MiG-21MF/bis vs Sea Harriers ?

  • Sea Harriers would have complete air superiority.

  • Sea Harriers would have had some losses.

  • Sea Harriers would have been blasted out of the sky.

  • None of the two aircraft would have gained air superiority.


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But then again, I think it comes down to the fact that the invasion of the Falkland Islands was launched too early, when not all Argentine forces were ready for a confrontation with the British, which had not been sufficiently thought through.
Spot on. When planning the Falklands invasion the Junta military wasn't that fool. They had made a detailed list of events planned across the year 1982 that were to play to its advantage - and to the british disavantage.
Events like
- Nott eviscerating the RN
- Invincible going to Australia
- Additional S.E and Exocet delivered
- The southern hemisphere seasons are reversed, so summer 1982 = winter season (June to September)

But for a host of complex reasons the invasion happened at OTL date and to Argentina disadvantage.
One of the reason was the the new 1981 Junta was a mix of the three armies officers: army, navy, air force. So they - supposedly - cooperated inside the junta and were supposed to cooperate efficiently for the invasion.

What happened was that they did not cooperated because of political rivalries between then. Ayana for example was a member of the Junta and from the Navy.
 
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I think that at the time, the best solution would have been Israeli help to modernize the Mirages/Daggers, in particular to add in-flight refueling capability.
Back in 1978, during the Beagle conflict, the Peruvians offered to sell the Argentinians 10 Mirage 5Ps for 1 million each, to help them against the Chileans.
In the end, the Argentinians let the offer lapse, and the Mirage 5 Mara were later delivered in 1982.
But if the Argentinians had received them earlier, and it had been delivered with in-flight refuelling booms, that would have changed the game.
AS-30s were also sold by Peru with the Mirage 5s, and if they had been available during the conflict, they might have performed well against the British ships.
Mirage-5-50-foto-4.jpg
Mirage 5P + air-air refueling + AS-30 = ?
 
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But then again, I think it comes down to the fact that the invasion of the Falkland Islands was launched too early, when not all Argentine forces were ready for a confrontation with the British, which had not been sufficiently thought through.
Arguably, Argentina would have benefited from waiting, because the Thatcher government's naval reforms would have made it quite unlikely for the British to be capable of retaking the Falklands.
 
Back in 1978, during the Beagle conflict, the Peruvians offered to sell the Argentinians 10 Mirage 5PAs for 1 million each, to help them against the Chileans.
In the end, the Argentinians let the offer lapse, and the Mirage 5 Mara were later delivered in 1982.
But if the Argentinians had received them earlier, and it had been delivered with in-flight refuelling booms, that would have changed the game.
AS-30s were also sold by Peru with the Mirage 5s, and if they had been available during the conflict, they might have performed well against the British ships.
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Mirage 5PA + air-air refueling + A-30 = ?
1. Question
The IFR probe, was there in 1982' or was intaled in Peru later on?
2. Statement
We still need a B-707 tanker. The Kc-130 can´t do the job
FAP
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Fact is that in Africa, French Jaguars and Mirage F1s refueled behind C-160 Transall NG (next generation) which were really slow at high altitude, slower than any Hercules. No idea however if an old delta wing Mirage III could slow enough to refuel the same way. Non FBW deltas had a lot of drag at low speeds.
 
The IFR probe, was there in 1982' or was intaled in Peru later on ?
Mirage 5Ps had in-flight refueling probes as early as the early 80s, it seems.
But the question is : were they removable probes like on the Mirage 2000 ?
And did the Mirage 5P have them or only the 5P/2/3/4 ?
Were these probes made, in Peru or France ?
 
That was the initial plan. They wanted to wait at least a few more weeks - to the onslaught of the austral winter, must have been around June 21, 1982. The RN acknowledged that they really feared the winter.

OTL they wanted to conclude the war before it started - once again, mid to late June. And they suceeded.

Think the junta plan was, the events that OTL happened over the months of march and april (South Georgia metal scrappers, then Falklands invasion proper) were to be moved closer from the beginning of austral spring - I'd say may-june. As the junta knew how much time it would take for the british to a) mobilize and b) move a task force from Europe to Ascension to Falklands: six to eight weeks.

Somewhat like the russians did last winter in Ukraine, they would then have dug in and reinforced during the winter months (I would say: june to september at last).

In a sense, the Junta wanted the british to run into the winter, postpone their intervention. Then they would have dug in (in the island) while reinforcing their military strength (S.E & Exocets among other stuff) on the continent.

