What would have happened if the Washington Naval Treaty and the London Naval Treaty were completely incapacitated in 1934?

[lancer21]

As to the Japanese, I don't know if they can build anything over OTL in reaction to this ATL US expansion program, except order two proper carriers instead of the Junyos (either repeat Hiryu or Shokaku depending of the slips capacity, certainly one Shokaku possible instead of Hiyo as it was build in the same slip as Zuikaku, and perhaps a repeat Hiryu instead of Junyo). They could possibly bring forward their CVL shadow conversion program (such as the Zuihos, Taiyos etc.) to try to "stay" with the Americans, which in a way it's a good thing as they won't waste time/money in finishing these ships twice.

As I've done the British naval programmes from 1922 to 1939, these are the Japanese naval programmes of the 1930s.

View attachment 698131​

Notes

• The 1931 and 1934 Programmes brought the IJN to the strength permitted by the WNT & 1st LNT.
• The 1937 and 1939 Programmes expanded the IJN beyond the strength permitted by the WNT & 1st LNT.
• Of the Aircraft Carriers:
  • Sōryū & Hiryū were in the 1934 Programme.
  • Shōkaku & Zuikaku were in the 1937 Programme.
  • Taihō was in the 1939 Programme.
• Of the Submarine Tenders
  • Ryūhō (ex-Taigei) was in the 1931 Programme.
  • Shōhō (ex-Tsurugizaki) & Zuihō were in the 1934 Programme.
  • Zuihō was completed as an Aircraft Carrier.
• Of the Seaplane Tenders.
  • Chitose, Chiyoda & Mizuho were in the 1934 Programme.
  • Nissin was in the 1937 Programme.
  • Mizuho & Nissin were sunk before they could be converted into Aircraft Carriers.
• Of the Battleships.
  • Yamato & Musashi were in the 1937 Programme.
  • Shinano & No. 111 were in the 1939 Programme.

That's a great table, thanks for that!

Just a quick return to the british, were any of their later prewar programs explicitly taking their strenght beyond that mandated by the WNT and LNT (such as the americans did with their Second Vinson Act in 1938 that increased their fleet by 20%?)

PS : I have taken note of this paragraph you posted earlier:

However, the quotas prescribed by the 1st LNT did not have to be met until 31st December 1936 and the Treaty had some "get out" and "escalator" clauses. The British Government invoked some of them before the Treaty expired. Therefore, on 31.12.36 the Navies of the British Commonwealth had 56 cruisers of 388,470 tons instead of 50 of 339,000 tons and 169 Destroyers (18 Flotillas worth) of 204,064 tons instead of 108 (12 Flotillas) of 150,000 tons that they would have had it the letter of the Treaty had been adhered to. This was done by keeping old ships that would have otherwise been scrapped 1935-36 to remain within the Treaty's tonnage quotas.

As to the americans, i found this to me at least very interesting article from 1938, though it doesn't seem to mention the Second Vinson Act, maybe the article was written before that act was passed. This is why i asked earlier about the possibility of the americans building more in this scenario, according to the claims of this article they were as of 1938 still well below the WNT and LNT limits. What is your view on that?

The Naval Race?

Since the adoption of new r

www.usni.org

 

[lancer21]

As to the Japanese, I don't know if they can build anything over OTL in reaction to this ATL US expansion program, except order two proper carriers instead of the Junyos (either repeat Hiryu or Shokaku depending of the slips capacity, certainly one Shokaku possible instead of Hiyo as it was build in the same slip as Zuikaku, and perhaps a repeat Hiryu instead of Junyo). They could possibly bring forward their CVL shadow conversion program (such as the Zuihos, Taiyos etc.) to try to "stay" with the Americans, which in a way it's a good thing as they won't waste time/money in finishing these ships twice.

You have reversed the cause and effect. The American expansion of the late 1930s was a reaction to the Japanese expansion (e.g. the Hornet & Essex were built in reply to Shōkaku & Zuikaku) and the deteriorating World Situation. It would be the same in this "version of history" that is the Americans would only build more ships 1934-39 if the Japanese built more.

If Japan had built a pair of proper carriers instead of Hiyō & Jun'yō they'd have been repeats of Shōkaku, but if they had the Americans would have replied by building a fourth Yorktown and a 25th Essex to counter them. Therefore, for all their faults, it was better for Japan that they were converted liners rather than bespoke aircraft carriers.

That being written, according to FM30-58 "Basic Field Manual - Military Intelligence - Identification of Japanese Naval Vessels - December 29, 1941" the Americans thought the Japanese had.

• 4 Pocket Battleships displacing 12-15,000 tons and armed with six 12" guns that didn't exist.
• 4 Shōkaku class aircraft carriers.
  • The third ship was named Takasago and the name of the fourth ship wasn't known.
  • I don't know, but it's possible that Takasago was Taihō ordered in 1939.
  • I don't know, but it's possible that the fourth ship was Unryū which was part of the Rapid Naval Armaments Supplement Programme of 1941.
• 3 Hiryū class aircraft carriers, the third ship was named Koryu.

Therefore, as the USN thought the IJN had more aircraft carriers than it actually had, Japan might have been able to build Hiyō & Jun'yō as Shōkaku class aircraft carriers without provoking America into building more aircraft carriers.

The apparent ineptitude of US intelligence is one of the reasons i believe the japanese could have gotten away with building two proper carriers instead of the Junyos. Look at their reaction time to Shokaku and Zuikaku, Hornet in autumn 1939 and CV-9 spring 1941! By the same yardstick, the replies (which imo wouldn't necessarily mean more CVs beyond the 24 finished Essexes and forgot how many ordered, 32?, but bringing some of them forward) to two ALT Junyos would be in best case taking the laying down into Essex territory, ie too late to matter for 1942, that is IF the americans have the extra slipways for it, a subject i've been trying to find out more about, and for now i'm not convinced they did have extra slips available in 1940 at least, otherwise they could have started CV-9 at roughly the same time as Hornet (say late 1939 or early 1940)

There is also another angle to look at this, the huge number of Essexes ordered in 1940 and 1941 could have been intended in part as replies to real or imaginary extra IJN carriers, but again they only came online in 1943, too late to count if the japanese really had that many carriers in 1942.

I have also seen various opinions/explanation that some of the imaginary IJN carriers like Koryu or Ryukaku or Takasago etc were actually greatly magnified CVLs like Shoho or Zuiho etc. Again, this points out that if they were really CVs and not measly CVLs the USN would that been in much bigger trouble in 1942 compared to OTL.

Have you ever seen earlier US intelligence estimates of IJN ships, such as 1939 or 1940? That would be really interesting to see. I will look into some Jane's from the period to remind myself of their estimates too.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As to the Japanese, I don't know if they can build anything over OTL in reaction to this ATL US expansion program, except order two proper carriers instead of the Junyos (either repeat Hiryu or Shokaku depending of the slips capacity, certainly one Shokaku possible instead of Hiyo as it was build in the same slip as Zuikaku, and perhaps a repeat Hiryu instead of Junyo). They could possibly bring forward their CVL shadow conversion program (such as the Zuihos, Taiyos etc.) to try to "stay" with the Americans, which in a way it's a good thing as they won't waste time/money in finishing these ships twice.

As I've done the British naval programmes from 1922 to 1939, these are the Japanese naval programmes of the 1930s.

