This paragraph is from Page 52 of "The Ships & Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet - Thirteenth Edition" by Norman Polmar and published in 1984.
The current U.S. Navy goal is 100 SSNs. Some Navy authorities have estimated that requirements in the 1990s and beyond could be as high as 100 SSNs. The navy is now building SSNs at the rate of 4 of the LOS ANGELES class per year, a rate to sustain a force of more than 100 SSNs. The replacement of older SSNs as they reach a normal service life of about 25 years, however, will probably hold the force at just over 90 submarines. (Ninety attack submarines was the Navy's force goal from 1973 to 1981 - that goal was never achieved; before that a force of 120 attack submarines, both diesel and nuclear, was authorised.)
IIRC from Norman Friedman in his book about post-war submarines (which I haven't checked) the pre-1973 requirement was for 105 attack submarines (both diesel & nuclear) not 120 and copies of Jane's from the late 1960s to early 1970s (which I haven't checked either) say 105 attack submarines too.

Who is correct?

However, if I've remembered Friedman correctly the service life of a nuclear powered submarine (SSBN as well as SSN) increased to 30 years by the middle 1970s as the interval between each refuelling increased to 10 years. That would have required an average building rate of 3 SSN a year to maintain a force of 90 boats and 4 a year to maintain a force of 120 boats.
 
This site has scale drawings of the SCB 100/100A/101 and 103 deck layouts, although the Midway's SCB101 lacks detail.

The Coral Sea 110A landing on deck area is much longer than the FDRs 110, the former extending level with the bow cats and lacking the deck edge lift at it's forward end. The FDR (and presumably the Midway which had the same 110 rebuild) landing on area only extends level with the island, then has the deck edge lift at it's forward end.

The biggest difference between the Coral Sea and Midway post SCB101 is beam overall at the flight deck, the Coral Sea is ~232' while the Midway is ~260'. By the drawings it looks like the Midway's landing on deck angle was increased of Coral Sea and FDR. I suspect that this increase in deck area over the Coral Sea is the bridge too far that ruined Midway.
The landing-path angle for Midway & FDR's SCB-110 was 10.5°.*
Coral Sea's SCB-110A and Midway's SCB-101.66 gave them a 13.5° angle.

* As was that of the SCB-125 Essex class ships, the Forrestals, the Kitty Hawks (all 4) and Enterprise.
The Nimitz class actually reduced the angle to 9.05°.


As for flight deck areas...
Midway class as built: flight deck area 104,216.6²
SCB-110: flight deck area 121,569.9'²
SCB-110A: flight deck area ?'²
SCB-101.66: flight deck area 175,111.2'²

I have searched several times and never found a flight deck area specification for Coral Sea - but I estimate it to be around 155,000 - 160,000 square feet.
 
IIRC from Norman Friedman in his book about post-war submarines (which I haven't checked) the pre-1973 requirement was for 105 attack submarines (both diesel & nuclear) not 120 and copies of Jane's from the late 1960s to early 1970s (which I haven't checked either) say 105 attack submarines too.
E.g. these paragraphs form Page 395 of Jane's 1968-69 which Norman Polmar wrote.
The attack submarines are a component of the general warfare forces and have a primary mission of anti-submarine warfare-seeking out and destroying enemy submarines. Current force levels provide for 105 attack submarines. At the end of 1968 there are 38 nuclear-powered attack submarines and approximately 70 conventional attack submarines in service.
The Department of Defense have stated that 57 "first-line" attack submarines of the "Narwhal", "Sturgeon", "Permit", and "Skipjack" classes will be required in the 1970s. In addition , the attack submarine force will have three additional "first-line" submarines of these classes for "general backup", nine older nuclear-powered submarines, the 12 post-World War II conventional submarines, and about a score of of modernised World War II-era submarines. Critics of Department of Defence policy advocate an all-nuclear attack submarine force.
That is:
60 first-line SSN of the Narwhal, Sturgeon, Permit and Skipjack classes.​
9 second-line SSN - one Tullibee, one Halibut , one Triton, 4 Skate, one Seawolf and one Nautilus class.​
12 post-World War II conventional submarines - 3 Barbel, one Darter, 2 Sailfish and 6 Tang class.​
About 20 modernised World War II-era submarines.​
Which makes a total of about 100 attack submarines (69 SSN & about 32 SS) instead of 120.

At that time 59 first-line SSN of the Narwhal, Sturgeon, Permit and Skipjack classes were in service, building, on order or proposed. That is 5 Skipjack, 13 Permit/Thresher, one Narwhal and 40 Sturgeon class. Only 37 Sturgeon class would be built because SSN-685 was built as the one-off Glenard P. Lipscomb and the 2 Sturgeons proposed for FY1970 would be built as the first 2 Los Angels class boats.

There were actually 14 post-World War II conventional submarines but the former SSG Greyback & Growler were to be converted into Transport Submarines (APSS). However, the planned conversion of Growler was cancelled and Greyback's designation was changed to LPSS (for Amphibious Transport Submarine).
 
