However, the
restructuring, while better, still allows opportunities for retaliation to occur ....

Seems like there's still a lot of room for improvement at Boeing....

Retaliation over safety issues says they've got a major problem within middle management, and I'd suspect senior middle management at that, the kind of people whose own pay rises and performance appraisals are dependent on hitting board-imposed delivery and quality metrics.

And if you've got someone in those positions who's liable to retaliate, then you screwed up when you promoted them, so it's not just them at fault.

 

[DWG]

If we had more actors in the industry, the pressure on quality & Safety will be lower.

That's ignoring the pressures within the supply chain and workforce.

Demand outstrips delivery positions and the ability to deliver the parts to allow an expansion in the number of delivery positions. Expanding the number of providers, which just isn't going to happen short of a decade at an absolute minimum, more likely two, might possibly produce more delivery slots, but that will just mean suppliers trying to split their capacity across three manufacturer-specific sets of parts, not two. Capacity isn't going to increase by 50%, the suppliers involved can see the overall market demand hasn't increased by that much, but their QA will now be split trying to keep three product lines safe, not two.

From the capital side of things*, costs mean you want your production capacity closely matched to demand, there's never going to be a situation is which production capacity is significantly in excess of demand, which means the pressure is always going to be there, no matter how many manufacturers there are.

On top of that you're looking at the need to man three (families of) production lines across the industry, which will need the people to do that, and we've seen what happened when Boeing and Spirit threw away their experienced staff and brought in new starts.

We haven't had a true tri-opoly in the industry since MD failed almost 30 years ago (and it was clearly failing as a large civil market airframer for about a decade before that). It's only in the past 10-15 years we've had major safety issues, and only at one of the two major suppliers. That says the duo-oply isn't the issue, though it might point to airframers which are failing in the market being inherently problematical. (Well, either that or the MD management virus screwed Boeing's safety management after screwing their own company).

* Blech, but we're stuck with it.

 

[DWG]

The scary thing is that we don´t hear much coming from Airbus,

Scary for Boeing, I don't think there's the evidence to claim there's an unseen safety issue at Airbus, because all those people using Airbuses, and all their national regulators, would have something to say. What's the worst quality criticism Airbus have had? Paint finish, from a single, admittedly large, airline.

 

[WatcherZero]

Yeah and the P&W PW1100G engine problems which is outta their control.

 

[DWG]

"Some interviewees mentioned a briefing was provided by Boeing legal prior to the interviews."

Well that's not at all concerning.

 

[DWG]

FAA gives Boeing 90 days to submit quality improvement plan

The Federal Aviation Administration has given Boeing a 90-day deadline to submit a plan detailing how it intends to address quality-control concerns recently identified by FAA investigators and by a separate safety review panel.

www.flightglobal.com

TLDR: FAA has given Boeing 90 days to respond with a comprehensive action plan to the Expert Review Panel report and the ongoing audit. It's not entirely clear how the 90 days ties in to the fact the audit hasn't finished yet, or the six months the panel report gave Boeing to implement its recommendations*.

* Which basically come down to:
you used to be world leaders in human factors back in 757/767 days, get back there;
stop ignoring your pilots (and give the Chief Pilot equivalent authority to the Chief Engineer);
make it impossible for your middle-managers to retaliate against safety staff doing their job (which implies they don't think they can be successfully ordered not to);
figure out how to fix the disconnect you created by moving your HQ away from the sites that do all the work;
figure out how to bring processes and training at all your (non-union) sites up to the same standard as at your (unionised) Seattle sites**;
stop assuming your pre-Safety Management System Safety Reporting Plan is better than the SMS***,
stop people using neither of them and reporting safety issues verbally to their supervisors.

It's important to remember the expert review was looking specifically at the delegated authority and engineering and safety management functions, not so much build quality on the lines, the audit will cover that.

** It's pretty obvious reading between the lines that SPEEA and IAM have been keeping Boeing management on the straight and narrow where they have influence (ie Seattle), but can't do that at the non-unionised sites.

*** It definitely read like the reviewers felt the SMS was being undermined by NIH syndrome, possibly deliberately orchestrated.

 

[WatcherZero]

Department of Justice has opened an investigation into the blowout as it happened two days before a two year deferred prosecution plea bargain on the previous crashes expired that Boeing would report all safety issues to the FAA and pay $2.5bn in fines and compensation to victims. The DoJ now has six months to decide whether the safety culture at Boeing violated the plea bargain.

