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Triton said:
"Australia’s secret plans to have its own nuclear arsenal"
by Benedict Brook

July 11, 2017

Source:
http://www.news.com.au/technology/science/australias-secret-plans-to-have-its-own-nuclear-arsenal/news-story/2bcac85b0f2cbe3f7e377217d6ef999b

LAST week’s successful test of a North Korean missile raised fresh fears Australia is now potentially within range of one of the rogue nation’s nukes.

Yet despite being the world’s third largest producer of uranium — the key ingredient in a nuclear bomb — Australia has no similar weapon to chuck back should Kim Jong-un press the big red button.

But, were it not for the rolling of Australian Prime Minister John Gorton in 1971, in a Liberal Party coup, Australia could easily have developed its own true blue, and massively deadly, nuke.

A military expert has told news.com.au, that top secret plans were so advanced Australia was considered “top of the pile” of countries expected to acquire its own nuclear arsenal.

It was 60 years ago that the last nuclear bomb was detonated in Australia, a British weapon at the Maralinga test site in South Australia.

If you look closely, evidence of Australia’s plans for its own nuke remain. A few hours south of Sydney, at picturesque Jervis Bay, a small road leads into the bush. By a boat ramp is a large car park.

However, this was never designed to be a place for tourists’ vehicles. Rather, it is the unfinished foundations of Australia’s first commercial nuclear power station.

The public were told it would revolutionise the country’s energy needs. The truth was it would enrich uranium for Australia’s atomic bombs.
The proposed nuclear power station at Jervis Bay would provide electricity — but it’s real purpose was to make the enriched uranium for nuclear bombs.

Associate Professor Wayne Reynolds is a defence and foreign policy expert at the University of Newcastle and author of the book Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb.

He says many are surprised to hear that Australia seriously looked into becoming a nuclear armed state.

“People said it was conspiracy stuff, but it wasn’t — it was the atomic age,” he told news.com.au.

“We wanted to have a navy; in WWII we wanted access to heavy bombers; and so we wanted nuclear weapons. We wanted to maintain a strategic leading edge.”

Australia didn’t want to go it alone. During WWII, British and Australian experts had worked alongside their American counterparts on the Manhattan Project to build the world’s first atomic bomb.

The expectation was that the US would share the results with its allies.

“In 1946, the Americans changed that calculation by announcing they would not share any of the technology or weapons,” says Prof Reynolds. “Britain and Australia were cut out from the club”.

This huge rift in UK-US relations set London on a course that would lead it to test its own weapons 1000 kilometres north west of Adelaide.

“Britain were worried, they knew Russia was developing a bomb and they were desperate to catch up to defend their cities,” he says.

Canberra was also worried. “The thinking was a naval fleet might try and invade. In Sydney and Melbourne we had two big cities that were very vulnerable and if you didn’t have strategic strike capability then you’ve had it.”

Many in the government harboured a desire for a joint “Empire” bomb produced between Australia, Britain, Canada and South Africa.

Despite the UK’s ownership of the bombs it detonated at Maralinga, Canberra hoped aiding Britain might be a step toward its own bomb.

Certainly, no one underestimated Australia’s atom ambitions.

“German, Italy, the Netherlands — all wanted nuclear weapons but Australia was top of the list because of our uranium resources, our scientists and our enrichment program,” Prof Reynolds says.

However, the very success of Britain’s tests only served to isolate Australia further.

In 1957, the US decided it would rather have the UK back in its nuclear club than out on an atomic limb. The US and UK now share their arsenal. “Australia was adrift,” says Prof Reynolds.

So Australia took tentative steps to go it alone. This included the Lucas Heights nuclear plant on Sydney’s southern fringe. Still Australia’s only reactor, it began its life researching, among other things, nuclear weapons.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the Government body which now owns Lucas Heights, told news.com.au it is prohibited from conducting any research that could find its way into a future missile.

“ANSTO was created in 1987 by an Act that sets our mandate and specifically outlaws research or development into the design or production of nuclear weapons,” a spokesman said.

“ANSTO’s expertise is geared towards peaceful applications of nuclear technologies.”

In the early 1960s, the Menzies Government was discussing with the US the top secret “SEATO plan 4” which could have seen American bombs on Australian soil.

“This were absolutely not known by the public and plan 4 was only declassified thirty years later,” says Prof Reynolds.

With Communism on the march in Asia, plan 4 detailed Australia’s potential involvement in an atomic response.

