USAF/USN 6th Gen Fighters - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS News & Analysis

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Here's my speculation, informed by what I'm hearing:

USN F/A-XX
1. NG and Boeing are providing system solutions that directly respond to the Navy's cost-conscious set of requirements.
2. LM has been insistent on offering a higher-end technological solution, one that the Navy is not comfortable with operationally and/or clearly knows it can not afford.
3. LM and the carrier-based Navy haven't had a close relationship since the S-3A program. LM's tone-deaf marketing approach may be attributed to either (a) protecting its F-35B/C franchise; or (b) reluctance to engage due to Kelly Johnson's unwritten 15th rule for the Skunk Works. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelly_Johnson_(engineer)

USAF NGAD-PCA
1. Boeing was tentatively selected for the award, prior to Kendall or OSD calling for a time out.
2. Boeing's poor performance on numerous past and ongoing programs may have contributed to Kendall/OSD's cold feet.
3. Meanwhile LM's performance on the DARPA-led flight demonstration program(s) suffered from significant schedule slip and cost overrun. "Past Performance" is often a heavily-weighted criterion in major acquisition source selections.
4. NG decision to not compete for NGAD-PCA is likely tied to protecting or growing its B-21 franchise.
The Boeing defense is not the civilian counter part, They can build the NGAD I m confident on it, look the X-37 B is realy a good program the F-15 EX too.
 
The Boeing defense is not the civilian counter part, They can build the NGAD I m confident on it, look the X-37 B is realy a good program the F-15 EX too.
The X-37B is a legacy Rockwell program and the F-15 and FA-18 programs are legacy McDonnell Douglas and have an extremely long developmental and production history. The X-37B is an outlier; the few that were built were completed almost 20 years ago.

The new (greenfield) programs currently conducted by BDS (T-7A, MQ-25, KC-46A, VC-25B) appear to be unbesmirched by adherence to to cost, schedule and quality metrics - or by profit.
 
LM has not been knocking its out of the park either. About the only program that seems to be running smoothly is B-21, and I could easily see the ISN going that direction. NGAD wise I think Boeing gets it. There was a rumor that USAF was impressed with their concept, and they likely have more bandwidth than LM. Besides the F-18 line, I believe they invested heavily in a new facility just to try to win FA-XX or NGAD. Assuming NGAD happens of course. IMO it either goes forward or doesn’t; there is not enough time to rescope and rebid.
 
4. NG decision to not compete for NGAD-PCA is likely tied to protecting or growing its B-21 franchise.
No, they've already stated it was due to the USAF owning the design and being able to allow other manufacturers to build it. NG doesn't want anything to do with that.
 
Besides the F-18 line, I believe they invested heavily in a new facility just to try to win FA-XX or NGAD. Assuming NGAD happens of course. IMO it either goes forward or doesn’t; there is not enough time to rescope and rebid.
One could also extrapolate that since Boeing has the most navy experience and flew the naval demonstrator, they could be making the investments to build on either he NGAD efforts given those investments would require similar'ish investments.
 
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One could also extrapolate that since Boeing has the most recent navy experience and flew the naval demonstrator, they could be making the investments to build on either he NGAD efforts given those investments would require similar'ish investments.

I’m sure they will take whatever they can get, so long as they get one of them.
 
I don’t think people fully appreciate just how much China has invested into making carriers a high risk, high cost target in modern warfare. The USN is likely reassessing whether it's still worth deploying expensive capital ships with expensive aircraft squadrons, especially as their ability to operate near contested zones is going to become increasingly limited.

Bring on smaller, more flexible expeditionary naval forces centered around UCAVs and be done with it. Lean on non-carrier based, long duration aircraft for intelligence & early warning.
 
I don’t think people fully appreciate just how much China has invested into making carriers a high risk, high cost target in modern warfare. The USN is likely reassessing whether it's still worth deploying expensive capital ships with expensive aircraft squadrons, especially as their ability to operate near contested zones is going to become increasingly limited.

Bring on smaller, more flexible expeditionary naval forces centered around UCAVs and be done with it. Lean on non-carrier based, long duration aircraft for intelligence & early warning.
If carriers defended by whole CVBGs are "high risk" then I fail to see how increasing dispersion of the defense force by spreading them around larger fleet of less capable CVLs change anything.