DoJ to investigate Boeing 737 MAX blow out incident

The US DoJ will investigate whether quality issues at Boeing, that likely led to a door plug blow out, may form a case for prosecution.

www.airport-technology.com

 

[DWG]

Department of Justice has opened an investigation into the blowout as it happened two days before a two year deferred prosecution plea bargain on the previous crashes expired that Boeing would report all safety issues to the FAA and pay $2.5bn in fines and compensation to victims. The DoJ now has six months to decide whether the safety culture at Boeing violated the plea bargain.

Given the expert panel recommendations complain about people not logging safety issues in the SMS, possibly for fear of retaliation from management, DoJ may have a case.

 

[Scott Kenny]

FAA gives Boeing 90 days to submit quality improvement plan

The Federal Aviation Administration has given Boeing a 90-day deadline to submit a plan detailing how it intends to address quality-control concerns recently identified by FAA investigators and by a separate safety review panel.

www.flightglobal.com

TLDR: FAA has given Boeing 90 days to respond with a comprehensive action plan to the Expert Review Panel report and the ongoing audit. It's not entirely clear how the 90 days ties in to the fact the audit hasn't finished yet, or the six months the panel report gave Boeing to implement its recommendations*.

* Which basically come down to:
you used to be world leaders in human factors back in 757/767 days, get back there;
stop ignoring your pilots (and give the Chief Pilot equivalent authority to the Chief Engineer);
make it impossible for your middle-managers to retaliate against safety staff doing their job (which implies they don't think they can be successfully ordered not to);
figure out how to fix the disconnect you created by moving your HQ away from the sites that do all the work;
figure out how to bring processes and training at all your (non-union) sites up to the same standard as at your (unionised) Seattle sites**;
stop assuming your pre-Safety Management System Safety Reporting Plan is better than the SMS***,
stop people using neither of them and reporting safety issues verbally to their supervisors.

It's important to remember the expert review was looking specifically at the delegated authority and engineering and safety management functions, not so much build quality on the lines, the audit will cover that.

** It's pretty obvious reading between the lines that SPEEA and IAM have been keeping Boeing management on the straight and narrow where they have influence (ie Seattle), but can't do that at the non-unionised sites.

*** It definitely read like the reviewers felt the SMS was being undermined by NIH syndrome, possibly deliberately orchestrated.

Point of order, Boeing has a company union, not part of IAM or SPEEA. (Or at least had a company union)

Each work group is a separate bargaining unit. For example, the Engineers/Designers are one group, the assembly line workers are at least one group, the receptionists and admin are a group...

Given the expert panel recommendations complain about people not logging safety issues in the SMS, possibly for fear of retaliation from management, DoJ may have a case.

I don't think "may have" is the right words there.

 

[Arjen]

I don't think "may have" is the right words there.

That's Brit understatement for you.

 

[kcran567]

The door plug that blew out on the 737 max, did the passengers get very lucky avoiding disaster, or are those plugs basically designed to blow out into airflow to avoid the horizontal and vertical tail surfaces? What kept the door from hitting the tail....the 727 rear ramp door system seems like a safer option.

Asking the question if this happened again would the plane still be able to land, or are those doors designed to avoid the tail if they blow off.

 

[DWG]

The door plug that blew out on the 737 max, did the passengers get very lucky avoiding disaster, or are those plugs basically designed to blow out into airflow to avoid the horizontal and vertical tail surfaces? What kept the door from hitting the tail....the 727 rear ramp door system seems like a safer option.

Asking the question if this happened again would the plane still be able to land, or are those doors designed to avoid the tail if they blow off.

See the Dan Air incident discussed earlier:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/boeing-737-max-family-news-only.14158/post-650598

You can't design the door/door plug to miss the tail, you can hope it will miss the tail, but there's a whole range of different variables that have to be taken into account:- cabin pressure, external pressure, aircraft attitude, is it climbing, banking, where is it in a dutch roll, air turbulence, the precise mechanism by which it came loose, was some poor sod leaning against it, and so on. There's all sorts of weird and wonderful behaviour been observed from things dropped from aircraft, including bombs that went up....

The problem with the 727 door is you can only have one of them. The door plugs are fitted on aircraft that need six doors for their maximum number of passengers, but have been fitted out with fewer seats so they only need four.

 

[robunos]

The door plugs are fitted on aircraft that need six doors for their maximum number of passengers, but have been fitted out with fewer seats so they only need four.

This is a question that's been bugging me since all this came about.
What's all this messing about with 'doors or plugs' ?
Why not just fit the doors and have done with it ?

cheers,
Robin.