“The plans laid out scenarios such as using tactical nuclear weapons in South East Asia. What would be the implications of a nuclear blast on the Kra Isthmus or the impact on the jungle of a high yield device?”

With an almost charming understatement, foreign minister Sir Garfield Barwick told his US counterpart in 1962 that Australia nuking its neighbours, “Was a very serious step … profoundly affecting our future political relations with Asia.”

A year later, China detonated its first nuclear weapon. It boosted the voices of bomb proponents. Who would be next? Japan? India? Indonesia? Could Australia stand by if bombs were pointed at Darwin from Bali?

The Government ramped up its weapons research.

In 1968, ex-RAAF pilot Gorton became Prime Minister. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was already in the works. However, a big supporter of a homegrown nuclear deterrent, Gorton wanted to Australia to be on the “brink of manufacture” of a weapon, says Prof Reynolds.

“If the whole world goes pear shaped, the NPT falls apart and rogue states start shooting weapons, he wanted to know if we [could build this bomb] quickly.”

Gorton gave the green light to Jervis Bay. Work began on the plant which was ostensibly for power generation.

Then, in 1971, Gorton was rolled and the Australian atomic dream died, explained Richard Broinowski of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, in a 2006 paper.

His replacement, Billy McMahon did not support the plans and construction ceased on the plant.

“As Treasurer, [McMahon] had been persuaded by officials that the ‘cover’ devised for the Jervis Bay reactor lacked credibility, since electricity generated there would be double the cost of electricity generated from Australian coal,” Mr Broinowski says.
Gough Whitlam formally ended Australia’s atom ambitions by signing onto the NPT and tying the country’s security to the US.

After decades of stability, the list of nuclear armed nations has increased. India, Pakistan, Israel and, of course, North Korea now possess them.

Prof Reynolds says it is unlikely Australia would seek to host nuclear bombs — its own or others. But history warns you to never say never.

“Historically, we’ve gone with the major powers. But if this unravels we might need a capability down here,” he says.”

“We have the people, the knowledge, the history, the uranium and we still have Lucas Heights.”

Old, old, news. I've known about the nuclear plans for over three decades now. Nothing new or of interest in that report.

Australia in 1970 was about six to twelve months from building a bomb. Today, Australia is about 10-20 years from building a bomb. We lack the industry, the infrastructure and above all else, the nuclear engineers to build and maintain a nuclear arsenal. The people do not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb. ::)
 
kaiserd said:
So are contributors here again seriously proposing the US violates another critical international nuclear weapons treaty?

"another"? Which nuclear weapons treaty is the US currently violating? Details please.
 
lastdingo said:
There are plenty stupid/uninformed people who have such thoughts, for example about the U.S. simply giving a hundred nukes to South Korea and Japan

No need. Japan and South Korea are perfectly able to build them on their own, and are beginning to consider it. You can thank China BTW.
 
lastdingo said:
There are plenty stupid/uninformed people who have such thoughts, for example about the U.S. simply giving a hundred nukes to South Korea and Japan, so it could withdraw from the region.
They don't and likely cannot take into account that the NPT prohibits this and is correctly considered indispensable.

The White House has likely still enough competent people to keep anything like that from happening, but on the other hand, Sarkozy once suggested a nukes sharing agreement with Germany and this offer was shot down by German foreign minister Steinmeier in presence of Merkel, with reference to the NPT.

It's a very widespread problem that humans begin to think of benefits of old efforts as self-evident.
This also happens with people talking nonsense about NATO and the EU.

The experience with North Korea has demonstrated that we should have little confidence in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Economic sanctions and diplomacy have failed to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Further, the international community could not prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons or the secret nuclear development programs in Iran, South Africa, Libya, and Syria. Israel refuses to confirm or deny that has nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia may or may not have a nuclear weapon on order from Pakistan. None of us delights in the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. It's not stupid or uniformed to consider that more nations will lose confidence in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and develop their own nuclear weapons for their security.
 
GTX said:
And unfortunately, some others can't seem to get that the powers that do have nuclear weapons telling others that they shouldn't comes across as hypocritical. Note that this isn't to say that I like the idea of some countries acquiring nukes, its just that I can see the hypocrisy and understand the anger some would feel in respect to this. I seem to recall that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a two way deal in that new powers would agree to not get nukes or would be prevented from doing so in return for the existing nuclear powers getting rid of theirs. Now some may say that this is an idealistic sentiment that doesn't address the real world situation but one has to acknowledge the above mentioned hypocrisy of those with nukes preventing others whilst seemingly wanting to increase their own arsenals... ::)

India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan are non-signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran signed the treaty on July 1, 1968. The treaty was ratified by parliament in February 1970. North Korea ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985 and only left on January 10, 2003 when the United States confronted North Korea for its illegal enriched uranium weapons program.

