What's next for Theater Air Defense Systems?

RyanC

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By "theater", I mean something functionally a PATRIOT / S-400 replacement; based upon the last three years of experience by military forces across the globe with the following intense air defense environments:

1.) Israel v Iran/Houthi ballistic missiles
2.) Ukraine and Russia vs manned aircraft, cruise missiles, mass UAS attacks, and ballistic missiles.
3.) Red Sea Naval Ships versus cruise missiles, mass UAS attacks, and ballistic missiles.

I realize I may be speaking for the obvious in that we have to stop thinking of future air defense systems as "PATRIOT", "S-400", "MEADS", "NASAMS", "SLAMRAAM"; etc; and instead think of them as a unified plug and play architecture of sensors, command posts and weapons (current buzzword is 'effector') which are added to and subtracted from depending on the Theater Threat level.

Likewise; the days of a single missile (or two) being the signature element of future air defenses are largely done with, due to the differing characteristics of threat targets as well as cost/exchange ratios.

For example, a two stage air defense missile (PAC-3 MSE) with an active radar homing head is very capable, but also very expensive. There's a need now for something low cost, but also with enough performance to engage moderate threat targets. How low cost could we get a PAC-2 style missile if we deleted the Track Via Missile (and the relatively expensive) antenna from it combined with a modern low cost motor?
 
AGR-20 AWPKSS could easily be converted into a SAM; the current PATRIOT launcher cannister is sized for a 410mm missile; the LAU-61 19 round Hydra launcher is only 413mm in diameter; so you could fit 19 x Hydra 70 type rockets into a single PATRIOT launcher box.

PAC-1/2 is about 5.3m long, versus 1.06m for Hydra-70, so there's room to bolt another Hydra-70 motor on to act as a booster stage for our Hydra-SAM - that missile would still only be 2.12m long (approx.).

Rough numbers for a VL AGR-20 derivative:

Single Stage Hydra-SAM: 5.7 km (18,700~ ft) altitude, 6.5 km downrange (167 m/s velocity) about 29.5 seconds after launch in a 45 degree flyout angle after 0.25 seconds of vertical flight.

Two Stage Hydra-SAM: 16.5 km (54,100~ ft) altitude, 15 km downrange (317 m/s velocity); about 63 seconds after launch at a 45 deg flyout angle after 1 second of vertical flight. (L/D constraints require little manuvering until the first stage booster is dropped; so two stage version has to fly vertically for 1 second until the booster drops.)

15 km isn't a lot of defended zone; but it would be useful in denying flight paths to Shaheed class UAS; especially if the launchers were unmanned and commanded remotely.

Missile guidance for this AGR-20 derivative would be command guidance; with everything expensive on the ground; IDK if accuracy could be obtained good enough to dispense with a HE warhead (and it's fuze) entirely.

It would all depend on how high a threat profile you'd want this low cost Hydra-SAM to handle; but back in the 1970s, they were obtaining skin-to-skin hits with command-guided SPRINT ABMs (something not even designed for HTK) they literally had to induce biases in SPRINT guidance because one of their test constraints was that all ICBM RV debris had to fall within a specific area of Kwajalein's lagoon to avoid Soviet recovery of RV debris by the AGIs that were always loitering off Kwaj.
 
By "theater", I mean something functionally a PATRIOT / S-400 replacement; based upon the last three years of experience by military forces across the globe with the following intense air defense environments:
Development cycle for theater systems is very long; reaction to current sudden developments at this level will take a decade. Predictive planning is absolutely crucial here.

For S-400, it's S-350/500 (together).
S-400 has some name for it, but despite the 4 number, it's more of S-300++. 350/500 are the true new gen systems.

Though caveat is S-400/500 don't belong to the same class as others in the list, being far larger and more ambitious in their footprint/envelope.
When US will finally fully "land" SM-6, it'll count in. Otherwise, for now at least(within atmosphere), it's Russia, China, and Iran.

For Patriot, LTFI died, so it's continuing upgrades of existing architecture for the time being, like LTADMS.
Patriot has justified itself as it is for the time being; at least as lo TBM it's very capable; problem isn't capability, it's intercept numbers, and new system won't help with that.

SAMP/T NG, together with IRIS-T SLM are as fresh as it gets.

Main lesson of the current moment - aerial warfare evolved too much into high art of elaborate platforms.
Cheap and low(doesn't mean low performance!) is the main concern for the moment.

Main lesson to be cautious about - we haven't seen stealth warfare yet. AD didn't encounter the enemy it was most concerned about for decades. It will.
 
