About North Korea - Locked

[Airplane]

Obama's decision to retire TLAM/N pretty much crippled extended deterrence. There's now
no way to provide it sub-strategically unless you were to reconstitute the DCA infrastructure
in S. Korea and Japan.

Agreed! The Russians have violated that treaty and actually deployed missiles that are supposed to be prohibited.

 

[Triton]

After the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea and/or Japan, there is the possibility that it could kick off an East Asian arms race. What if the Republic of China (Taiwan) were to re-activate its nuclear weapons program? Other ratifiers of the non-proliferation treaty deciding to leave?

 

[sferrin]

After the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea and/or Japan, there is the possibility that it could kick off an East Asian arms race. What if the Republic of China (Taiwan) were to re-activate its nuclear weapons program? Other ratifiers of the non-proliferation treaty deciding to leave?

What if? As it is now, very few who actually feel they NEED nuclear weapons are going to be deterred by a scrap of paper.

 

[marauder2048]

there is the possibility that it could kick off an East Asian arms race.

There's been an East Asian arms race; the previous administration elected to unilaterally disarm in the face of it.

 

[Triton]

If true, China is in favor of regime change.


"North Korea leader Kim Jong Un 'killed relatives over China coup plot'"
Thursday 24 August 2017

Source:
http://news.sky.com/story/north-korea-leader-kim-jong-un-killed-relatives-over-china-coup-plot-11002869

 

[Foo Fighter]

KJP cannot hide his paranoia. Killing family members demonstrates how bad things have become in the NKPR. The regime has a record for grandiose threats, mainly as a method of acquiring the basics that its people need for survival, the closed nation propaganda is nothing new and has been seen in the USSR and Japan to name but a few. That the NKPR now has a realistic nuclear threat IS new and is probably the reason that the CPR has decided to vote FOR sanctions rather than abstaining or voting against and this is a warning to the NKPR that it will not get everything its own way.

The best result would be for an agreed solution between the CPR, the US and Russia to remove the threat AND the weapon from use by the NKPR. If this is not done and the idiots in Pyongyang will build the threat level until breaking point is inevitable and the threat so large that the outcome is a real threat to the whole planet. Who needs a nuclear winter and possibly billions of dead people with genetic mutations and a population on the verge of extinction? How many species would survive from our natural flora and fauna?. Stopping them NOW is the only logical action but it MUST be a joint effort to work properly.

 

[bobbymike]

http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/348145-america-is-finally-thankfully-modernizing-our-nuclear-program

Mitchell Institute Says GBSD Contracts Put Nuclear Modernization Back on Track
8/29/2017

—Wilson Brissett​

A 90th Missile Security Force Squadron Humvee patrols the F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo., missile complex on Feb. 9, 2016. Air Force photo by SrA Jason Wiese.

​With the Air Force announcement last week of two design contracts to replace the Minuteman III ICBM system, “the United States is back on track to modernize its entire nuclear deterrent,” wrote retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula, dean of AFA’s Mitchell Institute, and Peter Huessy, director of strategic deterrent studies at Mitchell, in an op-ed for The Hill on Sunday.

The maturation of the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program signals the end of what the authors call “a misguided nuclear procurement holiday” for the US military since the end of the Cold War. During that time, Russia and China have actively upgraded their own nuclear forces with an eye to outpacing American capabilities, Deptula and Huessy wrote, and “in light of these strategic realities, it is imperative that America fully modernize its own nuclear deterrent.”

Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, disagreed.

“We should not be doubling down on these legacy nuclear modernization plans,” Smith said in a statement released Sunday on the GBSD and Long Range Standoff weapon recapitalization efforts. Smith said the programs, which together will cost the Air Force nearly $2.5 billion in technology maturation and risk reduction contracts, are too expensive and “could undermine strategic stability and fuel another arms race.”

He believes that money would be better spent on “serious unmet needs for theater missile defenses that work, cutting-edge cyber capabilities, and conventional weapons that will respond directly to the military challenges we are facing right now” from nations like North Korea.

But Deptula and Huessy noted the GBSD program will cost only “about two percent of the USAF budget” over the next 10 years, and its enhanced survivability will sustain strategic stability with key US adversaries.

For one, the geographical spread of the US ICBM program, across several vast western states, makes it very difficult for an adversary to destroy all the missiles, thereby discouraging attempts to do so.

They also said the new GBSD missiles will require “two warheads to effectively take out each missile silo,” another deterrent enhancement.

The new missiles will also be “more flexible and modular” than previous ICBMs, making it easier for the US to match adversary developments and keep the new system in the field “for the better part of five decades,” Deptula and Huessy wrote.

“Land-​based ICBMs have played a key role in the nuclear deterrent peace of the past 70 years” since World War II, according to the op-ed, and modernizing the force means they will continue to play that role well into the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are not enough 'eyeroll' emojis on the Interwebz for Rep. Smith.

 

[Triton]

"Russia Fears New U.S. Nuclear Arms Make Bombing More Likely"
Damien Sharkov,Newsweek 22 hours ago

Source:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-fears-u-nuclear-arms-201448069.html

Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs fears updated, high-precision U.S. models of nuclear bombs will lower inhibitions to use nuclear weapons in combat, Russian state news agency Itar-Tass reported on Tuesday.

