Don't know, but of your four options Bulwark being available is the most feasible as less wishful thinking and handwaving is required. When she was recommissioned in 1979 the plan was that she'd remain in service until 1984. Then the fires of 1980 happened and she was paid off on 27th March 1981.
The wishful thinking and handwaving is that the fires of 1980 didn't happen (and although the Defence Review of February 1981 still reduced the number of aircraft carriers from 3 to 2) this delayed her decommissioning 27th March 1982 and a week after that Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
Even more wishful thinking and handwaving is that the British economy performed better after the February 1966 Defence Review so that the 1974 and 1981 Defence Reviews weren't necessary. That way the 3 Invincibles were completed 1978-81 (and enough Sea Harriers to form 3 squadrons were delivered by March 1982), Bulwark & Hermes were still in commission as commando carriers and Fearless & Intrepid were both in commission (IOTL Fearless was the cadet training ship & Intrepid was in reserve). Plus Triumph was still in the Standby Squadron at Chatham instead of being scrapped.
Yes its wishful thinking , but given some thought was put into the CVA01 design for amphibious operation I wondered how that would play out in practice. For example I can't imagine a CVA01, probably half of this version of Britain's carrier force, is going to be anchored in San Carlos for a few days while operating as a commando carrier. It's perhaps more realistic for a CVA to steam into Falkland Sound during the night, fly off the troops at first light and head back out to sea before midday.
Yes. She took 9 years to convert (1956-65) at a cost of £10.2 million, served with the Far East Fleet from February 1965 to January 1972, was paid off on her return to the UK, spent the next 9 years in reserve at Chatham and was scrapped in 1981.
Edit: I wanted her saved so she could be used as a repair ship, not because she could carry a few helicopters.
Woodward with the main Task Force didn't arrive in Falklands waters to enforce the Total Exclusion Zone until 30 April with the decision to keep Hermes offshore taken later than that IIRC.
Given the amphibious commanders chose San Carlos while assuming they'd have the use of Hermes I wonder how they imagined they'd use her. Much like if the RN had CVA01s I can't imagine the RN having 2/3 of their fighters on half their carrier force risked in San Carlos or Falkland Sound for very long.
Yes its wishful thinking , but given some thought was put into the CVA01 design for amphibious operation I wondered how that would play out in practice. For example I can't imagine a CVA01, probably half of this version of Britain's carrier force, is going to be anchored in San Carlos for a few days while operating as a commando carrier. It's perhaps more realistic for a CVA to steam into Falkland Sound during the night, fly off the troops at first light and head back out to sea before midday.
Having a few CVA.01s built in the 1970s is even more wishful thinking and handwaving than what I suggested. That being written, I like your plan. Furthermore, a UK that's rich enough to afford them would be rich enough keep 2 commando carriers and both LPDs in full commission too.
Originally In Post 7 - I'm Reposting It So It's Close To The Information In Post 45
This is Paragraph 27a. of the the "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975 - Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence" dated 23rd February 1975.
a. The Amphibious Force. At present our amphibious capability consists of a Royal Marines brigade headquarters, four commando groups, a logistic regiment and Army support units, two squadrons of Royal Navy support helicopters, two commando ships (HMS Hermes and HMS Bulwark), two assault ships, (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid), and afloat support. HMS Bulwark will be paid off in 1976, earlier than previously planned, and her Wessex helicopter squadron will be disbanded. HMS Hermes will be declared to NATO as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carrier but will retain a secondary role as a commando ship. HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid will remain in service as previously planned throughout the 1980s, but only one ship will be kept at immediate operational readiness, the second being in care and maintenance or refit. Plans to order two purpose-built amphibious ships have been abandoned and detailed studies of alternative means of movement in the longer term are in hand.
When Triumph was converted to a repair ship in 1957-65, various titles were applied, but finally it was "Escort Maintenance Ship. A number of structures were built on her flight deck and the hangar space converted to workshops. From then on she only operated the odd Wessex or Wasp belonging to the ship's she was maintaining. After a refit in 1972 she went to maintained Reserve.
In Dec 1981 she was sold to s Spanish shipbreaker, who very quickly started work on her. AIUI some efforts were made to repurchase her in 1982 for use as a repair ship, but scrapping had gone too far. Instead the RN acquired Stena Inspector.
