UK Amphibious Warfare vessels 1960 to present

[uk 75]

The RN gets a lot of coverage here but one area has not been looked at so closely.
In the 1960s the RN converted two carriers to Commando Ships able to land Royal Marines by helicopters and small landing craft (Bulwark and Albion). Two Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ships based on US designs were constructed to bring heavy equipment ashore (Fearless and Intrepid).
Finally a class of five LSTs were built to replace wartime designs (Knight class).
Much of this force survived to take part in the 1982 Falklands War and the 1991 Gulf War. Bulwark and Albion gave way to just Hermes and then the three Invincible CVS.

The end of the Cold War forced the LPDs and LSTs to serve on into the 21st Century.
HMS Ocean a cheapish variant of the Invincibles arrived but it took much longer for new LPDs and LSTs to arrive.

HMS Ocean was disposed of to Brasil once the two CVs (Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales) entered service.

As had happened with Fearless and Intrepid only one of Albion and Bulwark are in service at a time. The number of Bay class has been reduced.

Meanwhile other countries have built ships combining the helicopter deck with a well to launch landing craft. The US Tarawa class led the way.

So much for history. What plans could the UK have realised instead?

 

[Rule of cool]

Centaurs were a better choice than Majestics for Commando carriers, they could carry a full 750 man Commando whereas a Majestic could only carry 450-500 troops.

Apparently some thought and design effort was given to CVA01 being used as a Commando carrier.

 

[EwenS]

4 Bays built, 2 still active, 1 awaiting refit at present & 1 sold to Australia in 2011.

Don't forget the Point Class. 6 Ro-Ro ships built 2002/03 under PFI deals, 4 of which remain on charter to the MOD moving heavy equipment around the world in support of exercises etc.

Strategic Sealift (Roll-On Roll-Off Vessels)

www.globalsecurity.org

Point-class sealift ship - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The future lies with the planned 6 ship MRSS project to replace, Albion, Bulwark, the 3 Bays and Argus. Who knows how that will turn out.

Royal Navy outlines Multi Role Support Ship requirements | Navy Lookout

www.navylookout.com

In the 1960s the USN separated airborne assault and seaborne assault between the Essex class conversions & Iwo Jima class LPH on the one hand and LPD/LSD on the other. That is the era of Albion/Bulwark/Fearless/Intrepid etc.

The USN only started combining the two elements at the end of the 1960s, with the design of the Tarawa class LHA (completed 1976 to 1980) and then Wasp class LHD (completed 1989 to 2009). But these are substantially larger ships than anything contemplated by the RN AFAIK (c40,000 tons). And they were still accompanied by other amphibious ships delivering heavy equipment.

After the 1960s the opportunity for the RN to do something different doesn't arise until the late 1980s / early 1990s.

Timelines for other navies:-

France - Mistral class 21,500 tonnes. Study started 1997. Service entry 2006-2012.
Spain - Juan Carlos 26,000 tonnes. Approved for construction 2003, entered service 2010.

Otherwise we are talking about ships like the Bay class but with hangars and the command & control facilities similar to the 1990s Albion & Bulwark. Ships like:-

Spain - Galicia class

Galicia-class landing platform dock - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Netherlands - Rotterdam class

Rotterdam-class landing platform dock - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Unless you go to a Tarawa / Wasp sized vessel the trade offs seem to involve helicopter numbers and the size thereof. Ocean 18 Sea King sized. Galicia / Rotterdam 4-6.

So some basic questions to answer:-
What is the budget
What is operational scenario foreseen
How many ships required
How many helicopters / landing craft / hovercraft / armoured vehicles etc required
Troop lift requirement in total and per ship.

And how many eggs do you want to put in each basket when your amphibious force goes in harms way.

 

[CV12Hornet]

One of the more unfortunate casualties of the 1966 decision to run down the carrier force was that it killed parallel attempts at two Ocean-style LPHs, as the focus turned to ships that could at least bring a modicum of strike capability. It's likely such ships could have been commissioned in the early to mid 70s and saved the Royal Navy vital manpower in directly replacing Albion and Bulwark.

 

[Rule of cool]

parallel attempts at two Ocean-style LPHs,

What's that now? I'm not surprised that there would have been plans to replace the Albion and Bulwark, but I've never heard about them.

 

[starviking]

Centaurs were a better choice than Majestics for Commando carriers, they could carry a full 750 man Commando whereas a Majestic could only carry 450-500 troops.

Apparently some thought and design effort was given to CVA01 being used as a Commando carrier.

“CVA-01: Portrait of a Missing Link”, Ian Sturton, Warship 2014, p41 - CVA-01 had a Commando Ship ability, and could accommodate a full Commando, their weapons, and tactical lift helicopters.

However, a maximum of 21 days in the role was envisaged, 7 days transit there, and back, and 7 days operations - and only in Internal Security or similar situation - not full combat situations. 4 ship’s aircraft would have to be landed.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What's that now? I'm not surprised that there would have been plans to replace the Albion and Bulwark, but I've never heard about them.