The B61-12 is a weapon that the U.S. has worked on for some time, testing a mock-up in 2015. The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced on Tuesday that it had carried out another non-nuclear test of the model 12 and would continue doing so in the next three years, hoping to clear it for service. The weapon is meant to be the first precision-guided atomic bomb, and Russia does not like the sound of it.

“The advantage of the new modification of the B61-12, according to U.S. military experts themselves lies in the fact that it will be, as they put it, ‘more ethical’ and ‘more usable,’” Mikhail Ulyanov, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Nonproliferation and Weapons Control Department told Tass.

Referring to comments made by former undersecretary of defense James Miller and ex-President Barack Obama’s key nuclear strategist General James E. Cartwright, Ulyanov expressed fears the U.S. may develop a more laissez-faire view of nuclear arms’ use, knowing they “cause less catastrophic consequences for the civilian population.

“From this we can conclude that the clearing of such bombs for service could objectively lead to lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear arms,” Ulyanov said. “This, we can imagine, is the main negative impact of the ongoing modernization.”

The upgrade is, in the eyes of some U.S. defense experts, a needed replacement of an integral part of U.S. nuclear capabilities whose design dates back to the 1960s. Former U.S. General Cartwright defended the program in 2016, noting that increasing precision and shrinking the size of the arms means fewer will be needed to act as a deterrent in the first place.

Ulyanov, however, felt the U.S. and any of its NATO allies that may benefit from the upgrade sought the B61-12’s potential clearing in response to what they perceive as Russia’s nuclear posturing. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have issued a handful of verbal reminders that Russia’s own nuclear capabilities exist to back up its foreign policy if needed.

North Korea’s current nuclear missile program has topped the list of concerns for the U.S. of late, with a missile test flying over Japan taking place on Tuesday morning. Though Russia formally opposes the North’s nuclear program, Moscow chose to once again condemn the U.S. for provoking the test by carrying out its annual defense drill with regional ally South Korea.

 

[sferrin]

This is nothing but fodder for US media to consume and dole out to the uneducated. Russia is updating every aspect of its nuclear forces, and is light years ahead of the US in that matter. For them to say that a 50+ year old gravity bomb is the end of the world displays a jaw-dropping amount of chutzpah. Sadly, their comments will put the Chicken Littles into a fury of hysteria.

 

[bobbymike]

This is nothing but fodder for US media to consume and dole out to the uneducated. Russia is updating every aspect of its nuclear forces, and is light years ahead of the US in that matter. For them to say that a 50+ year old gravity bomb is the end of the world displays a jaw-dropping amount of chutzpah. Sadly, their comments will put the Chicken Littles into a fury of hysteria.

Ever the same since I first started following nuclear matters in 1980.

 

[sferrin]

This is nothing but fodder for US media to consume and dole out to the uneducated. Russia is updating every aspect of its nuclear forces, and is light years ahead of the US in that matter. For them to say that a 50+ year old gravity bomb is the end of the world displays a jaw-dropping amount of chutzpah. Sadly, their comments will put the Chicken Littles into a fury of hysteria.

Ever the same since I first started following nuclear matters in 1980.

Yep. I remember the reaction when the US said it was putting Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. The direct result was the INF Treaty and elimination of over a thousand nuclear weapons. Those who opposed the deployment conveniently forgot that bit.

 

[Triton]

This is nothing but fodder for US media to consume and dole out to the uneducated. Russia is updating every aspect of its nuclear forces, and is light years ahead of the US in that matter. For them to say that a 50+ year old gravity bomb is the end of the world displays a jaw-dropping amount of chutzpah. Sadly, their comments will put the Chicken Littles into a fury of hysteria.

That's not what Mikhail Ulyanov said at all. His point is that the variable yield technology of the B61 Mod 12 allows the weapon to be considered to be a 'more ethical' and 'more usable" nuclear bomb by the United States. The variable yield technology allows the bomb's explosive force to be adjusted from an explosive force equivalent of 50,000 tons of TNT to as low as 300 tons of TNT. That's 98% smaller than "Little Boy" that was dropped on Hiroshima. Remember the discussion of developing a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) that could have been used during the Tora Bora campaign in Afghanistan? Against the bunkers used by Iran to develop nuclear weapons? Have a job that the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) or GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) can't do, how about using a "Dial-a-Yield" B61 Mod 12 nuclear bomb? Further, there has been renewed discussion in this country concerning the use of limited nuclear weapons and whether the United States could prevail in a limited nuclear war. This is a change from the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Having made that point, Ulyanov doesn't point out his country's own hypocrisy concerning the Russian military doctrine of "escalate to de-escalate" through the use of "limited" nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict.

 

[Triton]

Ever the same since I first started following nuclear matters in 1980.

Yep. I remember the reaction when the US said it was putting Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. The direct result was the INF Treaty and elimination of over a thousand nuclear weapons. Those who opposed the deployment conveniently forgot that bit.

I don't recall discussions in the 1980s concerning precision air strikes to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using low-yield nuclear bunker busters.