Part of Paragraph 46 of the 1975 Defence Review (CAB.129.181.c21)
Reductions in afloat support will be made by phasing out older ships and by deleting from the forward programme one Fleet maintenance ship, three large Fleet tankers and one afloat support ship.
Download this stock image: AJAXNETPHOTO. 24TH APRIL, 1974. PORTSMOUTH, ENGLAND. - SCRAPYARD BOUND - THE COLOSSUS CLASS LIGHT FLEET AIRCRAFT CARRIER HMS TRIUMPH BEING TOWED OUT OF THE NAVAL BASE TO THE SCRAP YARD. PHOTO:JONATHAN EASTLAND/AJAX. REF:7419 28 67 - 2GCNMF3 from Alamy's library of...
That photo is dated 24th April 1974 and was taken at Portsmouth. Except, Triumph wasn't sold for scrapping until December 1981 and she had been in reserve at Chatham since 1972 or 1975 depending upon the book or website. Therefore, the date and description is wrong or the date is correct and possibly she's being towed from Portsmouth (after the refit some sources say she had before going into reserve) to Chatham.
I found this old thread whilst searching the internet for information about the Fleet Maintenance Ship and it has some information that's pertinent to this thread, which is why I'm posting the link.
The above mentions the 2 purpose-built amphibious ships (See Post 46) and the Fleet Maintenance Ship, three large Fleet Tankers and one Afloat Support Ship (See Post 47) that were cancelled under the 1975 Defence Review.
That one was a Colossus / Majestic, correct ? (turned floating aviation workshop) . Just like 25 de Mayo... the irony. How about some Colossus / Majestic surviving just long enough to provide an aditional deck in the Falklands ? France kept Arromanches until 1974 and it was retired partly because of the first oil shock, also one of the reasons PH-75, the anointed successor, went nuclear. Also HMAS Melbourne, cough.
Melbourne had been having considerable issues with her sole catapult despite it having been completely rebuilt from Dec. 1970-July 1971 (thanks to the Canadians having dumped Bonaventure just after a major refit which rebuilt her catapult to near-new condition) and refits in May 1978-April 1979 and April-July 1980.
Accounts I have read suggest that her operations in 1981 were all helicopter and S-2 Trackers, with A-4s only present in case of emergency and their not actually seeing use except at light take-off weight and then only occasionally. She entered a "self-maintenance period" in Feb 1982 and was still there when decommissioned on 30 June 1982.
So her best use could have been as a helo/LPH ship.
I suppose we could see her in a British port with her crew undergoing training for the promised transfer of Invincible to the RAN. All of the helos etc historically loaded on the Atlantic Cs could then be loaded aboard her - along with some more troops. There would have been plenty of deck room to lash down a couple (or 3 or 4) Rapier launcher/radar sets to give her some self-defense capability while still operating a good number of helos.
Originally In Post 7 - I'm Reposting It So It's Close To The Information In Post 45
This is Paragraph 27a. of the the "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975 - Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence" dated 23rd February 1975.
It's strange that Britain not doing (opposed) amphibious landings was the stated reason for cancelling CVA01s in early 1966 yet as late as 1974 there were plans to build major new amphibious ships. That said, these plans look very tenuous, it doesn't look as is designs had been started or anything so I imagine that even in different circumstances these plans would be vulnerable to cancellation.
It's strange that Britain not doing (opposed) amphibious landings was the stated reason for cancelling CVA01s in early 1966 yet as late as 1974 there were plans to build major new amphibious ships.
The UK's commitment to reinforce AFNORTH would have been the policy driver I would think.
Besides the UK had spent nearly all the 1960s in some kind of counter-insurgency operation of one kind or another that to some extent relied on RN Commando helicopters and supporting vessels. If that trend had continued it would have required newer ships of some kind. Perhaps the 70s were just too quiet in retrospect to justify spending?
10 Sea King Mk 50s were purchased in 1974, deliveries started in August that year. Note that Sydney R17 (Majestic class CVL converted to LPH with 6 LCM-6s) had decommissioned in November 1973, with the planned replacement to be Tobruk L50 (enlarged Round Table LSH) so there was a reduction in the number of Sea Kings that could be usefully employed by the RAN.
As far as I know Sydney wasn't converted to a Commando Carrier/LPH, she was converted to a fast military transport. Jane's 1968-69 calls her a "Training Aircraft Carrier" (Fast Military Transport)" and also says.