They were abandoned in the Mason Review of 1974. I posted a quote from it somewhere here or on alternatehistory.com. And I think Brown says that the requirement was 3 commando carriers in the 1960s somewhere in "Rebuilding the Royal Navy". Furthermore, if I have remembered correctly I wouldn't be surprised to learn that 3 Fearless class LPDs were wanted to match the 3 commando carriers.

------- EDIT ------​

It was Post 62 in the thread "RN Tiger class Options".

Link to Post 62 of the thread "RN Tiger class Options".

---- Which Said ---- ​

This is Paragraph 27a. of the the "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975 - Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence" dated 23rd February 1975.

a. The Amphibious Force. At present our amphibious capability consists of a Royal Marines brigade headquarters, four commando groups, a logistic regiment and Army support units, two squadrons of Royal Navy support helicopters, two commando ships (HMS Hermes and HMS Bulwark), two assault ships, (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid), and afloat support. HMS Bulwark will be paid off in 1976, earlier than previously planned, and her Wessex helicopter squadron will be disbanded. HMS Hermes will be declared to NATO as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carrier but will retain a secondary role as a commando ship. HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid will remain in service as previously planned throughout the 1980s, but only one ship will be kept at immediate operational readiness, the second being in care and maintenance or refit. Plans to order two purpose-built amphibious ships have been abandoned and detailed studies of alternative means of movement in the longer term are in hand.

Source: National Archives File CAB.129.181.c21

 

[Hood]

Obtaining an LHA post Bulwark and Centaur seems to have been something of a saga. Even procuring Ocean was far from straightforward.
The private venture proposal to rebuild MV Contender Argent (sistership of Contender Bezant/RFA Argus) in 1987 was not taken up.
The idea to convert Ark Royal into an LPH in 1993 was taken seriously but not taken forward due to several practical issues (in addition to the loss of a third carrier on rotation). Partly the idea was to save money (surprise!), but Ark's superior command and control facilities were felt to be useful and it was hoped removing C&C facilities from the LPDs would save money too.
Now Ocean has gone with the two QE's picking up the Commando role. Another LHA/LPH seems unlikely.

 

[uk 75]

France seems to be much more adroit in designing ships.
For many years it operated two LPDs with Jean D'Arc available to carry helos in support.
It now has purpose built LHDs which have been matched by Spain and Italy.

I have some sympathy for MOD planners in that Royal Marines have more often been flown in to operations by transports to local airports than landed from ships. Same is true of paratroopers who never jump into action these days.

The two big CVs can cope with both F35s and Chinooks so are probably all the RMs will get. The Dutch can of course help in some cases.

 

[EwenS]

But the French replacement cycle doesn't seem to align with Britain's. Their construction cycle.

1962-68 2 LPD Ouragan class
1986 -88 Bougainville although she seems to have had more of a role in Pacific
1986-98 2 LPD Foudre class
2003-2012 3 LPH Mistral

Move to ships like Mistral was a 21st century thing for everyone except usn.

And Spain needed a ship that could operate AV-8B as replacement for Principe de Asturias, hence Juan Carlos.

Italy built Cavour due to need to operate AV-8B and then F-35. No dock. The San Giorgios dont have a helicopter hangar. And is building Trieste with a dock but still able to operate F-35B

1994-1998 LHA Ocean
1998-2004 2LPD Albion
2002-2006 Bay class

We had / have the Invincibles and then CVF for the fixed wing element.

So we go back to exactly what do we want our amphibious fleet to do and when? That seems to be something different for all navies.

 

[Rule of cool]

“CVA-01: Portrait of a Missing Link”, Ian Sturton, Warship 2014, p41 - CVA-01 had a Commando Ship ability, and could accommodate a full Commando, their weapons, and tactical lift helicopters.

However, a maximum of 21 days in the role was envisaged, 7 days transit there, and back, and 7 days operations - and only in Internal Security or similar situation - not full combat situations. 4 ship’s aircraft would have to be landed.

That sounds like what the Centaur did in 1964 with the Tanganyika mutiny. Given that in the mid 60s the LPDs were still new and the extant commando carriers' retirement was a long way off that sounds like a handy capability.

 

[starviking]

That sounds like what the Centaur did in 1964 with the Tanganyika mutiny. Given that in the mid 60s the LPDs were still new and the extant commando carriers' retirement was a long way off that sounds like a handy capability.

The article in Warship 2014 gives the requirement as dating from June 1964, so it’s safe to assume it’s inspired by Centaur’s role in the Tanganyika Mutiny.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The Royal Navy's 1947 shipbuilding programme included a single LSD. It was of course cancelled, but there were efforts to get it built until at least 1953 - a staff requirement being issued in 1952 - and design work for an LCM(8) to operate from it was completed in 1955.

There was also enthusiasm from Combined Operations for as many as six LSM(R) to support a brigade assault, but this was dropped in 1953 'until the outbreak of war' due to a shortage of suitable craft in reserve in the United States.