 

[Triton]

"No Longer Unthinkable: Should US Ready For ‘Limited’ Nuclear War?"
By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on May 30, 2013 at 4:57 PM

Source:
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/05/no-longer-unthinkable-should-us-ready-for-limited-nuclear-war/

AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION HQ: For more than 60 years, most Americans have thought of nuclear weapons as an all-or-nothing game. The only way to win is not to play at all, we believed, because any use of nukes will lead to Armageddon. That may no longer be the game our opposition is playing. As nuclear weapons proliferate to places that might not share our reluctance to use them in small numbers, however, the US military may face a “second nuclear age” of retail Armageddon for which it is utterly unprepared.

Outside the US, both established and emerging nuclear powers increasingly see nuclear weapons as weapons that can be used in a controlled, limited, and strategically useful fashion, said Barry Watts, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, arguably the Pentagon’s favorite thinktank. The Cold War “firebreaks” between conventional and nuclear conflict are breaking down, he wrote in a recent report. Russia has not only developed new, relatively low-yield tactical nukes but also routinely wargamed their use to stop both NATO and Chinese conventional forces should they overrun Moscow’s feeble post-Soviet military, Watts said this morning at the headquarters of the Air Force Association. Pakistan is likewise developing tactical nukes to stop India’s much larger military. Iran seeks nuclear weapons not only to offset Israel’s but to deter and, in the last resort, fend off an American attempt to perform “regime change” in Tehran the way we did in Baghdad. The US Air Force and Navy concept of “AirSea Battle” in the Western Pacific could entail strikes on the Chinese mainland that might provoke a nuclear response.

It’s precisely because US conventional power is so overwhelming that the temptation to turn to nuclear weapons to redress the balance is so irresistible. Ten years ago, the Iraqis sidestepped American dominance in the middle of the spectrum of conflict – regular warfare with tanks, planes, and precision-guided non-nuclear weapons – by going low and waging guerrilla warfare, for which the US proved painfully unprepared. In the future, nuclear proliferation means more and more countries will have the option to sidestep US conventional power by going high and staging a “limited” nuclear attack, for which we aren’t really prepared either. Indeed, some countries, notably a nuclear Iran with its terrorist proxies and North Korea with its criminal ties and special operations forces, could outflank America’s conventional military from both sides at once.

So, could the US military keep going after losing an Army brigade or a Navy aircraft carrier to a tactical nuclear strike? “I don’t think we’ve thought about continuing to do conventional operations in an environment in which some nuclear weapons have been used, [not] since the Cold War,” Watts told me after his talk. “You’ve got to have equipment that continues to work in that environment, and, in general, we don’t.”

For example, one of the ways the Army economized on its new “Nett Warrior” communications gear for foot troops was to scrap the requirement for its circuit to survive the electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, from a nuclear detonation, which can spread far below the lethal blast and radiation effects: Such shortcuts make sense for Afghanistan and Iraq, but not for Korea.

“So there are a lot of things you might want to invest in, to put it mildly,” said Watts.

One particularly controversial suggestion Watts offered is for the US to invest in new tactical nuclear weapons of its own. Currently, Watts argued, if an enemy attacks with a relatively low-yield atomic bomb, America’s choices for a response are limited to conventional strikes or thermonuclear weapons, with very little in between.

“The problem is most of the warheads we’ve retained… are huge weapons,” Watts said. “The ones on the [submarine-launched] Trident missiles are 450 kilotons.” The Air Force’s B-61 warhead is small enough to fit in the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and its yield can be “dialed down” to as low as an 0.3 kiloton yield, but the B-61 is a 60-year-old design that’s been out of production for years, although old bombs have been modernized. Said Watts, “Congress’s absolute prohibition about developing new warheads… makes it very difficult for us to have credible nuclear weapons that could be used in a limited way, not at the Armageddon level.”

Adversaries are less likely to be deterred by America’s nuclear arsenal if they decide we won’t strike back with our big bombs in response to a limited, low-yield nuclear attack on US troops. It’s even less credible the US will retaliate massively if the adversary stages the nuclear strike on its own soil as a last-ditch defense against “regime change,” as Russia has wargamed and as Iran is no doubt tempted to do. Least credible of is US nuclear retaliation for a nuclear attack that doesn’t actually kill anyone: An enemy with even modest space capability can detonate a nuclear warhead high in the atmosphere, where it will generate a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (or HEMP) that disrupts the electronics on which the US military depends without actually taking any lives. (Congress has held hearings on electromagnetic pulse in the past, albeit focused on threats to the American homeland rather than US forces abroad, but legislative interest has waned since the 2012 defeat of Maryland Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, the Hill’s foremost hawk on EMP).

Whether it’s morality or lack of suitable weapons that holds the US back from retaliating to a limited nuclear attack in kind, the American military at least needs to plan for how to take an atomic hit and keep on going. “You may end up fighting a nuclear/EMP environment even though you’re not using those kinds of weapons yourselves,” Watts said.

Watts is less worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism than he is about nation-states. He doubts Iranian mullahs, for example, would trust even their favorite proxies, Hezbollah, with a nuclear weapon. But he’s skeptical of the conventional wisdom that the Chinese have sworn never to use nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack on them.

“If you start digging into the literature [by Chinese strategists], they say all the politically correct things in the front of the book about how we’re not going to use nuclear weapons first,” Watts said. As you read more deeply, however, he found an unnerving willingness to consider nuclear detonations to generate EMP, for example, under the special circumstances of what Chinese doctrine called “local high-tech warfare under informationalized conditions.”