TRAINING AND CONVERSION. It was officially announced on 4th April 1957 that she would have a flying training role, but she was converted to a fast military transport in 1962, and was recommissioned in 1963. She also serves as a training ship, and can operate Wessex ant-submarine helicopters.
That being written, I think I've asked if Sydney could have been used as a Commando Carrier (here or on Alternatehistory.com). The reply was "Yes" and was supported with photographs of her operating as a Commando Carrier in an exercise.
Which is a long-winded way of asking . . . was one of the reasons why the RN didn't have Centaur converted to a Commando Carrier (after she became surplus to requirements as a Strike Carrier) that the RAN had Sydney?
I'm not sure if Sydney was intended to be used as a commando carrier.
In 1967 she was fitted with davits at flight deck level to hoist 6xLCM(6). The purpose of that seems to have more been directed at speeding up the turnaround times on her trooping trips to Vietnam. This was reduced to just 6 hours. At this time she was also carrying 4 Wessex as "additional anti-submarine protection".
Some photos of her in this configuration if you scan down the page.
Finally in 1973, just before decommissioning, she participated in a number of joint service exercises, so having the appearance if a commando carrier. See last photo.
Finally in 1973, just before decommissioning, she participated in a number of joint service exercises, so having the appearance if a commando carrier. See last photo.
IIUC the Sydney wasn't intended as a Commando carrier, it was purely as fast troop transport to support Australia's commitments in Malaya. She gained helicopter capability during the Vietnam years in order to economise on her escort, 2-4 Wessex replacing 1 of the 2 Darings or Rivers tasked with her escort to Vietnam in the early years. Once Vietnam was over, the regular trooping task finished and Australia having years of 'joint' experience for the first time ever Sydney was used in an exercise as a Commando carrier. That's what that picture shows. She was then decommissioned.
Was one of the reasons why the RN didn't have Centaur converted to a Commando Carrier (after she became surplus to requirements as a Strike Carrier)? {edited for clarity}
When the RN decommissioned Centaur (completed in Sept. 1953) in Dec. 1965 there was consideration of doing so... but it was decided to drop those plans to save money (the 22 Feb. release of the 1966 Defence White Paper made limiting "growth of the RN" a definite goal).
Besides, the RN already had Albion (completed May 1954 and converted to Commando Carrier 1/61-8/62) and Bulwark (completed Oct. 1954 and converted to Commando Carrier 1/59-1/60) in service, and so there was acceptance that they only needed those two.
Therefore there was no real role available for Centaur to fill in the RN save the one she filled... accommodation ship for ships undergoing refit (mostly carrier crews, as there was always a smaller ship either completing or ending refit when a smaller ship entered refit). Sale to a friendly foreign power was a possibility, however.
The RAN had looked at acquiring Centaur to supplement or replace Melbourne, but there seemed to be no need at the time for the larger ship (as Melbourne seemed to be meeting current needs*) especially since it was older (Melbourne had commissioned in October 1955) and was in need of a refit (her last significant refit was in 1960) while Melbourne was in good condition.
From the viewpoint of the 1980s and later all of this seems short-sighted on the part of both navies.
* Even the 1965 decision to buy A-4s and S-2s for Melbourne was tailored to what Melbourne could manage... to then trade Melbourne for a 2-year-older ship (there was no thought within the RAN or Parliament to operate two fixed-wing carriers) purely to get a larger flight deck and hangar would be to admit the decision was flawed.
Considering Melbourne's later difficulties keeping her single catapult operable, and the deterioration of her aircraft landing area that, in 1970-71 when her catapult was rebuilt and lengthened, required installing braces in the hangar to support the flight deck by supporting the gallery deck between the flight deck and hangar... the purchase of Centaur looks much better in hindsight than the decision actually taken.
It's strange that Britain not doing (opposed) amphibious landings was the stated reason for cancelling CVA-01s in early 1966 yet as late as 1974 there were plans to build major new amphibious ships.
What's strange? The American practice of opposed landings sees them attacking defended sites using armoured vehicles, transport helicopters and LCACs to land infantry and armour into the teeth of defenders covered by jets from aircraft carriers and attack helicopters; British doctrine of attacking undefended or thinly defended areas with light infantry as illustrated by the Falklands War still requires amphibious warfare ships.