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This table is also from the 13th Edition of "The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet" which is on Internet Archive.
Source:https://archive.org/details/shipsaircraftofu0013polm/page/3/mode/1up

Fleet Strength from P.3 of US Fleet 13th Ed..png

Until 1977 the U.S. Fiscal Year ended on 30th June
Therefore, 1964, 1968, 1972 & 1976 are at 30th June of those years
From 1977 the U.S. Fiscal Year ended on 30th September
Therefore, 1980, 1984 & 1990 are at 30th September of those years
n.a. = not available.
* = Plus one CV in yard for modernisation (SLEP) in 1980 and 1984.
** = Includes LPD's employed as flagships (AGF).
Total Active Ships exclude the Naval Auxiliary Force and Naval Reserve Force​

I added the totals for the lines that are emboldened. Except for 1990 my totals don't add to the totals in the first 3 lines of the table. I've checked the original and my Excel spreadsheet umpteen times, but can't find the errors. If you see any please send me a Private Message and I will make the necessary corrections.

Furthermore, there are discrepancies between the figures in this table and the tables that I posted earlier in the thread.
 
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The landing-path angle for Midway & FDR's SCB-110 was 10.5°.*
Coral Sea's SCB-110A and Midway's SCB-101.66 gave them a 13.5° angle.

* As was that of the SCB-125 Essex class ships, the Forrestals, the Kitty Hawks (all 4) and Enterprise.
The Nimitz class actually reduced the angle to 9.05°.


As for flight deck areas...
Midway class as built: flight deck area 104,216.6²
SCB-110: flight deck area 121,569.9'²
SCB-110A: flight deck area ?'²
SCB-101.66: flight deck area 175,111.2'²

I have searched several times and never found a flight deck area specification for Coral Sea - but I estimate it to be around 155,000 - 160,000 square feet.

I suspect that was a search for clearance between the landing flight path and the island. By the time the Nimitz rolled around it was so big and but its island was very small and placed well back that the angle of the landing deck could be reduced.

The question remains would the SCB11A deck layout be sufficient to operate the F111B without being so big and heavy that the freeboard issues on the Midway wouldn't arise?
 
You mean SCB-110A, I presume.

Coral Sea hosted the F-111B carrier trials... and after landing one on, moving it to the hangar (just barely fit on the deck-edge elevator) and moving it around in there, then returning it to the flight deck and launching it (plus deck handling exercises) the various Admirals and Captains shook their heads and proclaimed (I'm paraphrasing, but not much) "That F&^%#er is too D$mn big!".

Additionally, a fully-fueled (but no external payload) F-111B was just a little above the max load of the aircraft elevators... so they needed to be beefed up a little even if they weren't made larger.

Yes, it could just work, but at the expense of reduced aircraft numbers and a higher risk of bumping into something or dropping one over the side.


The F-14 was almost as big but fit a bit more comfortably, and fully fueled with no external load was under the elevator load limit... but you could not raise the canopy to the 60 degrees required to remove the canopy so the ejection seat could be removed for servicing. Nor could you jack the Tomcat high enough to achieve full extension of the landing gear so it could be raised and lowered for maintenance because the vertical stabilizers would hit the ceiling. Both operations required 4'-5' higher clearance than the Midways' hangars had... which is why F-14s could land on and take off from Midway, but could not be stationed aboard.

If the USN really wanted to operate the F-111B, F-14, or another large fighter from the Midways, they needed to pay more attention to detail design (maybe folding tails and a canopy designed for removal when near or at the closed position).
 
I don't disagree with any of that, the problem is that between 1962 and 1966 the future of the USN fighter force was the F111B and any carrier that cannot operate the F111B will only be able to serve until the F4 sqns last. This changed with the short-lived VFAX of 1966, but by 1968 the USN was back in a similar if somewhat better position with the VFX-F14 for another 5 or so years until the 2nd VFAX-F/A18. However this will drive decision making on the carrier fleet on and off for over a decide.

It's not just the Midways this will affect, someone said earlier in this thread that even the big C7 catapult can't launch fully loaded F111B in still air and the Forrestal and Saratoga had 2 C11s and 2 C7s so would have been in a really bad way.
 
Part of Post 201 about attack submarine requirements.
IIRC from Norman Friedman in his book about post-war submarines (which I haven't checked) the pre-1973 requirement was for 105 attack submarines (both diesel & nuclear) not 120 and copies of Jane's from the late 1960s to early 1970s (which I haven't checked either) say 105 attack submarines too.
Link to Post 203 in which I wrote that according to Jane's 1968-69 the USN had a requirement for 105 attack submarines.
I've also had a look at the copies of Jane's on Internet Archive from 1969-70 to 1974-75.
  • Jane's 1969-70 says 105 attack submarines, but doesn't go into as much detail about the proposed composition of the force than the previous edition.
    • However, instead of 40 Sturgeon class, it now says 37 Sturgeon class with the 34th & 35th to be completed in 1973, but it didn't say when 36th & 37th were to be completed.
    • SSN685 (Glenard P. Lipscomb) is now shown as a one-off "Quiet Design" to be completed in 1973.
    • SSN688 & 689 are now shown separately as "High Speed Design" but doesn't have projected completion dates. On the other hand it does say that 3 ships of this design were proposed for the FY1970 shipbuilding programme, but the third submarine (SSN690) was deferred to FY1970.
  • Jane's 1970-71 & 1971-72 aren't on Internet Archive.
  • Jane's 1972-73 & 1973-74 don't say how many attack submarines the USN wanted.
  • Jane's 1974-75 says that the current US attack submarine force goal was 90 nuclear-propelled submarines. This would not be attained until at least the early 1980s when the Navy would have 26 Los Angels class (including 3 proposed in the FY1975 programme, 53 other first-line SSNs (Skipjack & later) and 8 older SSNs suitable only for training & research. (26+53+8=87 not 90.) It doesn't say anything about this being a reduction from a requirement for 120 or 105 attack submarines.
    • 23 Los Angles class had been authorised FY1970 to FY1974 and were to complete between February 1975 and 1979.
    • 3 Los Angles class were proposed for the FY1975 programme, no commissioning dates were provided, but my guess is that they were planned to be completed in 1980.
    • Additional submarines were planned at the rate of 5 every 2 years.
    • 8 out of 9 second-line SSNs were in commission. These were Nautilus, Seawolf, Tullibee, Halibut and the 4 boats of the Skate class. Triton was decommissioned in 1969 and Nautilus could be expected to decommission in the near future. Halibut & Seawolf had been designated "mother" submarines for the deep submergence research programmes.
 