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AGR-20 AWPKSS could easily be converted into a SAM; the current PATRIOT launcher cannister is sized for a 410mm missile; the LAU-61 19 round Hydra launcher is only 413mm in diameter; so you could fit 19 x Hydra 70 type rockets into a single PATRIOT launcher box.

PAC-1/2 is about 5.3m long, versus 1.06m for Hydra-70, so there's room to bolt another Hydra-70 motor on to act as a booster stage for our Hydra-SAM - that missile would still only be 2.12m long (approx.).

Rough numbers for a VL AGR-20 derivative:

Single Stage Hydra-SAM: 5.7 km (18,700~ ft) altitude, 6.5 km downrange (167 m/s velocity) about 29.5 seconds after launch in a 45 degree flyout angle after 0.25 seconds of vertical flight.

Two Stage Hydra-SAM: 16.5 km (54,100~ ft) altitude, 15 km downrange (317 m/s velocity); about 63 seconds after launch at a 45 deg flyout angle after 1 second of vertical flight. (L/D constraints require little manuvering until the first stage booster is dropped; so two stage version has to fly vertically for 1 second until the booster drops.)

15 km isn't a lot of defended zone; but it would be useful in denying flight paths to Shaheed class UAS; especially if the launchers were unmanned and commanded remotely.

Missile guidance for this AGR-20 derivative would be command guidance; with everything expensive on the ground; IDK if accuracy could be obtained good enough to dispense with a HE warhead (and it's fuze) entirely.

It would all depend on how high a threat profile you'd want this low cost Hydra-SAM to handle; but back in the 1970s, they were obtaining skin-to-skin hits with command-guided SPRINT ABMs (something not even designed for HTK) they literally had to induce biases in SPRINT guidance because one of their test constraints was that all ICBM RV debris had to fall within a specific area of Kwajalein's lagoon to avoid Soviet recovery of RV debris by the AGIs that were always loitering off Kwaj.
Honestly something like an Avenger with 2 19 Missile Hydra pods than 4 (in total 8) stinger could be an better Solution. Afterall APKWS in the latest solution provides Laser and IR and there was this development with nammo for a more powerful motor (and there where thoses Guys with that interresting nozzle). Atleast to get numbers with sutch an system on JLTV which then only needs an radar. Or that could be an interresting mobile solution.
 
Honestly something like an Avenger with 2 19 Missile Hydra pods than 4 (in total 8) stinger could be an better Solution. Afterall APKWS in the latest solution provides Laser and IR and there was this development with nammo for a more powerful motor (and there where thoses Guys with that interresting nozzle). Atleast to get numbers with sutch an system on JLTV which then only needs an radar. Or that could be an interresting mobile solution.
I'd agree that it would make more sense to arm a different vehicle/platform with the short-range and point air defense systems like that. Using the volume of the long-range SAM launchers would be a waste when they could be carrying PAC-3/2, etc. A few such vehicles might have to be an organizational part of the SAM battery.
 
I believe we need to understand a few things:
  1. There is no such thing as an exquisite weapon. Ballistic missiles are now common weapons used with saturation tactics. Hypersonics are not in the game yet, but we should assume that when they will be, they'll become common and used in large numbers as well. Same goes for any new category of weapon.
  2. From that we should derive that cost efficiency must be top priority, as well as...
  3. Available stocks and the ability to replenish.
  4. With the exception of threats with unique attack profiles necessitating unique countermeasures, an interceptor should be classified by its kinematic and sensory capabilities, and not by its threat defeat type. If it can hit a cruise missile it can hit a helicopter, or a drone, or many other things. If it flies, there must be something to shoot it down with, preferably systems being less dedicated. Good examples would be Iron Dome originally a C-RAM but also capable of land and naval SHORAD and up to CRBM defeat. Also APKWS as an interceptor of all less maneuvering things, and anything from small arms to artillery cannons as AA assets with just the right fire control.
 
Cooperative Engagement Capability to the degree that the SAM battery is just a firing unit without a radar.

Gazillion cheap transmitters coupled with near-undetectable "passive" radars for defensive air search & tracking, highly survivable AEW (not on airliner, rather something faster) for detection of targets deep over 'red' terrain and classic AEW&C to detect & track deep over 'blue' terrain (against cruise missiles, for example).

Counter-platform with SM-6 missiles that have a giant no-escape zone against tactical aircraft.


https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2018/05/summary-modern-air-defences-for-europe.html
This blog post from 2018 is holding up very well IMO.
 