View attachment 698131​

Notes

• The 1931 and 1934 Programmes brought the IJN to the strength permitted by the WNT & 1st LNT.
• The 1937 and 1939 Programmes expanded the IJN beyond the strength permitted by the WNT & 1st LNT.
• Of the Aircraft Carriers:
  • Sōryū & Hiryū were in the 1934 Programme.
  • Shōkaku & Zuikaku were in the 1937 Programme.
  • Taihō was in the 1939 Programme.
• Of the Submarine Tenders
  • Ryūhō (ex-Taigei) was in the 1931 Programme.
  • Shōhō (ex-Tsurugisaki) & Zuihō were in the 1934 Programme.
  • Zuihō was completed as an Aircraft Carrier.
• Of the Seaplane Tenders.
  • Chitose, Chiyoda & Mizuho were in the 1934 Programme.
  • Nissin was in the 1937 Programme.
  • Mizuho & Nissin were sunk before they could be converted into Aircraft Carriers.
• Of the Battleships.
  • Yamato & Musashi were in the 1937 Programme.
  • Shinano & No. 111 were in the 1939 Programme.

That's a great table, thanks for that!

You're welcome.

Just a quick return to the British, were any of their later prewar programs explicitly taking their strength beyond that mandated by the WNT and LNT (such as the Americans did with their Second Vinson Act in 1938 that increased their fleet by 20%?)

That's exactly what the British naval programmes from the 1936-37 Building Programme onwards were doing. See Posts 10, 28 & 29.

PS : I have taken note of this paragraph you posted earlier:

However, the quotas prescribed by the 1st LNT did not have to be met until 31st December 1936 and the Treaty had some "get out" and "escalator" clauses. The British Government invoked some of them before the Treaty expired. Therefore, on 31.12.36 the Navies of the British Commonwealth had 56 cruisers of 388,470 tons instead of 50 of 339,000 tons and 169 Destroyers (18 Flotillas worth) of 204,064 tons instead of 108 (12 Flotillas) of 150,000 tons that they would have had it the letter of the Treaty had been adhered to. This was done by keeping old ships that would have otherwise been scrapped 1935-36 to remain within the Treaty's tonnage quotas.

At 3rd September 1939:

• Submarines - The 1st LNT allowed the British Commonwealth 52,700 tons.
  • 59,529 tons (57 Boats) Completed.
  • 17,440 tons (16 Boats) Under Construction, On Order or Planned.
  • 76,969 tons (73 Boats) Total - Against a requirement for 82 Submarines in the Two-Power Standard Fleet.
• Cruisers - The first 1st LNT allowed the British Commonwealth 339,000 tons.
  • 469,240 tons (65 ships) Completed.
  • 158,500 tons (23 ships) Under Construction and On Order.
  • 627,740 tons (88 ships) Total - Against a requirement for 100.
• Destroyers - The 1st LNT allowed the British Commonwealth 150,000 tons.
  • 256,259 (192 Ships) Completed.
  • 55,837 (30 Ships) Building or On Order. This included 6 Tribal class on order for the RAN.
  • 312,096 (222 Ships) Total.
  • The 192 existing Destroyers were just enough to form the 22 Flotillas required in the Two-Power Standard Fleet.

Therefore, the British Commonwealth's strengths in Submarines, Cruisers and Destroyers were all well in excess of the totals allowed under the First London Naval Treaty.

The 7 existing Aircraft Carriers had a displacement of 136,900 tons, which was slightly more than the 135,000 tons allowed by the Washington Naval Treaty. However, the force of 14 Aircraft Carriers that was planned for the middle 1940s would displace 319,450 tons.

Although, the displacement of the existing Capital Ships was within the 525,000 tons allowed by the Washington Naval Treaty the planned expansion from 15 to 20 ships would produce a force displacing over 700,000 tons.

As to the Americans, I found this to me at least very interesting article from 1938, though it doesn't seem to mention the Second Vinson Act, maybe the article was written before that act was passed. This is why i asked earlier about the possibility of the Americans building more in this scenario, according to the claims of this article they were as of 1938 still well below the WNT and LNT limits. What is your view on that?

The Naval Race?

Since the adoption of new r

www.usni.org

I haven't read the article.

However, the objective of the First Vinson Act was to bring the USN to the strength allowed by the WNT and 1st LNT.

AN ACT​

To establish the composition of the United States Navy with respect to the categories of vessels limited by the treaties signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, and at London, April 22, 1930, at the limits prescribed by those treaties; to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled. That the composition of the United States Navy with respect to the categories of vessels limited by the treaties signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, and at London, April 22, 1930, is hereby established at the limit prescribed by those treaties.

Sec. 2. That subject to the provisions of the treaties signed at Washington. February 6, 1922, and at London, April 22, 1930, the President of the United States is hereby authorized to undertake prior to December 31, 1936, or as soon thereafter as he may deem it advisable (in addition to the six cruisers not yet constructed under the Act approved February 13, 1929 (45 Stat. 1165), and in addition to the vessels being constructed pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 6174 of June 16. 1933), the construction of:

(a) One aircraft carrier of approximately fifteen thousand tons standard displacement, to replace the experimental aircraft carrier Langley;​

(b) ninety-nine thousand two hundred tons aggregate of destroyers to replace over-age destroyers;​

(c) thirty-five thousand five hundred and thirty tons aggregate of submarines to replace over-age submarines​

​

Provided, That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to replace, by vessels of modern design and construction, vessels in the Navy in the categories limited by the treaties signed at Washington, February 6. 1922, and at London, April 22. 1930 when their replacement is permitted by the said treaties:

Provided further, That the President is hereby authorized to procure the necessary naval aircraft for vessels and other naval purposes in numbers commensurate with a treaty navy:

Provided further, That the first and each succeeding alternate vessel of each category, except the fifteen-thousand-ton aircraft carrier, upon which work is undertaken, and the main engines, armor, and armament for such vessels, the construction and manufacture of which is authorized by this Act, shall be constructed or manufactured in the Government navy yards, naval stations, naval gun factories, naval ordnance plants, or arsenals of the United States, except such material or parts as were not customarily manufactured in such Government plants prior to February 13, 1929 :

Provided further, That, if inconsistent with the public interests in any year to have a vessel or vessels constructed as required above, the President may have such vessel or vessels built in a Government or private yard as he may direct.

That not less than 10 per centum of the aircraft, including the engines therefor, the procurement of which is authorized by this Act and hereafter undertaken, shall be constructed and/or manufactured in Government aircraft factories and/or other plants or factories owned and operated by the United States Government.

The foregoing paragraph is subject to the following conditions:

(1) That if it shall be determined by the President that present plants, factories, and equipment owned by the Government are not such as to permit the construction and/or manufacture of the said aircraft and/or engines in such Government plants and factories, in the proportions herein specified and required, then and in that event such requirement may be suspended in whole or in part by his order. However, in the event of such order of suspension being made by the President, then at his discretion the existing plants, factories, and facilities now owned and/or operated by the Government shall forthwith be expanded and equipped to enable the Government to construct, manufacture, and repair not less than 10 per centum of its naval aircraft therein, except that it shall be discretionary with the President as to the per centum constructed and/or manufactured in Government plants if he should find it impracticable for the Government to undertake the construction and/or manufacture of not less than 10 per centum of its naval aircraft therein.

