1935-1940: alternative Luftwaffe?

[_Del_]

The Germans drew the wrong conclusions that would cost them the next war: the decision not to manufacture four engine strategic bombers prevented them from destroying the Russian factories located behind the Urals in 1942.

Given the relative "success" of the daylight bombing campaign against German industry, I think that is a pretty dubious assessment. Couple that with the fact the four-engine strategic bombers gobbled up disproportionate industrial resources to produce compared to the smaller twins, and I'm not at all sure they made the wrong decision.

Even accepting your premise at face-value, the Soviet Union had nothing but room further east. There is nothing to prevent them from simply moving production farther east out of the range of disruption as they did with the first move.

One area they might have enjoyed more four engine aircraft was something like the "Scourge of the Atlantic" which did not use high-powered and in-demand engines and performed valuable service in maritime patrol and attack.

 

[Hood]

The 210 was a mess. I'm not sure that could have been foreseen given Willy's reputation.

There is some evidence that the RLM interfering with the choice of single tail versus twin tail was responsible for some of the aerodynamic issues. Had they maybe left it for Messerchmitt to sort (most probably Willy's underlings as he was more a manager by that time) then it might have turned out ok.
And for my money ditch the barbettes, 90% of two/three-seaters in the war managed just fine with a dorsal gunner with manual guns, this obsession with powered rear guns in smaller aircraft did the Germans no favours.

Does it matter if the Ju 52 was obsolete? It was a workhorse but I agree that a twin-engined transport might have been more economical all-around. Maybe if Lufthansa hadn't of opted for warmed over bomber prototypes (Ju 86, He 111) it might have been able to develop a better DC-2/DC-3 analog before the war to sit alongside its Fw 200 & Ju 90 long-range fleet.

 

[Hood]

Given the relative "success" of the daylight bombing campaign against German industry, I think that is a pretty dubious assessment. Couple that with the fact the four-engine strategic bombers gobbled up disproportionate industrial resources to produce compared to the smaller twins, and I'm not at all sure they made the wrong decision.

Agreed and strategic bombing needed thousands of bombers for effectiveness. The Germans barely kept up with Allied twin-engined bomber production let alone anything on the scale of the Lancaster and Halifax production groups or Willow Run.
A couple of hundred Ju 89s wasn't going to cut it.

 

[tomo pauk]

Not sure that is a fair assessment. They had very long legs for one. They did fairly well in free ranging fighter sweeps using the right tactics. They were abysmal in the "close escort" which both sides dabbled with and was largely ineffective regardless of aircraft quality, but the 110 was particularly ill-suited for it. The biggest complaint seems to be that it cannot get into a turning fight with Spitfires, but there weren't a lot of aircraft that could.

Long legs was useful over the Med and in the Africa campaign, both for sweeps and as Jabos. Similar work in the east where they frequently tore up trains, airfields, vehicles, etc.
It did fine work as an interceptor for daylight bombing raids until long-range escort became available. It had enough power and reserves to lug the 21cm rockets to break up bomber boxes.

The 210 was a mess. I'm not sure that could have been foreseen given Willy's reputation. 310 wasn't much better. 410 was useful, but how do you get there without working through the disaster that was the 210 program? And maybe the biggest problem with the 210 was that it took the 110 essentially out of production and disrupted the lines, while what was finally produced proved ineffective. They would have been better off just leaving the 110 in production for a time until the 410 was finally developed -- but again, the chicken-egg problem.

Bf 110 was the only long-range fighter worth speaking about until the Zero arrived.
With that said, a drop-tank outfitted Bf 109 covers the areas of interest in 1939-40, especially the best part of France and England. It is easier to make them in good numbers for obvious reasons. Unlike the 110, it can also climb and roll every bit as good as Hurricane or Spitfire if not better. Bf 109 also dived better, is/was a very small fighter, while Bf 110 was easier to see and hit due to it's big size.
Fw 190 was also lugging the 21cm rockets, while again being a far better performer all-around, and again cheaper to make. We can also note that Bf 110/210/410 will use the fuel at twice the rate of what Bf 109 will, or a DB-601/605-powered Fw 190.
Me 410 used almost 2400 of DB 603 engines for its production run of just under 1200 pcs. Those 2400 DB 603s in the nose of Fw 190 woud've make these 190s much better fighters than it was the case in late 1943-early 1944, ie. just in time.

The big issue here is the 252 uses the engines that are in much higher demand for combat aircraft. The 352 is fine, but comes too late to make much of a difference, and is not as capable as the 252.

German military transport aviation, while excellent for the time of late 1930s/early 1940s, was in shambles by mid-1941. Combat losses were very high in the Netherlands and in Crete, while new aircraft were slow to materialize. Why the Ju 52 soldiered too long with three 660-700 HP engines is anyone's guess.
I'd suggest that transports are to be made predominantly from wood and steel, with aluminium alloys used sparingly. A low-high mix: simple, 1-2 engined aircraft (like the An-2 biplane, Bellanca Aircruiser, Noorduyn Norseman; Bristol Bombay, HP Harrow), and capable 3-4 engined A/C.
But, granted, the DC-3/C-47 is such a tempting role model, even if the engines are just 1000 HP types.

Engines are the big bottleneck in Germany.

For this time frame - 1935-40 - probably no.
Eg. DB 601 and Jumo 211 were about as good as Merlin, and much better than what other people are making. Bramo 323 and BMW 132 were as capable as Pegasus and Mercury, respectively. Production of engines in Germany was on the mass scale, helping the LW number about the same number of capable aircraft as France and UK combined by 1939?