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Jane's 1974-75 says that the current US attack submarine force goal was 90 nuclear-propelled submarines. This would not be attained until at least the early 1980s when the Navy would have 26 Los Angels class (including 3 proposed in the FY1975 programme, 53 other first-line SSNs (Skipjack & later) and 8 older SSNs suitable only for training & research. (26+53+8=87 not 90.) It doesn't say anything about this being a reduction from a requirement for 120 or 105 attack submarines.
  • 23 Los Angles class had been authorised FY1970 to FY1974 and were to complete between February 1975 and 1979.
  • 3 Los Angles class were proposed for the FY1975 programme, no commissioning dates were provided, but my guess is that they were planned to be completed in 1980.
  • Additional submarines were planned at the rate of 5 every 2 years.
  • 8 out of 9 second-line SSNs were in commission. These were Nautilus, Seawolf, Tullibee, Halibut and the 4 boats of the Skate class. Triton was decommissioned in 1969 and Nautilus could be expected to decommission in the near future. Halibut & Seawolf had been designated "mother" submarines for the deep submergence research programmes.
If Jane's misunderstood the USN saying "90 attack submarines" as only including nuclear boats when the USN was getting 87 SSNs plus 3 good SSKs (Barbel class) to make 90, it works.

But yes, ever since the USN started decomissioning the 637s, the total fleet numbers really took a dive. And the Combat Commanders like CENTCOM had mission plans written around having 90ish boats.

Edit: And those Combat Commanders STILL have mission plans written around having 90 boats!
 
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Playing around with some broadly-contemporary figures (which I think are from Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, but can't confirm just now), the 1958 paper seems to suggest 1.5 MAF lift. The requirement for one MAF would be:
  • 12 helicopter assault ships
  • 9 amphibious transport docks
  • 9 dock landing ships
  • 18 tank landing ships
  • 3 fast amphibious transports
  • 6 assault fire support ships
  • 5 attack cargo ships
  • 1 headquarters ship
That actually tracks with the number of NEWPORT class tank landing ship ordered: 27 were planned, but only 20 were completed. Similarly, 15 amphibious transport docks and 13 dock landing ships were completed in the 1960s and early 1970s, all corresponding broadly to 20-knot shipping for a 1.5 MAF lift capability.
At this time the navy's force goal for FY 76 [01.7.75 to 30.06.76] was two 20-kt MEF-level forces:
  • 6 AGC,
  • 16 LPH,
  • 10 AKA,
  • 26 LSD,
  • 26 LPD,
  • 40 LST, and
  • 4 tankers,
  • plus ancillary ships such as 6 APD and 2 APSS.
McNamara supported both 20-kt capability and the ability to mount a full divisional attack. With limited rather than general war in view, 20 kts no longer seemed so important as protection against submarines. In a world full of crises, however, it offered valuable flexibility. a 20-kt force in the Eastern Pacific could deploy to many areas in the Atlantic about as quickly as a 13-kt force based in the Atlantic.

That's a total of 132 amphibious ships and 4 tankers. That's similar to the fleet for 1975 as projected in 1967 which included 137 amphibious ships. See Post 38.

In the "money no object" line of thought would there be a continued interest in APD/LPR conversions?

My first thought was to utilize the non-FRAM'd Sumner/Robert H. Smith ships, in stripping everything after the first funnel to give a similar transport capability to the Charles Lawrence/Crosley classes. However the Sumner boasts a significant firepower advantage with four 5" barrels over the single gun found on the converted DEs.

Another thought was a new-build route utilizing the Forest Sherman/CF Adams hull design as a baseline.
 
In the "money no object" line of thought would there be a continued interest in APD/LPR conversions?

My first thought was to utilize the non-FRAM'd Sumner/Robert H. Smith ships, in stripping everything after the first funnel to give a similar transport capability to the Charles Lawrence/Crosley classes. However the Sumner boasts a significant firepower advantage with four 5" barrels over the single gun found on the converted DEs.

Another thought was a new-build route utilizing the Forest Sherman/CF Adams hull design as a baseline.
I recall that the plan in the 1960s was to build new APDs to replace the surviving wartime APDs and a new class of Inshore Fire Support Ship (armed 5in & 8in guns and rockets) to replace the various types of Landing Craft derived fire support vessels and the dwindling number of gun cruisers. However, I don't recall Friedman saying how many were planned or when they were planned to be built.
 