(2) The President is also authorized to employ Government establishments in any case where—

(a) It should reasonably appear that the persons, firms, or corporations, or the agents therefor, bidding for the construction of any of said aircraft, engines, spare parts, or equipment have entered into any combination, agreement, or understanding the effect, object, or purpose of which is to deprive the Government of fair, open, and unrestricted competition in letting contracts for the construction of any of said aircraft, engines, spare parts, or equipment, or—​

​

(b) Should it reasonably appear that any person, firm, or corporation, or agents thereof, being solely or peculiarly in position to manufacture or furnish the particular type or design of aircraft, engines, spare parts, or equipment required by the Navy, in bidding on such aircraft, engines, spare parts, or equipment, have named a price in excess of cost of production plus a reasonable profit, as provided in section 3 of this Act.​

The funds necessary for the enlargement and expansion of such existing plants and facilities now owned by the Government for the construction and manufacture of naval aircraft, are hereby authorized to be appropriated.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to submit annually to the Bureau of the Budget estimates for the construction of the foregoing vessels and aircraft ; and there is hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act: Provided, That no contract shall be made by the Secretary of the Navy for the construction and/or manufacture of any complete naval vessel or aircraft, or any portion thereof, herein, heretofore, or hereafter authorized unless the contractor agrees—

(a) To make a report, as hereinafter described, under oath, to the Secretary of the Navy upon the completion of the contract.​

​

(b) To pay into the Treasury profit, as hereinafter provided shall be determined by the Treasury Department, in excess of 10 per centum of the total contract price, such amount to become the property of the United States: Provided, That if such amount is not voluntarily paid the Secretary of the Treasury may collect the same under the usual methods employed under the internal revenue laws to collect Federal income taxes.​

​

(c) To make no subdivisions of any contract or subcontract for the same article or articles for the purpose of evading the provisions of this Act, but. any subdivision of any contract or subcontract involving an amount in excess of $10,000 shall be subject to the conditions herein prescribed.​

​

(d) That the manufacturing spaces and books of its own plant, affiliates, and subdivisions shall at all times be subject to inspection and audit by any person designated by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and/or by a duly authorized committee of Congress.​

​

(e) To make no subcontract unless the subcontractor agrees to the foregoing conditions.​

The report shall be in form prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy and shall state the total contract price, the cost of performing the contract, the net income, and the per centum such net income bears to the contract price. A copy of such report shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for consideration in connection with the Federal income tax returns of the contractor for the taxable year or years concerned.

The method of ascertaining the amount of excess profit to be paid into the Treasury shall be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in agreement with the Secretary of the Navy and made available to the public. The method initially fixed upon shall be so determined on or before June 30, 1934: Provided, That in any case where an excess profit may be found to be owing to the United States in consequence hereof, the Secretary of the Treasury shall allow credit for any Federal income taxes paid or remaining to be paid upon the amount of such excess profit.

The contract or subcontracts referred to herein are limited to those where the award exceeds $10,000.

Sec. 4. That in the event of international agreement for the further limitations of naval armament to which the United States is signatory, the President is hereby authorized and empowered to suspend so much of its naval construction as has been authorized as may be necessary to bring the naval armament of the United States within the limitation so agreed upon, except that such suspension shall not apply to vessels actually under construction on the date of the passage of this Act.

Approved, March 27, 1934.

 

[EwenS]

There is also another angle to look at this, the huge number of Essexes ordered in 1940 and 1941 could have been intended in part as replies to real or imaginary extra IJN carriers, but again they only came online in 1943, too late to count if the japanese really had that many carriers in 1942.

Re the Essex class. There were 11 ordered in 1940 (CV-9 - CV-19) originally scheduled for completion between March 1944 and Aug 1946 per BuShips reports. All were to be built in civilian yards.

CV-9 couldn't have ben ordered as an Essex class design until the carrier tonnage limit enshrined in US legislation was lifted in the Two Ocean Navy Act. After Hornet all that was left was 20,400 tons, which would have meant a slightly modified Yorktown at best. Although CV-9 was ordered in April 1940 the General Arrangement plans were not completed until Aug and further design changes were not signed off until Nov.

Orders for 2 more Essex class (CV-20 & 21) were placed on 15 Dec 1941 as part of an early wartime expansion programme.

On 7 Aug 1942, as part of the maximum war programme, and as a reaction to Coral Sea & Midway, a further 10 Essex class were ordered to be built in the US Navy Yards, although 1 was reordered from Newport News. Another 3 were added to the programme in June 1943. One vessel from each of these programmes was never completed. And a final 6 found their way into the FY44 programme but were cancelled.

 

[lancer21]

At 3rd September 1939:

• Submarines - The 1st LNT allowed the British Commonwealth 52,700 tons.
  • 59,529 tons (57 Boats) Completed.
  • 17,440 tons (16 Boats) Under Construction, On Order or Planned.
  • 76,969 tons (73 Boats) Total - Against a requirement for 82 Submarines in the Two-Power Standard Fleet.
• Cruisers - The first 1st LNT allowed the British Commonwealth 339,000 tons.
  • 469,240 tons (65 ships) Completed.
  • 158,500 tons (23 ships) Under Construction and On Order.
  • 627,740 tons (88 ships) Total - Against a requirement for 100.
• Destroyers - The 1st LNT allowed the British Commonwealth 150,000 tons.
  • 256,259 (192 Ships) Completed.
  • 55,837 (30 Ships) Building or On Order. This included 6 Tribal class on order for the RAN.
  • 312,096 (222 Ships) Total.
  • The 192 existing Destroyers were just enough to form the 22 Flotillas required in the Two-Power Standard Fleet.

Therefore, the British Commonwealth's strengths in Submarines, Cruisers and Destroyers were all well in excess of the totals allowed under the First London Naval Treaty.

The 7 existing Aircraft Carriers had a displacement of 136,900 tons, which was slightly more than the 135,000 tons allowed by the Washington Naval Treaty. However, the force of 14 Aircraft Carriers that was planned for the middle 1940s would displace 319,450 tons.

Although, the displacement of the existing Capital Ships was within the 525,000 tons allowed by the Washington Naval Treaty the planned expansion from 15 to 20 ships would produce a force displacing over 700,000 tons.

Fascinating figures, again many thanks for your work. Presumably, as shown in your posts nr 10 and 29, there was still a large number of overage ships kept in RN service to beef up the numbers (one can get a fairly accurate picture by substracting the numbers in your table from post nr 10 from the totals above, like 105 underage DDs of 192, 35 CL/CAs of 65 etc. Not quite sure if my reasoning/calculation is sound.

Have you by any chance such totals at roughly the time of underage/overage ships for the IJN and the USN too (which was under the treaty limits at 69 or 73%, at least as of 1938 according to the article i linked to earlier)?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Fascinating figures, again many thanks for your work. Presumably, as shown in your posts nr 10 and 29, there was still a large number of overage ships kept in RN service to beef up the numbers (one can get a fairly accurate picture by subtracting the numbers in your table from post nr 10 from the totals above, like 105 underage DDs of 192, 35 CL/CAs of 65 etc. Not quite sure if my reasoning/calculation is sound.

It was 12 old & 45 new Submarines, 28 old & 37 new Cruisers and 79 old and 113 new Destroyers.

Submarines - 57 completed 1918-39 all of which were in the Royal Navy.

• 12 Old Boats completed 1918-29 and consisting of 3 H class and 9 L class.
• 45 New Boats completed 1927-39 and consisting of 18 boats of the O, P & R classes, 12 S class, 3 T class, 3 U class, 3 Thames class and 6 Porpoise class.
• Under the 1st LNT a Submarine could be replaced 13 years after its date of completion and therefore:
  • The 9 Old Boats of the H class were completed 1918-20 so they became over-age 1931-33.
  • The 3 Old Boats of the L class were completed 1924-26 so they became over-age 1937-39.
  • The 45 New Boats would become over-age 1940-52.
• Under the D.R.C. Standard Fleet all 55 Submarines had to be under-age.
• Under the Two-Power Standard Fleet 6 of the 82 Submarines could be over-age.
• At least - that's as far as I can remember - if I'm wrong I'll be corrected.
• Or to put it another way (if I am right) the new-to-old rations were 55:0 and 76:6 respectively.
• The actual new-to-old ration at 03.09.39 was 45:12.