How these engines were used was ... less than ideal, though. It was very much feasible to make a long-range fighter that performs around a DB-601 or Jumo 211, so the Bf 110 can be skipped.
The Hs 126, made in more than 900 copies, was 'Germany's Lysander'- too heavy and expensive for a close-range recon, but incapable to carry a bomb load despite the 900 HP engine, so you still nedd to call Ju 87s in. Better slap these engines on Ju 87s, and make another hundred or two of Storchs.
I've already mentioned the Ju 52 with 3 engines, unable to emulate the humble Bombay or Harrow that used two.

But then again, every country made their number of flops (some unusable clunkers amounted in many hundreds), so we might probably look at German purchase decisions in that light.

 

[_Del_]

But then again, every country made their number of flops (some unusable clunkers amounted in many hundreds), so we might probably look at German purchase decisions in that light.

That is very true.

 

[riggerrob]

Not sure that is a fair assessment. They had very long legs for one. They did fairly well in free ranging fighter sweeps using the right tactics. They were abysmal in the "close escort" which both sides dabbled with and was largely ineffective regardless of aircraft quality, but the 110 was particularly ill-suited for it. The biggest complaint seems to be that it cannot get into a turning fight with Spitfires, but there weren't a lot of aircraft that could.

Long legs was useful over the Med and in the Africa campaign, both for sweeps and as Jabos. Similar work in the east where they frequently tore up trains, airfields, vehicles, etc.
It did fine work as an interceptor for daylight bombing raids until long-range escort became available. It had enough power and reserves to lug the 21cm rockets to break up bomber boxes.

The 210 was a mess. I'm not sure that could have been foreseen given Willy's reputation. 310 wasn't much better. 410 was useful, but how do you get there without working through the disaster that was the 210 program? And maybe the biggest problem with the 210 was that it took the 110 essentially out of production and disrupted the lines, while what was finally produced proved ineffective. They would have been better off just leaving the 110 in production for a time until the 410 was finally developed -- but again, the chicken-egg problem.

Bf 110 was the only long-range fighter worth speaking about until the Zero arrived.
With that said, a drop-tank outfitted Bf 109 covers the areas of interest in 1939-40, especially the best part of France and England. It is easier to make them in good numbers for obvious reasons. Unlike the 110, it can also climb and roll every bit as good as Hurricane or Spitfire if not better. Bf 109 also dived better, is/was a very small fighter, while Bf 110 was easier to see and hit due to it's big size.
Fw 190 was also lugging the 21cm rockets, while again being a far better performer all-around, and again cheaper to make. We can also note that Bf 110/210/410 will use the fuel at twice the rate of what Bf 109 will, or a DB-601/605-powered Fw 190.
Me 410 used almost 2400 of DB 603 engines for its production run of just under 1200 pcs. Those 2400 DB 603s in the nose of Fw 190 woud've make these 190s much better fighters than it was the case in late 1943-early 1944, ie. just in time.

The big issue here is the 252 uses the engines that are in much higher demand for combat aircraft. The 352 is fine, but comes too late to make much of a difference, and is not as capable as the 252.

German military transport aviation, while excellent for the time of late 1930s/early 1940s, was in shambles by mid-1941. Combat losses were very high in the Netherlands and in Crete, while new aircraft were slow to materialize. Why the Ju 52 soldiered too long with three 660-700 HP engines is anyone's guess.
I'd suggest that transports are to be made predominantly from wood and steel, with aluminium alloys used sparingly. A low-high mix: simple, 1-2 engined aircraft (like the An-2 biplane, Bellanca Aircruiser, Noorduyn Norseman; Bristol Bombay, HP Harrow), and capable 3-4 engined A/C.
But, granted, the DC-3/C-47 is such a tempting role model, even if the engines are just 1000 HP types.

Engines are the big bottleneck in Germany.

For this time frame - 1935-40 - probably no.
Eg. DB 601 and Jumo 211 were about as good as Merlin, and much better than what other people are making. Bramo 323 and BMW 132 were as capable as Pegasus and Mercury, respectively. Production of engines in Germany was on the mass scale, helping the LW number about the same number of capable aircraft as France and UK combined by 1939?

How these engines were used was ... less than ideal, though. It was very much feasible to make a long-range fighter that performs around a DB-601 or Jumo 211, so the Bf 110 can be skipped.
The Hs 126, made in more than 900 copies, was 'Germany's Lysander'- too heavy and expensive for a close-range recon, but incapable to carry a bomb load despite the 900 HP engine, so you still nedd to call Ju 87s in. Better slap these engines on Ju 87s, and make another hundred or two of Storchs.
I've already mentioned the Ju 52 with 3 engines, unable to emulate the humble Bombay or Harrow that used two.

But then again, every country made their number of flops (some unusable clunkers amounted in many hundreds), so we might probably look at German purchase decisions in that light.

Every nation built a few flops: Blackburn Botha, etc. The key is to build a handful of prototypes and learn from your mistakes. Take the lessons learned and apply them to make the next generation better.

 

[riggerrob]

Cancel Messerschmitt Bf. 110, 210 and 310 because they did not really have a role. By late war, they were pressed into service as night-fighters, but that was purely in desperation.