In the "money no object" line of thought would there be a continued interest in APD/LPR conversions?

My first thought was to utilize the non-FRAM'd Sumner/Robert H. Smith ships, in stripping everything after the first funnel to give a similar transport capability to the Charles Lawrence/Crosley classes. However the Sumner boasts a significant firepower advantage with four 5" barrels over the single gun found on the converted DEs.

Another thought was a new-build route utilizing the Forest Sherman/CF Adams hull design as a baseline.
I recall that the plan in the 1960s was to build new APDs to replace the surviving wartime APDs and a new class of Inshore Fire Support Ship (armed 5in & 8in guns and rockets) to replace the various types of Landing Craft derived fire support vessels and the dwindling number of gun cruisers. However, I don't recall Friedman saying how many were planned or when they were planned to be built.
See Below. Post 93 from Page 3
Chapter 14 Fire Support Revisited
Pages 403 - 424

This chapter was about a new class of Landing Ship Fire Support (LFS) that was proposed in the 1960s, but there isn't much about the number of ships required.

There is this paragraph on Pages 406 and 407.
  • In May 1964 the Marines produced MCDEC (Marine Cops Development Centre) project 30-64-01, "Naval Gunfire Requirements for the Long Range Period Through 1975 for a Division/Wing Team (MEF)", a study for naval gunfire support (NGS) requirements for the period through 1975.
  • The CNO and CMC (Commandant Marine Corps) convened an ad hoc working group, the Hooper Committee, on NGS.
  • At least three 8in ships would be needed to support an opposed MEF landing.
  • Without active rocket ships, there was little neutralisation of fire.
  • Four such ships would be needed in an MEF landing.
  • The committee therefore recommended commissioning two Battleships and two Heavy Cruisers while developing an LFS.
  • Four LSMR/IFS should be commissioned at once, and preparation made to activate four more on an accelerated basis.
  • The Navy decided to retain two active Heavy Cruisers in commission and to activate four rocket ships (Carronade and three LSMR), which were assigned to the Pacific Fleet.
  • The Marines wanted one Heavy Cruiser, four LFS and seven destroyers to support an MEF landing: the two MEF requirement thus equated to eight LFS.
  • LFS characteristics were not identified.
And these sentences on Page 417.
  • In January 1970 the LFS was due for briefing to Op-03 (in charge of surface warships) so that it could be entered into the long-range T-OPM for FY 72.
  • It would be included in the Five Year Defence Plan, funded in FY 72 for construction of a lead ship beginning in 1973.
  • It was expected that seven to ten LFS would be built.
At the bottom of Page 408 and the top of Page 409 it also says that ln late 1965 a study showed that 6 LFS were required to support an opposed invasion of North Vietnam (Vin A) which would require a total of 12 to ensure the presence of 6 at H-30 because 3 would be lost in the approach to the target area and 3 more would be lost in the target area. This LFS would be armed with two 175mm guns and four twin 5in/54 lightweight guns.

The above seems to have evolved into the LSFR (because it was armed with guns and rockets) illustrated on Page 411. The date of the design was 29.11.68 and its characteristics were as follows:
  • Armament:
    • Twelve 5in rocket launchers on the foc'sle;
    • Two single Major Calibre Lightweight Gun Mountings (still 175mm) in A & Y positions;
    • Four single 5in lightweight guns (Mk 45s) in B, C, W & X positions superfiring the big guns;
    • Two Mk 86 directors for the guns, one forward in D position and one atop the aft "mack";
    • One BPMS launcher in V position, superfiring the aft 5in guns;
    • There was a helipad on the quarterdeck, but no hangar.
  • Dimensions:
    • 550 x 57.8 x 17.2 feet.
  • Displacement:
    • 5,487 tons light;
    • 7,258 tons full load.
  • Machinery and Maximum Speed:
    • Diesel engines producing 15,600bhp, driving twin screws for a speed of 20 knots.
  • Endurance:
    • 10,000 nautical miles at 20 knots.
  • Accommodation for 18 officers and 291 enlisted men for a total of 309 all ranks.
That's the most powerfully armed version of the LFS in the chapter and as this is a money-no-object thread, this is the design that would have been built, with the 8in Mk 71 MCLWG in place of the 175mm version.

That is, it was the most powerfully armed version apart from a late 1967 design for a ship armed with a triple 16in/50 turret, one MCLWG (175mm) and two single 5in guns. The illustration of the ship on Page 409 has two side drawings, one with two 5in Mk 42s and the other with two 5in Mk 45s. There was only one Mk 86 fire control system, no rockets and no BPMS. There would be a landing area sufficient for one HU2K (SH-2) helicopter. The hull dimensions were (480ft x 72ft x 16ft 11in) making it shorter and beamier than the 29.11.68 design. Its displacement at 9,000 tons, was larger than the 29.11.68 design, but Friedman didn't say whether that was the light or full load displacement. Her diesel propulsion was to be sufficient for 20 knots on two shafts, with an endurance of 10,000 nautical miles, which I presume was at 20 knots, although he didn't say so specifically. The ship would accommodate 14 officers and 288 enlisted men for a total of 302 all ranks, which was about the same as the 29.11.68 design.

IIRC another reason why they wanted some Inshore Fire Support Ships was that modern destroyers couldn't get as close to shore as World War II destroyers, due to their increase in size and to avoid damage to their sonar domes.
 