No idea when austral winter ends (must be around autumn in our hemisphere, inverted: that's September 21) then spring pushes to December 21 when summer starts ?

So the british task force would have to wait october or later ?
 
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Mirage 5Ps had in-flight refueling probes as early as the early 80s, it seems.
But the question is : were they removable probes like on the Mirage 2000 ?
And did the Mirage 5P have them or only the 5P/2/3/4 ?
Were these probes made, in Peru or France ?
I don ´t think that the planes had they probes when was recieved by Peru
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The probe have the french style
F-1
1705161401642.png

M-5P
1705161507771.png
 
It took quite a long time for Mirage III (by large, V included) to get refueling probes. Mirage 50 had it by 1979: legacy of Mirage F1, kinda.

But before - no idea. I even wonder if the Israelis did not did it before Dassault, somewhere in the 1970's (Kfir ?)

My understanding is that Mirage III nose and internal tankage, being older generation than Mirage F1 (almost born with a refueling probe) was not really optimal to add a refueling probe.

By the way, in the end there are two diffeent refueling probes on Mirage III
- the F1-like, planted on the nose
- the one above the air intake

Then again, I'm not sure that Mirage F1C as entering service even in 1973 with the AdA, had the refueling probe. Think it came with the F1C-200 series.
 
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It took quite a long time for Mirage III (by large, V included) to get refueling probes. Mirage 50 had it by 1979: legacy of Mirage F1, kinda.

But before - no idea. I even wonder if the Israelis did not did it before Dassault, somewhere in the 1970's (Kfir ?)

My understanding is that Mirage III nose and internal tankage, being older generation than Mirage F1 (almost born with a refueling probe) was not really optimal to add a refueling probe.

By the way, in the end there are two diffeent refueling probes on Mirage III
- the F1-like, planted on the nose
- the one above the air intake

Then again, I'm not sure that Mirage F1C as entering service even in 1973 with the AdA, had the refueling probe. Think it came with the F1C-200 series.
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Archibald
If I m not worng, this type was with the help of Israel
 
MiG-21 is a serviceable enough short range day fighter, but has no advantage over Mirage III in this scenario. R-13M and R-60 is no advance over R550 so it doesn't really even up the odds against the SHAR with AIM-9L, even assuming you find some way to get the MiG-21s to the Falklands.

So, the MiG-21MF/bis would not have been able to operate effectively over the Falklands.
The Mirage III/V family was adapted to the situation and Fishbeds would have been useless.
What the Argentines needed was more combat drop tanks and a refueling capability similar to the Mirage III/V Rose.
No 21s.
edited : Except that, thanks to their ability to use unprepared runways and resist FOD, the Fishbed could have operated from BAM Malvinas.

The Mig-21 was prepared for rough field operation and is also equiped with a brack parachute. It would be able to use less than 1 km of runway in AA configuration.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCmAQgY_RBc
 
The Mig-21 was prepared for rough field operation and is also equiped with a brack parachute. It would be able to use less than 1 km of runway in AA configuration.
That's not the problem.

The problem is the short range that wouldn't let them spend much if any time over the islands when flying from the mainland.
 
I was talking about using the Port Stanley airport on Falkland Islands.

Before the war it was used for passenger flights.

Some argentinian MB-339 jets were stationed there during the war.

A Mig-21 armed in AA configuration, with only 2-4 missiles, could in theory operate also on that 900m airstrip.

62981_1607871307.jpg


Stanley-Airport-Pre-1982-1200x802.jpg.webp


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zM7yaCoBDU4
 
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I was talking about using the Port Stanley airport on Falkland Islands.
[...]
Right. They could fly just fine from that airfield.

But they'd struggle to get there from the mainland. They'd also fail to fly CAP missions over the strikes coming to British ships east of the islands from the mainland. Worse, they'd be unable to fly to the mainland if chased off the island.

So once the British carriers are within Harrier range of the islands, any Fishbeds would be in trouble.
 
Using the three drop tanks configuration you obtain a ferry range of over 1.500 km, and you still have two pylons free for putting two AA missiles, in case you meet with unfriendlies on the way.


mig21sm-1.jpg


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And basically, if you have decent pilots any straight road of one km lenght is enough to operate the aircraft, at least in minimal load AA configuration or light attack (two UB-16 containers).


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpuORPtSxhY
 
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Rather than start a new thread, I will put this question here?
Why did the Argentinians not make strafing runs with cannon and rocket fire on the fragile superstructires of British ships and disable their weapons and sensors as well as bridge and deck crews? Pucaras and MBs would have been useful in this role.
 