They were abandoned in the Mason Review of 1974. I posted a quote from it somewhere here or on alternatehistory.com. And I think Brown says that the requirement was 3 commando carriers in the 1960s somewhere in "Rebuilding the Royal Navy". Furthermore, if I have remembered correctly I wouldn't be surprised to learn that 3 Fearless class LPDs were wanted to match the 3 commando carriers.

When the future amphibious force was being designed in 1959, detailed costings were produced for amphibious forces of slightly less than brigade strength:

• Case C:Task force comprising one Commando carrier and two large amphibious transport docks.
  • Case C: Two Commando carriers and four amphibious transport docks, all in active commission.
  • Case C+: One Commando carrier and three amphibious transport docks, with two of the latter in reserve.
• Case D: Task force comprising two Commando carriers and two small amphibious transport docks.
  • Case D: Three Commando carriers and three amphibious transport docks, all in active commission
  • Case D+: Two Commando carriers and two amphibious transport docks, with one of each in reserve.

All scenarios assumed nine LSTs would be provided by the War Department. Case D+ was cheapest to acquire, cheapest to operate, and required the least additional manpower. It also bears the closest resemblance to what happened.

That said, the War Department LST was actually built as the Round Table class, of which there were only six. This largely corresponds to two-thirds of the full Case D force being procured.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 13.

All scenarios assumed nine LSTs would be provided by the War Department. Case D+ was cheapest to acquire, cheapest to operate, and required the least additional manpower. It also bears the closest resemblance to what happened.

That said, the War Department LST was actually built as the Round Table class, of which there were only six. This largely corresponds to two-thirds of the full Case D force being procured.

Do you know if the 9 LSTs were the existing LST(3) or the Sir Lancelot class LSL? Because, for what it's worth:

• The War Office had 7 LST(3) from 1946 and IIRC they were part of the RASC (Civilian Fleet).
• They were taken over by the Atlantic Steam Navigation Company in 1952.
• Another 12 were acquired by the Company in 1956 for the Suez War and all 19 were still in service in 1959.
• One was sold in 1960 and the other 18 were transferred to the British India Steam Navigation Company in 1961.
• 5 were sold 1961-63 which meant that 13 were still in service in 1964 when Sir Lancelot entered service.
• The other 5 Sir Lancelot class came into service 1966-68 and 12 out of the 13 remaining LST(3) were sold 1966-69.
• The 6 Sir Lancelot class and Empire Gull the remaining LST(3) were transferred to the RFA in 1970.
• In addition to the 19 LST(3) that Atlantic Steam Navigation Company operated on behalf of the War Office, were 7 LST(3) that it acquired Acquired 1946-55 which it operated as roll-on-roll-off car ferries until 1960-65. All 7 ships were taken up from trade for the Suez War.

The Sir Lancelot class LSL were larger and faster than the LST(3) so maybe the 6 that were built could do the work of 9 or more LST(3).

According to Conway's 1922-46 and 1947-95.

Landing Ship Tank Mark 3
Displacement: 2,300 tons light and 4,980 tons full load.
Dimensions: 347ft 6in overall length and 55ft 3in beam.
Machinery: 2 Admiralty 3-Drum Boilers with VTE producing 5,500ihp and driving 2 shafts.
Maximum Speed: 13.5 knots.
Complement: 118-190 plus 170-162 troops. [the 170 or 192 may be a typo in the book as the smaller number is usually first.]

However, that's their crew in service with the RN in WW2. It would probably be less than that with a civilian crew in the 1950s and 1960s.

Sir Lancelot class
Displacement: 3,270 tons light and 5,674 tons full load.
Dimensions: 380ft waterline length, 412ft 1in overall length and 59ft 8in beam.
Machinery: 2 diesels producing 9,400bhp and driving 2 shafts.
Maximum Speed: 17 knots.
Complement: 68 plus 340-534 troops.

Sir Galahad Mk 2
Displacement: 6,200 tons light and 8,585 tons full load.
Dimensions: 461ft overall length and 64 feet beam.
Machinery: 2 diesels producing 13,320bhp and driving 2 shafts.
Maximum Speed: 18 knots.
Complement: 49 plus 343-537 troops.

I wonder if more Sir Lancelot class would have been built if the East of Suez withdrawal had been delayed 5 or 10 years, because as far as I know the plan in February 1966 (when CVA.01 was cancelled) was to remain there until at least 1985.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 14.

• The 6 Sir Lancelot class and Empire Gull the remaining LST(3) were transferred to the RFA in 1970.

Empire Gull remained in service with the RFA until 1980. She was replaced by the Armament Store Carrier HMAV St George, which was completed in 1981 and operated by the British Army's Royal Corps of Transport, hence the prefix HMAV (Her Majesty's Army Vessel) instead of RFA (Royal Fleet Auxiliary).

 

[EwenS]

That sounds like what the Centaur did in 1964 with the Tanganyika mutiny. Given that in the mid 60s the LPDs were still new and the extant commando carriers' retirement was a long way off that sounds like a handy capability.