Cruisers - 65 completed 1917-39 including 6 in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and 2 in the NZ Division of the RN.

• 28 Old Cruisers completed 1917-26 and consisting of 13 C class, 8 D class, 2 E class, 4 Hawkins class and the Australian cruiser Adelaide.
• 37 New Cruisers completed 1928-39 and consisting of 13 County class (2 RAN), 2 York class, 5 Leander class (2 NZ Div), 3 Amphion class (all 3 in the RAN), 4 Arethusa class and 10 ships of Southampton, Gloucester & Edinburgh classes.
• Under the terms of the 1st LNT.
  • A cruiser laid down before 01.01.20 became over-age 16 years after its date of completion.
  • A cruiser laid down after 31.12.19 became over-age 20 years after its date of completion.
  • All the Old Cruisers were laid down before end of 1918 and therefore:
    • 19 were overage at the end of 1936.
    • 5 became overage 1937-38.
    • And the 2 E class ships would become overage in 1942.
    • The 7.5in gunned Hawkins class ships Frobisher and Effingham didn't become over-age until 1940 and 1941 respectively, but the 1st LNT allowed them to be scrapped before the end of 1936.
    • This is because they would have broken the British Commonwealth's Heavy Cruiser Quota of 146,800 tons if they weren't scrapped (or re-armed with 6in guns) before the end of 1936 because the quota was only large enough for the 13 County and 2 York class Heavy Cruisers.
  • The first of the New Cruisers were laid down in 1924 so they'd become overage between 1948 and 1959.
• Under the D.R.C. Standard Fleet 10 of the 70 Cruisers could be over-age.
• Under the Two-Power Standard Fleet 15 of the 100 Cruisers could be over age.
• Or put another way the new-to-old ratios were 60:10 and 85:15 respectively.
• The actual new-to-old ratio on 03.09.39 was 37:28 or 41:24 if Effingham, Frobisher and the 2 E class are counted as under-age ships.

Destroyers - 192 completed 1917-39 including 5 in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and 7 in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).

• 79 Old Destroyers consisting of 12 R&S class, 58 V&W class and 9 Leaders (including 4 V&W and one Leader in the RAN) completed 1917-25 and under the terms of the 1st LNT.
  • A Destroyer laid down before 01.01.21 became over-age 12 years after its date of completion.
  • A Destroyer laid down after 31.12.20 became over-age 16 years after its date of completion.
  • All 79 Old Destroyers were laid down before the end of 1918 and therefore under the terms of the 1st LNT became overage between 1929 and 1937.
• 113 New Destroyers consisting of 81 of the A-to-I classes (7 RCN), 16 Javelin class and 16 Tribal class completed 1927-39. The first of them was laid down in 1924 so they would become overage between 1943 and 1955.
• Under the D.R.C. Standard Fleet all 16 Flotillas had to be under age.
• Under the Two-Power Standard Fleet 6 of the 22 Flotillas could be over age.
• Or put another way the new-to-old ratios were 16:0 and 16:6 respectively.
• The actual new-to-old ratio on 03.09.39 was about 13:9.

Have you by any chance such totals at roughly the time of underage/overage ships for the IJN and the USN too (which was under the treaty limits at 69 or 73%, at least as of 1938 according to the article I linked to earlier)?

I have the information to do some of that. However, these posts take a long time to write and I'm behind on my real life.

 

[lancer21]

Of course, life comes first. You knowledge is amazing as you again kindly shared above, which is why people keep asking you stuff!

I have looked into the 1940 Jane's and it's not as bad as i expected re CVs, fiction wise they "only" have the Koryu which they say was laid down in 1937 and completed in 1940.

The subject of new build BBs, BCs and cruisers is quite laughable though, they have 4 good old (and completely fictious) Kadekuru, Kashino, Hachijo plus one more 15,000 ton BCs laid down 1937-38, no less than 5 BBs of 40,000 tons with 16 inch guns of which 2 laid down in 1937 (Nisshin and Takamatsu), 1 in 1938 and 2 in 1939, and at least 5 CLs building of 9000 tons with twelve 6 inch guns of which 3 are named Sumida, Hashidate and Tsugaru. Though they do add that there is some uncertainty to all this info.

Separately in the book Black Shoe Carrier Admiral by John Lundstrom an ONI report from spring 1942 lists the same Ryukaku and Koryu (apart from the known ships), and also Kasuga and Nitta Maru (they have found out about the CVE conversions). No word yet about the Junyos though (Hayataka, Hitaka to their interpretation), i think they found out about them after Midway.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I have also seen various opinions/explanation that some of the imaginary IJN carriers like Koryu or Ryukaku or Takasago etc were actually greatly magnified CVLs like Shoho or Zuiho etc. Again, this points out that if they were really CVs and not measly CVLs the USN would that been in much bigger trouble in 1942 compared to OTL.

Maybe.

At 07.12.41 the IJN actually had 10 Aircraft Carriers consisting of 8 "Official Carriers" (Hōshō, Akagi, Kaga, Ryūjō, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku & Zuikaku) and 2 "Shadow Carriers" (Zuihō completed 27.12.40 and Taiyō completed 15.09.41). The next ship to be completed was Shōhō on 26.01.42.

According to the Report I was quoting (and you seem to be quoting in Post 47) Japan had 11 Aircraft Carriers completed or under construction. That is Hōshō, Akagi, Kaga, Ryūjō, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku & Zuikaku which actually existed, plus the third Sōryū and the third & fourth Shōkaku class, which didn't. Zuihō & Shōhō are in the Report as the Submarine Tenders Takasagi & Tsurugisaki and I didn't spot Taiyō at all.

Maybe Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku & Zuikaku were spotted and misidentified as fictional ships of the same classes or as you say perhaps Taiyō & Zuihō were sighted and misidentified as fictional ships of the Sōryū & Shōkaku classes.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The apparent ineptitude of US intelligence is one of the reasons I believe the Japanese could have gotten away with building two proper carriers instead of the Junyos. Look at their reaction time to Shokaku and Zuikaku, Hornet in autumn 1939 and CV-9 spring 1941! By the same yardstick, the replies (which imo wouldn't necessarily mean more CVs beyond the 24 finished Essexes and forgot how many ordered, 32?, but bringing some of them forward) to two ALT Junyos would be in best case taking the laying down into Essex territory, i.e. too late to matter for 1942, that is IF the Americans have the extra slipways for it, a subject I've been trying to find out more about, and for now I'm not convinced they did have extra slips available in 1940 at least, otherwise they could have started CV-9 at roughly the same time as Hornet (say late 1939 or early 1940).

There is also another angle to look at this, the huge number of Essexes ordered in 1940 and 1941 could have been intended in part as replies to real or imaginary extra IJN carriers, but again they only came online in 1943, too late to count if the Japanese really had that many carriers in 1942.

It could have been skill on the part of the Japanese Intelligence Service rather than an inept U.S. Intelligence service.

The Americans weren't that far behind in practice. See below.