Such special circumstances might well arise in a Western Pacific war, perhaps triggered by a Sino-Japanese clash over the Senkaku Islands, in which the US came to an ally’s defense by waging a long-range AirSea Battle. In theory, both sides could swear off strikes on each other’s homelands and try to limit the fighting to the air and sea. But there’s one big problem: While America’s main weapons for a naval battle are ships, submarines and aircraft launched from carriers at sea, China’s naval arsenal depends heavily on long-range sensors and missiles based on land. The US would either have to take shots from Beijing’s best weapons without responding or escalate to an attack on China’s coastal provinces.

Watts did not discuss this topic in detail, but another strategist at the discussion did. “The issue is escalation… if you cross the Chinese coastline,” said Peter Wilson, a national security consultant. “How do you keep the war regional?” Even if the US strike causes no Chinese casualties – for example, a precision missile or even cyber attack that shut down China’s power grid – “the reply may be a HEMP shot over Hawaii.”

“We’ve gotten very used to bombing countries, going downtown and working our will” from Baghdad to Belgrade, Wilson said. When the target has nuclear weapons, however, even using America’s fading conventional superiority starts looking a lot more dangerous.

 

[marauder2048]

That's not what Mikhail Ulyanov said at all. His point is that the variable yield technology of the B61 Mod 12 allows the weapon to be considered to be a 'more ethical' and 'more usable" nuclear bomb by the United States.
...
Further, there has been renewed discussion in this country concerning the use of limited nuclear weapons and whether the United States could prevail in a limited nuclear war. This is a change from the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Variable-yield or dial-a-yield warheads have been in both arsenals for many decades.
They were never regarded as lowering the nuclear threshold and NATO hasn't, AFAIK,
conducted a nuclear weapons release exercise in ages.

The B61s reside in fixed storage vaults and none of the current DCAs are particularly
capable of penetrating Russian air defenses without a fairly massive SEAD campaign.

Since Obama killed TLAM/N the B61-12 is in the awkward position of being
the only sub-strategic nuclear weapon in the US inventory but sometime
in the 2020s a few hundred of them are scheduled to be arrayed against
thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

The MAD doctrine never had any bearing on tactical nuclear weapons.

 

[bobbymike]

Ever the same since I first started following nuclear matters in 1980.

Yep. I remember the reaction when the US said it was putting Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. The direct result was the INF Treaty and elimination of over a thousand nuclear weapons. Those who opposed the deployment conveniently forgot that bit.

I don't recall discussions in the 1980s concerning precision air strikes to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using low-yield nuclear bunker busters.

Scott's response indicates he understood my premise, yours indicates the opposite.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-inspections-idUSKCN1BB1JC

Ya why inspect 'military sites' :

 

[sferrin]

Ever the same since I first started following nuclear matters in 1980.

Yep. I remember the reaction when the US said it was putting Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. The direct result was the INF Treaty and elimination of over a thousand nuclear weapons. Those who opposed the deployment conveniently forgot that bit.

I don't recall discussions in the 1980s concerning precision air strikes to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using low-yield nuclear bunker busters.

No, it was even more "horrifying". We added 572 nuclear capable missiles to the inventory in Europe, including 108 launchers with first-strike capable Pershing IIs. Imagine the hysteria if we were to suggest doing that in SK and Japan.

 

[sferrin]

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-inspections-idUSKCN1BB1JC

Ya why inspect 'military sites' :

What a sweet deal we made with Iran. Well, sweet for Iran anyway.

 

[Triton]

No, it was even more "horrifying". We added 572 nuclear capable missiles to the inventory in Europe, including 108 launchers with first-strike capable Pershing IIs. Imagine the hysteria if we were to suggest doing that in SK and Japan.

Did planners believe that tactical nuclear strikes using Pershing II and GLCM missiles would give Warsaw Pact forces pause and that NATO could "escalate to de-escalate" in the 1980s? That such a war would be "limited", that they could signal intent, and that they could control escalation? Give time for cooler heads to prevail and allow Washington and Moscow time to negotiate a cease fire?

 

[Triton]

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-inspections-idUSKCN1BB1JC

Ya why inspect 'military sites' :

What a sweet deal we made with Iran. Well, sweet for Iran anyway.

I wonder if a United States nuclear sharing agreement is possible, or desirable, with Saudi Arabia and/or members of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a counter to Iran?

 

[marauder2048]

Did planners believe that tactical nuclear strikes using Pershing II and GLCM missiles would give Warsaw Pact forces pause and that NATO could "escalate to de-escalate" in the 1980s? That such a war would be "limited", that they could signal intent, and that they could control escalation? Give time for cooler heads to prevail and allow Washington and Moscow time to negotiate a cease fire?

Yes to all of the above.

 

[marauder2048]

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-inspections-idUSKCN1BB1JC

Ya why inspect 'military sites' :

What a sweet deal we made with Iran. Well, sweet for Iran anyway.

I wonder if a United States nuclear sharing agreement is possible, or desirable, with Saudi Arabia and/or members of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a counter to Iran?

Assuming the US wanted to violate or abrograte the NPT and assuming that Pakistan and China aren't already providing those sharing agreements.

 

[bobbymike]

Did planners believe that tactical nuclear strikes using Pershing II and GLCM missiles would give Warsaw Pact forces pause and that NATO could "escalate to de-escalate" in the 1980s? That such a war would be "limited", that they could signal intent, and that they could control escalation? Give time for cooler heads to prevail and allow Washington and Moscow time to negotiate a cease fire?