The United States and the Soviet Union signed the SALT I (1972), SALT II (1979), and START I (1991) treaties.

I don't find it hypocritical that the international community has enacted sanctions against Iran and North Korea considering that both nations ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
 
Triton said:
I don't find it hypocritical that the international community has enacted sanctions against Iran and North Korea considering that both nations ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

i think you missed the point of what I wrote. I suggest you re read it again more carefully.
 
Kadija_Man said:
Old, old, news. I've known about the nuclear plans for over three decades now. Nothing new or of interest in that report.

I shared the article for the benefit of members who don't live in Australia.

Kadija_Man said:
Australia in 1970 was about six to twelve months from building a bomb. Today, Australia is about 10-20 years from building a bomb. We lack the industry, the infrastructure and above all else, the nuclear engineers to build and maintain a nuclear arsenal. The people do not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb. ::)

I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?
 

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Triton said:
I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?

Who said anything about capitulating?

Re the supposed fanciful threat to Australia from Nth Korea, maybe some of us can look at things rationally and understand that the supposed threat is realistically fanciful. There is a difference between "look at me" rankings and a real threat that needs to be countered. Some can't seem to comprehend that.
 
GTX said:
Triton said:
I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?

Who said anything about capitulating?

Re the supposed fanciful threat to Australia from Nth Korea, maybe some of us can look at things rationally and understand that the supposed threat is realistically fanciful. There is a difference between "look at me" rankings and a real threat that needs to be countered. Some can't seem to comprehend that.

And some think that waiting until AFTER one gets nuked before deciding a threat is real is not a good ideea.
 
sferrin said:
GTX said:
Triton said:
I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?

Who said anything about capitulating?

Re the supposed fanciful threat to Australia from Nth Korea, maybe some of us can look at things rationally and understand that the supposed threat is realistically fanciful. There is a difference between "look at me" rankings and a real threat that needs to be countered. Some can't seem to comprehend that.

And some think that waiting until AFTER one gets nuked before deciding a threat is real is not a good ideea.


The August 29 ballistic missile launch was an unprecedented act of aggression by North Korea on Japan. How many more acts of aggression does North Korea need to commit before people consider the threat to be credible?
 
GTX said:
Who said anything about capitulating?

The citizens of western democracies have developed such a dread to nuclear war and nuclear weapons that they are unwilling to develop or maintain a credible nuclear deterrence despite credible threats to their security. The citizens of the United States or its allies do not achieve peace and security by allowing the nuclear triad to rot from neglect.
 
Triton said:
lastdingo said:
There are plenty stupid/uninformed people who have such thoughts, for example about the U.S. simply giving a hundred nukes to South Korea and Japan, so it could withdraw from the region.
They don't and likely cannot take into account that the NPT prohibits this and is correctly considered indispensable.

The White House has likely still enough competent people to keep anything like that from happening, but on the other hand, Sarkozy once suggested a nukes sharing agreement with Germany and this offer was shot down by German foreign minister Steinmeier in presence of Merkel, with reference to the NPT.

It's a very widespread problem that humans begin to think of benefits of old efforts as self-evident.
This also happens with people talking nonsense about NATO and the EU.

The experience with North Korea has demonstrated that we should have little confidence in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Economic sanctions and diplomacy have failed to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Further, the international community could not prevent India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons or the secret nuclear development programs in Iran, South Africa, Libya, and Syria. Israel refuses to confirm or deny that has nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia may or may not have a nuclear weapon on order from Pakistan. None of us delights in the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. It's not stupid or uniformed to consider that more nations will lose confidence in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and develop their own nuclear weapons for their security.

You have little confidence in the NPT?

Where has the NPT failed? What signatories of the NPT have acquired nukes, against the NPT?

The DPRK is not a current signatory. Iran is a signatory but no one has yet proved that it is contravening the NPT itself that I am aware of. It has failed to maintain it's nuclear safeguards, a different matter. Israel, India, are not signatories. South Africa created nukes but renounced them.