Hornet was built under the American Fiscal Year 1939 Building Programme, i.e. the Fiscal Year ending 30.06.39. Silverstone (U.S. Warships of World War 2) says Essex was in the FY 1940 Building Programme (i.e. the Fiscal Year ending 30.06.40) and Shipscribe says it was in the FY 1941 Building Programme (i.e. the Fiscal Year ending 30.06.41). I've included Lexington because she was the second Essex to be completed.

As already discussed Essex and Hornet were built in reply to Shōkaku & Zuikaku. Hornet was built as a Yorktown class ship to get it into service as soon as possible and it was only completed a month after Zuikaku and 10 weeks after Shōkaku.

If Hiyō and Jun'yō had been additional Shōkaku class ships it would only have put 38 extra aircraft to sea (and they'd have been about 10 knots faster) but they would have taken the same length of time to build and the Americans would have known about them because they'd have been in either the 1937 or 1939 Fleet Replenishment Programmes approved by the Japanese Parliament rather than "Shadow Carriers".

If it was the former (i.e. part of the 1937 Programme) my gut feelings are that:

1. Congress would approve an increase from 135,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers to 215,000 tons (instead of to 175,000 tons in the "Real World") and a fourth Yorktown (CV8A Constellation) would be laid down in the autumn of 1939 completed in the autumn of 1941 and be operational at the same time as Hornet. Therefore, the Japanese get another 38 aircraft to sea but the Americans get another 96 based on the 1938 air group for a Yorktown class ship. Essex would be built as per the "Real World" but one of the other early Essex class would be laid down and completed several months earlier in this "version of history".
2. Or there would still be an increase to 175,000 tons in 1938, but Essex would be built as a Yorktown to get her in service as soon as possible too. Therefore, she's laid down in the autumn of 1939, completed in the autumn of 1941 and operational at the same time as Hornet. Which is effectively, the same result as No. 1.
3. Or they decide to use the extra 80,000 tons to build 4 Yorkowns and no ships of a new design to get them into service as soon as possible. All 4 are laid down in the autumn of 1939, completed in the autumn of 1941 and operational at the same time as Hornet. Then the USN theoretically has another 288 aircraft aboard 3 extra Aircraft Carriers in the carrier battles of 1942 (except that it's unlikely that Wasp is sent to the Pacific) when the Japanese have the same number of ships and only 38 extra aircraft.
4. Note that all of the above (Japanese as well as American) include the procurement of the extra aircraft and training the extra aircraft required for the air groups, which should go without saying, but there's always one.

I think Hiyō and Jun'yō would have to be in the 1937 Programme to be additional Shōkaku class ships and still be completed in the middle of 1942. If they were in the 1939 Programme I think that at the very least Jun'yō would be delayed by several months.

 

[BlackBat242]

I've long preferred option 2 above, with the Essex class basically as historic.
Having a 4th Yorktown in the Pacific from the start of the war would ensure that there are 3 USN carriers at Coral Sea, thus likely keeping Lex from being sunk - although if she survives she likely takes a year to repair).
This gives 4 carriers at Midway, and Yorktown almost certainly survives, having a second carrier's CAP to defend that pair.

I would NOT let the 4th Midway (CVB-44) be cancelled on Jan 11 1943, but would go ahead with her construction.
The 5th & 6th Midways, CVB-56 & CVB-57, would still be cancelled on 28 March 1945 before keel-laying as historic.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Have you by any chance such totals at roughly the time of underage/overage ships for the IJN and the USN too (which was under the treaty limits at 69 or 73%, at least as of 1938 according to the article I linked to earlier)?

I have the information to do some of that. However, these posts take a long time to write and I'm behind on my real life.

Of course, life comes first. You knowledge is amazing as you again kindly shared above, which is why people keep asking you stuff!

"Here's one I did earlier" as they said on "Blue Peter" when I were a lad.

Please note that the displacements quoted are the declared standard displacements (according to my copy of Jane's Fighting Ships 1939) and the actual standard displacements were often considerably in excess of what the Japanese Government said they were.



The IJN had 17 Light Cruisers on 07.12.41. That included:

• Tenryu, Tatsuta, Kuma & Tama which became over-age before the end of 1936 and should have been scrapped by 31.12.36 to make way for the 4 Mogami class and remain within Japan's light cruiser quota of 100,450 tons.
• Kitikai, Kiso & Oi which became over-age in 1937 and should have been scrapped by 31.12.37 to make way for the Tone class and remain within Japan's light cruiser quota of 100,450 tons.
• Tenryu, Tatsuta, Kuma, Tama, Kitikai, Kiso & Oi were laid down before 01.01.20 and (under the 1st LNT's rules of replacement) became over-age 16 years after their date of completion.
• The other Light Cruisers were laid down after 31.12.19 and (under the 1st LNT's rules of replacement) became over-age 20 years after their date of completion. That's why Yura to Naka become overage 1942-45 instead of 1938-41.
• Article 12, Paragraph 4 of the 1st LNT allowed for the first 3 Kuma class (Kuma, Tama & Kikikami) to be converted to training ships.
  • The "Asama", "Yakumo", "Izumo", "Iwate" and "Kasuga" shall be disposed of in accordance with Section I or II of Annex II to this Part II when the first three vessels of the "Kuma" class have been replaced by new vessels. These three vessels of the "Kuma" class shall be reduced to the condition prescribed in Section V, sub-paragraph (b)2 of Annex II to this Part II, and are to be used for training ships, and their tonnage shall not thereafter be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.
• The Mogami class were built as Light Cruisers armed with fifteen 6.1in guns in 5 triple turrets. They were re-armed as Heavy Cruisers 1939-40 with ten 8in guns in 5 twin turrets.
• The Tone class were ordered as Light Cruisers armed with twelve 6.1in guns in 4 triple turrets, but they were completed as Heavy Cruisers with eight 8in guns in four twin turrets.
• The Light Cruisers were used as flagships for the Submarine & Destroyer Flotillas. The Agano, Oyodo and (I think) the Katori classes were built to replace them.

So the short answer is that 7 out of the 17 Light Cruisers that the IJN had on 07.12.41 were over-age (according to the terms of the 1st LNT) and should have been scrapped by the end of 1937 to remain within Japan's LNT Quota for Light Cruisers. Plus, 4 of the other 10 would become overage in 1942 and the last 6 would become overage 1943-45.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've long preferred option 2 above, with the Essex class basically as historic.
Having a 4th Yorktown in the Pacific from the start of the war would ensure that there are 3 USN carriers at Coral Sea, thus likely keeping Lex from being sunk - although if she survives she likely takes a year to repair).
This gives 4 carriers at Midway, and Yorktown almost certainly survives, having a second carrier's CAP to defend that pair.

I would NOT let the 4th Midway (CVB-44) be cancelled on Jan 11 1943, but would go ahead with her construction.
The 5th & 6th Midways, CVB-56 & CVB-57, would still be cancelled on 28 March 1945 before keel-laying as historic.

I like it.

I've also though that 25th & 26th Essex class (Iwo Jima & Reprisal) and the CVLs Saipan & Wright should have been cancelled before they were laid down and the resources used to build CVB-56 & 57. I know that doesn't fit what happened in the "Real World" because CV-50 to 57 (27th to 32nd Essex and 5th & 6th Midways) were in FY 45, while Iwo Jima, Saipan & Wright were in FY 44 and Reprisal was in FY 43. Plus the slipways that Iwo Jima, Reprisal, Saipan & Wright were built on might not be large enough for a Midway.