I see the Tanganyika Mutiny rather differently. Another example of the RN using whatever large warships were readily available to get an urgent job done. Immediately coming to mind are:-

Use of Home Fleet cruisers in 1940 to land troops in Norway
Resupply of Malta by cruisers, fast minelayer & submarine and movement of troops to / from the island in WW2
Operation Slapstick to invade Italy via Taranto in Sept 1943. 1st Airborne transported there by 5 cruisers & fast minelayer Abdiel
Due to a shipping shortage in 1945, the cruisers Enterprise & Devonshire began trooping duties to the Far East in June 1945, before the end of WW2, being joined by more cruisers CVE & fleet carriers after the war ended.
Aug 1950 the cruiser Ceylon took the 1st Bat Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders while the Repair Carrier Unicorn took the 1st Bat Middlesex Regt from Hong Kong to Pusan in Korea. Short notice voyage that lasted 4 days.
Light carrier Ocean was used July-Oct 1950 to move personnel & stores from UK to Singapore for use in Korea.
Ocean & Theseus took troops & stores to Cyprus in 1955 to quell disturbances there. Ocean repeated the trip the following year ahead of Suez.
Ocean & Theseus again forsook their training role in Oct 1956 to take 45 Commando & helicopters ahead of the landings at Suez on 6 Nov. After Operation Musketeer they returned troops to the UK.

Centaur was called into Aden on 20 Jan 1964 at short notice. Loaded the 600 men of 45 Commando and their kit in 12 hours and sailed for Zanzibar where she arrived on the evening of 24th. The assault went in the following morning and the stores and other heavier equipment landed over the next couple of days. The troops were crammed into the after part of the hangar on camp beds with little room to spare.

The planned use of CVA-01 seems to have had a little more thought behind it than most, if not all, of the above. But that long history might well have influenced matters.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Do you know if the 9 LSTs were the existing LST(3) or the Sir Lancelot class LSL? Because, for what it's worth [...] The Sir Lancelot class LSL were larger and faster than the LST(3) so maybe the 6 that were built could do the work of 9 or more LST(3).

The latter. The LST(3)s were transparently worn out and in need for replacement by the mid-1960s, and the requirements for the new LSTs were being drawn up at the same time as the shape of the new amphibious force was being defined. While the Round Table class were somewhat faster and longer ranged than the LST(3)s, they actually had the same load when beaching, meaning that it was a 1-for-1 swap in the assault force.

The implication is that the Round Table class were de facto LST(4)s.

The number to be built was reduced to six in 1960 - planning was for one west of Suez, three east of Suez, and two in reserve. That would give the proper number of hulls east of Suez for either Case C or D once reserves were activated.

Cases A and B - implied, but not discussed, in my earlier post - required eighteen War Department LSTs, nine each side of Suez, so that a full brigade could be landed. The naval element would be the same as for Cases C and D respectively.

With only four or five either side in Cases C and D, the follow-on echelons would have to be reduced. For the sake of completeness, cases E through G also assumed nine War Department LSTs.

• Case E and F replaced the assault ships with Royal Navy LSTs equipped with landing craft davits - LST(A) to operate in the assault role.
  • Case E required 5 LST(A) to replace 3 assault ships
  • Case F required 4 LST(A) to replace 2 assault ships
• Case G and H could only carry the assault elements of two Commandos:
  • Case G required one Commando carrier and two assault ships
  • Case H required two Commando carriers and one assault ship

The 'large' assault ship shown by Brown (DL/A) had 50% more capacity than the 'small' ship which became the FEARLESS class. That would allow Cases A and C to use only two, instead of three, in the assault force. It's possible that the various LSTs correspond to options for a new-build LST(A).

 

[Archibald]

Interesting that they thought of using CVA-01 as a commando carrier / LPH. France did that with the Clemenceau carriers, since from the 1970's there weren't enough combat jets and sailors for two complete air groups (Crusader attrition was severe, and not enough Super Etendard were procured, 71 instead of 90 - 100).

One example: Gulf war 1.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_aircraft_carrier_Clemenceau#Career

In 1990, escorted by the cruiser Colbert and the tanker Var, she transported 40 helicopters (SA-341F/ -342 Gazelles, SA-330 Pumas), three Br-1050 Alizés and trucks to Iraq during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The gist of the idea was to turn one of the Clemenceaus into a giant LPH, borrowing Gazelle and Puma choppers from the Army.

Before 1974 we had Arromanches and it was used a "swiss knife carrier" for all kind of missions: training, ASW, LPH, commando carrier, crisis-hospital ship.
PH-75, nuclear or not, was to replace Arromanches in that role. Nuclear power would provide electrical power aplenty.

 

[Hood]

From Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70.

 

[EwenS]

Following Suez, in 1957-58 a dozen of the surviving LCT(8) were transferred to the British Army RASC and spending a lot of time East of Suez. Some of these were still in service into the 1970s

 

[Scott Kenny]

What kind of force are we trying to land?

The Royal Marines don't have all the extra bits that a US MEU brings to the party.