It goes towards there since the very start of national air defenses in 1920s.
The problem is that air defenses have to still be able to function by themselves, and there are significant limits on quality of tracks you can achieve without specialized fire control systems.
 
I'd think space base cuing is on the table for next gen systems, especially for likes of hypersonics with high signature and low response time if using land based sensors.
 
I'd think space base cuing is on the table for next gen systems, especially for likes of hypersonics with high signature and low response time if using land based sensors.
Air defense system is often used when you can't expect air superiority.
Expecting unconditional space dominance in such circumstances is quite optimistic.
 
Air defense system is often used when you can't expect air superiority.
Expecting unconditional space dominance in such circumstances is quite optimistic.

The US and PRC could expect fairly unconditional space dominance against anyone else but each other. And even in non dominant situations, the ability to physically destroy large constellations or electronics disrupt them over an opposing nation’s airspace is probably going to be limited.
 
The US and PRC could expect fairly unconditional space dominance against anyone else but each other. And even in non dominant situations, the ability to physically destroy large constellations or electronics disrupt them over an opposing nation’s airspace is probably going to be limited.
But that effectively means that planning any air defense in post-Trump world must take into account lack of space superiority, and means to contest one.

Before, there was rather naive (but empirically true) case for nations with right check boxes(though to be fair those didn't need air defenses anyway).

Not anymore.
 
I think suggestions of using APKWS as a SAM are missing the issue that at the core it's designed as a straight-line weapons system. It's gained a little steering ability in the transition from Hydra 70 to APKWS, but does it have the agility to engage a target evading at 9G, or more?
 
I think suggestions of using APKWS as a SAM are missing the issue that at the core it's designed as a straight-line weapons system. It's gained a little steering ability in the transition from Hydra 70 to APKWS, but does it have the agility to engage a target evading at 9G, or more?
A possible solution to help with the problem ...
 
I think suggestions of using APKWS as a SAM are missing the issue that at the core it's designed as a straight-line weapons system. It's gained a little steering ability in the transition from Hydra 70 to APKWS, but does it have the agility to engage a target evading at 9G, or more?

APKWS is intended for slow maneuvering targets that do not react to incoming fire. Anything fast or clever enough to evade (I cannot think of any UAV that is aware of its environment to that degree but it’s probably coming) requires a real SAM. The Tamir that the UsMC bought seems to be a good compromise between capabilities and cost for high speed targets.
 
I think suggestions of using APKWS as a SAM are missing the issue that at the core it's designed as a straight-line weapons system. It's gained a little steering ability in the transition from Hydra 70 to APKWS, but does it have the agility to engage a target evading at 9G, or more?
This isn't that big of a problem, every problem has its own compromise. They are clearly not theater air defense systems, though.
 
By "theater", I mean something functionally a PATRIOT / S-400 replacement; based upon the last three years of experience by military forces across the globe with the following intense air defense environments:

1.) Israel v Iran/Houthi ballistic missiles
2.) Ukraine and Russia vs manned aircraft, cruise missiles, mass UAS attacks, and ballistic missiles.
3.) Red Sea Naval Ships versus cruise missiles, mass UAS attacks, and ballistic missiles.

I realize I may be speaking for the obvious in that we have to stop thinking of future air defense systems as "PATRIOT", "S-400", "MEADS", "NASAMS", "SLAMRAAM"; etc; and instead think of them as a unified plug and play architecture of sensors, command posts and weapons (current buzzword is 'effector') which are added to and subtracted from depending on the Theater Threat level.
What you are describing is something already happening. It is still a "next big thing" as these kind of advanced system of systems is something that is fully built and put in service yet, but take a look at the recent Polish acquisition of SAMs that are to be operated under one umbrella for example, or MDA C2BMC. Modern C2 and battlespace management systems are approaching a level of integration and sophistication where I feel that we are not far away from true theatre-level (or even global-level) IAMD, and USAF ABMS or Army IBCS seems pretty close already.

Though if you are suggesting that future SAM systems should not be bound to (or separated by the borders of, if you will) organic command systems and sensors but be completely integrated to over-arching C2 and fire control network, that's something I'd disagree with, mainly out of redundancy reasons as well as other practical reasons. I think we would sgill need to wait a few more decades before we forego of the disctinctions of Patriot, Land-ceptor, SAMP/T, etc and are only left with the C2FC system, the effector and its launch vehicle with connecting nodes.
 

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