Hi,
As I understand it US Doctrine does not necessarily call for a direct assualt. Specifically I believe that USMC amphibious/expeditionary operations are developed around maneuver warfare, using a combination of helicopters , V-22s, and AAVs and the like to bring the first waves ashore, with the LCAC forming part of the following wave Assult Follow On Echelon, with more (and often times heavier) equipment (see for example Objective Maneuver from the Seaand Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). Though LCACs can also be used to bring amhibious vehicles closer to shore before launching as part of the earliest waves. '
The use of helicopters and V-22 in the assualtwave can give such an amphibious/expeditionary assult the ability to land inshore and away from fortified locations to envelope potential defenses, and the air-cushion abilities of the LCACs supposely allow those craft to cross over a wider range of beaches than tradinational landing craft opening up more shore front for potential landing, I'm going from memory here, but I believe the numbers were something along the lines of conventional landing craft being limited to10% of beaches world wide whereas an air cushion vehicle like the LCAc being able to operateover 90% (or something like that). In addition, I believe that in Iraq some LCAC operated along rivers and even inland over flat sand for a fair bit of distance.
What's strange? The American practice of opposed landings sees them attacking defended sites using armoured vehicles, transport helicopters and LCACs to land infantry and armour into the teeth of defenders covered by jets from aircraft carriers and attack helicopters; British doctrine of attacking undefended or thinly defended areas with light infantry as illustrated by the Falklands War still requires amphibious warfare ships.
While the 2 x 81mm mortars and 2 x 106mm recoiless rifles for the Fanning Head Mod pales in comparison to the beaches of Normandy or Okinawa the Argentine Air Force was no joke, nor was the submarine San Luis. There was likely nowhere the British could have landed that was safe from these threats and a conventional carrier capability would have been very useful against the Air Force in particular.
In the NATO context the RM/RNLM landings on Norway would at least be at a friendly port and covered by NATO forces in the area. In that scenario amphibious ships aren't quite so necessary.
Looking for something else in Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water I found out where the British planned/hoped to land if they had access to Hermes as an LPH: Cow Bay/Volunteer Bay. This is on the North East coast of East Falkland, about 30km from Stanley as the crow flies or a 55km walk to Mt Kent, compared to the 93km walk from Port San Carlos.
From "Logistics in the Falklands War" the choice of landing area was given detailed consideration from the very start. San Carlos was chosen by Clapp & Thomson on 8 May as the amphibious force left Ascension. In summary the selection process was:-
"After very quickly ruling out a landing and consolidation on West Falkland (which would have then required a second landing on East Falkland) the planning team led by Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thomson, identified an initial 19 possible beaches on East Falkland worthy of further study. The priorities were:-
1. beach gradients suitable for landing craft and mexiflotes
2. there had to be suitable exits from the beach area for the few tracked vehicles they had.
3. it had to be suitable for defence against ground, sea and air attack.
4. they did not want the beaches to be vulnerable to Argentinian artillery anticipated to be dug in around Stanley, or Exocets
The 19 were whittled down to 3 - Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay, Berkeley Sound, and San Carlos. Clapp / Thomson and other planning teams in the UK had their favourites for a variety of reasons.
Ultimately the choice was left to the Clapp / Thomson team, who made theiir final selection on 8 May 1982 as the amphibious force left Ascension Island. San Carlos was chosen because (in no particular order):-
1. it was on the other side of the island from the concentration of Argentine forces, so would be a surprise (there were those on the planning staffs in the UK that wanted to land much closer to Stanley and who preferred one of the other two options)
2. it was protected from air attack to a great extent by the surrounding hills that gave Argentinian pilots little time to aim their weapons from low level or exposed them to Sea Dart missiles if higher approaches were attempted. It also meant that the threat of Exocet attack could be eliminated.
3. it was outside the range of known Argentine artillery
4. Falkland Sound leading to San Carlos Water and the latter itself were more sheltered than the open waters at the other sites, especially that at Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay that was exposed directly to the rigours of the South Atlantic. Essential for getting t he troops etc ashore quickly and easily.
5. it was believed that there would be less chance of mining
6. defensively it was easier to defend from Argentine counter attack.
The one threat that did remain was that from the two Argentinian Type 209 submarines, San Luis & Salta. Fortunately the latter was non-operational during the Falklands War, but later the former did cause the RN a few headaches in inshore waters northeast of the islands."