The NPT was designed to prevent new states acquiring nuclear weapons. In return the original signatories agreed to renounce their nukes. How's that going, hey? ::)
 
Triton said:
I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?

The DPRK may have threatened Australia. Many countries have rhetorically threatened Australia. Did we immediately believe them and build nuclear weapons to counter their unrealistic threats?

The DPRK is about 2-3 years away from building sufficient ICBMs to be a threat to Australia realistically. If they ever work out how to build an effective re-entry vehicle for their nuclear warheads. The DPRK will be saving it's missiles and bombs for far more immediate threats than a nation a long, long, away in the Southern Hemisphere. Simply because Kim Jung Un has uttered a threat, does not make it a reality.

I would suggest that his empty rhetoric will become a reality the first time a nuclear mushroom cloud rises over Australian territory. Until then, I'd suggest that the world and Washington in particular with it's equally tin-pot el Presidenta calm down and actually look at the problem sensibly rather than mouthing empty rhetoric of his own back and ratcheting up the temperature of international relations.

Australia is quietly gaining ABM capability in it's anti-air-warfare destroyers like HMAS Hobart - which possesses one of the best radars in service anywhere. They will be sufficient to protect Darwin or Brisbane or Sydney or Melbourne or Hobart or Adelaide or Perth from a DPRK nuclear tipped ICBM, if one ever eventuates. We don't need to build nuclear warheads to wipe out cities. We don't need nuclear power to power our cities.
 
Triton said:
sferrin said:
GTX said:
Triton said:
I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?

Who said anything about capitulating?

Re the supposed fanciful threat to Australia from Nth Korea, maybe some of us can look at things rationally and understand that the supposed threat is realistically fanciful. There is a difference between "look at me" rankings and a real threat that needs to be countered. Some can't seem to comprehend that.

And some think that waiting until AFTER one gets nuked before deciding a threat is real is not a good ideea.


The August 29 ballistic missile launch was an unprecedented act of aggression by North Korea on Japan. How many more acts of aggression does North Korea need to commit before people consider the threat to be credible?

Well, the last time I checked, Japan isn't Australia. Nor do I count a test where an IRBM overflies a neighbour a "threat" of much consequence.

What surprises me is how some people get a bee in their bonnet as soon as the word "nuclear" or "missile" enters the conversation.

Kim Jong Un is making unrealistic demands that the DPRK be accorded nuclear status and be seen as an equal on the world stage. He won't get them granted and he might provoke an immature el Presidente into doing something we all live to regret.

Should Kim Jong Un be removed or made to pull his head in? Yes. My question though, is how is that going to happen without making a large number of innocent Koreans (both North and South) dead? Force seems to be the only response that many here consider. I wonder why? ::)
 
As I type this the news is reporting a +-6.3 magnitude earthquake under North Korea.
Cannikin was 7.0.
I know that the Richter scale is logarithmic so that's a big difference, but if this is a test then this is probably pretty big.
I assume that variance in local
geology makes such readings fungible, but is there a ballpark rule of thumb regarding yield to Richter scale?
 
North Korea hydrogen weapon sized to fit on ICBM according to missile defense agency
 

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Brickmuppet said:
As I type this the news is reporting a +-6.3 magnitude earthquake under North Korea.
Cannikin was 7.0.
I know that the Richter scale is logarithmic so that's a big difference, but if this is a test then this is probably pretty big.
I assume that variance in local
geology makes such readings fungible, but is there a ballpark rule of thumb regarding yield to Richter scale?

Voice of America is reporting that the device is between 100 kilotons to 1 megaton, according to experts.

Source:
https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-quake-nuclear-test/4013117.html
 
Triton said:
sferrin said:
GTX said:
Triton said:
I've never understood the argument that if a nation capitulates it will have peace. The Australian people may not support nuclear energy or acquisition of the bomb, but North Korea has threatened Australia. When does bellicose rhetoric become a credible security threat to Australia? Does it take North Korea missile tests over Australian territory?

Who said anything about capitulating?

Re the supposed fanciful threat to Australia from Nth Korea, maybe some of us can look at things rationally and understand that the supposed threat is realistically fanciful. There is a difference between "look at me" rankings and a real threat that needs to be countered. Some can't seem to comprehend that.

And some think that waiting until AFTER one gets nuked before deciding a threat is real is not a good ideea.


The August 29 ballistic missile launch was an unprecedented act of aggression by North Korea on Japan. How many more acts of aggression does North Korea need to commit before people consider the threat to be credible?