And basically, if you have decent pilots any straight road of one km lenght is enough to operate the aircraft, at least in minimal load AA configuration or light attack (two UB-16 containers).
Now try and find a 1km length of road straight and level enough in the Falklands in 1982. There were no roads outside Stanley, only tracks. This was a typical Falklands "road" in 1982.

1735750156112.jpeg

It was using Stanley Airport, or some small grass strip as at Goose Green & Pebble Island for Pucara, or nothing.

Things have changed a lot on the islands in the last 40 odd years.
 
Port Stanley was good enough for Mig-21. Right after the conflict the british air force started to operate F-4 Phantom from the airstrip.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifyWNDIH3C0
I never said it wasn't. But it was the ONLY place on the islands where they could potentially operate from. You were suggesting any 1km piece of road would do (post #536). I merely pointed out that such alternatives didn't exist.

The Phantoms deployed to Port Stanley starting in Oct 1982 AFTER the runway had been extended to 1,900m (from 1,200m during the War) with aluminium planking and arrester gear installed.
 
Which took some work.
Built by Royal Engineers and Royal Air Force personnel following the cessation of hostilities in the 1982 Falklands War, this 2,000ft/609m extension of the original Port Stanley Airfield runway was made entirely of AM-2 Aluminum Matting laid over a compacted bed of stone mined from the quarries to the North. Completed between August 15th and August 27th 1982, the extension along with additional upgrades to the original runway and taxiway areas permitted the RAF to begin full-scale operations at the airfield with F-4 Phantom fighters and C-130 transports, allowing the establishment of Royal Air Force Station Stanley. Following the relocation of RAF forces to Mount Pleasant, the AM-2 Matting covering this section of the runway was removed and the extension remains unused by the modern-day airfield.
 
I never said it wasn't. But it was the ONLY place on the islands where they could potentially operate from. You were suggesting any 1km piece of road would do (post #536). I merely pointed out that such alternatives didn't exist.

The Phantoms deployed to Port Stanley starting in Oct 1982 AFTER the runway had been extended to 1,900m (from 1,200m during the War) with aluminium planking and arrester gear installed.

I did not knew that the infrastructure was at the time so desolate in the Falklands, without paved roads. Anyway, the existing landing strip at Port Stanley was good enough for the operation of Mig-21s armed in air to air or light attack configuration (for example two UB-16 57mm rocket containers weighting loaded 138 kg each).

Rather than start a new thread, I will put this question here?
Why did the Argentinians not make strafing runs with cannon and rocket fire on the fragile superstructires of British ships and disable their weapons and sensors as well as bridge and deck crews? Pucaras and MBs would have been useful in this role.

I think the Pucaras and MBs were too vulnerable to the ship defensive canons and various missiles because of their low speed. A Pucara was indeed destroyed by a Stinger during the conflict.
 
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Rather than start a new thread, I will put this question here?
Why did the Argentinians not make strafing runs with cannon and rocket fire on the fragile superstructires of British ships and disable their weapons and sensors as well as bridge and deck crews? Pucaras and MBs would have been useful in this role.
The main task of both types was close support of the ground troops.

Although 20 Pucaras deployed to the island at different times between April & the end of May 1982, there were never that many present at any one time due to aircraft lost or damaged beyond the repair capabilities of the personnel on the islands through accident, bombing attacks or simply shot down (one to a Stinger missile & one to a Sea Harrier). The losses started on 1 May with one suffering a nose gear collapse and another destroyed and several damaged during the first Sea Harrier bombing raid on Stanley airfield. Then there were the 7 destroyed or damaged beyond repair by the SAS attack on Pebble Island on 15 May. Each time replacements had to be flown in from the mainland.

As for the MB.339, only 7 deployed to the Falklands at some point during the war, with 2 returning to the mainland on 3 June. One was shot down by a Blowpipe missile over Goose Green. The remaining MB.326 & 339 were retained on the mainland in case of attack there.

On 21st May, the day of the landings at San Carlos, one of the MB.339 was sent on an armed recce sortie to confirm reports of the landings. He encountered the frigate Argonaut and fired his 8 x 127mm rockets and his cannon at her. Damage however was minimal, unlike a Skyhawk raid later in the day.
 
I am still puzzled by the enthusiasm for getting a few twin Atoll armed Mig21s to Port Stanley as somehow a Sea Harrier killer. Even if it had been possible I cannot see the Aim9L equipped Sea Harriers having much trouble with them.
The US would have provided F5s in the UK for dissimilar training much as France did with Mirages.
 