For reference, a US MEU contains:

standard infantry battalion, plus:​

artillery battery (6 guns)​

AAV platoon (15 tracks, nominally 21 troops each with a crew of 4)​

combat engineer platoon​

Tank Platoon (4 Abrams) (Not anymore, but was standard before ~2015)​

LAV company (7-16 LAVs) for recon​

Deep Reconnaissance Platoon (23 troops, HQ plus 3 teams of 6)​

attack helicopters (4-6x)​

light utility helicopters (3ish)​

medium-lift helicopters/tiltrotors (12x, 24-32 troops each)​

heavy-lift helicopters (4x, 30+ troops each)​

light-attack planes (6x) Harriers or F-35​

aerial refueling/heavy transports (2x) KC-130s​

​

Note the lack of AAA or SAM vehicles (being addressed in the 2020s, plus adding coastal artillery/AShMs)​

Now, IIRC the Royal Marines is purely a light infantry formation, so you already don't need the Tank platoon or LAV company. Artillery would be towed, not self-propelled, and likely sling-loaded onto shore. You'd also not have separate medium-lift and heavy-lift helicopters, that would be pure Chinooks.

So what needs to go ashore via landing craft? Whatever jeep-equivalent vehicles are towing the artillery and carrying ammunition? Am I missing anything?

 

[Rule of cool]

What kind of force are we trying to land?

The Royal Marines don't have all the extra bits that a US MEU brings to the party.



Now, IIRC the Royal Marines is purely a light infantry formation, so you already don't need the Tank platoon or LAV company. Artillery would be towed, not self-propelled, and likely sling-loaded onto shore. You'd also not have separate medium-lift and heavy-lift helicopters, that would be pure Chinooks.

So what needs to go ashore via landing craft? Whatever jeep-equivalent vehicles are towing the artillery and carrying ammunition? Am I missing anything?

IIUC the British provided a lot of the support the RM needed from the Army and Navy. In the Cold War the RN provided the Commando helicopter sqns and the Army provided the artillery, light helicopters and engineers. However you're right that the RM lacked armour, but they operated differently from the USMC and preferred not to land in the face of direct defences.

As for what gets landed by landing craft, the helicopter sqn in a commando carrier can only lift 1 company at a time and then with light gear. Landing craft can land another company of troops at the same time, this could be the heavy weapons company with mortars etc in the first wave. After the troops are landed they require huge amounts of stuff, from food and water to shovels and iron sheets for field fortification.

 

[Yellow Palace]

What kind of force are we trying to land?

The Royal Marines don't have all the extra bits that a US MEU brings to the party.



Now, IIRC the Royal Marines is purely a light infantry formation, so you already don't need the Tank platoon or LAV company. Artillery would be towed, not self-propelled, and likely sling-loaded onto shore. You'd also not have separate medium-lift and heavy-lift helicopters, that would be pure Chinooks.

So what needs to go ashore via landing craft? Whatever jeep-equivalent vehicles are towing the artillery and carrying ammunition? Am I missing anything?

In the 1960s, planning called for a brigade headquarters, two or three light infantry battalion groups (i.e. with associated engineers etc.), two tank squadrons, and two field artillery batteries.

It's not actually that different from a contemporary USMC Regimental Landing Team. The major differences are no amphibious vehicles, and no integrated air element.

 

[EwenS]

The RM have operated the all terrain / amphibious Bv202, Bv206 & BvS210 Viking series of vehicles since at least the 1970s. The first of those saw service in the Falklands.

Bandvagn 202 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Bandvagn 206 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

BvS10 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Today they are operated by Viking Squadron of the Commando Logistics Regiment (previously the RM Armoured Support Group)

Viking Squadron - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 22.

IIUC the British provided a lot of the support the RM needed from the Army and Navy. In the Cold War the RN provided the Commando helicopter sqns and the Army provided the artillery, light helicopters and engineers.

Yes, you did understand correctly. That is, apart from the light helicopters and some of the commando helicopters.

In the 1960s some of the pilots in the FAA's commando helicopter squadrons were Royal Marines.

In the 1960s HQ 3 Commando Brigade, the 4 commandos and the RA's commando regiments had an Air Troop/Flight. The troops and flights in the far east were formed into 3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron, RM on 12.08.68. The squadron absorbed the home based units when it returned to the UK in 1971. The squadron became 847 NAS on 01.09.95.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The RM have operated the all terrain / amphibious Bv202, Bv206 & BvS210 Viking series of vehicles since at least the 1970s. The first of those saw service in the Falklands.

Amphibious in the sense of river-crossing, not comparable to the USMC's LVTs. The UK did have that capability in the 1940s and 1950s (it was used at Suez), but decided it wasn't worth retaining.

 

[MadRat]

I can imagine the advent of electric vehicles could make it easy to roll up to a river edge with a vehicle, offload 7-8 inflatables with electric outboards capable of 15-20mph, and troops in pairs transverse water obstacles to position to secure landings on the far shore. The options once air is secure become pretty wide open.

 

[DWG]

In the 1960s, planning called for a brigade headquarters, two or three light infantry battalion groups (i.e. with associated engineers etc.), two tank squadrons, and two field artillery batteries.