 

[WatcherZero]

Shares in Spirit have jumped 15.3% today after rumours Boeing was in talks to buy it back (Shares in Boeing fell 1%). However it seems that it was Spirit that approached Boeing rather than vice versa and Spirit have at the same time approached Airbus to discuss selling their former Bombardier Irish operation that manufactures A220 wings. Apparently Airbus aren't in any rush to buy it as the wings are manufactured at a loss using a low energy but high cost resin injection process rather than an autoclave process, but it might be forced to if Spirit sells itself to Boeing in which case it would likely spend a billion or two redesigning the manufacturing process to cut costs. Boeing management has previously indicated it was happy to keep Spirit at a distance rather than buy it back for more than it sold for.

 

[DWG]

This is a question that's been bugging me since all this came about.
What's all this messing about with 'doors or plugs' ?
Why not just fit the doors and have done with it ?

AIUI, the maintenance costs are greater with doors than with plugs, plus you need one extra cabin attendant - presumably because you'll need someone at the pair of doors if you need to evac through them.

 

[DWG]

Spirit Aerosystems shares surge on possible Boeing buy

Shares of Spirit AeroSystems surged Friday on news Boeing is in talks to potentially acquire the supplier as the aviation giant seeks to right itself amid its latest safety crisis.

www.france24.com

"We believe that the reintegration of Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems' manufacturing operations would further strengthen aviation safety, improve quality and serve the interests of our customers, employees, and shareholders," said a statement from Boeing,

 

[Scott Kenny]

This is a question that's been bugging me since all this came about.
What's all this messing about with 'doors or plugs' ?
Why not just fit the doors and have done with it ?

cheers,
Robin.

Cost.

The doors have a set of maintenance requirements that have to be done every so often. The plugs have less than 1/3 the hours needed for those checks.

The extra doors also require an extra cabin attendant or two.

 

[TomcatViP]

Emergency exits have increased pitch seating. Something that airlines certainly don't like to offer for free...

 

[Scott Kenny]

Emergency exits have increased pitch seating. Something that airlines certainly don't like to offer for free...

Oddly enough, the door or plug installation depends on how many passengers they stuff into the tube. More pax = extra doors.

And that means a further reduced seat pitch to stick several extra rows of seats in.

 

[DWG]

Emergency exits have increased pitch seating. Something that airlines certainly don't like to offer for free...

The Alaska Air 737 Max 9 was flying with seating for 178 passenger, 42 less than the maximum configuration for a 737 Max 9 (220 with Lion Air), that's a minimum of 7 rows of passengers they're opting not to carry. United Airlines Max 9s are similar, but carry 179 pax.

Lion Air's max capacity seat pitch is 29", so 7 rows x 29" is 203" (16' 11"/5.16m) Alaska is choosing not to fill with seats, which makes the extra 7" of a 36" exit row over a 29" Lion Air seat pitch, or 5" over a 31" Alaska seat pitch, fairly trivial

 

[Moose]

Oddly enough, the door or plug installation depends on how many passengers they stuff into the tube. More pax = extra doors.

And that means a further reduced seat pitch to stick several extra rows of seats in.

More steerage, less business class.

 

[robunos]

Why not just fit the doors and have done with it ?

Thanks for the input, Gents, understand what you're saying . . .
So my next question is, could the extra doors be fitted, but not used, sort of like the plug, but with an actual door behind the trim panel ?

cheers,
Robin.

 

[Arjen]

I assume the plug is the cheaper option to fit in aircraft that don't need the extra doors vs. fitting extra doors. Cheaper, provided you don't make the mess of quality management Boeing inflicted on itself.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Thanks for the input, Gents, understand what you're saying . . .
So my next question is, could the extra doors be fitted, but not used, sort of like the plug, but with an actual door behind the trim panel ?

cheers,
Robin.

Not really. You'd still have to do the inspections on the door. Those are required because the door is installed, not because it was used.

The plug is the "not used" door.

 

[WatcherZero]

Thanks for the input, Gents, understand what you're saying . . .
So my next question is, could the extra doors be fitted, but not used, sort of like the plug, but with an actual door behind the trim panel ?

cheers,
Robin.

Yes theres three customer options: The plug with a regular window, a fitted but deactivated mid-cabin door (normal door on the outside of plane but panelled over on the inside with no window) or an active door (and you can have door types 1-3 with or without an attendant seat or a type C door all with a small window). Boeing says even if you go for the deactivated door though its a significant cost to make it active. They do all require maintenance inspections to varying degrees as well.

Hence if you dont think youll ever reconfigure to a high capacity seating arrangement the door plug with less maintenance and a full size window is an attractive option even if it reduces second hand value of the plane.

 

[robunos]

Thanks again, Gents.
The idea I had was, by eliminating the choice between plug and door during production, there would be less opportunity for mistakes to be made.
Obviously, this would incur further costs, both in production, and in service, but what price an accident ?

cheers,
Robin.