In Vietnam War, flown by competent pilots, the Mig-21 made a good figure against the american air force. It would have created problems also against the Sea Harrier.

It is interesting to watch this documentary in order to understand in what austere conditions the Mig-21 and the Mig-23/27 can conduct their operations.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDoZGoaG9_w


It is interesting to remark that later versions of Mig-21 could use also a radar version of the Atoll, which gave them an all-aspect capability.
msl_aam_r3_p05.jpg
 
Rather than start a new thread, I will put this question here?
Why did the Argentinians not make strafing runs with cannon and rocket fire on the fragile superstructires of British ships and disable their weapons and sensors as well as bridge and deck crews? Pucaras and MBs would have been useful in this role.

They did to an extent, I've seen photos of a couple of RN escorts riddled with holes from aircraft cannon fire. Lt Crippa flying an MB339 made a gun and rocket attack on HMS Argonaut on the morning of the San Carlos landing, damaging her Type 965 radar.

However the FAA did not make extensive use of rockets as part of their attacks on the British fleet. This does seem like a bit of a lost opportunity to mix up the attacks and cause damage to ships rather than trying only to sink them with bombs.
 
As for fighters on Port Stanley, any fighters there would have been hideously vulnerable to the constant attacks on that airfield. The RN regularly bombed and shelled the airfield, and there was almost no hardstand available for dispersal or defensive measures like revetments to limit damage attacks might cause. At best the FAA could conduct shuttle missions; fly out to the Falklands, do a CAP, land at Port Stanley, do a rapid turnaround before the British can mount an attack, do another CAP, fly back to the mainland. This is how the British used Sid's Strip for Sea Harriers, it added 25 minutes to the CAP time over the islands by not having to fly back to the carriers.
 
As long as the RN would have not a visual observer in place which could dirrect the fire exactly on the areas of dispersion of the Migs the shelling would not have been very effective in eliminating the threat. In fact, the vietnamese used with succes the dispersion method for their Migs, using even helicopters. The FAA could have done the same, using their Chinooks.
T015004_a.jpg


Anyway, the only successful attack on the airstrip seems to be from the Black Buck missions, which would not have been able to be performed with Mig interceptors present in the area.

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I don ´t think that the planes had they probes when was recieved by Peru
View attachment 716986
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View attachment 716988
The probe have the french style
F-1
View attachment 716989

M-5P
View attachment 716990
The Spanish Mirage F-1s did not give good results, the aircraft based in the Canary Islands suffered corrosion problems and when they were tried to be used in low-altitude attacks, several accidents occurred, at least one fatal. Pilots believe that the excessive glacis of the windscreen hinders visibility at low altitude.
 
In my opinion that War was well planned from the beginning: The main objective of the Argentine government was political and was aimed at internal public opinion, the secondary objective was of an economic nature and was aimed at controlling the enormous natural wealth of the area, the third objective was strategic and consisted of sending a message of military power to the government of Chile.

I believe that at no time did the Argentine Generals believe that a British attack carried out from thousands of kilometers was possible without the possibility of large-scale logistical support and without air superiority. It seemed crazy to me at the time and I still think it was tremendously risky.

After so many years I think we still don't know what really happened.

Maybe they thought that a government led by a woman would give in and they were wrong.

I wish we had women like that in the government of the European Union now.
 
In my opinion that War was well planned from the beginning:
In that case, I would really hate to see a badly planned War if I were a citizen of the aggressor nation.
I mean, don't results count?
 
As long as the RN would have not a visual observer in place which could dirrect the fire exactly on the areas of dispersion of the Migs the shelling would not have been very effective in eliminating the threat. In fact, the vietnamese used with succes the dispersion method for their Migs, using even helicopters. The FAA could have done the same, using their Chinooks.

The British would have had radar coverage of the Falklands airspace at medium to high altitude, they would likely know if fighters had headed back to the mainland or landed at Port Stanley. Further the SAS were on Mt Kent from 25 May so would have at least some eyes on Port Stanley airfield.

Flying fighters to and from the airfield is not a serious military tactic. Firstly where is the hardstand strong enough to park a fighter on? Secondly what if the Chinook is not available to fly the fighter back from the airfield, or gets shot down while doing this task? Dispersal has to be done at airfields, like the FAA did by dispersing it's Pucaras at Goose Green and Pebble Island, or at hard-standing on the main airfield which was in impossibly short supply at Port Stanley.
 