It's not actually that different from a contemporary USMC Regimental Landing Team. The major differences are no amphibious vehicles, and no integrated air element.

And even without the Tank Squadrons (ISTR the Blues and Royals were to supply a CVR(T) squadron right through until the end of the Cold War, and an MBT squadron may have persisted as well) you needed a tank scale landing craft to get the Centurion BARVs (Beach ARVs) ashore. Centurion BARV apparently lasted until 2003, being replaced by the Leopard based Hippo.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

If the RN wanted to get the most bang for their pound, it would have been to build something similar to the Tarawa class, et al., LHA's. The only difference is you make them capable of handling fixed wing aircraft to a degree. What you end up with is a sort of CVE / CVL that has amphibious capability too. Make the amphibious part secondary to the flight deck but there.

As it stands, the RN can barely get the Ark Royal or QE to sea let alone put a really viable air wing aboard. An LHA sort of ship would appear to make more sense.

 

[EwenS]

If the RN wanted to get the most bang for their pound, it would have been to build something similar to the Tarawa class, et al., LHA's. The only difference is you make them capable of handling fixed wing aircraft to a degree. What you end up with is a sort of CVE / CVL that has amphibious capability too. Make the amphibious part secondary to the flight deck but there.

As it stands, the RN can barely get the Ark Royal or QE to sea let alone put a really viable air wing aboard. An LHA sort of ship would appear to make more sense.

The largest LHAs in the world are the America class of 45,000 tons. They make an excellent example of the sacrifices that need to be made between

1. LHA-6 & 7 America & Tripoli, aviation only & no well deck and
2. LHA-8 Bougainville onwards, less aviation facilities but with a well deck.

LHA 6 Flight I / LHA 8 class - Schematic

The LHA(R) was intended to replace the LHA 1 Class amphibious assault ships and would provide forward presence and power projection as an integral part of joint, interagency and multinational maritime expeditionary forces. The LHA(R) Flight 0 Ship would be a variant of the LHD 8 amphibious...

www.globalsecurity.org

In particular note the difference in aviation fuel- 1.3m gals v just 500k gals.

Also their speed is significantly less than a QE. And this about the standard of protection offered.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/lightning-carrier-isnt-either

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The largest LHAs in the world are the America class of 45,000 tons. They make an excellent example of the sacrifices that need to be made between

1. LHA-6 & 7 America & Tripoli, aviation only & no well deck and
2. LHA-8 Bougainville onwards, less aviation facilities but with a well deck.

LHA 6 Flight I / LHA 8 class - Schematic

The LHA(R) was intended to replace the LHA 1 Class amphibious assault ships and would provide forward presence and power projection as an integral part of joint, interagency and multinational maritime expeditionary forces. The LHA(R) Flight 0 Ship would be a variant of the LHD 8 amphibious...

www.globalsecurity.org

In particular note the difference in aviation fuel- 1.3m gals v just 500k gals.

Also their speed is significantly less than a QE. And this about the standard of protection offered.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/july/lightning-carrier-isnt-either

They are an excellent compromise when you can't afford both types of ship. That they are "less survivable" (from the USNI article) only means they are as I pointed out more like CVE or CVL's than a full-blown carrier. If what you can afford is a CVL that can also do some amphibious work, rather than a full CV, build the CVL.

 

[Rule of cool]

Amphibious in the sense of river-crossing, not comparable to the USMC's LVTs.

This is an important distinction. IIUC in 1971 Soviet made armour that was amphibious for river crossings (BMPs?) overheated when crossing the huge rivers in the Indian invasion of East Pakistan. A river crossing there might take 45 minutes or so, rather than the few minutes envisaged in the design. US LVTs were designed from the outset for long-ish journeys in the sea that would have to contend with surf as standard, making them much more seaworthy from the outset.

 

[Rule of cool]

Overall by the mid 60s Britain had set itself up pretty well for Amphibious warfare for the next 20+ years if they so desired. The Fearless class and LSLs were new builds and the Hermes and Bulwark lasted into the mid 80s, so the force would have avoided the industrial troubles of the 70s.

If they had gone the CVA01 route it's inherent troop carrying-landing capacity likely would have allowed some reduction in the amphibious force, perhaps the disposal of Bulwark and the utilisation of the Hermes and both Commando and ASW carrier. Such a path would have allowed a reversion to a fully fledged strike carrier Task Group and Amphibious Task Group at short-ish notice in an emergency if required. That might make for an interesting situation in the Falklands scenario where Hermes is unavailable for the Commando task, would CVA01 or 02 be used in the Commando capacity?

 

[Rule of cool]

Commodore Micheal Clapp RN and Brigadier Julian Thompson assumed during the lead-up to the San Carlos landing that Hermes would be available for a helicopter assault, but were told by Woodward that this was not going to happen. What if a Commando carrier was available for the Falklands, how would it be used?

There might be a number of Alternative History scenarios:

• OTL with Hermes being used.
• OTL but with Bulwark being available in time.
• Any of the conventional carrier scenarios plus Hermes as Commando carrier
• A conventional carrier scenario but using one of the CVA01's Commando capability.