Yes to all of the above.

Wasn't the strategy called "flexible response"? And it caused the arms control community to scream "Reagan thinks he can win a nuclear war"?

BTW I consulted a nuclear strategy expert friend and he said MAD was never US policy. He has a nuclear strategy book coming out in January.

 

[Triton]

Accurate?

Proud Prophet

At the height of the Cold War, the Reagan administration worried about the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear war plan. In fact when he was first briefed on the U.S. strike plan, Reagan became physically ill and the briefing had to be postponed.

In 1983, amidst heightened tensions with the Soviets, the administration put the U.S. war-plan to the test in a war game called Proud Prophet.

According to author and Defense Department advisor Paul Bracken, it was unlike any other war game in Cold War history. Whereas most other war games cast staffers from think tanks, former administration officials and pentagon employees in the roles of U.S. president or Soviet commanders, Proud Prophet involved actual U.S. national-security decision-makers, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the chairman of the joint chiefs.

Furthermore, “to make it as realistic as possible, actual top-secret U.S. war plans were incorporated into the game … [making it] the most realistic exercise involving nuclear weapons ever played by the U.S. government during the Cold War,” Bracken wrote.

The simulation played out around the clock for two weeks, with “hundreds of military officers participating in Washington as well as communicating over top-secret links with all the major U.S. military commands around the world.”

The result? “Many of the strategic concepts proposed to deal with the Soviet Union were revealed to be either irresponsible or totally incompatible with current U.S. capabilities and immediately thrown out.”

Chief among them were the use of limited de-escalatory nuclear strikes. Like in our hypothetical scenario above, “the idea behind these was that once the Soviet leaders saw that the West would go nuclear they would come to their senses and accept a ceasefire … they were supposed to limit a nuclear war.”

But that isn’t how it played out.

“The Soviet Union team interpreted the nuclear strikes as an attack on their nation, their way of life and their honor,” Bracken wrote. “So they responded with an enormous nuclear salvo at the United States.

“The United States retaliated in kind. The result was a catastrophe that made all the wars of the past five hundred years pale in comparison. A half-billion human beings were killed in the initial exchanges and at least that many more would have died from radiation and starvation. NATO was gone. So was a good part of Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. Major parts of the Northern Hemisphere would be uninhabitable for decades.”

Source:
https://warisboring.com/no-you-cant-have-a-small-nuclear-war/#v=onepage&q=proud%20prophet%20war%20game&f=false

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IS-423.pdf

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/31/air_forces_new_icbm_plans_could_damage_defense_industrial_base_112201.html

 

[marauder2048]

Accurate?

Proud Prophet

Source:
https://warisboring.com/no-you-cant-have-a-small-nuclear-war/#v=onepage&q=proud%20prophet%20war%20game&f=false

The declassified (but still pretty heavily redacted) summary of Proud Prophet 83 doesn't bear much
resemblance to the account given in Bracken's book that (conveniently IMHO) surfaced only after Weinberger was dead.

http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Special_Collections/12-M-1487.pdf

 

[sferrin]

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/186451/s.-korea-revives-sub_launched-nuclear-missiles-concept.html

"Allies Discuss Redeployment of Nuclear Weapons

(Source: The Korea Times; issued Aug 31, 2017)


Defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States discussed the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the South to counter North Korea's nuclear capability, government sources said Thursday.

Defense Minister Song Young-moo raised this topic during a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Wednesday.

These weapons were removed from South Korea in 1991 by the George Bush administration after the two Koreas signed a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The defense chiefs also discussed ways to build up Seoul's military power.

This was in line with President Moon Jae-in's pledge to enhance the nation's self-defense capability.

Nuclear-powered submarines and larger warheads

Song insisted the country be allowed to develop its own nuclear-powered submarine and revise missile guidelines to allow the South to use larger warheads.

Song said nuclear submarines were the best at countering threats from North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). "

I wonder if we could jump start that effort and sell them some -688s that were retired early.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/186451/s.-korea-revives-sub_launched-nuclear-missiles-concept.html

"Allies Discuss Redeployment of Nuclear Weapons

(Source: The Korea Times; issued Aug 31, 2017)


Defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States discussed the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the South to counter North Korea's nuclear capability, government sources said Thursday.

Defense Minister Song Young-moo raised this topic during a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Wednesday.

These weapons were removed from South Korea in 1991 by the George Bush administration after the two Koreas signed a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The defense chiefs also discussed ways to build up Seoul's military power.

This was in line with President Moon Jae-in's pledge to enhance the nation's self-defense capability.

Nuclear-powered submarines and larger warheads

Song insisted the country be allowed to develop its own nuclear-powered submarine and revise missile guidelines to allow the South to use larger warheads.

Song said nuclear submarines were the best at countering threats from North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). "

I wonder if we could jump start that effort and sell them some -688s that were retired early.

Re-deployment of nukes (do we have any tactical nukes left to deploy?) or letting Japan/S. Korea build their own arsenal IMHO is the only way to get China off the fence and de-nuke the whole peninsula

*GHW Bush & 1991* - How many times have I read those together marking the unwarranted and precipitous decline of the US's nuclear enterprise to this day.