The whole argument around long range AShBMs revolves around a simplistic single-party-active scenario wherein China acquires US carriers, launch, incapacitate and get done with it. In reality those missiles are facing increasing persistent stare threats and whole batteries can be neutralize after initial launch detection/launch command intercept leaving only a portion of the force usable. The kill method can be either long range penetrating bombers that loiter just right outside the ADIZ or PGS type system. And that's before the discussion of missile defense takes place.

CVNs will still be needed because we have reached the limit of usable natural land for OCONUS bomber base in WESTPAC.
 
I don’t think people fully appreciate just how much China has invested into making carriers a high risk, high cost target in modern warfare. The USN is likely reassessing whether it's still worth deploying expensive capital ships with expensive aircraft squadrons, especially as their ability to operate near contested zones is going to become increasingly limited.

Bring on smaller, more flexible expeditionary naval forces centered around UCAVs and be done with it. Lean on non-carrier based, long duration aircraft for intelligence & early warning.
They can't, fixed disseminated base are not better or in a more security than a carrier group, in fact in futur war the carrier group could be the better way to dominate the battle, if FA/XX have a long range the carrier group could be far away of the ennemy fire possibility, and by moving all the time more difficult for the ennemy to be at the every place. And stop with your marvelous UAV it is not the holy grail in Ukraine it dominate nothing.
 
I don’t think people fully appreciate just how much China has invested into making carriers a high risk, high cost target in modern warfare. The USN is likely reassessing whether it's still worth deploying expensive capital ships with expensive aircraft squadrons, especially as their ability to operate near contested zones is going to become increasingly limited.

Bring on smaller, more flexible expeditionary naval forces centered around UCAVs and be done with it. Lean on non-carrier based, long duration aircraft for intelligence & early warning.

The PRC still seems to think carrier development and production is worth while. I do not think anyone here thinks that the threat is not severe; that is why increasing strike range is so imperative.

UCAVs still have to take off from somewhere, and something still needs to defend wherever there is. You can spread your eggs into more baskets, but you still have limited assets to defend those baskets. The fact is CVs are a sunk cost, and they have unique capabilities smaller ships will not have, so neither the PLAN or the USN will stop building them.
 
The PRC still seems to think carrier development and production is worth while. I do not think anyone here thinks that the threat is not severe; that is why increasing strike range is so imperative.

UCAVs still have to take off from somewhere, and something still needs to defend wherever there is. You can spread your eggs into more baskets, but you still have limited assets to defend those baskets. The fact is CVs are a sunk cost, and they have unique capabilities smaller ships will not have, so neither the PLAN or the USN will stop building them.

The PRC doesn’t really use the carriers the same way as the U.S.
 
In terms of experience and carrier-doctrine the PLA:N is where the USN was in the 1920s.

Nope. What I meant to say is that in the near future the primary task is force projection in the operations within Second Island Chain rather than expeditionary forces. Has nothing to do with capabilities.
 
Wouldn't that not be more costly at the end? See:
- attrition
- larger mission package
- lower sorties rate
- immobilize few opponents Defence to be countered.

On the opposite, a NGAS sustained mission require less aircraft, can generate more missions (less participating aircraft that required less offloaded fuel) and are very tough to be countered while requiring a large number of a/c to do so.
That might be true. Today? 2030? 2040?

The problem might be that the technology is not there yet, or it cannot be developed for something that fits within the current budget? A tanker with that has the ability to provide an operationally meaningful offload might approach the cost of the B-21? From a value point of view it might be better to buy more PCAs, B-21s, munitions and other systems than sink billions into the development of NGAS when you have already paid to develop those other systems.

Maybe traditional tankers can survive under the defense umbrella of the USAF and JSDF in Japanese airspace and top off manned fighters performing missions near Taiwan?
 
In terms of experience and carrier-doctrine the PLA:N is where the USN was in the 1920s.
When there is 100+ years of carrier experience to leverage you don't start from scratch. There is clearly some maturity still needed but not that much.