Not sure that is a fair assessment. They had very long legs for one. They did fairly well in free ranging fighter sweeps using the right tactics. They were abysmal in the "close escort" which both sides dabbled with and was largely ineffective regardless of aircraft quality, but the 110 was particularly ill-suited for it. The biggest complaint seems to be that it cannot get into a turning fight with Spitfires, but there weren't a lot of aircraft that could.

Long legs was useful over the Med and in the Africa campaign, both for sweeps and as Jabos. Similar work in the east where they frequently tore up trains, airfields, vehicles, etc.
It did fine work as an interceptor for daylight bombing raids until long-range escort became available. It had enough power and reserves to lug the 21cm rockets to break up bomber boxes.

The 210 was a mess. I'm not sure that could have been foreseen given Willy's reputation. 310 wasn't much better. 410 was useful, but how do you get there without working through the disaster that was the 210 program? And maybe the biggest problem with the 210 was that it took the 110 essentially out of production and disrupted the lines, while what was finally produced proved ineffective. They would have been better off just leaving the 110 in production for a time until the 410 was finally developed -- but again, the chicken-egg problem.

. Ju. 52-3 trimotor was obsolete by the start of WW2. The Ju. 252 and 352 were ...

The big issue here is the 252 uses the engines that are in much higher demand for combat aircraft. The 352 is fine, but comes too late to make much of a difference, and is not as capable as the 252.

Engines are the big bottleneck in Germany.

Messerschmitt 210 was a mess because of turbulent airflow over wing roots. That turbulent airflow also degraded tail surfaces. It seems that the Messerschmitt works was busy with other projects, so called in some engineers - from another company (Arado?) - to design wings for 210.
It took them until the 410 version to smooth out airflow problems.

Like Il-2 and Lancaster rear gunners, I suspect that the second crew member's real role was warning the pilot about enemy airplanes attacking from the rear. IOW rear-firing guns were more of a formality.

 

[riggerrob]

"...

Does it matter if the Ju 52 was obsolete? It was a workhorse but I agree that a twin-engined transport might have been more economical all-around. Maybe if Lufthansa hadn't of opted for warmed over bomber prototypes (Ju 86, He 111) it might have been able to develop a better DC-2/DC-3 analog before the war to sit alongside its Fw 200 & Ju 90 long-range fleet.

Ju52's limited load-carrying capability hampered operations in Crete, North Africa, Eastern Front, Battle of the Bulge, etc. The Luftwaffe was always short of transport airplane tonnage.
Yes, keeping an old design in production is better than nothing. But the problem was more about engine production. Ju.52 was powered a trio of BMW321 radial engines developing 725 horsepower for take-off. FW 200 Condor used 4 of the same engine.
Ju.252 was powered by a trio of Junkers Jumo 211F, V-12 liquid-cooled engines generating 1,300 hp. each. That engine was also used on: Ju.87, Ju88 and Heinkel 111. So the Jumo engine was too valuable for bombers.
Finally, Junkers 352 was powered by a trio of BMW-Bramo Fafnir engines generating 1,000 hp. That engine was also installed on Arado232 "thousandfooter" transport, Dornier 17, Dornier 24 flying boat and FW 200 Condor.
Which raises the question of which engine was best for a mid-war transport with 2 or 3 engines??????

 

[riggerrob]

May I suggest that the Luftwaffe was correct in not building large numbers of large, 4-engined bombers?

All those turrets were a tremendous drag and did not reduce vulnerability. RAF Bomber Command suffered up to 25 percent casualties among their Lancaster, Halifax and Stirling bomber fleets. In comparison, RAF Mosquito fast bombers only suffered light casualties.
Following that logic, the Luftwaffe was wise to focus on Ju.88, 188, etc. light, fast bombers.

 

[_Del_]

Like Il-2 and Lancaster rear gunners, I suspect that the second crew member's real role was warning the pilot about enemy airplanes attacking from the rear. IOW rear-firing guns were more of a formality.

I don't know. I wouldn't underestimate the psychological effect of seeing a guy in the back seat aiming a gun in one's general direction. Certainly discourages getting in close. Maybe the flash or tracers makes a guy break off his run just a little bit earlier. Maybe the guy opts for more difficult deflection shots. Maybe he uses that much more time, gas, and ammo making his passes.
But the extra pair of eyes telling you when to break, as you said, is a nice function.

 

[_Del_]

May I suggest that the Luftwaffe was correct in not building large numbers of large, 4-engined bombers?

All those turrets were a tremendous drag and did not reduce vulnerability. RAF Bomber Command suffered up to 25 percent casualties among their Lancaster, Halifax and Stirling bomber fleets. In comparison, RAF Mosquito fast bombers only suffered light casualties.
Following that logic, the Luftwaffe was wise to focus on Ju.88, 188, etc. light, fast bombers.

Even ignoring the losses and the limited effectiveness of strategic bombing, there's no way Germany can make enough of them to make a real difference. That's the crux.

 

[tomo pauk]

Messerschmitt 210 was a mess because of turbulent airflow over wing roots. That turbulent airflow also degraded tail surfaces. It seems that the Messerschmitt works was busy with other projects, so called in some engineers - from another company (Arado?) - to design wings for 210.
It took them until the 410 version to smooth out airflow problems.

Cure to the Me 210 problems was lengthening of the fuselage, that happened for the 210C version (made both in Germany and Hungary). All of that took the most precious commodity - time - when Nazi Germany didn't have a day to spare.
Should've cancelled the whole 110/210/410 idea and concentrated on Bf 109 andfast bomber/night fighter production instead (Ju 88 or something better), while later siphoning any extra DB engine on Fw 190 production.