From "Logistics in the Falklands War" the choice of landing area was given detailed consideration from the very start. San Carlos was chosen by Clapp & Thomson on 8 May as the amphibious force left Ascension. In summary the selection process was:-
"After very quickly ruling out a landing and consolidation on West Falkland (which would have then required a second landing on East Falkland) the planning team led by Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thomson, identified an initial 19 possible beaches on East Falkland worthy of further study. The priorities were:-
1. beach gradients suitable for landing craft and mexiflotes
2. there had to be suitable exits from the beach area for the few tracked vehicles they had.
3. it had to be suitable for defence against ground, sea and air attack.
4. they did not want the beaches to be vulnerable to Argentinian artillery anticipated to be dug in around Stanley, or Exocets
The 19 were whittled down to 3 - Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay, Berkeley Sound, and San Carlos. Clapp / Thomson and other planning teams in the UK had their favourites for a variety of reasons.
Ultimately the choice was left to the Clapp / Thomson team, who made theiir final selection on 8 May 1982 as the amphibious force left Ascension Island. San Carlos was chosen because (in no particular order):-
1. it was on the other side of the island from the concentration of Argentine forces, so would be a surprise (there were those on the planning staffs in the UK that wanted to land much closer to Stanley and who preferred one of the other two options)
2. it was protected from air attack to a great extent by the surrounding hills that gave Argentinian pilots little time to aim their weapons from low level or exposed them to Sea Dart missiles if higher approaches were attempted. It also meant that the threat of Exocet attack could be eliminated.
3. it was outside the range of known Argentine artillery
4. Falkland Sound leading to San Carlos Water and the latter itself were more sheltered than the open waters at the other sites, especially that at Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay that was exposed directly to the rigours of the South Atlantic. Essential for getting t he troops etc ashore quickly and easily.
5. it was believed that there would be less chance of mining
6. defensively it was easier to defend from Argentine counter attack.
The one threat that did remain was that from the two Argentinian Type 209 submarines, San Luis & Salta. Fortunately the latter was non-operational during the Falklands War, but later the former did cause the RN a few headaches in inshore waters northeast of the islands."
The 800' peaks/700' ridges around San Calos are a great a natural defence against air attack for landing ships inside the anchorage.
I'm not seeing much value in Cow Bay/ Volunteer Bay other than it would allow the Hermes or other LPH plenty of sea room. Perhaps with a sqn of Commando helicopters available troops could be airlifted to peaks some 13km inland that would function as blocking positions for any advance of the enemy from Port Stanley. It's also 85km further away from mainland Argentina which would stretch the range for aircraft even further, maybe making up for the open surrounding terrain compared to San Carlos.
Maybe if the RN had a different (ie bigger/better) fleet available to it, more capable aircraft and an LPH, Cow Bay might have been selected.
The 800' peaks/700' ridges around San Calos are a great a natural defence against air attack for landing ships inside the anchorage.
I'm not seeing much value in Cow Bay/ Volunteer Bay other than it would allow the Hermes or other LPH plenty of sea room. Perhaps with a sqn of Commando helicopters available troops could be airlifted to peaks some 13km inland that would function as blocking positions for any advance of the enemy from Port Stanley. It's also 85km further away from mainland Argentina which would stretch the range for aircraft even further, maybe making up for the open surrounding terrain compared to San Carlos.
Maybe if the RN had a different (ie bigger/better) fleet available to it, more capable aircraft and an LPH, Cow Bay might have been selected.
Then think about Normandy and the great storm of 19/20 June 1944.
Take a look at the map. Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay are very exposed to the worst of South Atlantic heavy seas let alone the worst gales. Think about how an LCVP / LCM would cope, let alone a mexiflote would survive? And that was how most of the troops and heavy equipment were going to be landed. Think of getting the troops into the landing craft rrom Canberra, Norland and Elk in rougher seas on those first few days.
Even if Hermes had been available only a small proportion of the troops could have been put ashore by the then available helicopters.
Then think about Normandy and the great storm of 19/20 June 1944.
Take a look at the map. Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay are very exposed to the worst of South Atlantic heavy seas let alone the worst gales. Think about how an LCVP / LCM would cope, let alone a mexiflote would survive? And that was how most of the troops and heavy equipment were going to be landed. Think of getting the troops into the landing craft rrom Canberra, Norland and Elk in rougher seas on those first few days.
Even if Hermes had been available only a small proportion of the troops could have been put ashore by the then available helicopters.