 

[sferrin]

This could be a pretty good start for Japan's ICBM.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-V

 

[bobbymike]

This could be a pretty good start for Japan's ICBM.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-V

Nice size for our next ICBM

 

[Triton]

Accurate?

Proud Prophet

Source:
https://warisboring.com/no-you-cant-have-a-small-nuclear-war/#v=onepage&q=proud%20prophet%20war%20game&f=false

The declassified (but still pretty heavily redacted) summary of Proud Prophet 83 doesn't bear much
resemblance to the account given in Bracken's book that (conveniently IMHO) surfaced only after Weinberger was dead.

http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Special_Collections/12-M-1487.pdf

Thank you marauder2048

 

[Triton]

*GHW Bush & 1991* - How many times have I read those together marking the unwarranted and precipitous decline of the US's nuclear enterprise to this day.

President George HW Bush told us it was our "Peace Dividend" and nuclear war was something that Americans no longer had to worry about. In his 1992 State of the Union address, President George HW Bush said "By the grace of God, America won the cold war." Unfortunately, some of our political leaders and citizens can't get beyond the end of the Cold War, the United States is the last super power, and the "New World Order" to realize that the world has changed since the 1990s and that new threats have emerged.

 

[GTX]

Unfortunately, some of our political leaders and citizens can't get beyond the end of the Cold War, the United States is the last super power, and the "New World Order" to realize that the world has changed since the 1990s and that new threats have emerged.

And unfortunately, some others can't seem to get that the powers that do have nuclear weapons telling others that they shouldn't comes across as hypocritical. Note that this isn't to say that I like the idea of some countries acquiring nukes, its just that I can see the hypocrisy and understand the anger some would feel in respect to this. I seem to recall that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a two way deal in that new powers would agree to not get nukes or would be prevented from doing so in return for the existing nuclear powers getting rid of theirs. Now some may say that this is an idealistic sentiment that doesn't address the real world situation but one has to acknowledge the above mentioned hypocrisy of those with nukes preventing others whilst seemingly wanting to increase their own arsenals... :

 

[Triton]

"Australia’s secret plans to have its own nuclear arsenal"
by Benedict Brook

July 11, 2017

Source:
http://www.news.com.au/technology/science/australias-secret-plans-to-have-its-own-nuclear-arsenal/news-story/2bcac85b0f2cbe3f7e377217d6ef999b

LAST week’s successful test of a North Korean missile raised fresh fears Australia is now potentially within range of one of the rogue nation’s nukes.

Yet despite being the world’s third largest producer of uranium — the key ingredient in a nuclear bomb — Australia has no similar weapon to chuck back should Kim Jong-un press the big red button.

But, were it not for the rolling of Australian Prime Minister John Gorton in 1971, in a Liberal Party coup, Australia could easily have developed its own true blue, and massively deadly, nuke.

A military expert has told news.com.au, that top secret plans were so advanced Australia was considered “top of the pile” of countries expected to acquire its own nuclear arsenal.

It was 60 years ago that the last nuclear bomb was detonated in Australia, a British weapon at the Maralinga test site in South Australia.

If you look closely, evidence of Australia’s plans for its own nuke remain. A few hours south of Sydney, at picturesque Jervis Bay, a small road leads into the bush. By a boat ramp is a large car park.

However, this was never designed to be a place for tourists’ vehicles. Rather, it is the unfinished foundations of Australia’s first commercial nuclear power station.

The public were told it would revolutionise the country’s energy needs. The truth was it would enrich uranium for Australia’s atomic bombs.
The proposed nuclear power station at Jervis Bay would provide electricity — but it’s real purpose was to make the enriched uranium for nuclear bombs.

Associate Professor Wayne Reynolds is a defence and foreign policy expert at the University of Newcastle and author of the book Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb.

He says many are surprised to hear that Australia seriously looked into becoming a nuclear armed state.

“People said it was conspiracy stuff, but it wasn’t — it was the atomic age,” he told news.com.au.

“We wanted to have a navy; in WWII we wanted access to heavy bombers; and so we wanted nuclear weapons. We wanted to maintain a strategic leading edge.”

Australia didn’t want to go it alone. During WWII, British and Australian experts had worked alongside their American counterparts on the Manhattan Project to build the world’s first atomic bomb.

The expectation was that the US would share the results with its allies.

“In 1946, the Americans changed that calculation by announcing they would not share any of the technology or weapons,” says Prof Reynolds. “Britain and Australia were cut out from the club”.

This huge rift in UK-US relations set London on a course that would lead it to test its own weapons 1000 kilometres north west of Adelaide.

“Britain were worried, they knew Russia was developing a bomb and they were desperate to catch up to defend their cities,” he says.

Canberra was also worried. “The thinking was a naval fleet might try and invade. In Sydney and Melbourne we had two big cities that were very vulnerable and if you didn’t have strategic strike capability then you’ve had it.”

Many in the government harboured a desire for a joint “Empire” bomb produced between Australia, Britain, Canada and South Africa.

Despite the UK’s ownership of the bombs it detonated at Maralinga, Canberra hoped aiding Britain might be a step toward its own bomb.

Certainly, no one underestimated Australia’s atom ambitions.

“German, Italy, the Netherlands — all wanted nuclear weapons but Australia was top of the list because of our uranium resources, our scientists and our enrichment program,” Prof Reynolds says.

