The short battery life should always rise suspicions. The AR-924 specs mentioned that the internal parts including the battery could be user exchanged. This feature was no doubt exploited in yesterday's attack.
If the shipment was indeed made through Jordan, and Jordan was indeed involved, then the consequences would be dire. Jordan, already badly experienced in the recent years, has become a police state. Doubtful such a pager op could have been run without the knowledge and consent from the top level. We should learn soon what was the shipment route, anyway, so this thread still needs clarification.
I think that Hezbollah were not stupid. The idea to use two-way HAM radios, which they actually did from at least the 1990s, and to use pagers for one-way comms was bright and clever. But they did not suspect the chain supply attack. I presume that the batteries inside the pagers and radios were doctored with explosives, and they were remotely detonated, perhaps from an UAV or ELINT plane. The Icom IC-V82 radio is relatively old. It was introduced around two decades ago. Doubtful they could have got a large shipment of such doctored radios lately. Rather, they had to replace the aging batteries. In such a scenario, they probably asked their member, an Ahmed, to procure them. He contacted his trusted friend, a Samir, who then reached out to Faisal, who was actually a traitor collaborating with Yitzhak. And you know how the story ended. Worse if each of the guys got his commission.
Instead of visiting a shop and buying what was on the shelves at the moment, they most likely relied on contacts and large orders. And that was undoubtedly their gravest mistake.
I assume that Hezbollah already knows who supplied the rigged items. Perhaps that individual (or individuals) undergoes enhanced interrogation while we discuss the matter. Tomorrow, the head of Hezbollah is to make public statement on the attack. Hopefully we will learn more details and the culprit.