I don't disagree, but its interesting to see how the (supposed) availability of an LPH plays into the thinking when selecting a landing zone.
Using the bare minimum of the 5 Westland Commando helicopters on Hermes and the 10 scattered around on Fearless, Intrepid, Canberra, Elk and Norland they could probably lift a Company reinforced by some heavy weapons to a key high ground position inland. Perhaps platoons could also be lifted to one or two other high ground positions before the helicopters were re-tasked with other lifting jobs like artillery and Rapier.
Take a look at the map. Cow Bay / Volunteer Bay are very exposed to the worst of South Atlantic heavy seas let alone the worst gales. Think about how an LCVP / LCM would cope, let alone a mexiflote would survive? And that was how most of the troops and heavy equipment were going to be landed. Think of getting the troops into the landing craft rrom Canberra, Norland and Elk in rougher seas on those first few days.
Cow Bay is horribly exposed to the weather. Berkeley Sound is somewhat sheltered, but the plausible landing beaches are within range for Argentine artillery. That makes San Carlos the only sensible landing site to establish an operational base.
Berkeley Sound might work with a strong enough initial force to take Stanley by force majeure straight off the beaches. But a UK with the amphibious forces to pull that off is one that doesn't get the Falklands invaded.
If a helicopter assault ship was available, it would be most useful to use airlanded troops to seize key points as part of the initial assault, then to support manoeuvre ashore. Bluff Cove would likely be entirely avoided if the Guards could be airlifted.
Cow Bay is horribly exposed to the weather. Berkeley Sound is somewhat sheltered, but the plausible landing beaches are within range for Argentine artillery. That makes San Carlos the only sensible landing site to establish an operational base.
Berkeley Sound might work with a strong enough initial force to take Stanley by force majeure straight off the beaches. But a UK with the amphibious forces to pull that off is one that doesn't get the Falklands invaded.
If a helicopter assault ship was available, it would be most useful to use airlanded troops to seize key points as part of the initial assault, then to support manoeuvre ashore. Bluff Cove would likely be entirely avoided if the Guards could be airlifted.
I don't disagree, however when it was assumed that an LPH was available the thinking was that Cow/Volunteer Bay was a serious option.
For all it's advantages I wouldn't want to take something as valuable as 1 of the 2 carriers acting as an LPH into Falkland Sound or San Carlos. It's well within range of the Argentine Air forces and has either no sea room to maneuvre in Falkland Sound or is actually anchored in San Carlos. Cow/Volunteer Bay on the other hand gives the carrier/LPH all the sea room in the world, is further away from the Argentine Air Forces to be almost invulnerable and provides a much more comprehensive CAP due to the short distance between the landing zone and the carriers operating east of the islands.
All in all the availability of an LPH does change the equation, San Carlos might still win out but Cow/Volunteer Bay wasn't in the final 3 for no reason.
A problem with all the planning for the landings was there were two teams involved, working remotely from each other but both wanting an input.
1. Clapp & Thomson sailing south with the first hand Falklands expertise of Ewen Southby-Tailyour with his extensive notes of the waters that he had made during his 1978/79 tour in the islands when commander ofvthe garrison.
AND
2. Admiral Fieldhouse Commander in Chief, Fleet and his staff back in Britain, remote from the scene, lacking Southby-Tailyour's expertise, but still wanting a say in running the war. London trying to run things from 8,000 miles away was a recurring theme of the war that led to some difficulties at times.
I listed out the various factors that needed to be taken into account in a previous post. Ultimately it was a question of balancing the various factors for and against each site. One of the reasons Cow Bay ended up in the final three was that it was the preferred option of Admiral Fieldhouee and his staff in Britain. You can't just dismiss the boss's choice without good reason. At the end of the day Fieldhouee left the final choice to Clapp and Thomson as the amphibious force left Ascension. They immediately selected San Carlos on 8 May.
A problem with all the planning for the landings was there were two teams involved, working remotely from each other but both wanting an input.
1. Clapp & Thomson sailing south with the first hand Falklands expertise of Ewen Southby-Tailyour with his extensive notes of the waters that he had made during his 1978/79 tour in the islands when commander ofvthe garrison.
AND
2. Admiral Fieldhouse Commander in Chief, Fleet and his staff back in Britain, remote from the scene, lacking Southby-Tailyour's expertise, but still wanting a say in running the war. London trying to run things from 8,000 miles away was a recurring theme of the war that led to some difficulties at times.