Even before this latest nuclear test (after your comments above);
- The "overflight" of Japan by the referenced missile test was a threat and could be seen as an act of aggression and as an escalation, but stating that it as was unprecedented in the context of North Korea's history of behaviour is a reach.
- I don't think anybody, especially South Koreans and Japanese people who have long been within range of North Korea's conventional, chemical/ biological and nuclear weapons, dosn't see North Korea as a credible threat (unless your solely care about their ability to reach the continental US).
- The main point of discussion here is about what to do about this credible threat with one strand fixating on supposed military options/ solutions which the other strand pointing out how unrealistic that is without a very high risk of apocalypticaly high South Korean (and North Korean) casualties and a high risk of wider escalation.
 
There is a long way to go from flying a missile over Japan and testing a 60kt nuclear device underground to successfully and reliably delivering a nuclear warhead over intercontinental distances. It took 6 years and vast industrial effort for the USSR to develop the R-7, and a similar time for the US Atlas, both suffering many failures and operational limitations. The likelihood is any nuclear-armed missile fired at Guam would miss, break up in flight or fail to renter correctly. It would also result in immediate intervention in North Korea. I'm not sure even Kim Jong Un is that crazy.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
There is a long way to go from flying a missile over Japan and testing a 60kt nuclear device underground to successfully and reliably delivering a nuclear warhead over intercontinental distances. It took 6 years and vast industrial effort for the USSR to develop the R-7, and a similar time for the US Atlas, both suffering many failures and operational limitations. The likelihood is any nuclear-armed missile fired at Guam would miss, break up in flight or fail to renter correctly. It would also result in immediate intervention in North Korea. I'm not sure even Kim Jong Un is that crazy.

I don't believe he is crazy at all. However, even the smartest person can make a mistake or a miscaculation, particularly when faced by el Presidente who appears to be just as unrealistic as Jong Un. Either one could misunderstand the other and over-react.

As for the DPRK representing a threat to Oz - forget it. ::)
 
Though not entirely faultless on some of the technical aspects the BBC article below nearly summarises pros & cons of specific military action options against North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41095772
 
Triton said:
Brickmuppet said:
As I type this the news is reporting a +-6.3 magnitude earthquake under North Korea.
Cannikin was 7.0.
I know that the Richter scale is logarithmic so that's a big difference, but if this is a test then this is probably pretty big.
I assume that variance in local
geology makes such readings fungible, but is there a ballpark rule of thumb regarding yield to Richter scale?

Voice of America is reporting that the device is between 100 kilotons to 1 megaton, according to experts.

Source:
https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-quake-nuclear-test/4013117.html

NORSAR predict 120Kt with 5.8 richter scale magnitude.

Apparently they are using the equation based on CTBT for Novaya Zemlya Region. The equation is as follows :

mb=4.25+0.75x10*LOG(w)

Where mb is "Magnitude of Body Wave" or that earthquake. while w is the yield in kiloton.

There are also other equations :
mb=4.64+0.73x10*LOG(w)
mb=4.45+0.75x10*LOG(w)

Using above equations and mb of 5.8 as provided by NORSAR. The yield of the bomb is about 40-120Kt.
With 6.3 it would be 190-540 Kt.
 
PaulMM (Overscan) said:
There is a long way to go from flying a missile over Japan and testing a 60kt nuclear device underground to successfully and reliably delivering a nuclear warhead over intercontinental distances. It took 6 years and vast industrial effort for the USSR to develop the R-7, and a similar time for the US Atlas, both suffering many failures and operational limitations. The likelihood is any nuclear-armed missile fired at Guam would miss, break up in flight or fail to renter correctly. It would also result in immediate intervention in North Korea. I'm not sure even Kim Jong Un is that crazy.

The question still stands: at what point does one take the threat seriously? We're talking nuclear weapons here after all. Not something there's a lot of room for an oopsie on.
 
kaiserd said:
solutions which the other strand pointing out how unrealistic that is without a very high risk of apocalypticaly high South Korean (and North Korean) casualties and a high risk of wider escalation.

Do you have any evidence supporting the "apocalypticaly" high claim? (I'm fairly certain whatever it would be would be less than a nuclear strike however.)
 