Nope. What I meant to say is that in the near future the primary task is force projection in the operations within Second Island Chain rather than expeditionary forces. Has nothing to do with capabilities.
To me it looks similar to Soviet doctrine on the 1980s in using carriers to support surface and submerged forces within defined geographic regions. I'm not convinced that would stand up to the heat and uncertainly of a first week of war but not my butt on the line.
 
Well, it would be nice if someone actually asked the Navy program what its timeline was to field a Super Hornet replacement. I suppose they will have to announce that later in the year once they make their source selection.


The Navy has not stopped buying new combat aircraft. Both Block 4 F-35C, and the MQ-25 are being fielded this decade. Both will either directly or indirectly provide more advanced capability over Block 2/3 Super Hornet, or offload missions from it to preserve airframe life. If the F/A-XX, does end up taking more time than planned, the Navy could always increase the number of F-35C's it and USMC fields, field a more attack oriented variant of MQ-25, increase the throughput or planned numbers from/of the F-18 E/F service life extension effort or a combination of any of those options.
The last Super Hornet will be delivered in 2027. The first Super Bugs were delivered in 1998. That's 27 years ago.

As all the old squadrons use up all the life on their planes, they need to be replaced. Bluntly, FAXX need to have an IOC in less than 10 years, but good luck making that happen.



No, they've already stated it was due to the USAF owning the design and being able to allow other manufacturers to build it. NG doesn't want anything to do with that.
I hadn't heard that, I know LockMart wasn't happy about the idea.

But it does make sense that they don't want to lose a guaranteed revenue stream.



The PRC doesn’t really use the carriers the same way as the U.S.
Yet.
 
They can't, fixed disseminated base are not better or in a more security than a carrier group, in fact in futur war the carrier group could be the better way to dominate the battle, if FA/XX have a long range the carrier group could be far away of the ennemy fire possibility, and by moving all the time more difficult for the ennemy to be at the every place. And stop with your marvelous UAV it is not the holy grail in Ukraine it dominate nothing.

I don't think I was arguing anything about land bases vs carrier groups?

As for your comment about carriers being the better way to dominate battle, are you familiar with China's A2/AD network? They’ve been fortifying themselves for decades with the explicit goal of making carrier operations in the western Pacific too risky to be viable. This has been a strategic initiative of theirs since the 90s, limiting US power projection by developing multiple layers of anti-ship capabilities.

Not even sure what relevance Ukraine drone operations have here, so I'll just leave that alone.
 
If carriers defended by whole CVBGs are "high risk" then I fail to see how increasing dispersion of the defense force by spreading them around larger fleet of less capable CVLs change anything.

The whole argument around long range AShBMs revolves around a simplistic single-party-active scenario wherein China acquires US carriers, launch, incapacitate and get done with it. In reality those missiles are facing increasing persistent stare threats and whole batteries can be neutralize after initial launch detection/launch command intercept leaving only a portion of the force usable. The kill method can be either long range penetrating bombers that loiter just right outside the ADIZ or PGS type system. And that's before the discussion of missile defense takes place.

CVNs will still be needed because we have reached the limit of usable natural land for OCONUS bomber base in WESTPAC.
Your argument assumes that carrier groups can operate with impunity, but the entire reason the US is reconsidering its force structure is because China has spent decades building a layered A2/AD system designed to hold US carrier ops at risk in the western Pacific. Dispersing forces isn't about making them weaker, it's about making them harder to target.

The idea that ASBMs are a non-factor because the US can just neutralize entire batteries is a bit optimistic. China’s ASBM systems are mobile, networked, and backed by improving ISR, making them much harder to fully eliminate before they can strike. Some of these mobile batteries are even fortified inside mountain complexes. Missile defense is also not foolproof (which I think you know), and assuming we can just preemptively wipe out all ASBM threats isn't a reliable strategy.

And while it's true that we have limited OCONUS bomber bases, the solution isn't just more CVNs. The US is already shifting to a more flexible basing strategy with EABO, partnership agreements, & longer ranged aircraft. The idea that the future fight will look exactly like past carrier operations doesn’t hold up when the threat environment has changed so much.
 
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Somewhat.

As long as the Chinese are operating fairly close to shore, they can always augment their carrier combat air patrols with land-based air cover. Which then frees up their carrier planes for strikes.