I listed out the various factors that needed to be taken into account in a previous post. Ultimately it was a question of balancing the various factors for and against each site. One of the reasons Cow Bay ended up in the final three was that it was the preferred option of Admiral Fieldhouee and his staff in Britain. You can't just dismiss the boss's choice without good reason. At the end of the day Fieldhouee left the final choice to Clapp and Thomson as the amphibious force left Ascension. They immediately selected San Carlos on 8 May.
I've seen that a problem with the Task Force was that Woodward and Thompson were both 1-stars, so there was friction in the theatre command arrangements. Woodward was Flag Officer 1st Flotilla (FOF1), FOF2 was also a 1 star but (FOF3 known as Flag Officer Carriers Amphibious Ships (FOCAS) until 1979) was also a NATO command and a 2-star appointment with a large staff for a seagoing command.
A better solution would have been to send FOF3 Vice Admiral Derek Reffel south with the carriers. He would immediately become the theatre commander, and it would close the gap that existed between the 3-star Fieldhouse and 1 star Woodward and Thompson. What's more Reffel was an experienced carrier and amphibious officer, having commanded the Hermes and Commodore Amphibious Warfare in the 70s as opposed to Woodward who was a former submariner.
It's amazing how consequential lines on an org chart can be.
I've seen that a problem with the Task Force was that Woodward and Thompson were both 1-stars, so there was friction in the theatre command arrangements. Woodward was Flag Officer 1st Flotilla (FOF1), FOF2 was also a 1 star but (FOF3 known as Flag Officer Carriers Amphibious Ships (FOCAS) until 1979) was also a NATO command and a 2-star appointment with a large staff for a seagoing command.
A better solution would have been to send FOF3 Vice Admiral Derek Reffel south with the carriers. He would immediately become the theatre commander, and it would close the gap that existed between the 3-star Fieldhouse and 1 star Woodward and Thompson. What's more Reffel was an experienced carrier and amphibious officer, having commanded the Hermes and Commodore Amphibious Warfare in the 70s as opposed to Woodward who was a former submariner.
It's amazing how consequential lines on an org chart can be.
Not sure what the problem was with Reffell, but Clapp & Southby Tailyour said in "Amphibious Assault Falklands" that he had been banned from the HQ at Northwood for the duration so his advice was not available.
Reffell went south in July in succession to Woodward.
Not sure what the problem was with Reffell, but Clapp & Southby Tailyour said in "Amphibious Assault Falklands" that he had been banned from the HQ at Northwood for the duration so his advice was not available.
Reffell went south in July in succession to Woodward.
I've done a bit of digging around and it appears 3* Fieldhouse was a former submariner like 1* Sandy, so like appointed like. However I've also read that there is or was a bit of a principle that a bit of friction between equals in a Joint operation is better than having the Naval or Military higher than the other and over-ruling their requirements to the detriment of the overall operation. If that was the case to an extent the 2* Marine General Jeremy Moore was appointed to lead the ground force of 2 Brigades on 12 May (although he didn't arrive in theatre until 30 May) so it was appropriate to appoint a Navy 2* at that time to exercise command over the Naval covering force the the Amphibious force.
An interesting bit of side info in the attached document by Commodore Michael Clapp and Brigadier Julian Thompson is that Britain lacked national HQs at the higher levels. They were NATO HQs with British commanders, so couldn't be involved in the planning for this national campaign. Commanders often lacked the comprehensive staffed HQs needed for an operation of this magnitude, which impacted the operation. It's little wonder so much was improvised.
I don't disagree, however when it was assumed that an LPH was available the thinking was that Cow/Volunteer Bay was a serious option.
For all it's advantages I wouldn't want to take something as valuable as 1 of the 2 carriers acting as an LPH into Falkland Sound or San Carlos. It's well within range of the Argentine Air forces and has either no sea room to maneuvre in Falkland Sound or is actually anchored in San Carlos. Cow/Volunteer Bay on the other hand gives the carrier/LPH all the sea room in the world, is further away from the Argentine Air Forces to be almost invulnerable and provides a much more comprehensive CAP due to the short distance between the landing zone and the carriers operating east of the islands.
All in all the availability of an LPH does change the equation, San Carlos might still win out but Cow/Volunteer Bay wasn't in the final 3 for no reason.
