- Joined
- 6 August 2007
- Messages
- 3,468
- Reaction score
- 4,018
UpForce said:From a design standpoint a helicopter doesn't seem like a prime candidate for stealth, even with the RAH-66s of this World ... I've bookmarked a couple of links to bespoke rotor flow softwares which seemed exclusively flow dynamics related. It's been a couple of years since I've visited them, but both were billed "state of the art" at the time and even now - it seems to me - it'd be a bit of a stretch to make them "multiphysics enough" to include both acoustics and RCS and coalesce all the design goals into a perfectly integrated product. Dunno, perhaps finite element methods have leaped forward in the mean time and this sort of thing is within the reach of any wet behind the ears mech BEng these days.
Both finite element methods and methods of moments have, in the last 5 years, become much more accessible. For example, I have regularly been using CUDA (http://www.nvidia.com/object/cuda_home_new.html) and OpenCL (http://www.khronos.org/opencl/) based finite element simulations to compute the RCS of objects derived from photographs using OpenCV (http://opencv.willowgarage.com/wiki/) and OpenFrameworks (http://www.openframeworks.cc/). This is where my analysis of the J-20 came from, and I had been planning to do an article on how it was done.
Hedge is one package that can use GPU computing for computational electromagnetics:
http://mathema.tician.de/software/hedge
There are a number of GPU shaders and CUDA kernels for finite element methods as well. Simple optical methods are sufficient for modeling some scenarios, however, and require much less power.
In industry, there have been significant advances in modeling and simulation capabilities specifically for the survivability of rotorcraft. A group at Sikorsky apparently made some headway with this several years ago, unfortunately I have not yet found a source for this that I can post.
Now that the story is out of the mainstream news cycle...
We'll be generous and assume a standard, unmodified UH-60, as any of the modifications discussed would likely have a negative impact on performance. According to most accounts, there were 24 assaulters on the two primary aircraft (our UH-60s), which would mean the aircraft were about fully loaded. A fully loaded UH-60 has a nominal range of 360 or so miles. DoD reports that the assault staged out of JBad, though local observers originally reported Ghazi AB in Pakistan (where the US has a presence, originally for flood relief operations).
Even with the most direct route to the target from JBad, 160 miles each way, a standard UH-60 would have no time on target (planned for 30 minutes), and little reserve. This is ignoring terrain, air density, and a whole lot of other factors that would come into play and increase fuel consumption. Most routes from JBad would also expose the assault force to multiple AAA sites and radars, such as those at Peshawar and Cherat. Routes that avoid AAA sites would add significant distance, and require more fuel. Sean O'Connor's list of worldwide SAM sites (http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/06/worldwide-sam-site-overview.html) is a good starting point if you are curious about this.
If the assault force had staged out of Ghazi at Tarbela Air Field, the range to the target would have been significantly less, about 80 miles round trip. Using Ghazi would also have decreased exposure to air defense sites, and provided different opportunities for using terrain to mask an approach to the target. Regardless, it's still unlikely that the assault force recovered to Ghazi, though it could have been used to refuel on the way out (though that too is unlikely). They still would have been getting out of Pakistan as fast as possible. The activity observed at Ghazi by locals could have easily been CSAR support, which was provided by USAF and would have appeared to be an assault force to the casual observer.
Given all that, it seems very likely that the assault force refueled at some point, most probably inside Pakistan. Air refueling would be unlikely for a number of reasons. Either they stopped at Ghazi both ways, or there was a FARP inside Pakistan. This could have been done using fuel bladders on the two MH-47s if the assault blocking force was used to provide security, or other assets were used exclusively for the FARP. In the past TF160 has done it both ways.
It's reasonable to assume that modifications to a UH-60 would decrease performance and range. Even a small decrease in range would alter the mission planning significantly and require a FARP, or mulitple FARPs, within non permissive territory. A FARP decreases some risks (running out of gas), but increases others (chances of discovery, contact, accidents).
However, I like turtles.