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In the "money no object" line of thought would there be a continued interest in APD/LPR conversions?

My first thought was to utilize the non-FRAM'd Sumner/Robert H. Smith ships, in stripping everything after the first funnel to give a similar transport capability to the Charles Lawrence/Crosley classes. However the Sumner boasts a significant firepower advantage with four 5" barrels over the single gun found on the converted DEs.

Another thought was a new-build route utilizing the Forest Sherman/CF Adams hull design as a baseline.
I've not heard of any plans for additional/new LPRs, but they'd certainly be required: at least twelve would be needed to put six on each coast, and by 1969 only eight wartime ones were left.

Likewise, while the LPSS requirement would initially be filled by three converted fleet boats and the GRAYBACK, something else would be needed in time. Converting GROWLER is an obvious measure but only gets you half way there.


Edit: disregard the above, I've multiplied by two twice. But replacements for the wartime LPRs would be needed eventually, and converting GROWLER to run alongside GRAYBACK to get two modern-ish LPSS makes a lot of sense.
That's the most powerfully armed version of the LFS in the chapter and as this is a money-no-object thread, this is the design that would have been built, with the 8in Mk 71 MCLWG in place of the 175mm version.
I'd guess that's most likely, but it's not guaranteed - it may be that the larger version was a design study aimed at 'if you want all the things you've asked for, you'll get a ship that's too big to be useful'.
 
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In the "money no object" line of thought would there be a continued interest in APD/LPR conversions?

My first thought was to utilize the non-FRAM'd Sumner/Robert H. Smith ships, in stripping everything after the first funnel to give a similar transport capability to the Charles Lawrence/Crosley classes. However the Sumner boasts a significant firepower advantage with four 5" barrels over the single gun found on the converted DEs.

Another thought was a new-build route utilizing the Forest Sherman/CF Adams hull design as a baseline.
In Norman Friedman's US Small Combatants there's a brief description of an Ocean Surveillance ship (more of a small destroyer escort or Frigate) which was also expected to perform APD roles.
 
Partly in reference to Post #4 and the ‘Wish List’…This is from Warships and Navies Review (1974 I think)…regarding the U.S.Navy.
It helps to show what effect the Vietnam War was having on the Military (Navy) Budget.
 

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Partly in reference to Post #4 and the ‘Wish List’…This is from Warships and Navies Review (1974 I think)…regarding the U.S.Navy.
It helps to show what effect the Vietnam War was having on the Military (Navy) Budget.
Ninja'd!

See Message 36 below.
Some more background information.
  • According to the tables in Posts 32, 33 and 35 the US Navy had 932 active ships on 30.06.67. This included 105 (attack) submarines, 23 aircraft carriers, 297 surface warships and 162 amphibious assault ships.
  • According to the tables in Posts 33 and 35 the US Navy had 559 active ships at 30.06.75. This included 75 (attack) submarines, 15 aircraft carriers, 193 surface warships and 64 amphibious assault ships.
  • That's a reduction of 373 ships including 30 (attack) submarines, 8 aircraft carriers, 104 surface warships and 102 amphibious assault ships.
  • However, in 1967 the fleet planned for 1975 had 826 active ships. This included 105 (attack submarines), 20 aircraft carriers, 243 surface warships (the source called them "escort ships" and 137 amphibious assault ships.
    • That is according to an article called "American Sea Power" by James D. Hessman in in the Second Edition of "Warships & Navies Review" Edited by Anthony J. Watts.
    • Which, in turn, said that it was according to tables provided for the Senate Armed Service Committee by by Zumwalt during the so-called "authorisation" hearings on the 1973 Defense Department budget.
 
Partly in reference to Post #4 and the ‘Wish List’…This is from Warships and Navies Review (1974 I think)…regarding the U.S.Navy.
It helps to show what effect the Vietnam War was having on the Military (Navy) Budget.
And Message 37.

See attached from the 1972 (for FY73) Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings, it shows how the forecasts/plans for 1975 changed year by year from 1967.
This is the attachment.

Senate Appropriations Committee FY73 Hearings.png
 
Partly in reference to Post #4 and the ‘Wish List’…This is from Warships and Navies Review (1974 I think)…regarding the U.S.Navy.
It helps to show what effect the Vietnam War was having on the Military (Navy) Budget.
And Message 38.
FWIW I don't need to as the article I quoted included that information. I didn't include it in Post 36 because I thought the projected fleet for 1975 at 1968, 1969 & 1970 irrelevant. (And still do.)

However, for completeness these are the projected fleets for 1975 in 1967, 1968, 1969 & 1970 and the actual fleets in 1967 & 1975 according to my sources.

1741788668744.png

And here's a full-size version your table in Post 37.

1741788723145.png
 
Well, yeah.

Once nuclear power was proven for subs, the diesel boats were utterly non-competitive. Only the Barbel class boat was anything resembling competitive. Now, could there have been a small number of diesel boats maintained as LPSS? Sure. That's probably the one place where the USN messed up. But an LPSS is basically a giant SEAL Delivery Vehicle, not a submarine.
 