However, I like the idea of 6 Midways and 24 Essex class being the core of the post-war US Carrier Force instead of the "Real World's" 3 Midways and 24 Essex class.

• All other things being equal 4 would have SCB.110 refits 1954-57 & 2 SCB.110A 1957-60.
• If they existed in the current ALT 1960s US Navy thread would have SCB.101 refits in the second half of the 1960s which were completed on time and at cost.
• The 3 extra Midways would also 3 allow SCB.27C Essex class to become CVS in the 1960s & replace 3 of the SCB.27A and/or they could be rotated between the active fleets and the reserve so they wear out at a slower and more even rate.

Have you thought of names for the 4th Yorktown and 4th Midway? I chose Constellation for CV-8A because it was the name of a cancelled Lexington class battle cruiser and the name of a post-war super-carrier.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Have you by any chance such totals at roughly the time of underage/overage ships for the IJN and the USN too (which was under the treaty limits at 69 or 73%, at least as of 1938 according to the article I linked to earlier)?

I have the information to do some of that. However, these posts take a long time to write and I'm behind on my real life.

Of course, life comes first. You knowledge is amazing as you again kindly shared above, which is why people keep asking you stuff!

Here's another one I did earlier. It's what the Japanese Heavy Cruiser Force would have been at 07.12.41 if Japan had kept to the terms of the 1st LNT.

​

Except that instead of the 12 ships there were 18 with an official displacement of 159,400 tons because there were also the 4 Mogami & 2 Tone class which were completed/ordered as Light Cruisers and converted to/completed as Heavy Cruisers.

None of the ships were over-age because they'd all been laid down after 31.12.19 and (under the 1st LNT's rules of replacement) didn't become over-age until 20 years after their date of completion. Therefore, Furutaka & Kako would become over-age in 1946 and the Takao class would become overage in 1952.

Please note that the displacements quoted are the declared standard displacements (according to my copy of Jane's Fighting Ships 1939) and the actual standard displacements were often considerably in excess of what the Japanese Government said they were.

 

[lancer21]

Have you thought of names for the 4th Yorktown and 4th Midway? I chose Constellation for CV-8A because it was the name of a cancelled Lexington class battle cruiser and the name of a post-war super-carrier.

How about Constitution (Lexington class CC), United States (CC and 1949 CVB). America (postwar supercarrier) and Crown Point (proposed CV/CVL name) to chose from?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Have you thought of names for the 4th Yorktown and 4th Midway? I chose Constellation for CV-8A because it was the name of a cancelled Lexington class battle cruiser and the name of a post-war super-carrier.

How about Constitution (Lexington class CC), United States (CC and 1949 CVB). America (post-war super carrier) and Crown Point (proposed CV/CVL name) to chose from?

As Constellation, Constitution and United States were 3 of the "original six frigates" authorised in 1794 I think Chesapeake, Congress and President would also be suitable names.

Except, imagine the propaganda value to the enemy of sinking a ship named America, Congress, Constitution, President or United States.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Have you by any chance such totals at roughly the time of underage/overage ships for the IJN and the USN too (which was under the treaty limits at 69 or 73%, at least as of 1938 according to the article I linked to earlier)?

I have the information to do some of that. However, these posts take a long time to write and I'm behind on my real life.

Of course, life comes first. You knowledge is amazing as you again kindly shared above, which is why people keep asking you stuff!

Here's another one I did earlier.

​

• The official displacements are according to my copy of Jane's 1939 and the actual displacements are according to Conway's 1922-46.
• It shows that the combined displacements of Akagi to Hiryu officially added to exactly the 81,000 tons allowed by the Washington Naval Treaty, but actually exceeded them by 25% as completed and nearly 50% after Akagi to Ryujo were rebuilt.
• However, I'm letting Japan off for Akagi and Kaga because Lexington and Saratoga displaced 33,000 tons each, officially, but actually had displacements of 37,681 tons according to Conway's 1922-46.
• If Japan had declared the actual displacements of these ships, it wouldn't have been possible to build Hiryu, and it would have been necessary to reduce Soryu's actual standard displacement from 15,900 tons to 13,000 tons.
• However, as I'm letting Japan off for Akagi and Kaga a total of 19,200 tons would have been available.
  • So Soryu might have been an enlarged version or Hiryu.
  • Or they could have built 2 "keel up" versions of the rebuilt Ryujo, but that would have exceeded the quota by 2,000 tons, i.e. the two ships would have displaced 21,200 tons when 19,200 tons were available.

 

[lancer21]

As i used to argue previously, IJN missed a trick in rearming the Mogamis and even the Tones, with the 6 inch guns, 50% more barrels and twice the firing rate they could have thrown a lot more shells at an enemy than with the 8 inch guns.

The other trick is not having "cheated properly" re the Ryujo, with the benefit of hindsight they should have build a pre-Soryu, i imagine it as built around twin DD machinery of 100, 000HP, speed 32kts, displacement about 14,000-15,000 tons (basically a sort of Soryu with smaller machinery), compared to a declared displacement of say about 9000 tons. OTL Hiryu and Soryu could also be declared as 9000 tons because why not.

The third trick is not having "cheated more" regarding the post LNT DDs , TBs and CLs and some of the auxiliaries too (Taigei iirc was problematic too i think) could have saved themselves a lot of time, money and slip space by not having to rebuild the damn things, they probably needed to be 10% bigger from the start.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As I used to argue previously, IJN missed a trick in rearming the Mogamis and even the Tones, with the 6 inch guns, 50% more barrels and twice the firing rate they could have thrown a lot more shells at an enemy than with the 8 inch guns.

I'd not thought of that before and don't necessarily disagree with you.

• The 15.5 cm/60 (6.1") 3rd Year Type gun in the Mogami, Oyodo and Yamato classes had a rate of fire of 5-6 rounds per minute and the triple turrets they were fitted to elevated to 55 degrees.
• 6"/47 (15.2 cm) Mark 16 gun in the Brooklyn and Cleveland classes had a rate of fire of 8-12 rounds per minute and the triple turrets they were fitted to initially elevated to 40 degrees. However, the elevation was increased to 60 degrees during World War II. The rate of fire fell to 5 rounds a minute when firing at 60 degrees.

However, the Naval Weapons which is my source for the above also says.

Post-war, there was a program to increase the AA potential of the Cleveland class by giving their 6"/47 (15.2 cm) guns a power-operated loading cradle which was designed to allow all-angle loading. A prototype was installed on one gun of USS Mobile (CL-63) for evaluation in June 1950. The project was soon abandoned as the increased top-weight of 21 tons (22 mt) was considered too large a risk from a stability viewpoint. In addition, at this time most of the Cleveland class were either already in or soon would be put into mothballs. A decade later when six of these ships were modified and recommissioned as missile cruisers, interest in gun-oriented AA defense had waned and none of these cruisers were given the new loading gear.

Therefore, I think the Japanese need to make their 6.1in gun fire reliably at at least 7.5-9 rounds per minute, preferably 8-10 rounds per minute up to 40 degrees (like their American rivals) and ideally the elevation & rate of fire to be a good AA gun as well as a good anti-ship weapon.

The other trick is not having "cheated properly" re the Ryujo, with the benefit of hindsight they should have build a pre-Soryu, i imagine it as built around twin DD machinery of 100, 000HP, speed 32kts, displacement about 14,000-15,000 tons (basically a sort of Soryu with smaller machinery), compared to a declared displacement of say about 9000 tons. OTL Hiryu and Soryu could also be declared as 9000 tons because why not.