Another point some seem to be ignorant of (willingly or not) is NK will soon have to ability to blackmail countries. "Give us the goods or we'll nuke you." And maybe he does an end-to-end, Polaris-style, nuke shot to drive the point home. Then what? You going to hit him then? Well, if you thought casualties would be high with his artillery aimed at Seoul, imagine the casualties with artillery aimed at Soul AND nuclear-tipped ICBMs aimed at everywhere else.
 
sferrin said:
Another point some seem to be ignorant of (willingly or not) is NK will soon have to ability to blackmail countries. "Give us the goods or we'll nuke you." And maybe he does an end-to-end, Polaris-style, nuke shot to drive the point home. Then what? You going to hit him then? Well, if you thought casualties would be high with his artillery aimed at Seoul, imagine the casualties with artillery aimed at Soul AND nuclear-tipped ICBMs aimed at everywhere else.

I think now - right now - is time for a preemptive strike. Screw China. They are the ones that handed NK the keys to nuclear club.
 
sferrin said:
Another point some seem to be ignorant of (willingly or not) is NK will soon have to ability to blackmail countries. "Give us the goods or we'll nuke you." And maybe he does an end-to-end, Polaris-style, nuke shot to drive the point home. Then what? You going to hit him then? Well, if you thought casualties would be high with his artillery aimed at Seoul, imagine the casualties with artillery aimed at Soul AND nuclear-tipped ICBMs aimed at everywhere else.

Your logic is faulty.
In this scenario North Korea could threaten to nuke this other country unless North Korea get X.
This other country can say no we are not giving you X and if you nuke us the US will nuke you.
This will leave North Korea risking everything for X (taking the risk that the US won't honour their commitments).

That is a world away from yourself instigating a conflict with North Korea to try to (hopefully) take out their nuclear and missile capabilities, an act that North Korea would (probably correctly) interpret as a inevitable step to removing their regime and leaving them with nothing to loose but with a lot of scope to make their downfall as messy and bloody as possible.

Given the previous posts by many of the same contributors on this very topic I hope you appreciate that you are making an argument against the inherent deterrence power of US nuclear forces.
 
Triton said:
GTX said:
Who said anything about capitulating?

The citizens of western democracies have developed such a dread to nuclear war and nuclear weapons that they are unwilling to develop or maintain a credible nuclear deterrence despite credible threats to their security. The citizens of the United States or its allies do not achieve peace and security by allowing the nuclear triad to rot from neglect.

Arming oneself also with such weapons does not necessarily solve the issue. Instead of escalation why not try de-escalation or isn't that macho enough?
 
kaiserd said:
sferrin said:
Another point some seem to be ignorant of (willingly or not) is NK will soon have to ability to blackmail countries. "Give us the goods or we'll nuke you." And maybe he does an end-to-end, Polaris-style, nuke shot to drive the point home. Then what? You going to hit him then? Well, if you thought casualties would be high with his artillery aimed at Seoul, imagine the casualties with artillery aimed at Soul AND nuclear-tipped ICBMs aimed at everywhere else.

Your logic is faulty.
In this scenario North Korea could threaten to nuke this other country unless North Korea get X.
This other country can say no we are not giving you X and if you nuke us the US will nuke you.

One wouldn't even need to use the US nuclear threat in such a scenario. If NK (or anyone else for that matter) were to use a nuclear weapon in such a scenario they would instantly find themselves under so much condemnation and combined conventional military assault from other countries as to make the result not worth it. At the end of the day the use of nukes as an offensive weapon is a strategy that doesn't work - the retaliation (nuclear or otherwise) is simply too great. Interestingly enough though, their use as a defensive counter does arguably work. At the end of the day, this sort of thing comes down to a form of game theory.
 
"Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy "

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: September 2017

Source:
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron
 
GTX said:
Arming oneself also with such weapons does not necessarily solve the issue. Instead of escalation why not try de-escalation or isn't that macho enough?

How? You wanna talk some more? How's that been workin' so far?
 
kaiserd said:
Your logic is faulty.
In this scenario North Korea could threaten to nuke this other country unless North Korea get X.
This other country can say no we are not giving you X and if you nuke us the US will nuke you.

What makes you think NK would believe them? The US' credibility isn't exactly stellar at the moment.

kaiserd said:
Given the previous posts by many of the same contributors on this very topic I hope you appreciate that you are making an argument against the inherent deterrence power of US nuclear forces.