In that case, I would really hate to see a badly planned War if I were a citizen of the aggressor nation.
I mean, don't results count?
Strictly military, War is War regardless of who starts it and who ends it. The causes, almost always the same.

Almost all the dictators with long mandates Franco, Castro... they have survived by not starting wars.

When a dictator attacks his neighbors, it is because he does not know well the trade of survival.

For a dictator, the only thing that counts is survival at any cost, including the lives of all citizens who are necessary.

All that is needed for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.

Some good men who have gone down in history this week will be remembered for what they did not do, I don't think it will be a good result for their management.
 
The very first attack on Port Stanley airfield on the opening day of British operations by Sea Harriers (1 May) destroyed one Pucara and damaged several others, not all of which proved repairable.

What were the results of the Black Buck missions?

BB1 - one hole in the runway that failed to close it
BB2 - all the bombs missed anything important
BB3 & 4 - cancelled
BB5 - anti-radar mission. Minor damage to Westinghouse warning radar that failed to put it out of action.
BB6 - anti-radar mission that destroyed a Skyguard AA fire control radar. The aircraft caused much embarrassment by landing at Rio de Janiero after it broke its refuelling probe on the way home. It landed still carrying a US supplied Shrike ARM that hung up.
BB7 - last bombing mission targeting stores and aircraft at Stanley airfield 2 days before surrender. All missed their intended targets.

These missions consumed huge quantities of tanker support (15 Victors each time) just to get a single Vulcan down to the Falklands. To achieve exactly what?

So we're the BB missions worthwhile?

Perhapsd their greatest effect was making the Argentinians believe that an air attack on the mainland was possible and that aviation resources had to be retained there.
 
The very first attack on Port Stanley airfield on the opening day of British operations by Sea Harriers (1 May) destroyed one Pucara and damaged several others, not all of which proved repairable.

What were the results of the Black Buck missions?

BB1 - one hole in the runway that failed to close it
BB2 - all the bombs missed anything important
BB3 & 4 - cancelled
BB5 - anti-radar mission. Minor damage to Westinghouse warning radar that failed to put it out of action.
BB6 - anti-radar mission that destroyed a Skyguard AA fire control radar. The aircraft caused much embarrassment by landing at Rio de Janiero after it broke its refuelling probe on the way home. It landed still carrying a US supplied Shrike ARM that hung up.
BB7 - last bombing mission targeting stores and aircraft at Stanley airfield 2 days before surrender. All missed their intended targets.

These missions consumed huge quantities of tanker support (15 Victors each time) just to get a single Vulcan down to the Falklands. To achieve exactly what?

So we're the BB missions worthwhile?

Perhapsd their greatest effect was making the Argentinians believe that an air attack on the mainland was possible and that aviation resources had to be retained there.
These epic long-duration missions were only intended to demonstrate to the Soviets the military and technological capability of the British forces. At that time there were many bloody criticisms in the Soviet press (and in that of its Western slaves) about the British ability to preserve some of its colonies furthest from the Metropolis that, if a Cuba-type coup d'état occurred, in any of them they would become excellent Soviet naval bases. They were simply testing whether the cake was already sufficiently cooked.
 
The RN regularly bombed and shelled the airfield, and there was almost no hardstand available for dispersal or defensive measures like revetments to limit damage attacks might cause..
One can quickly build a crude revetment with standard construction equipment, or even by hand if you have rocks and guys filling sandbags. On the whole, I'd agree it wasn't worth losing more than a handful of the existing aircraft in their fleet.
 
I was in the UK during the Falklands War. I felt bruised national pride was a big factor in slugging it out with Argentina. Very little strategic considerations in place.
In my opinion, when the Argentines decided to occupy the islands, they were convinced that their action would only get a diplomatic protest. From a military point of view, anything else seemed impossible. Think about what it cost to cross the canal with an army in 1944. I believe that only Soviet interest in the colonies made this war possible. Maybe the Russians thought that this time it would be like Suez, and they were wrong.
 
I am still puzzled by the enthusiasm for getting a few twin Atoll armed Mig21s to Port Stanley as somehow a Sea Harrier killer. Even if it had been possible I cannot see the Aim9L equipped Sea Harriers having much trouble with them.
The US would have provided F5s in the UK for dissimilar training much as France did with Mirages.
Fighters don't win wars
 
One can quickly build a crude revetment with standard construction equipment, or even by hand if you have rocks and guys filling sandbags. On the whole, I'd agree it wasn't worth losing more than a handful of the existing aircraft in their fleet.
The British knew this from their experiences against the German airfields in France during 1944.
 

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