Ju.52 was powered a trio of BMW321 radial engines developing 725 horsepower for take-off. FW 200 Condor used 4 of the same engine.
Ju.252 was powered by a trio of Junkers Jumo 211F, V-12 liquid-cooled engines generating 1,300 hp. each. That engine was also used on: Ju.87, Ju88 and Heinkel 111. So the Jumo engine was too valuable for bombers.
Finally, Junkers 352 was powered by a trio of BMW-Bramo Fafnir engines generating 1,000 hp. That engine was also installed on Arado232 "thousandfooter" transport, Dornier 17, Dornier 24 flying boat and FW 200 Condor.
Which raises the question of which engine was best for a mid-war transport with 2 or 3 engines??????

Ju 52 used the 660 HP BMW 132A or T engine until well into the ww2 (yes, English-language Wikipedia is misleading on German hardware). Even the Ju 86s and Hs 126 used 820-860 HP versions, ditto for Fw 200. On 100 oct fuel, the 132H was capable for 1000 HP; granted, we don't want to use the 100 oct fuel on measly transports; the 132H will do 900 HP on 87 oct fuel.
Bramo 323 was a bit more powerful, already the Do-17Z have had a 1000 HP version, 323P (later 323Rs, used on mid-war Fw 200F, on 100 oct fuel were good for 1100, and then 1200 HP ).
Jumo 211s were indeed too valuable for combat aircraft.

So all in all, the difference was small, just forget the early 132s. The Ju 52 can do more than good on just two 900 HP engines - already one complete powerplant less equals to 700-800 kg saving per aircraft.

 

[HoHun]

Hi,

And for my money ditch the barbettes, 90% of two/three-seaters in the war managed just fine with a dorsal gunner with manual guns, this obsession with powered rear guns in smaller aircraft did the Germans no favours.

According to Mankau/Petrick's book on the German destroyers, the Me 210 was really meant to replace the Me 110 and the Ju 87 in one fell stroke, and making the type more capable of defending itself by adding the capability to fire at attackers in the lower hemisphere, against which the older types had been defenseless.

So unlike the British, they did not expect increased accuracy from powered guns, but they needed them to make a capability work that would otherwise have required a third crewmember and a ventral gunnery position, resulting in a larger, heavier and lower performing aircraft.

That the barbettes didn't work as well as had been hoped was part of the development risk that's inherent when you're trying to push the state of the art forward. If you only build stuff that you can be sure will work, you'll end up with obsolescent products.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Another possible engine for the transports might've been the (Jumo) dieseles. Fuel consumption was around 20% lower than for the gasoline engines, a major thing for arm of military that is using the fuel stocks like there is no tomorrow. So I'd probably have two of 205s on a "Ju 52/2m", lowering the installed weight and improving the streamlining - less drag & weight is beneficial for fuel mileage, too.
For the big transport, probably the 'baby Me 323', that uses technology of yesterday for airframe (= more steel, wood and canvas, and less light alloys), has a cavernous cargo bay, and uses 4 engines. Yes, it needs to be produced by late 1930s.

 

[riggerrob]

Another possible engine for the transports might've been the (Jumo) dieseles. Fuel consumption was around 20% lower than for the gasoline engines, a major thing for arm of military that is using the fuel stocks like there is no tomorrow. So I'd probably have two of 205s on a "Ju 52/2m", lowering the installed weight and improving the streamlining - less drag & weight is beneficial for fuel mileage, too.
For the big transport, probably the 'baby Me 323', that uses technology of yesterday for airframe (= more steel, wood and canvas, and less light alloys), has a cavernous cargo bay, and uses 4 engines. Yes, it needs to be produced by late 1930s.

Another advantage of diesels is that they do not need precious high-octane gasoline. Diesels are like jets in that they can burn almost any flammable liquid that can be pumped through injectors.

 

[lordroel]

Kill Goering, for a start.

I always wonder if Manfred von Richthofen had survive and took over Goering position but then i realize , i do not know what Richthofen views are on Jews and the Nazi party would be.

 

[Archibald]

Kill Goering, for a start.

I always wonder if Manfred von Richthofen had survive and took over Goering position but then i realize , i do not know what Richthofen views are on Jews and the Nazi party would be.

He had surviving brothers, cousins (Lothar, Wolfram - from memory) all over the Nazi LW and... they were devoted nazis. Not sure Manfred would have been any better.
Plus the case of fat Goering himself, that miserable SOB.

 

[BB1984]

May I suggest that the Luftwaffe was correct in not building large numbers of large, 4-engined bombers?

All those turrets were a tremendous drag and did not reduce vulnerability. RAF Bomber Command suffered up to 25 percent casualties among their Lancaster, Halifax and Stirling bomber fleets. In comparison, RAF Mosquito fast bombers only suffered light casualties.
Following that logic, the Luftwaffe was wise to focus on Ju.88, 188, etc. light, fast bombers.

Even ignoring the losses and the limited effectiveness of strategic bombing, there's no way Germany can make enough of them to make a real difference. That's the crux.

Focusing on the Ju-88/188 etc. was what Germany wound up doing, but it was not their plan. They wanted the Bomber B program to work and, if it had, the Ju-288 or FW-191 would have been in the same class as the allied four engine bombers (much as the Manchester/Lancaster were roughly equivalent) and the Ju-188 would never have entered production.