They should have "cheated properly" with all the ships built under the 1931 Programme (such as the Mogami class cruisers and Hatsuharu class destroyers. Having learned "the hard way" Japan did cheat properly with the ships built under the 1934 Programme and subsequent programmes.

The third trick is not having "cheated more" regarding the post LNT DDs , TBs and CLs and some of the auxiliaries too (Taigei IIRC was problematic too I think) could have saved themselves a lot of time, money and slip space by not having to rebuild the damn things, they probably needed to be 10% bigger from the start.

I think most of that was inevitable. However, if they'd "cheated properly" with the ships built under the 1931 Programme Japan would have saved itself the time, money and dockyard space from not having to rebuild those dam things.

This thread on Alternatehistory.com may be of interest to you.

Optimize the IJN for WW2

There are several of these optimize topic on various navies/air arms etc. recently, which usually bring very interesting historical and ATL details forward, so i thought of another discussion on IJN. Some of my various ideas are to re-engine the Nagatos for true fast BB speed (125,000 HP like...

www.alternatehistory.com

 

[lancer21]

That is my topic there, i go as mack8 at alternatehistory.com.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That is my topic there, I go as mack8 at alternatehistory.com.

For good or ill I'm also the NOMISYRRUC there. I'm here because @Archibald asked me to contribute, so if you like my contributions thank him and if you don't like them blame him.

 

[Archibald]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this. I actually hate the WNT because it screwed battleship ascent to 18 inch and 70 000 tons grandiosity
(except for the Yamatos)
You British and Americans have craptons of battleships to fantasize on, but I shall remind you that in the case of France, WWI and WWII screw both Normandie and Richelieu classes almost the same way.
- five or six uber-battleship planned, a few started
- world war and invading germans crash the party for the worse
(miracle on the Marne - works only once - battle of the frontiers, you nightmare - 1870, 1914 and 1940 in a row - crap)
- too few uber-battleships, if none, ever finished as a result
- only a handful of hulls here and there, rotting on shipyards, as a result
- too expensive except perhaps as an aircraft carrier (or not: Jean Bart almost went the way of the Bearn)

 

[lancer21]

As I used to argue previously, IJN missed a trick in rearming the Mogamis and even the Tones, with the 6 inch guns, 50% more barrels and twice the firing rate they could have thrown a lot more shells at an enemy than with the 8 inch guns.

I'd not thought of that before and don't necessarily disagree with you.

• The 15.5 cm/60 (6.1") 3rd Year Type gun in the Mogami, Oyodo and Yamato classes had a rate of fire of 5-6 rounds per minute and the triple turrets they were fitted to elevated to 55 degrees.
• 6"/47 (15.2 cm) Mark 16 gun in the Brooklyn and Cleveland classes had a rate of fire of 8-12 rounds per minute and the triple turrets they were fitted to initially elevated to 40 degrees. However, the elevation was increased to 60 degrees during World War II. The rate of fire fell to 5 rounds a minute when firing at 60 degrees.

However, the Naval Weapons which is my source for the above also says.

Post-war, there was a program to increase the AA potential of the Cleveland class by giving their 6"/47 (15.2 cm) guns a power-operated loading cradle which was designed to allow all-angle loading. A prototype was installed on one gun of USS Mobile (CL-63) for evaluation in June 1950. The project was soon abandoned as the increased top-weight of 21 tons (22 mt) was considered too large a risk from a stability viewpoint. In addition, at this time most of the Cleveland class were either already in or soon would be put into mothballs. A decade later when six of these ships were modified and recommissioned as missile cruisers, interest in gun-oriented AA defense had waned and none of these cruisers were given the new loading gear.

Therefore, I think the Japanese need to make their 6.1in gun fire reliably at at least 7.5-9 rounds per minute, preferably 8-10 rounds per minute up to 40 degrees (like their American rivals) and ideally the elevation & rate of fire to be a good AA gun as well as a good anti-ship weapon.

The other trick is not having "cheated properly" re the Ryujo, with the benefit of hindsight they should have build a pre-Soryu, i imagine it as built around twin DD machinery of 100, 000HP, speed 32kts, displacement about 14,000-15,000 tons (basically a sort of Soryu with smaller machinery), compared to a declared displacement of say about 9000 tons. OTL Hiryu and Soryu could also be declared as 9000 tons because why not.

They should have "cheated properly" with all the ships built under the 1931 Programme (such as the Mogami class cruisers and Hatsuharu class destroyers. Having learned "the hard way" Japan did cheat properly with the ships built under the 1934 Programme and subsequent programmes.

The third trick is not having "cheated more" regarding the post LNT DDs , TBs and CLs and some of the auxiliaries too (Taigei IIRC was problematic too I think) could have saved themselves a lot of time, money and slip space by not having to rebuild the damn things, they probably needed to be 10% bigger from the start.

I think most of that was inevitable. However, if they'd "cheated properly" with the ships built under the 1931 Programme Japan would have saved itself the time, money and dockyard space from not having to rebuild those dam things.

This thread on Alternatehistory.com may be of interest to you.

Optimize the IJN for WW2

There are several of these optimize topic on various navies/air arms etc. recently, which usually bring very interesting historical and ATL details forward, so i thought of another discussion on IJN. Some of my various ideas are to re-engine the Nagatos for true fast BB speed (125,000 HP like...

www.alternatehistory.com

I don't know what kind of breakthrough the americans achieved to have their 6 inch fire that much faster compared to the japanese 15,5cm gun. Though as per NavWeaps the japanese gun was still very good. But even splitting the difference as you say to 7-9 rpm would of course been very welcome for the IJN gun.

As to the IJN's overweight ships woes, apart from the complications brought by LNT, i have read that whoever was in charge of design bears a big blame too, i can't recall the names now, either Hiraga or Fujimoto (or maybe someone else). Plus of course them being asked from the top to cram all those weapons on smaller ships.

To my thinking, if they would have avoided even in part those woes the saved slip time and money would have probably allowed them to squeeze in another pair of Tones, they did wanted them in the 1939 program but they had no slip space or money or both, they only authorized them in 1941 as you know, alongside Unryu.

Which gets us back to the Junyos, in the planning for the 1939 program they actually wanted 3 carriers, but only got Taiho. So i guess we can quite neatly add Unryu or even a repeat Shokaku to Maru 4 here instead of Hiyo, the slip space is available right on time. However to get a proper CV instead of Junyo it will need to be added to the small 1938 program which would need to be greatly enlarged. Hm, actually if they have the money they could bring that emergency 1941 program of 1 CV and 2 CA to 1938.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this.

If that's a reference to you asking me to join Secret Projects. I thought you sent me a PM before you were banned from AlternateHistory.com or after you had been banned and were re-joining with different user names until the moderators worked out what you were doing and banned you again. However, when I checked my PM file I couldn't find it.

 

[Archibald]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this.

If that's a reference to you asking me to join Secret Projects. I thought you sent me a PM before you were banned from AlternateHistory.com or after you had been banned and were re-joining with different user names until the moderators worked out what you were doing and banned you again. However, when I checked my PM file I couldn't find it.

It happened a few times. Now I have accepted the fact the moderators are irretrievable dickheads - and wehraboos too.

"calbear""AH.com" - Google Search

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this.

If that's a reference to you asking me to join Secret Projects. I thought you sent me a PM before you were banned from AlternateHistory.com or after you had been banned and were re-joining with different user names until the moderators worked out what you were doing and banned you again. However, when I checked my PM file I couldn't find it.