However, the very success of Britain’s tests only served to isolate Australia further.

In 1957, the US decided it would rather have the UK back in its nuclear club than out on an atomic limb. The US and UK now share their arsenal. “Australia was adrift,” says Prof Reynolds.

So Australia took tentative steps to go it alone. This included the Lucas Heights nuclear plant on Sydney’s southern fringe. Still Australia’s only reactor, it began its life researching, among other things, nuclear weapons.

The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the Government body which now owns Lucas Heights, told news.com.au it is prohibited from conducting any research that could find its way into a future missile.

“ANSTO was created in 1987 by an Act that sets our mandate and specifically outlaws research or development into the design or production of nuclear weapons,” a spokesman said.

“ANSTO’s expertise is geared towards peaceful applications of nuclear technologies.”

In the early 1960s, the Menzies Government was discussing with the US the top secret “SEATO plan 4” which could have seen American bombs on Australian soil.

“This were absolutely not known by the public and plan 4 was only declassified thirty years later,” says Prof Reynolds.

With Communism on the march in Asia, plan 4 detailed Australia’s potential involvement in an atomic response.

“The plans laid out scenarios such as using tactical nuclear weapons in South East Asia. What would be the implications of a nuclear blast on the Kra Isthmus or the impact on the jungle of a high yield device?”

With an almost charming understatement, foreign minister Sir Garfield Barwick told his US counterpart in 1962 that Australia nuking its neighbours, “Was a very serious step … profoundly affecting our future political relations with Asia.”

A year later, China detonated its first nuclear weapon. It boosted the voices of bomb proponents. Who would be next? Japan? India? Indonesia? Could Australia stand by if bombs were pointed at Darwin from Bali?

The Government ramped up its weapons research.

In 1968, ex-RAAF pilot Gorton became Prime Minister. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was already in the works. However, a big supporter of a homegrown nuclear deterrent, Gorton wanted to Australia to be on the “brink of manufacture” of a weapon, says Prof Reynolds.

“If the whole world goes pear shaped, the NPT falls apart and rogue states start shooting weapons, he wanted to know if we [could build this bomb] quickly.”

Gorton gave the green light to Jervis Bay. Work began on the plant which was ostensibly for power generation.

Then, in 1971, Gorton was rolled and the Australian atomic dream died, explained Richard Broinowski of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, in a 2006 paper.

His replacement, Billy McMahon did not support the plans and construction ceased on the plant.

“As Treasurer, [McMahon] had been persuaded by officials that the ‘cover’ devised for the Jervis Bay reactor lacked credibility, since electricity generated there would be double the cost of electricity generated from Australian coal,” Mr Broinowski says.
Gough Whitlam formally ended Australia’s atom ambitions by signing onto the NPT and tying the country’s security to the US.

After decades of stability, the list of nuclear armed nations has increased. India, Pakistan, Israel and, of course, North Korea now possess them.

Prof Reynolds says it is unlikely Australia would seek to host nuclear bombs — its own or others. But history warns you to never say never.

“Historically, we’ve gone with the major powers. But if this unravels we might need a capability down here,” he says.”

“We have the people, the knowledge, the history, the uranium and we still have Lucas Heights.”

 

[Triton]

"Australia Needs Nukes"
by Christine Leah and Crispin Rovere

October 28, 2015

Source:
https://warisboring.com/australia-needs-nukes/

Over the past century, Australia has been America’s most dependable military ally. In every major U.S. conflict, including World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, Australians have fought alongside.

Yet as competition between China and the United States heats up in the Western Pacific, Australia is cautious not to provoke its greatest trading partner. When it comes to a potential U.S.-China conflict, Australia is doing all it can to keep its options open – and with good reason.

Australia is highly vulnerable to long-range missile attack, including those carrying nuclear payloads. Despite Australia being a continental power, almost all its population is concentrated in a half-dozen major cities — easy targets for small numbers of warheads.

In a high-intensity conflict between the United States and China, it is conceivable that China may target Australia with long-range nuclear missiles as a step up the escalation ladder, demonstrating to the United States its capacity, and willingness, to conduct nuclear strikes over intercontinental ranges.

n this eventuality, extended nuclear deterrence would hardly be credible. Retaliating on Australia’s behalf would demonstrably mean accepting large-scale nuclear attack by China on the continental United States.

For this reason, many Australians believe entering into conflict with the world’s most populous nuclear power, for any reason and under any circumstance, is unthinkable – despite very strong support for the Australia-U.S. alliance overall. The most effective means for Australia to insulate itself from long-range nuclear attack is to develop or acquire its own reliable long-range nuclear deterrent.

WIB icon

Many would consider this a bad idea. If Australia (a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT) went nuclear, conventional wisdom suggests it very difficult to dissuade Japan, South Korea and others from following suit, critically threatening the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

This view is fundamentally flawed. In actuality, Australia has a very unique legal status with regard to nuclear weapons.

At present, there are five Nuclear-Weapon States under the NPT (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China). Under Article IX.3 of the NPT, a country may accede to the treaty as a Nuclear-Weapon State if that state “manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967”.
Royal Australian Navy Collins-class submarine HMAS Farncomb (SSG 74) transits the waters of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam during the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. Twenty-two nations, more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in RIMPAC exercise from Jun. 29 to Aug. 3, in and around the Hawaiian Islands. The world's largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity that helps participants foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans. RIMPAC 2012 is the 23rd exercise in the series that began in 1971.