In some ways, Bomber B, was the "have your cake and eat it too" solution: much higher speed than, for instance, a B-17 but still with good defensive armament and a heavy load.

For "what-if" purposes, there were two ways to go:

1. Put enough resources into engine development and production to get the Ju222/DB609 class engines working and in production on time, or . . .
2. Give up on those engines early and push for faster, better twin engine bomber development. Accelerating the Ju-88/188/388 development line is the most obvious choice and would also allow accelerating the Ju-88C to Ju-88G heavy fighter version, which would be part of an Me-110 replacement strategy that would have sidestepped the Me-210 debacle. Dumping the Ju-288 would have also freed up Junkers resources to do that acceleration.

More and better engine development / production was an issue in any case (as others have pointed out as well).

Just as an aside, it's easy to pick on the Me-210, but the competing Arado 240 went through a very similar path, needing massive re-design before emerging as the very good, but too late, Ar-440. At least the 210C/410 gave good service.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Germans drew the wrong conclusions that would cost them the next war: the decision not to manufacture four engine strategic bombers prevented them from destroying the Russian factories located behind the Urals in 1942.

Given the relative "success" of the daylight bombing campaign against German industry, I think that is a pretty dubious assessment. Couple that with the fact the four-engine strategic bombers gobbled up disproportionate industrial resources to produce compared to the smaller twins, and I'm not at all sure they made the wrong decision.

Even accepting your premise at face-value, the Soviet Union had nothing but room further east. There is nothing to prevent them from simply moving production farther east out of the range of disruption as they did with the first move.

One area they might have enjoyed more four engine aircraft was something like the "Scourge of the Atlantic" which did not use high-powered and in-demand engines and performed valuable service in maritime patrol and attack.

Re the last paragraph...

Would 275-odd Do19s or Ju89s using BMW132 or Bramo 323 engines been better LRMP aircraft than the "real world's" 275-odd Fw200Cs?

 

[tomo pauk]

A tidbit about the Ju 52, and why IMO it was not the best use of German resources:
- 1-engined Ju 52 used 700 kg of fuel to fly 2000 kg of cargo to the distance of 1000 km
- early 3-engined Ju 52 used 1165 kg of fuel to fly 2000 kg of cargo to 850 km(!)
- export Ju 52/3 with 715 HP P&W Hornet used 1080 kg of fuel to move 2450 kg to 850 km

What they did was to add complexity, engines and price to basic Ju 52 so the 3-engined type can about equal the payload vs. distance of a simple & cheap 1-engined type. Yes, the 3-engined types cruised faster, a consequence of not just having triple the HP, but also the fast that their engines were supercharged so they flew at higher altitudes; the engine-out situation obviously favors the 3-engined type.

So I'd reiterate my earlier suggestion - the Ju 52 is to be built with just two engines.

 

[Pioneer]

A tidbit about the Ju 52, and why IMO it was not the best use of German resources:
- 1-engined Ju 52 used 700 kg of fuel to fly 2000 kg of cargo to the distance of 1000 km
- early 3-engined Ju 52 used 1165 kg of fuel to fly 2000 kg of cargo to 850 km(!)
- export Ju 52/3 with 715 HP P&W Hornet used 1080 kg of fuel to move 2450 kg to 850 km

What they did was to add complexity, engines and price to basic Ju 52 so the 3-engined type can about equal the payload vs. distance of a simple & cheap 1-engined type. Yes, the 3-engined types cruised faster, a consequence of not just having triple the HP, but also the fast that their engines were supercharged so they flew at higher altitudes; the engine-out situation obviously favors the 3-engined type.

So I'd reiterate my earlier suggestion - the Ju 52 is to be built with just two engines.

Interesting comparison.
Thanks tomo pauk

And, if I may, the Ju 52 is naturally replaced by a more modern and more capable design much earlier and more proficiently....

Regards
Pioneer

 

[tomo pauk]

And, if I may, the Ju 52 is naturally replaced by a more modern and more capable design much earlier and more proficiently....

Yes, the more capable A/C is/was needed.
Me - I'd go with a 4-engined high-wing transport, that uses the light alloys as little as possible, the steel, wood and canvas being the main materials. Such a thing was proposed by Arado, but it was too late. The Ar 232B used 4 9-cyl radials, offering double the take-off weight and double the payload.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

A tidbit about the Ju 52, and why IMO it was not the best use of German resources:
- 1-engined Ju 52 used 700 kg of fuel to fly 2000 kg of cargo to the distance of 1000 km
- early 3-engined Ju 52 used 1165 kg of fuel to fly 2000 kg of cargo to 850 km(!)
- export Ju 52/3 with 715 HP P&W Hornet used 1080 kg of fuel to move 2450 kg to 850 km

Well, one significant operational advantage of having substantially more power available is the ability to achieve short take-off from rough airfields. This was certainly not the design case of the Ju 52/3m, but rather a coincedental advantage, but considering the kind of use the Ju 52/3m saw in WW2, I wouldn't feel confident in claiming that the single-engined variant could have provided similarly good service.

I don't think that there were too many military people critical of the Ju 52/3m, even if it's clear that in an airline context, operating from well-maintained airfields, it was not competitive against the DC-2.