So, as long as they don’t operate a carrier…as a carrier.
 
Please, in the discussion about longer range aircraft, remember that longer range without airframe number increase provides less operational sorties, less firepower, higher mission failure rates, less Tactical opportunities.

Increase the range and sorties duration is like giving in day after day the initiative on the battle ground*.
See Russia long range aviation component that is merely a complementary force in Ukraine when it should be dictating the Tactical situation as per doctrinal initiatives.

NGAD Maxi will inherently impart a reduced AF momentum.

*I know, readers would probably shoot at me "P-38, P-51!" but the facts are there was no battle grounds while those were actively regaining Air dominance over Europe. On the west side, it was purely an Air Battle until D-day. On the contrary, the conflict that is drafted today will involves mission generated for Ground force support.
 
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Please, in the discussion about longer range aircraft, remember that longer range without airframe number increase provide less operational sorties, less firepower, higher mission failure rates, less Tactical opportunities.

Increase the range and sorties duration is like giving in day after day the initiative on the battle ground.
See Russia long range aviation component that is merely a complementary force in Ukraine when it should be dictating the Tactical situationas per doctrinal initiatives.

NGAD Maxi will inherently impart a reduced AF momentum.
Russia doesn't have that kind of a doctrine for its air force, though.
 
Please, in the discussion about longer range aircraft, remember that longer range without airframe number increase provides less operational sorties, less firepower, higher mission failure rates, less Tactical opportunities.

Increase the range and sorties duration is like giving in day after day the initiative on the battle ground*.
See Russia long range aviation component that is merely a complementary force in Ukraine when it should be dictating the Tactical situation as per doctrinal initiatives.
Russia/Soviets don't operate that way.

Only the Su-25 is dedicated to army support. Everything else is keeping the enemy off the Su25s, or keeping their CAS planes from flying.
 
The last Super Hornet will be delivered in 2027. The first Super Bugs were delivered in 1998. That's 27 years ago.

As all the old squadrons use up all the life on their planes, they need to be replaced. Bluntly, FAXX need to have an IOC in less than 10 years, but good luck making that happen.

There are two separate things here. When is the F/A-XX needed? The answer could we be, 'today' depending on what one thinks or who one asks. But it is probably important for the Navy to develop a capable strike fighter with advanced capabilities that will provide it some sort of competitive advantage within its scope / missions. It also needs a well tested aircraft..not something that is hastily inducted without adequate land and at sea testing (to an earlier point someone else made about China being able to develop and field a naval fighter in five years or less). I could well see it taking a decade from source selection to in service / IOC with the Navy beginning to buy aircraft somewhere between in the 2028-2030 timeframe.

If the Navy needs to generate more aircraft or readiness over the next decade, it does have levers it can pull. It can buy more F-35's*, induct more aircraft into the F/A-18 SLM, increase SLM throughput through investments in that line/process, and field more unmanned capability (accelerate MQ-25 and upgrade to cover strike missions). There are options assuming that the Navy does want to hedge or field some additional capability within the next decade to improve readiness or aircraft inventories. Congress can act and increase investments in any or all of these areas just as it did when adding Super Hornets those last few years.

All this assumes that Navy's NGAD actually happens. If it does not, then those same options would have to continue through the 30s until more capable unmanned strike aircraft are developed and fielded in the late 30s / early 40s.

*Lockheed has a combined capacity to produce 60 F-35C and B variant aircraft a year. Over the last three years, the DON has requested 34, 35, and 26 aircraft respectively (plus whatever Congress may have added). Even accounting for export B slots, there is probably a lot more the Navy can squeeze out of the F-35C production if it had and wanted to address a serious strike fighter shortfall ahead of it that could not be mitigated by other more affordable means.
 
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There are two separate things here. When is the F/A-XX needed? The answer could we be, 'today' depending on what one thinks or who one asks. But it is probably important for the Navy to develop a capable strike fighter with advanced capabilities that will provide it some sort of competitive advantage within its scope / missions. It also needs a well tested aircraft..not something that is hastily inducted without adequate land and at sea testing (to an earlier point someone else made about China being able to develop and field a naval fighter in five years or less). I could well see it taking a decade from source selection to in service / IOC with the Navy beginning to buy aircraft somewhere between in the 2028-2030 timeframe.