Australia qualifies. In the 1950s and ’60s, Australia hosted a series of nuclear tests conducted by the United Kingdom. These nuclear explosions were conducted on Australian sovereign territory with the active participation of Australian scientists and military personnel.

These tests received financial support direct from the Australian government, with at least some explosions likely to have used fissile material that had been sourced locally from within Australia. No other non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT is in this category.

As Rod Lyon of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute sharply has observed from recently declassified documents, Australian negotiators were very much cognizant of this legal basis prior to Australia joining the treaty. In sum, if Australia determined it was a national security imperative to develop an independent nuclear deterrent, it would be legally entitled to do so.

As this legal status does not apply to America’s other allies in the Asia-Pacific, a changed nuclear status by Australia under the NPT would not automatically undermine the treaty as a whole.

A nuclear-armed Australia is likely to confer a number of strategic advantages upon the United States. It strengthens Australia’s resolve in supporting the United States in a potentially open-ended strategic contest in the Asia-Pacific. It supports extended nuclear deterrence by removing a potentially vulnerable element of the policy, and the nations in Southeast Asia will see Australia as a more capable strategic partner and deepen cooperation.

There’s more. A nuclear-armed Australia makes drawing the country into a broader collective defense architecture much more feasible. Having a reliable U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific with an independent nuclear deterrent strengthens nuclear deterrence in the Asia-Pacific overall. And it achieves these objectives without fatally weakening nuclear non-proliferation efforts more broadly.

The United States should publicly recognize Australia’s right to nuclear weapons under the NPT. This does not mean that Australia will immediately seek to acquire such weapons.

Australia has a strong non-proliferation record and a long history of disarmament activism. In the short-term, Australia would use this recognition to leverage its position in present nuclear arms control negotiations, further persuading countries in the region to exercise nuclear restraint.

Regardless of Australia’s future nuclear choices, just acknowledging the legal reality of Australia’s unique status under the NPT supports America’s long-term strategy in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. government should do so as a matter of priority.

 

[bobbymike]

"Australia Needs Nukes"
by Christine Leah and Crispin Rovere

October 28, 2015

Source:
https://warisboring.com/australia-needs-nukes/

Yes I agree along with Japan and South Korea. China and Russia want to stand around - or actively help - lunatic countries like North Korea and Iran nuke up then guess what? The great democracies of the world will defend themselves. Plus Australia, S. Korea and Japan are not a party to INF we could even start rolling GLCMs and Pershing IIs off the assembly lines again.

 

[marauder2048]

Accurate?

Proud Prophet

Source:
https://warisboring.com/no-you-cant-have-a-small-nuclear-war/#v=onepage&q=proud%20prophet%20war%20game&f=false

The declassified (but still pretty heavily redacted) summary of Proud Prophet 83 doesn't bear much
resemblance to the account given in Bracken's book that (conveniently IMHO) surfaced only after Weinberger was dead.

http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Special_Collections/12-M-1487.pdf

Thank you marauder2048

Miller's account in Butler's "Uncommon Cause" of limited options was that at least some of the
plans prior to 1985 did not take into account the disposition or capability of Soviet early warning sensors
and consequently the limited options could not be reliably distinguished from a major US strategic attack.


"We set out, with the Defense Intelligence Agency, to assess capabilities of the Soviets' ballistic
missile early warning radars and launch detection satellites. Armed with this knowledge
we worked to create an entirely new series of limited options that were both focused and
militarily effective while conveying to the Soviet leadership the restrained nature of our response.
Once again, Secretary Weinberger signed the new guidance and my team and I followed up, per our new
authority to ensure that his direction was implemented. " (pg. 10).

https://www.wagingpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/butler_volume2.pdf

 

[kaiserd]

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-inspections-idUSKCN1BB1JC

Ya why inspect 'military sites' :

What a sweet deal we made with Iran. Well, sweet for Iran anyway.

I wonder if a United States nuclear sharing agreement is possible, or desirable, with Saudi Arabia and/or members of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a counter to Iran?

Assuming the US wanted to violate or abrograte the NPT and assuming that Pakistan and China aren't already providing those sharing agreements.

So are contributors here again seriously proposing the US violates another critical international nuclear weapons treaty? This time the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty that works massively in favour of the existing nuclear powers. How could it possibly be in the US interest for this treaty to go away?

Related news on the Iran deal:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/31/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-un

https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/28/benjamin-netanyahu-iran-building-missile-production-sites-syria-and-lebanon

 

[lastdingo]

There are plenty stupid/uninformed people who have such thoughts, for example about the U.S. simply giving a hundred nukes to South Korea and Japan, so it could withdraw from the region.
They don't and likely cannot take into account that the NPT prohibits this and is correctly considered indispensable.

The White House has likely still enough competent people to keep anything like that from happening, but on the other hand, Sarkozy once suggested a nukes sharing agreement with Germany and this offer was shot down by German foreign minister Steinmeier in presence of Merkel, with reference to the NPT.

It's a very widespread problem that humans begin to think of benefits of old efforts as self-evident.
This also happens with people talking nonsense about NATO and the EU.