By the way, where did you find the range data? Looks quite useful!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Well, one significant operational advantage of having substantially more power available is the ability to achieve short take-off from rough airfields. This was certainly not the design case of the Ju 52/3m, but rather a coincedental advantage, but considering the kind of use the Ju 52/3m saw in WW2, I wouldn't feel confident in claiming that the single-engined variant could have provided similarly good service.

I'm not a vocal supporter of the historical 1-engined Ju-52, just trying to point out the thing that the 3-engined Ju 52 was a very inefficient way to improve the LW transport capabilities. Inefficient because taxed the engine production at BMW, propeller production, and fuel usage, all for barely an improved payload vs. distance measurement.
The table* notes only 180m needed for take off for the 1-engined Ju-52, vs. 300+- for the Ju-52/3m; weights of 7000 kg vs. 9000-10500 kg respectively - the lighter type that shared the wing size & design will need less speed for taking off.
If the 1-engined Ju-52 is still under consideration by LW, it should get a supercharged engine (the BMW VI was not S/Charged) like the BMW 132 or Bramo 323, that is also lighter as-installed, and can offer power increase of 20-30% out from the box. It also allows for cruising on 'normal' altitudes for better fuel mileage.
Once G&R 14N is available, shove that one in the nose instead of German engines. The HS-12Y also works, either from Avia and from H-S themselves. Yes, the engine-out situation is still a problem.

I don't think that there were too many military people critical of the Ju 52/3m, even if it's clear that in an airline context, operating from well-maintained airfields, it was not competitive against the DC-2.

By the way, where did you find the range data? Looks quite useful!

Military people were not the ones paying for aircraft and fuel. What they might not like is the vast quantity of Ju 52s and their crew required to move a lot of cargo between point A to the point B.
We can compare the Ju-52 against the British 'non-sexy' transports, like the Harrow, that was carrying more on greater distance on just two engines.

*table with data is from the 'Ju 52 Flugzeug und Legende' by Nowarra.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

The table* notes only 180m needed for take off for the 1-engined Ju-52, vs. 300+- for the Ju-52/3m; weights of 7000 kg vs. 9000-10500 kg respectively - the lighter type that shared the wing size & design will need less speed for taking off.

Hm, at 150% the take-off weight, you need only 123% the take-off speed, and if you have 250% the thrust, you have 167% the acceleration. As take-off run depends on the square of speed, it should be 150% for the Ju 52/3m at equal acceleration, but with three engines running, it would be 150% divided by 167%, or 90% of the "/1m"'s take-off run.

So I suspect Nowarra's numbers have to be a bit off there.

Of course, a Ju 52/2m would be an interesting compromise, but I'm not so sure it would have been a safe plane to operate at least with the BMW 132 engines it historically had. A streamlined fuselage would certainly have helped top speed, and fuel economy as well, but climb rate would not have been much improved, and that was a bit limited on two engines only.

Attached a coarse analysis I ran a while back ... the two-engine case does of course assume the original trimotor aerodynamics, but you can see that with two engines only, the climb rate is just 40% of what it is with three engines, even at the relatively low flying weight of 9500 kg.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Hm, at 150% the take-off weight, you need only 123% the take-off speed, and if you have 250% the thrust, you have 167% the acceleration. As take-off run depends on the square of speed, it should be 150% for the Ju 52/3m at equal acceleration, but with three engines running, it would be 150% divided by 167%, or 90% of the "/1m"'s take-off run.

So I suspect Nowarra's numbers have to be a bit off there.

You might be as well right. It is not like we have abundance data on the "/1m".

Of course, a Ju 52/2m would be an interesting compromise, but I'm not so sure it would have been a safe plane to operate at least with the BMW 132 engines it historically had. A streamlined fuselage would certainly have helped top speed, and fuel economy as well, but climb rate would not have been much improved, and that was a bit limited on two engines only.

BMW was making 800 to 960 HP versions of the 132 well before ww2 started.

Attached a coarse analysis I ran a while back ... the two-engine case does of course assume the original trimotor aerodynamics, but you can see that with two engines only, the climb rate is just 40% of what it is with three engines, even at the relatively low flying weight of 9500 kg.

Thanks for that.
Could you make, time allowing, such charts that include eg. 132F or 132N? Engine and other data from the Ju 86G and Do 17P manual, respectively:

 

[Pioneer]

I have to admit the notion of a single- engine Ju 52 makes me cringe. It definitely needs to be at minimum of two engine arrangement for some form of safety/battle damage redundancy, especially if it's carrying troops/para troops.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[HoHun]

Hi Tomo,

Could you make, time allowing, such charts that include eg. 132F or 132N? Engine and other data from the Ju 86G and Do 17P manual, respectively:

Thanks for the data! Here is the performance estimate.



I've used 11000 kg for the Ju 52/3m with BMW 132N because that's the highest flying weight for the later versions. Probably it's more like a re-engined g8e, but I'm not fluent in Ju 52 version numbering.

With regard to engine failures on twin-engined transports, here's a recent incident with an R4D-8 that belly-landed after an engine failure, being unable to establish a positive climb rate:

View: https://youtu.be/DNHGUyEy3dM


Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the data! Here is the performance estimate.

Cheers, man

I've used 11000 kg for the Ju 52/3m with BMW 132N because that's the highest flying weight for the later versions. Probably it's more like a re-engined g8e, but I'm not fluent in Ju 52 version numbering.