If the Navy needs to generate more aircraft or readiness over the next decade, it does have levers it can pull. It can buy more F-35's*, induct more aircraft into the F/A-18 SLM, increase SLM throughput through investments in that line/process, and field more unmanned capability (accelerate MQ-25 and upgrade to cover strike missions). There are options assuming that the Navy does want to hedge or field some additional capability within the next decade to improve readiness or aircraft inventories. Congress can act and increase investments in any or all of these areas just as it did when adding Super Hornets those last few years.

All this assumes that Navy's NGAD actually happens. If it does not, then those same options would have to continue through the 30s until more capable unmanned strike aircraft are developed and fielded in the late 30s / early 40s.

*Lockheed has a combined capacity to produce 60 F-35C and B variant aircraft a year. Over the last three years, the DON has requested 34, 35, and 26 aircraft respectively (plus whatever Congress may have added). Even accounting for export B slots, there is probably a lot more the Navy can squeeze out of the F-35C production if it had and wanted to address a serious strike fighter shortfall ahead of it that could not be mitigated by other means.
Unmanned craft with today kinematics performance and weapon load capacity are unable to replace the Manned fighters. They are nothing more that reusable cruise missile
 
Unmanned craft with today kinematics performance and weapon load capacity are unable to replace the Manned fighters. They are nothing more that reusable cruise missile
They do not need to 'replace' manned fighters now or in the near term. Just support mission areas in useful ways. That should be the near term focus.Clearly the entire world seems to have a view about unmanned aviation that is quite a bit different than yours.

Long term, if the Trump administration takes a position that AF and Navy manned NGAD programs should be set aside in the interest of unmanned capability, then both the AF and Navy would need to spend quite a bit of time and effort to develop highly capable, autonomous unmanned air-superiority and strike aircraft. That, depending on the requirements, could take upwards of a decade and a half so pushes unmanned NGAD towards 2040 timeframe. But the folks in the administration who will have to make those calls are not in place yet..SecNav nominee actually emphasized NGAD in his prepared remarks during confirmation so that seems encouraging..Same for recent AF uniformed officials speaking out about importance of manned NGAD platform..again signs point to this being a direction we are headed while simultaneously accelerating the adoption of unmanned aircraft..
 
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They do not need to 'replace' manned fighters now or in the near term. Just support mission areas in useful ways. That should be the near term focus.Clearly the entire world seems to have a view about unmanned aviation that is quite a bit different than yours.

Long term, if the Trump administration takes a position that AF and Navy manned NGAD programs should be set aside in the interest of unmanned capability, then both the AF and Navy would need to spend quite a bit of time and effort to develop highly capable, autonomous unmanned air-superiority and strike aircraft. That, depending on the requirements, could take upwards of a decade and a half so pushes unmanned NGAD towards 2040 timeframe. But the folks in the administration who will have to make those calls are not in place yet..SecNav nominee actually emphasized NGAD in his prepared remarks during confirmation so that seems encouraging..Same for recent AF uniformed officials speaking out about importance of manned NGAD platform..again signs point to this being a direction we are headed while simultaneously accelerating the adoption of unmanned aircraft..
I m confident about the Navy and USAF for doing the right choice ;) my view about the unmanned is about a mix of manned and unmanned but not a all unmanned fleet for a lot of reasons.
 
SecNav nominee actually emphasized NGAD in his prepared remarks during confirmation so that seems encouraging..Same for recent AF uniformed officials speaking out about importance of manned NGAD platform..again signs point to this being a direction we are headed while simultaneously accelerating the adoption of unmanned aircraft..
The thing is, will there be enough funding to do both at the same time?
Or should the U.S. pick a priority to ensure on time on budget delivery?
More importantly, no country can challenge U.S. air dominance except China.
For the foreseeable future in the next decade, the only peer vs peer war worth noting is Taiwan if the U.S. decided to intervene.
It's questionable NGAD man or unmanned is combat ready by then.
How about focus on readily available weapon system preparing for the up coming Taiwan conflict?
 