Would the Commando carrier sail into Falkland Sound to fly off the troops to the San Carlos landing zone in any scenario? Would the presence of a Commando carrier make some of the other landing site options preferable to San Carlos?

 

[EwenS]

San Carlos wasn't chosen on a whim. It was chosen at a staff conference at Ascension Island on 29 April 1982 after extensive work to narrow down a suitable location from more than a dozen sites initially identified. The objective was to find a suitably protected site where an entire brigade group with all its heavy equipment and supplies could be landed. Not just what could be delivered by the relatively few helicopters present at the start of the landing operations. Sea King HC.4 of 846 squadron (initial strength 15 - 9 left UK on Hermes, 3 on Fearless, 1 on Intrepid plus 2 others on other ships) and Wessex HU.5 of 845 squadron. Then figure in the losses to the landing date (2xHC.4 plus 2 HU.5 lost in South Georgia). As it was 11 HC.4 & 5 HU.5 did support the landings on 21st May. They were used to land and move forward artillery, Rapier batteries, fuel & ammunition.

The carriers still needed their Sea King HAS.5 aboard to counter the Argentine subnarine threat.

Atlantic Conveyor added a single Chinook and a single Wessex HU.5 to the helicopter fleet before being sunk on 25th May with further Chinook & Wessex still aboard. Her sister ship, Atlantic Causeway, arrived on 29th May carrying 8 Sea King HAS.2A configured as transports and 20 Wessex HU.5. The SK and 12 of the Wessex were disembarked to East Falkland between 29 May and 1 June, with the remaining 8 Wesex held aboard as a reserve.

Woodward with the main Task Force didn't arrive in Falklands waters to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone until 30 April with the decision to keep Hermes offshore taken later than that IIRC.

Good article on the reasoning behind the selection of San Carlos here:-

Selecting San Carlos

Conclusion
"The decision to land at San Carlos came from careful consideration by task force planners who assessed the geography, typography, hydrography, and meteorology of the Falklands while pitting the capabilities of their forces against the known and later discovered capabilities of Argentinian forces. Task force planners faced constant duress over the timetable and the fog of war. The grand objectives and preconditions firmly established by senior political and military leadership guided task force planners and they followed the guidelines as best they could. Political and military leadership sought an unopposed landing, and San Carlos met that condition because it was out of range of Argentina’s heavy guns and defended by a force smaller than a company at a single observation point. The San Carlos inlet also met the minimum number of beaches, the specific grade, and possessed good exit points for a brigade-size landing force. Furthermore, San Carlos Water had two suitable anchorage sites for landing vessels, and the risk of swell and enemy submarines was low. The terrain around the inlet gave the anchored ships and the offloading troops protection from counterattacks and made aerial bombardment much more of a challenge for Argentina. The surrounding landscape also enabled the British to erect ground-based missile defense systems, providing further security for the landing force and relieving the pressure on their naval escorts. Lastly, San Carlos was within an acceptable range away from their ultimate objective of Stanley."

 

[PMN1]

Atlantic Conveyor added a single Chinook and a single Wessex HU.5 to the helicopter fleet before being sunk on 25th May with further Chinook & Wessex still aboard. Her sister ship, Atlantic Causeway, arrived on 29th May carrying 8 Sea King HAS.2A configured as transports and 20 Wessex HU.5. The SK and 12 of the Wessex were disembarked to East Falkland between 29 May and 1 June, with the remaining 8 Wesex held aboard as a reserve.

The closeness of the dates of arrival just shows the stupidity of not spreading the equipment carried between ships.

 

[EwenS]

The transport helicopter squadrons formed specially for the Falklands were

848- formed with Wessex HU.5, from a core of personnel from 707 squadron with additional personnel from 772, both training units, on 17 April 1982. Separate flights on
RFA Regent - A flight 2 helicopters joined 19 April
RFA Olna - B flight 2 helicopters joined 10 May
RFA Olwen- C flight 2 helicopters joined 16 June
SS Atlantic Conveyor - 6 helicopters (5 lost)

847 - formed 7 May 1982 from personnel of 771 & 772 squadrons with 21 Wessex HU.5. A flight on Engadine, B flight on SS Atlantic Causeway (20 aircraft)

825 - formed on 3 May 1982 from 706 squadron, another training unit, with 10 Sea King HAS.2 converted for the transport role. 2 sailed on 12 May on QE2 and the remainder on SS Atlantic Causeway. 2 were transferred to Canberra on 27th with the squadron consolidating ashore at San Carlos in early June.

Atlantic Conveyor requisitioned 14 April
Atlantic Causeway requisitioned 3 May
Both for helicopter support role.

Elk requisitioned 5 April as aircraft & ordnance transport. Took Scouts Gazelles and 2-3 SK. HC.4 from 846.
Norland requisitioned 16 April, took 1 SK HC.4 south.
Nordic Ferry requisitioned 1 May & took Gazelles south
Tor Caledonia requisitioned 18 May & took Scouts & Gazelles south

Astronomer requisitioned 28 May as helicopter carrier & repair ship.