The advantage of deleting one engine from the 52/3m is that weight also goes down, even if we account for better 132s being heavier by ~100 kg than the 132A/T/Z.
Some Ju 52 versions, courtesy of avialogs.com where a wealth of manuals can be found:

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In the final paragraph of Post 81 @_Del_ wrote...

One area they might have enjoyed more four engine aircraft was something like the "Scourge of the Atlantic" which did not use high-powered and in-demand engines and performed valuable service in maritime patrol and attack.

To which I replied in Post 99...

Would 275-odd Do19s or Ju89s using BMW132 or Bramo 323 engines been better LRMP aircraft than the "real world's" 275-odd Fw200Cs?

My thinking was that both trios of Do19 and Ju89 prototypes would be completed after which a pre-production batch of 12 Do19A-0 or Ju89A-0 would be completed 1938-39 for operational trials. They would be followed by 275-odd production aircraft which would be a one-to-one substitution for the 275-odd Fw200s that were built in the "real world".

Dornier developed the Do17 into the Do217 and Junkers developed the Ju90 into the Ju290. Would the same thing be possible with the Do19 and Ju89?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Luftwaffe had 14 maritime reconnaissance squadrons at the outbreak of World War II against a requirement for 27. They were equipped with Do18 twin-engine flying boats, He59 twin-engine seaplanes and He60 single-engine seaplanes. The intention was that the Ar196 would replace the He60 and the He115 would replace the He59 while in the longer term the Bv138 would replace the Do18.

However, many of the squadron's personnel believed that landplanes would have been better because they thought they'd be less vulnerable to enemy fighters and this was soon confirmed by wartime experience.

Therefore, would it have been possible to have the squadrons equipped with landplanes instead of seaplanes and flying boats at the outbreak of World War Two? That is without reducing the number of landplanes in the mainstream of the Luftwaffe.

Ideally the squadrons equipped with Do18s would have Do17Zs and the squadrons that had the He59 and He60 would have He111Hs or He111Ps. The Ar196 and He115 would still be built, but only in sufficient numbers to replace the He60s operating from capital ships & cruisers and the He59s in the air sea rescue organisations respectively.

 

[tomo pauk]

Therefore, would it have been possible to have the squadrons with landplanes instead of seaplanes and flying boats at the outbreak of World War Two? That is without reducing the number of landplanes in the mainstream of the Luftwaffe.

There is really no point in many A/C companies making the diversed inventory of either bespoke seaplanes + landplane->seaplane conversions for Germany. I'd have B&V make all the flying boats needed, Arado all floatplanes, so both Dornier and Heinkel can concentrate on landplanes.

 

[riggerrob]

The Luftwaffe had 14 maritime reconnaissance squadrons at the outbreak of World War II against a requirement for 27. They were equipped with Do18 twin-engine flying boats, He59 twin-engine seaplanes and He60 single-engine seaplanes. The intention was that the Ar196 would replace the He60 and the He115 would replace the He59 while in the longer term the Bv138 would replace the Do18.

However, many of the squadron's personnel believed that landplanes would have been better because they thought they'd be less vulnerable to enemy fighters and this was soon confirmed by wartime experience.

Therefore, would it have been possible to have the squadrons equipped with landplanes instead of seaplanes and flying boats at the outbreak of World War Two? That is without reducing the number of landplanes in the mainstream of the Luftwaffe.

Ideally the squadrons equipped with Do18s would have Do17Zs and the squadrons that had the He59 and He60 would have He111Hs or He111Ps. The Ar196 and He115 would still be built, but only in sufficient numbers to replace the He60s operating from capital ships & cruisers and the He59s in the air sea rescue organisations respectively.

Arado 196 was a valuable floatplane because it could be catapulted from battleships and land beside the ship are a mission. Keep in mind that few seaplanes (be they floatplanes or flying boats) can operate on the open ocean everyday. If waves or swells are higher than "X" meters, then seaplanes cannot take-off except from sheltered harbors. Speaking of sheltered harbors, Norwegian fjords are ideal for launching floatplanes.
But the LUftwaffe still needed a few seaplane squadrons to rescue pilots who ditched in the English Channel.

 

[lancer21]

If i may add some small musings here, imo one of the things that Luftwaffe lacked in this period was a 14 cylinder radial, like the french, italians , japanese or indeed the americans had, respectively GR14K/N, Kinsei and Ha-5, Piaggio PXI (based on GR14K anyway) or the R-1830. Obviously the BMW-801 does not count here as it went in service in 1941.

Seems BMW and Bramo duplicated their efforts with the BMW-132 and Bramo-323, perhaps Bramo would be better of building a 14 cylinder radial instead of the 323, it should easily give say 1200HP if we use the 323A as benchmark, and likely something like 1350-1400HP if we use the 323Z. Would be very useful to take the pressure of the DB and Jumo series, what you think?

I don't know where that would leave the OTL BMW-139/801 and Bramo-329 development, perhaps then Bramo could focus on upgrading this earlier 14 cylinder into something akin to the OTL 1500 HP engine, while BMW could focus on building an 18 cylinder 1800-2000HP class engine based on the 132. This engine should be developed alongside the Jumo-222, which should just stick to a relatively modest 2000HP goal. For this they have to cancel the merger between BMW and Bramo of course.

The other major thing to do is NOT cancel the DB-603 development! You could then have this engine availalable in prototype form rated about 1500 HP already in 1938-1939 powering the FW-190, the Me-210, the Do-217, and a four separate engine He-177, though probably my ATL radials would be better of powering the bombers, leaving the DB-603 inlines for the FW-190 and Me-210 etc.