Now, could there have been a small number of diesel boats maintained as LPSS? Sure. That's probably the one place where the USN messed up. But an LPSS is basically a giant SEAL Delivery Vehicle, not a submarine.
Given that the number in question is likely 'two', and the role has been filled by surplus SSBNs since the 1980s, I suspect the advantages of a diesel boat were outweighed by the disadvantages of having a very small number in an otherwise all-nuclear force.
 
Given that the number in question is likely 'two', and the role has been filled by surplus SSBNs since the 1980s, I suspect the advantages of a diesel boat were outweighed by the disadvantages of having a very small number in an otherwise all-nuclear force.
I'd honestly want more like 12. 3 in Holy Loch, 3 in La Maddelena, and 6 in Yokosuka (option to base 3 of those elsewhere, like Darwin or the UAE). That gives 4 at sea at all times.
 
I'd honestly want more like 12. 3 in Holy Loch, 3 in La Maddelena, and 6 in Yokosuka (option to base 3 of those elsewhere, like Darwin or the UAE). That gives 4 at sea at all times.
The actual stated requirement in the relevant timeframe was for two: one to accompany each MEF. You could reasonably argue for a third to cover refits. As a division-scale landing would be planned weeks or months in advance, maintaining a force continually at sea wouldn't be a requirement.

I don't think there was ever a formal requirement for more than eight or ten of them, and that was in the late 1940s when the USN could put silly things like 'a thousand SSKs' in its forward plans.
 
US Aircraft Carriers Laid Down 1952-1970
That is with 12 authorised FY 1952 to FY 1963 at the rate of one per year.
And 3 authorised FY 1965, FY 1967 and FY 1969.

US Super Carriers to Middle 1970s.png

Notes
  • Names.
    • The extra aircraft carriers are so named because I have that sort of sense of humour.
    • However, so did Congress because they allowed SSBNs called Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, so it was really "Thirty-nine for Freedom and Two for Slavery".
    • According to Page 309 of Jane's 1961-62 names considered for Enterprise included Congress and Constitution.
  • Building Times.
    • The average building time for Forrestal to Enterprise were 2 years 9 months to launch and 10 months to fit out for a total of 3 years 7 months.
    • John F. Kennedy was to have been launched on 01.04.67 and completed on 29.04.68 which are the dates in the table.
    • According to Page 353 of Jane's 1968-69 CVAN-68 (Nimitz) was ordered on 31.03.67, laid down on 22.06.68 and will be completed 1971-72 at a cost of $544,000,000.
    • That's why Nimitz, Eisenhower and the 4 the extra ships took 2 years 6 months to launch and one year to fit out for a total of 3 years and 6 months.
  • Designs.
    • Kitty Hawk class.
      • They kept their 2 Terrier launchers which had the NTU as part of their SLEP refits.
    • Enterprise class.
      • All 6 ships were completed with 2 Terrier launchers and Scanfar radars.
      • Both systems had their valve electronics replaced by solid-state electronics in "get well" refits that improved their performance as well as their reliability.
      • Aegis was fitted in the 1980s and the Scanfar radars were replaced by SPY-1A radars.
    • Nimitz class
      • It might not be possible to build the 1965 Carrier as a Nimitz.
      • The A4W reactor may not be ready and the SCB.101 design may not be ready.
      • It might be built as a SCB.250.
      • Except that AIUI IOTL no SCB.250s were built because the USN didn't want another one-off aircraft carrier, especially a nuclear powered one.
  • The Midway class.
    • Midway didn't have her SCB.101 refit because one was never planned ITTL.
    • A similar refit was never planned F.D.R. ITTL.
    • The USN had 12 super carriers by 1968 ITTL instead of 9.
    • And 3 more were under construction, on order or planned to complete 1969-73 to replace the Nimitz class.
      • CVAN-71 replaced Midway.
      • CVAN-72 replaced Franklin D. Roosevelt.
      • CVAN-73 replaced Coral Sea.
    • Therefore, the SCB.101 refits weren't required.
    • And Rosie's austere refit of OTL wasn't needed either.
  • Future construction.
    • Carl Vinson (CVN-70 IOTL and CVAN-74 ITTL) was planned for FY 1971 for completion 1975-76.
    • And due to the delays and cost overruns Nimitz & Eisenhower went through was actually authorised in FY 1974 and completed in 1982 IOTL.
    • At that point IOTL the USN had twelve aircraft carriers of post-war construction plus Midway and Coral Sea for a total of fourteen against a long-standing requirement for a minimum of fifteen attack carriers not counting any ships having a SLEP refit.
    • IOTL the next carriers authorised were.
      • FY 1980 Theodore Roosevelt.
      • FY 1983 Abraham Lincoln & George Washington.
      • FY 1988 John C. Stennis & Harry S. Truman.
    • Of these 5 ships.
      • Roosevelt was the fifteen aircraft carrier.
      • Lincoln was the sixteenth aircraft carrier and was to cover the ship having a SLEP refit.
      • Washington was to replace Coral Sea.
      • Stennis was to replace Midway
        • And.
      • Truman was to replace Forrestal.
    • So what happens next ITTL?
      • Carl Vinson (whenever built) would be the USN's sixteen aircraft carrier of post-war construction rather than the twelfth.
      • So do they build her, give Forrestal to Constellation SLEP refits and don't order the next aircraft carrier until FY 1988 when two are ordered to replace Forrestal & Saratoga?
      • Or do they keep building aircraft carriers at the rate of one every two years.
        • To replace Forrestal to Kitty Hawk between 1975-76 & 1985-86.
          • At which point the USN has 15 CVAN completed since 1961.
        • And then Enterprise to Kennedy 1987-88 to 1997-98?
          • At which point the USN has 15 Nimitz class completed since 1969.
        • In the latter case there isn't a Service Life Extension Programme, because it wasn't required.
      • Or they increase the building rate to one very 3 years starting FY 1971 and increase the service life of an attack carrier from 30 to 45 years.
        • In which case 8 were completed by the late 1990s instead of 12.
        • Kennedy wouldn't be replaced until 2008-09.
        • And some of the first 12 super carriers would have to have a SLEP refit.
Just a thought.
 