Contender Bezant chartered 12 May as aircraft and helicopter transport.

So the air assets taken south after the initial deployment were spread about. But there were limits to the number of suitable ships chartered / requisitioned and able to be quickly converted to allow them to be reassembled and flown off at the other end.

The TF did a very good job of keeping ships out of the TEZ, only bringing them forward just in time for the dash to San Carlos under escort. In that respect Atlantic Conveyor was unlucky. She was offloading helicopters and preparing for the run into San Carlos when the Exocet attack emerged. Remember she had flown off all the Sea Harriers & GR.3 she brought down on 18/19 May. A lot of other ships survived that procedure unscathed.

Getting kit south had to be balanced against spreading it around multiple ships.

Edit:- 845 went south with 12 Wessex HU.5, initially leaving 3 at Ascension. The remainder wandered around a total of 14 ships during the Campaign, and losing 2 in South Georgia.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Commodore Michael Clapp RN and Brigadier Julian Thompson assumed during the lead-up to the San Carlos landing that Hermes would be available for a helicopter assault, but were told by Woodward that this was not going to happen. What if a Commando carrier was available for the Falklands, how would it be used?

There might be a number of Alternative History scenarios:

• OTL with Hermes being used.
• OTL but with Bulwark being available in time.
• Any of the conventional carrier scenarios plus Hermes as Commando carrier
• A conventional carrier scenario but using one of the CVA01's Commando capability.

Would the Commando carrier sail into Falkland Sound to fly off the troops to the San Carlos landing zone in any scenario? Would the presence of a Commando carrier make some of the other landing site options preferable to San Carlos?

Don't know, but of your four options Bulwark being available is the most feasible as less wishful thinking and handwaving is required. When she was recommissioned in 1979 the plan was that she'd remain in service until 1984. Then the fires of 1980 happened and she was paid off on 27th March 1981.

The wishful thinking and handwaving is that the fires of 1980 didn't happen (and although the Defence Review of February 1981 still reduced the number of aircraft carriers from 3 to 2) this delayed her decommissioning 27th March 1982 and a week after that Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.

Even more wishful thinking and handwaving is that the British economy performed better after the February 1966 Defence Review so that the 1974 and 1981 Defence Reviews weren't necessary. That way the 3 Invincibles were completed 1978-81 (and enough Sea Harriers to form 3 squadrons were delivered by March 1982), Bulwark & Hermes were still in commission as commando carriers and Fearless & Intrepid were both in commission (IOTL Fearless was the cadet training ship & Intrepid was in reserve). Plus Triumph was still in the Standby Squadron at Chatham instead of being scrapped.

 

[Archibald]

Plus Triumph was still in the Standby Squadron at Chatham instead of being scrapped.

That one was a Colossus / Majestic, correct ? (turned floating aviation workshop) . Just like 25 de Mayo... the irony. How about some Colossus / Majestic surviving just long enough to provide an aditional deck in the Falklands ? France kept Arromanches until 1974 and it was retired partly because of the first oil shock, also one of the reasons PH-75, the anointed successor, went nuclear. Also HMAS Melbourne, cough.

 

[EwenS]

That one was a Colossus / Majestic, correct ? (turned floating aviation workshop) . Just like 25 de Mayo... the irony. How about some Colossus / Majestic surviving just long enough to provide an aditional deck in the Falklands ? France kept Arromanches until 1974 and it was retired partly because of the first oil shock, also one of the reasons PH-75, the anointed successor, went nuclear. Also HMAS Melbourne, cough.

When Triumph was converted to a repair ship in 1957-65, various titles were applied, but finally it was "Escort Maintenance Ship. A number of structures were built on her flight deck and the hangar space converted to workshops. From then on she only operated the odd Wessex or Wasp belonging to the ship's she was maintaining. After a refit in 1972 she went to maintained Reserve.

In Dec 1981 she was sold to s Spanish shipbreaker, who very quickly started work on her. AIUI some efforts were made to repurchase her in 1982 for use as a repair ship, but scrapping had gone too far. Instead the RNacquired Stena Inspector.

Here she is on the way to the breakers.

AJAXNETPHOTO. 24TH APRIL, 1974. PORTSMOUTH, ENGLAND. - SCRAPYARD BOUND - THE COLOSSUS CLASS LIGHT FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIER HMS TRIUMPH BEING TOWED OUT OF THE NAVAL BASE TO THE SCRAP YARD. PHOTO:JONATHAN EASTLAND/AJAX. REF:7419 28 67 Stock Photo - Ala

Download this stock image: AJAXNETPHOTO. 24TH APRIL, 1974. PORTSMOUTH, ENGLAND. - SCRAPYARD BOUND - THE COLOSSUS CLASS LIGHT FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIER HMS TRIUMPH BEING TOWED OUT OF THE NAVAL BASE TO THE SCRAP YARD. PHOTO:JONATHAN EASTLAND/AJAX. REF:7419 28 67 - 2GCNMF3 from Alamy's library of...

www.alamy.com