 

[Calum Douglas]

Organizationally they were finished from 1936 onwards when they issued accelerated time-planning guidelines for new aircraft programmes, all else is moot unless this is altered.

This is from a letter from Robert Lusser to Erhard Milch on 15th Jan 1942, showing how the development steps had
(post 1936) been compressed so as to have testing, production preparations, and prototype stages in parallel instead of in series.

As Lusser correctly states "The belief [that such a plan can work] proved to be little more than a fantasy!"

("Dieser Glaube hat sich als eine schwere Illusion herausgestellt !")

 

[tomo pauk]

Organizationally they were finished from 1936 onwards when they issued accelerated time-planning guidelines for new aircraft programmes, all else is moot unless this is altered.

This is from a letter from Robert Lusser to Erhard Milch on 15th Jan 1942, showing how the development steps had
(post 1936) been compressed so as to have testing, production preparations, and prototype stages in parallel instead of in series.

As Lusser correctly states "The belief [that such a plan can work] is little more than a fantasy!"

("Dieser Glaube hat sich als eine schwere Illusion herausgestellt !")

Thanks for the facsimile.
We can note that NAA started making Mustangs 15 months after they received contract from the BPC. Grumman was also quick on the ball with Hellcat, the only hiccup being that the R-2600 was found lacking vs. R-2800, so the later engine was eventually the powerplant of choice. The Fw 190 was also very fast in the development phase, the BMW 139 kinda sucker-punched it.

Granted, bigger A/C will take longer, and some companies were better than other ones in designing the 'winners'.

 

[Calum Douglas]

Organizationally they were finished from 1936 onwards when they issued accelerated time-planning guidelines for new aircraft programmes, all else is moot unless this is altered.

This is from a letter from Robert Lusser to Erhard Milch on 15th Jan 1942, showing how the development steps had
(post 1936) been compressed so as to have testing, production preparations, and prototype stages in parallel instead of in series.

As Lusser correctly states "The belief [that such a plan can work] is little more than a fantasy!"

("Dieser Glaube hat sich als eine schwere Illusion herausgestellt !")

Thanks for the facsimile.
We can note that NAA started making Mustangs 15 months after they received contract from the BPC. Grumman was also quick on the ball with Hellcat, the only hiccup being that the R-2600 was found lacking vs. R-2800, so the later engine was eventually the powerplant of choice. The Fw 190 was also very fast in the development phase, the BMW 139 kinda sucker-punched it.

Granted, bigger A/C will take longer, and some companies were better than other ones in designing the 'winners'.

This may well be so, however I would gently point out that the P-51 did not make any real contribution to the European air war until almost four years after it was designed. So, as Lusser points out, one can rush things, but ultimately, despite what one might wish, four years is how long it will REALLY take to mature the concept until its actually operationally useful. (his pont was, you can get it into the air in 2 years, and then spend 2 years bu**ering about fixing it, or you can just spend 4 years on it)

Getting back to the post topic, what I was mentioning this for was in the main that this plan change was (in my view, for which I have I think a "reasonable" archive document backup for, at least to a "reasonable degree" of probability) directly responsible for the failure of the Me210 to be operational (and working properly) in very late 1940. Not only did it determine planning changes to timing, but also suggested that the RLM draft in "spare" designers from other firms to help during "slack periods" in their own offices. It is, at least according to British Intelligence, this that ruined much of the Me210`s aero when Arado engineers were forcibly inserted into the Me design team. These Arado guys "happened" to design most of the bits that didnt work. Perhaps pure co-incidence !

(I`m not suggesting Arado were bad designers, merely that doing aircraft design by "mix and match" of people in the design team is a really bad idea)

 

[tomo pauk]

This may well be so, however I would gently point out that the P-51 did not make any real contribution to the European air war until almost four years after it was designed. So, as Lusser points out, one can rush things, but ultimately, despite what one might wish, four years is how long it will REALLY take to mature the concept until its actually operationally useful.

Mustang was actually operationally useful from day one it entered service. Unfortunately, the non-turbo V-1710 was a sub-par engine wrt. the alttude power between late 1940 and late 1943 (not NAA's fault, though).

 

[Calum Douglas]

This may well be so, however I would gently point out that the P-51 did not make any real contribution to the European air war until almost four years after it was designed. So, as Lusser points out, one can rush things, but ultimately, despite what one might wish, four years is how long it will REALLY take to mature the concept until its actually operationally useful.

Mustang was actually operationally useful from day one it entered service. Unfortunately, the non-turbo V-1710 was a sub-par engine wrt. the alttude power between late 1940 and late 1943 (not NAA's fault, though).

Well I suppose we`d then just have to argue about definitions of a sucessful aircraft programme, as to if having the correct engine is or is not, a useful aircraft programme. I think we should not do that here, as it will ruin the thread.

But, as the thread is about the Lufwaffe, and Robert Lusser was there and did it, what he wrote probably is more critical to this thread topic than NAA !

As you know from my book, I`m a huge Mustang fan.

 

[tomo pauk]

@HoHun

(since I'm not allowed to send you the PM)

I've started a conversation on another forum about the Fw 190 being mooted with extra supercharger sets, of two different types, in an installation much better streamlined than it was the case with the Kangaroo, the V18. Unfortunately, it seems that really good data is lacking. Perhaps you have a better insight on this?