Not at all. I'm saying the US is unlikely to nuke NK just because NK nuked another country. Has absolutely nothing to do with nuclear weapons themselves. Lastly, you're suggesting the notion of leaving North Korea with the ability to nuke somebody is acceptable.
 
sferrin said:
kaiserd said:
Your logic is faulty.
In this scenario North Korea could threaten to nuke this other country unless North Korea get X.
This other country can say no we are not giving you X and if you nuke us the US will nuke you.

What makes you think NK would believe them? The US' credibility isn't exactly stellar at the moment.

kaiserd said:
Given the previous posts by many of the same contributors on this very topic I hope you appreciate that you are making an argument against the inherent deterrence power of US nuclear forces.

Not at all. I'm saying the US is unlikely to nuke NK just because NK nuked another country. Has absolutely nothing to do with nuclear weapons themselves. Lastly, you're suggesting the notion of leaving North Korea with the ability to nuke somebody is acceptable.

For other contributors unfamiliar with the US nuclear umbrella;
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_umbrella
Many other links available....
 
kaiserd said:
For other contributors unfamiliar with the US nuclear umbrella;
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_umbrella
Many other links available....

Extended deterrence is fundamentally premised on sub-strategic nuclear weapons none of which
the US can deploy in the region because:

1. The DCA (and other) infrastructure was dismantled as part of the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula agreeement
2. The previous administration dismantled TLAM-N
 
"Cloud of Controversy Looms Over Nuclear Weapons Modernization"
by Sandra Erwin

August 23, 2017

Source:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/23/cloud_of_controversy_looms_over_nuclear_weapons_modernization_112122.html

Donald Trump recently reminded the world that his “first order as president was to renovate and modernize our nuclear arsenal.” And he tweeted: “Hopefully we will never have to use this power, but there will never be a time that we are not the most powerful nation in the world!”

The president’s hot rhetoric, alas, is about to collide with the cold fiscal and political realities of nuclear weapons modernization.

The U.S. Air Force this week took a major step forward when it selected Boeing and Northrop Grumman to begin designing a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile to replace the 50-year-old Minuteman.

The August 21 announcement did not come as a surprise. The Air Force had been steadfast in its plans to start acquiring the next-generation ICBM, known as the ground-based strategic deterrent program. It solicited proposals last summer and bids were due in October. Each of the winners received a $349 million award for the so-called “technology maturation and risk reduction” phase of the project. Boeing and Northrop beat out Lockheed Martin in the high-stakes competition.

The contractors, over the next three years, will map out their concepts for how to build, deploy and maintain a fleet of more than 600 missiles. The ground-based strategic deterrent, or GBSD, is the land-based leg of the nation’s nuclear triad. Along with the Navy’s nuclear missile submarines and the Air Force’s nuclear-armed stealth bombers, they exist for the sole purpose of deterring other countries from launching a thermonuclear war.

Congress this fall will be digging deeper into the Pentagon’s planned modernization of the triad and expects to receive an updated “nuclear posture review” from the Defense Department. While a debate is expected on the geopolitical realities that compel the United States to continue to fund these programs, the projected $400 billion price tag for the modernization looms large.

The GBSD program alone is projected to cost up to $80 billion for the missiles and ground infrastructure. Critics have suggested the Air Force should save the money and continue to upgrade the aging Minuteman III inventory. Others have floated the idea of completely doing away with the land-based leg of the triad, arguing that the Navy’s new Columbia-class submarines and the Air Force’s B-2 and B-21 stealth bombers will provide sufficient deterrence.

Daunting fiscal and political hurdles should be a concern for the Air Force and for the contractors in this program, noted defense industry analyst Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners. “We remain guarded on prospects for GBSD,” he wrote in a note to investors. The Pentagon simply will not have enough money to pay for everything it wants over the next decade. “There’s the nuclear triad, Army modernization, Navy expansion, new space systems, the F-35 joint strike fighter,” he argued. “Funding will be constrained.”

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has said repeatedly the Pentagon will need a major budget boost to pay for long-term modernization needs. But it is hard to envision how that will happen in an era of deep partisan divisions and no consensus on national security funding priorities.

The GBSD today is the most politically vulnerable of the three legs. The Navy’s Columbia-class submarine program seems “quite safe,” said Callan. The Air Force’s super-secret B-21 bomber has dual conventional and nuclear roles, and its development is said to be progressing. Meanwhile, “we continue to wonder about the logic and cost of replacing land-based ICBMs,” he said. Some fundamental questions have yet to be asked: “What's the incremental deterrent value of a land-based ICBM force? Why not use maneuvering hypersonic weapons? And who is being deterred?” Also, is the GBSD the way to deter Russia in the 2020s and how much does this matter to China?