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Or they increase the building rate to one very 3 years starting FY 1971 and increase the service life of an attack carrier from 30 to 45 years.
FYI that was the target build rate for the NIMITZ class once they'd stepped down from one every two years after VINSON. Obviously VINSON was delayed, then messing around with CVV meant the 1977 ship didn't happen, but the actual build program (rather than order schedule) through the 1980s and 1990s stuck pretty close to it.

Doing a 3-year drumbeat and a 50-year life means you can also keep a 16th carrier around as a training ship, retiring the LEXINGTON once the VINSON comes along circa 1979 - and the FORRESTAL becomes AVT-59 twelve years early.
 
FYI that was the target build rate for the NIMITZ class once they'd stepped down from one every two years after VINSON. Obviously VINSON was delayed, then messing around with CVV meant the 1977 ship didn't happen, but the actual build program (rather than order schedule) through the 1980s and 1990s stuck pretty close to it.

Doing a 3-year drumbeat and a 50-year life means you can also keep a 16th carrier around as a training ship, retiring the LEXINGTON once the VINSON comes along circa 1979 - and the FORRESTAL becomes AVT-59 twelve years early.
FWIW another option is to keep building one a year until the target of 15 post-war attack carriers is reached in 1969 instead of 1973. The 3 extra ships would be authorised FY 1964 to 1966 and be built to the SCB.250 design.

Then build 6-10 SCB.100 Anti-Submarine Support Carriers to replace the Essex class used in that role, which may include one ship to replace Lexington as the training carrier.

Then resume building super carriers at the rate required to maintain a force of 15 ships under 30 years of age or 15 ships under 45 years of age.
 
FYI that was the target build rate for the NIMITZ class once they'd stepped down from one every two years after VINSON. Obviously VINSON was delayed, then messing around with CVV meant the 1977 ship didn't happen, but the actual build program (rather than order schedule) through the 1980s and 1990s stuck pretty close to it.

Doing a 3-year drumbeat and a 50-year life means you can also keep a 16th carrier around as a training ship, retiring the LEXINGTON once the VINSON comes along circa 1979 - and the FORRESTAL becomes AVT-59 twelve years early.
What was the date for that? Because after McNamara deleted the FY65 attack carrier, the ships that became Nimitz, Eisenhower and Vinson were to have been authorised FY67, FY69 and FY71, with each ship taking 3-4 years to build and replace the 3 SCB.27C Essexes still operating in the CVA role. Then another 3 CVAN would be authorised FY73, FY75 and FY77 to replace the Midways. Again each ship would take 3-4 years to build and they would be competed between 1977 and 1982.

AFAIK the service life of an aircraft carrier wasn't increased to 50 years until the second half of the 1970s. E.g. the SLEP programme didn't begin until 28.09.80 when Saratoga paid off for her refit and she recommissioned 28 months later on 02.02.83.

FWIW
This is What Happens if One Attack Carrier is Built Every Other Year from FY 1965 as Outlined in Message 224

Except that Johnson and Nixon won't be built if the Cold War still ends as IOTL.

US Super Carriers to Middle 1990s - 2 per year..png

Vinson replaces Forrestal, MacArthur replaces Saratoga and so on until Nixon replaces Kennedy.​
 
FYI that was the target build rate for the NIMITZ class once they'd stepped down from one every two years after VINSON. Obviously VINSON was delayed, then messing around with CVV meant the 1977 ship didn't happen, but the actual build program (rather than order schedule) through the 1980s and 1990s stuck pretty close to it.

Doing a 3-year drumbeat and a 50-year life means you can also keep a 16th carrier around as a training ship, retiring the LEXINGTON once the VINSON comes along circa 1979 - and the FORRESTAL becomes AVT-59 twelve years early.
FWIW
This is What Happens if One Attack Carrier is Built Every Three Years from FY 1972 as Outlined in Message 224

US Super Carriers to Middle 1990s - 3 per year..png

Forrestal is replaced by Vinson one year later than before and by 1997 they've only got as far as replacing Woodrow Wilson.​
 
The actual stated requirement in the relevant timeframe was for two: one to accompany each MEF. You could reasonably argue for a third to cover refits. As a division-scale landing would be planned weeks or months in advance, maintaining a force continually at sea wouldn't be a requirement.

I don't think there was ever a formal requirement for more than eight or ten of them, and that was in the late 1940s when the USN could put silly things like 'a thousand SSKs' in its forward plans.
I guess because I'm seeing LPSS as "overgrown SDVs" not "submarines that happen to carry Marine Raiders".

A couple LPSS for each MEF, then a whole pile to use for secret-squirrel stuff.
 