Not to worry, apart from maybe Hungary and Russia the rest of Europe won’t buy the NGAD, so they can ignore potential European requirements.
Has there been any incentive for NGAD to potentially have clients other than USAF ? Perhaps even if it was cleared for export, I assume it would be more attractive for Pacific allies(such as Australia), rather than Europe, given the requirements NGAD was spurred on.
 
Given a) the news that LM is out of F/A-XX, b) it turns out you can potentially spell NGAD without NG, (c) unconfirmed reports Boeing was/is the NGAD frontrunner and (d) the USNs strong relationship with NG as it relates to F/A-XX, then perhaps the NGAD pause and review was as much about pushing a re-underwriting of NGAD as a system to the new administration as it was the decision of selecting Boeing as the winner.
 
I don’t think people fully appreciate just how much China has invested into making carriers a high risk, high cost target in modern warfare.
That would explain why they're building them at a higher rate than the USN. Also, you should compare it to the Soviets in the late 80s. Backfires and SSGNs galore.
 
Has there been any incentive for NGAD to potentially have clients other than USAF ? Perhaps even if it was cleared for export, I assume it would be more attractive for Pacific allies(such as Australia), rather than Europe, given the requirements NGAD was spurred on.

Potentially. But how many allies even in the Pacific can afford a $300+ Million NGAD? Japan is already a partner on GCAP so unlikely they'll buy a third type in addition to it and F-35A/B. Australia perhaps? But I can see them also buying GCAP down the road..
 
That would explain why they're building them at a higher rate than the USN. Also, you should compare it to the Soviets in the late 80s. Backfires and SSGNs galore.

China is currently building its carriers for regional power projection, not for power projection on a global scale like the USN. PLAN carriers are also designed to operate under the protective cover of China's A2/AD umbrella, so it's a much different threat environment than what USN carriers would have to face in the Western Pacific.

As for the Soviet comparison, their doctrine prioritized submarines, bombers, and missile forces over carriers for sea denial rather than a mix of denial and power projection. Their anti-access strategy also lacked the same level of real time targeting, precision strike, and layered defense as what China's fielding today. They also never pursued anything resembling modern Chinese carrier ambitions for regional dominance.
 
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China is currently building its carriers for regional power projection, not for power projection on a global scale like the USN. PLAN carriers are also designed to operate under the protective cover of China's A2/AD umbrella, so it's a much different threat environment than what USN carriers would have to face in the Western Pacific.

As for the Soviet comparison, their doctrine prioritized submarines, bombers, and missile forces over carriers for sea denial rather than a mix of denial and power projection. Their anti-access strategy also lacked the same level of real time targeting, precision strike, and layered defense as what China's fielding today. They also never pursued anything resembling modern Chinese carrier ambitions for regional dominance.
But the West was also facing that with far inferior defensive firepower compared to today.
 
Please, in the discussion about longer range aircraft, remember that longer range without airframe number increase provides less operational sorties, less firepower, higher mission failure rates, less Tactical opportunities.

Increase the range and sorties duration is like giving in day after day the initiative on the battle ground*.
See Russia long range aviation component that is merely a complementary force in Ukraine when it should be dictating the Tactical situation as per doctrinal initiatives.

NGAD Maxi will inherently impart a reduced AF momentum.

*I know, readers would probably shoot at me "P-38, P-51!" but the facts are there was no battle grounds while those were actively regaining Air dominance over Europe. On the west side, it was purely an Air Battle until D-day. On the contrary, the conflict that is drafted today will involves mission generated for Ground force support.
longer range without airframe number increase provides less operational sorties, less firepower, higher mission failure rates, less Tactical opportunities.

Increase the range and sorties duration is like giving in day after day the initiative on the battle ground*.

The above can not be emphasized enough.

.. would argue strategic opportunities against centers of gravity rather than tactical or even operational level targets should be the emphasis of a NGAD ie a big bird w/large missiles.

"less operational sorties, less firepower, higher mission failure rates"

means that a complementing Penetrating/Persistent Counter-air (PCA) capability must afford significant AAM, Anti-radiation Msle, counter-airfield Msle magazines. Minus a multi-role new large stealth only an existing bomber can meet the (PCA) requirement.

PS: Terminating NGAS seems to be a disaster.
 
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