Kingston Reif, a nuclear weapons analyst at the Arms Control Association, said the GBSD program is “ripe for further scrutiny.” A debate is expected on Capitol Hill on “whether GBSD is the most cost-effective way to replace the Minuteman III system,” Reif said. “The Air Force has yet to make a compelling case, in my view, as to why another Minuteman III life extension isn't a viable option in the near term.”

The Pentagon has rejected these arguments and intends to forcefully defend investments in a new land-based leg of the triad.

“Yes, it’s a lot of money. But it is well worth it given world conditions,” former Air Force Secretary Deborah James told RealClearDefense.

James, who served during the Obama administration, was one of the architects of the GBSD program and one of its most ardent advocates. “I do recognize that there are different viewpoints,” she said. But the “preponderant view” now is that the global security environment warrants these investments.

“Russia is building up its nuclear arsenal. North Korea is posing threats that 15 to 20 years ago we didn’t even think about,” said James. “This is probably no time to radically change the triad approach that has served us well for over 70 years.” And she noted that the cost — about 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget — should not be cause for alarm.

James predicts that GBSD contractors will refine the cost estimates and introduce new technologies that will make the new system cheaper to operate than the Cold War-era Minuteman missiles

“The last time we developed ICBM technology was more than 40 years ago,” she said. “A lot has changed and we are using very old data.”

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein said the ICBM modernization is not up for debate. "As others have stated, the only thing more expensive than deterrence is fighting a war. The Minuteman III is 45 years old. It is time to upgrade."

Nuclear weapons experts who have studied the history of strategic deterrence predict the triad will survive whatever political storms lie ahead. No U.S. administration wants to be the one blamed for weakening the nation’s posture.

What makes the triad hard to break is that each leg is supposed to be independent. The Pentagon designed it that way so any of the three legs can inflict unacceptable damage. “Bombers are more flexible. Submarines are viewed as the last resort. But the ICBMs are viewed as the most stabilizing leg,” said an industry official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Minuteman III leg features 450 hardened silos that are connected to the president through redundant and assured communications, he noted. “It would require a massive attack to eliminate the ICBMs. It poses an adversary an insurmountable obstacle,” the official said. “If we did not have the ICBMs our nuclear force would resemble France, with just submarines and bombers. ICBMs -- because of the sheer number of targets -- play a critical role in stabilizing the nuclear balance. And you need varied means of attack so adversaries don’t focus on just one thing.
 
sferrin said:
GTX said:
Arming oneself also with such weapons does not necessarily solve the issue. Instead of escalation why not try de-escalation or isn't that macho enough?

How? You wanna talk some more? How's that been workin' so far?

Seems to me, pretty good for the most part. You'd prefer war instead? ::)
 
marauder2048 said:
kaiserd said:
For other contributors unfamiliar with the US nuclear umbrella;
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_umbrella
Many other links available....

Extended deterrence is fundamentally premised on sub-strategic nuclear weapons none of which
the US can deploy in the region because:

1. The DCA (and other) infrastructure was dismantled as part of the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula agreeement
2. The previous administration dismantled TLAM-N

There are other weapons, you realise?

You also realise that the DPRK doesn't have sufficient weapons to hurt anybody, except the ROK, seriously at the moment?
 
Kadija_Man said:
marauder2048 said:
kaiserd said:
For other contributors unfamiliar with the US nuclear umbrella;
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_umbrella
Many other links available....

Extended deterrence is fundamentally premised on sub-strategic nuclear weapons none of which
the US can deploy in the region because:

1. The DCA (and other) infrastructure was dismantled as part of the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula agreeement
2. The previous administration dismantled TLAM-N

There are other weapons, you realise?

Nothing sub-strategic (the basis for extended deterrence) and North Korea is uniquely prepared to resist a conventional attack.

Kadija_Man said:
You also realise that the DPRK doesn't have sufficient weapons to hurt anybody, except the ROK, seriously at the moment?

That seems to be a rather unfounded assertion.
 
GTX said:
Arming oneself also with such weapons does not necessarily solve the issue. Instead of escalation why not try de-escalation or isn't that macho enough?

The United States and the international community have tried sanctions and diplomacy for 25 years to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions beginning with the George HW Bush administration. Haven't we given sanctions and diplomacy enough time? Isn't it time to consider other alternatives however unpleasant they might be?
 
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