@isayyo2 asked me.
In the "money no object" line of thought would there be a continued interest in APD/LPR conversions?

My first thought was to utilize the non-FRAM'd Sumner/Robert H. Smith ships, in stripping everything after the first funnel to give a similar transport capability to the Charles Lawrence/Crosley classes. However the Sumner boasts a significant firepower advantage with four 5" barrels over the single gun found on the converted DEs.

Another thought was a new-build route utilizing the Forest Sherman/CF Adams hull design as a baseline.
To which @A Tentative Fleet Plan replied.
In Norman Friedman's US Small Combatants there's a brief description of an Ocean Surveillance ship (more of a small destroyer escort or Frigate) which was also expected to perform APD roles.
FWIW this is the last thing Norman Friedman wrote about the APD (on pages 344 & 345) of his book about U.S. amphibious ships and craft.
There was one other important surviving type, the APD. Because it already met the 20-kt criterion, replacement was not an issue through the 1960s, however, the ships were aging. To replace the APD, in August 1965 the Pacific Fleet commander proposed a new amphibious raid and reconnaissance ship. In September 1966, in reviewing the FY 69-75 program, he remarked that nothing had reduced the requirements for beach surveys (by UDTs) or for supporting larger groups of reconnaissance and raiding personnel. Indeed "operations along the coast of Vietnam confirm the need for these ships almost daily". By this time the APD was no longer mainly a boat control ship, but she was valued as a coordinating centre for small area interdiction, blockade, surveillance and/or destruction. The new ship would also conduct electronic reconnaissance and would support deception operations. A design study was carried out, but the ship was not built. The APD capability was lost when the ships were decommissioned.
Is the design study he wrote about above, the Ocean Surveillance Ship, that he wrote about in this other book?
 
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What was the date for that? Because after McNamara deleted the FY65 attack carrier, the ships that became Nimitz, Eisenhower and Vinson were to have been authorised FY67, FY69 and FY71, with each ship taking 3-4 years to build and replace the 3 SCB.27C Essexes still operating in the CVA role. Then another 3 CVAN would be authorised FY73, FY75 and FY77 to replace the Midways. Again each ship would take 3-4 years to build and they would be competed between 1977 and 1982.

AFAIK the service life of an aircraft carrier wasn't increased to 50 years until the second half of the 1970s. E.g. the SLEP programme didn't begin until 28.09.80 when Saratoga paid off for her refit and she recommissioned 28 months later on 02.02.83.

FWIW
This is What Happens if One Attack Carrier is Built Every Other Year from FY 1965 as Outlined in Message 224

Except that Johnson and Nixon won't be built if the Cold War still ends as IOTL.

View attachment 762995

Vinson replaces Forrestal, MacArthur replaces Saratoga and so on until Nixon replaces Kennedy.​
Now I feel compelled to come up with ship slogans for the new additions.

USS Woodrow Wilson CVN-59: "You'll Hate Me Later"
USS Calvin Coolidge CVN-60: "Keep Cool"
USS Herbert Hoover CVN-62: "Get a Load of This Relief Effort"
USS Jefferson F. Davis CVN-65: "Thanks for Being REALLY Cool About the Last Few Years"
USS Douglas MacArthur CVN-73: "I Shall Return As Many Times As It Takes For You To Figure Out What's Good For You"
USS James Buchanan CVN-75: "Arguably the Worst Thing That Ever Happens To You"
USS Andrew Johnson CVN-77: "Not Even My Friends Like Me"
USS Warren G. Harding CVN-79: "Teapot Dome Was a Warm-Up"
USS Lyndon B. Johnson CVN-91: "Jumbo Time"
USS Richard Nixon CVN-93: "Perfectly Legal"
 
Now I feel compelled to come up with ship slogans for the new additions.

USS Woodrow Wilson CVN-59: "You'll Hate Me Later"
USS Calvin Coolidge CVN-60: "Keep Cool"
USS Herbert Hoover CVN-62: "Get a Load of This Relief Effort"
USS Jefferson F. Davis CVN-65: "Thanks for Being REALLY Cool About the Last Few Years"
USS Douglas MacArthur CVN-73: "I Shall Return As Many Times As It Takes For You To Figure Out What's Good For You"
USS James Buchanan CVN-75: "Arguably the Worst Thing That Ever Happens To You"
USS Andrew Johnson CVN-77: "Not Even My Friends Like Me"
USS Warren G. Harding CVN-79: "Teapot Dome Was a Warm-Up"
USS Lyndon B. Johnson CVN-91: "Jumbo Time"
USS Richard Nixon CVN-93: "Perfectly Legal"
FWIW I can't use Woodrow Wilson because there was a Lafayette class submarine of that name. Her hull number was SSBN-624. She was commissioned on 27.12.63 and decommissioned on 01.09.94.
 
After watching the Fallout TV show I've been playing Fallout 4 with its atom-punk aesthetic, which had got me thinking how far nuclear power could stretch in reality.

USS America and JFK could have been nuclear powered, particularly JFK if the USN was able to give a good justification to Mac around costs over whole of life. If the USN got another nuke carrier or to a handful more nuke cruisers wouldn't be too much of a stretch.

IIUC the USN also had a destroyer reactor in development in the early 60s so there might be a small chance of a class of nuclear-powered destroyers as small as 4,000t.
 

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