But was it assumed that an LPH would be available? And if it was assumed when did the assumption disappear? Clearly a lot earlier than 8 May. I'm not sure that ever existed realistically based on the carrier air groups and the plans for them, let alone the risk to the ships themselves.
When the TF left the UK Hermes has 8 Sea Harriers, 9 Sea King HAS.5 & 9 Sea King HC.4 while Invincible carried 8 Sea Harriers & 9 Sea King HAS.5 for totals of 26 and 17 respectively. They took all but 2 (left with 899 squadron) of the immediately available Sea Harriers. Work then began immediately to scounge up as many more as possible as well as pilots to fly them.
The result was the formation of 809 squadron on 6 April, just the day after the TF sailed from Portsmouth. It was quickly equipped with 8 more SHARS. 2 came from 899 squadron, 5 from storage and 1 direct from the BAe Dunsfold factory. That pretty much cleared the inventory. Between 30 April & 2 May all these were flown to Ascension. They were followed by 6 Harrier GR.3 3-5 May. All 14 embarked on the Atlantic Conveyor on 6 May. They were flown off to Hermes and Invincible on 18 May as soon as she came within flying distance of the TF.
The forthcoming availibility of these extra SHAR / Harriers must have been communicated to the various TF commanders in the month of planning that was carried out. They would even have seen them arrive at Ascension before the Amphibious Group sailed south on the 8 May. So they would have known well in advance that there was a liklihood that the carriers would have their decks full and therefore that Hermes wouldn't have the space to act as an LPH.
In preparation for their arrival some reshuffling of the helicopters on Hermes took place, with 4 HAS.5 going to the Fort Austin on 17 May and all the remaining HC.4 sent to various other ships.
Taking account of the losses and movements to that point, on the morning of 21 May, the day of the landings, the Hermes air group consisted of 15 SHAR, 6 Harrier GR.3, 5 Sea King HAS.5 and 2 Lynx HAS.2 for a total of 28. Invincible was carrying 10 SHAR, 9 Sea King HAS.5 and a Lynx HAS.2 for a total of 20. By this time, following the loss of the Sheffield to an Exocet, Woodward was keeping the carriers well out to the NE of the TEZ.
This is a photo of Hermes flight deck dated 19 May following the arrival of the extra fixed wing aircraft. 1 Sea King HAS.5, 3 Harrier GR.3 and 7 SHAR probably taken from the FLYCO position on the island. Note the SHAR at readiness to lauch to augment the CAP.
This is what the forward end of her flight deck could look like around this time.
Flight deck operations on board HMS HERMES. A Sea Harrier takes off from the ski-jump while various missiles, helicopters and vehicles crowd the flight deck of the carrier. The arms front to back include: 1000lb GP bombs with type 114 'Slick' tails, 1000lb GP Bombs with Type 117 parachute...
A Harrier of No 1 Squadron RAF is prepared for a sortie on the flight deck of HMS HERMES.
www.iwm.org.uk
While the exact date of these two photos is marked unknown, they could be part of the same sequence.
The landings themselves began in the early hours of 21 May. The primary task assigned to the 11 available Sea King HC.4 (14 left the UK and 3 had been lost up to that point) was to transport the 12 Rapier missile units of T Battery, 12 Regiment RA ashore with all their equipment. This was a priority in view of the expected Argentinian reaction. This started from 10am with the first big raid at 1030 in the shape of 8 Daggers. The HC.4 were spread around Intrepid (4), Fearless (4), Norland (2) and Canberra (1).
These were augmented by a handful of Wessex HU.5 on Antrim (1), Stromness (1), Resource (2) & Intrepid (2). There were about another dozen HU.5 out at sea on various RFAs at this time. The sole Chinook that became available remained aboard Atlantic Conveyor, until the 25 May, the same day that she was sunk. Helilift would really have to await the arrival of the Atlantic Causeway at the end of May with 8 Sea King HAS.2A in the transport role along with 20 Wessex HU.5.
I think the Amphibious and Land force commanders thought they'd have an LPH until the 12 April, when Sandy said no. I think they still had to look at Cow/Volunteer Bay in order to justify its rejection to Northwood. Apparently it was an 'Officers beach' where you could step ashore without getting your boots wet.
With the strength at the Task Force disposal Cow bay is not suitable, things would have to change for it to be higher up the list.
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