It happened a few times. Now I have accepted the fact the moderators are irretrievable dickheads - and wehraboos too.

"calbear""AH.com" - Google Search

For what it's worth I get on with Calbear reasonably well. It was Burton K Wheeler that gave me a warning for casual rudeness, except I wasn't being casual.

Edit: There are more than a few "AlternateHistory.com refugees" contributing to this forum.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this.

If that's a reference to you asking me to join Secret Projects. I thought you sent me a PM before you were banned from AlternateHistory.com or after you had been banned and were re-joining with different user names until the moderators worked out what you were doing and banned you again. However, when I checked my PM file I couldn't find it.

It happened a few times. Now I have accepted the fact the moderators are irretrievable dickheads - and wehraboos too.

"calbear""AH.com" - Google Search

For what it's worth I get on with Calbear reasonably well. It was Burton K Wheeler that gave me a warning for casual rudeness, except I wasn't being casual.

Edit: There are more than a few "AlternateHistory.com refugees" contributing to this forum.

I found the PM. It was in December 2020 and you were pretending to be @groundhogday666.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this. I actually hate the WNT because it screwed battleship ascent to 18 inch and 70 000 tons grandiosity
(except for the Yamatos)
You British and Americans have craptons of battleships to fantasize on, but I shall remind you that in the case of France, WWI and WWII screw both Normandie and Richelieu classes almost the same way.
- five or six uber-battleship planned, a few started
- world war and invading Germans crash the party for the worse
(miracle on the Marne - works only once - battle of the frontiers, you nightmare - 1870, 1914 and 1940 in a row - crap)
- too few uber-battleships, if none, ever finished as a result
- only a handful of hulls here and there, rotting on shipyards, as a result
- too expensive except perhaps as an aircraft carrier (or not: Jean Bart almost went the way of the Bearn)

For what it's worth I think a total breakdown of the Treaty System at the end of 1934 won't make the slightest bit of difference to what France does because it was only a semi-detached member of it in the "Real World" because the French Government wouldn't agree to tonnage quotas for its Submariner, Cruiser & Destroyer Forces under the 1st LNT, broke the Capital Ship rules of the WNT/1st LNT when it laid down Richelieu & Jean Bart in 1935-36, France didn't build Aircraft Carriers to the limits allowed by the WNT/1st LNT and finally the French Foreign Minister did sign the 1st LNT, but the French Parliament didn't ratify it.

Rather than repeat myself, this is what I've written in earlier posts.

All of the countries did effectively withdraw in the "Real World" because they invoked some of the "get out" and "escalation" clauses in the WNT and 1st LNT before 31st December 1936.

For example:

• The British Commonwealth's tonnages of cruisers and destroyers were in excess of the 1st LNT quotas at the end of 1936. This was because they didn't scrap ships that had to be scrapped to stay within the quotas. It was justified by invoking one of the "get out" clauses in the 1st LNT.
• France laid down 123,000 tons of Capital Ships before the end of 1936 when the 1st LNT only allowed them to lay down 70,000 tons. @Archibald may be able to confirm or deny this, but my understanding is that the French Government said "We're building Richelieu and Jean Bart regardless of what the Treaties say, because the Germans building "The Twins" and the Italians building Littorio & Vittorio Vento threatens our national security."

Going back to France.

• I've already explained how France broke the Treaties anyway when they laid down Richelieu and Jean Bart in 1935-36.
• They were allowed to have 60,000 tons of Aircraft Carriers, but only built the 22,146 ton Béarn while the tonnage quota was in force. The two Aircraft Carriers ordered after the tonnage quotas expired displaced 18,000 tons each when the 2nd LNT allowed them to displace up to 23,000 tons.
• The size of the Submarine, Cruiser and Destroyer forces wasn't limited by Treaty because the French Government refused to accept limitations upon them at the First London Naval Conference and was exempt from the parts of the First London Naval Treaty that limited the quantity and quality of Submarines, Cruisers and Destroyers.
• Plus the French Government was more concerned about Germany and Italy's naval expansion than Japan's.

Therefore, I think what the French Government did in this "version of history" would be exactly what the did in the "Real World".

To which I add that France struggled to build some of the ships that it did order in the 1930s in the "Real World" due to not having enough of the necessary industrial resources (e.g. slipways to build the Richelieu class on) so the French Government wouldn't be able to build more even if they wanted to.

I think France would only try to build more if Germany & Italy built more or at least announced that they would be building more. I wrote "try" to build more because I expect France to fail as already written they found it hard to build all the ships ordered in the 1930s in the "Real World".

 

[Archibald]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this.

If that's a reference to you asking me to join Secret Projects. I thought you sent me a PM before you were banned from AlternateHistory.com or after you had been banned and were re-joining with different user names until the moderators worked out what you were doing and banned you again. However, when I checked my PM file I couldn't find it.

It happened a few times. Now I have accepted the fact the moderators are irretrievable dickheads - and wehraboos too.

"calbear""AH.com" - Google Search

For what it's worth I get on with Calbear reasonably well. It was Burton K Wheeler that gave me a warning for casual rudeness, except I wasn't being casual.

Edit: There are more than a few "AlternateHistory.com refugees" contributing to this forum.

I found the PM. It was in December 2020 and you were pretending to be @groundhogday666.

All in the pseudo. God I love this movie, particularly the gopher. And the scene where Phil goes Fast & Furious with the local police, and when they catch him and he rolls down his car window for the cop to speak to him - he orders a cheeseburger as if he was at a McDonald's drive. Only to awake in his motel bed the next morning, rather than in jail.
"I got you, baaaaaaabe..."
Some people have calculated he might have been caught in the time loop 40 000 times or more. No surprise he ends a little baffled with the ordeal.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this. I actually hate the WNT because it screwed battleship ascent to 18 inch and 70 000 tons grandiosity
(except for the Yamatos)
You British and Americans have craptons of battleships to fantasize on, but I shall remind you that in the case of France, WWI and WWII screw both Normandie and Richelieu classes almost the same way.
- five or six uber-battleship planned, a few started
- world war and invading Germans crash the party for the worse
(miracle on the Marne - works only once - battle of the frontiers, you nightmare - 1870, 1914 and 1940 in a row - crap)
- too few uber-battleships, if none, ever finished as a result
- only a handful of hulls here and there, rotting on shipyards, as a result
- too expensive except perhaps as an aircraft carrier (or not: Jean Bart almost went the way of the Bearn)

This is the current version of my French Naval Programmes table.

​

NOTES:

• The list for Submarines may be incomplete.
• Aircraft Carriers
  • The ship in the 1926 Programme is the Seaplane Carrier Commandant Teste.
  • The ships in the 1938 Programme are Joffre and Painlevé.
    • Joffre laid down on 26.11.38 and it was planned that she would be launched in 1941 but my source didn't have a planned completion date.
    • Painlevé hadn't been laid down before France fell and it looks like the 40,000 ton Battleship ordered from the same yard was given priority over her.
• Capital Ships.
  • 1931 - Dunkerque.
  • 1932 - Strasbourg.
  • 1935 - Richelieu & Jean Bart.
  • 1938 - Clemenceau & Gascoigne.
    • Clemenceau was laid down on 17.01.39 and it was planned that she would be launched in 1941 and be completed at before the end of 1943.
    • Gascoigne was to be laid down in the Summer of 1940, launched in the Spring of 1942 and completed in June 1944.
  • 1940 - Two 40,000 ton ships.
    • Possible names were Alsace, Normandie, Flandre & Bourgogne.
    • They were to be laid down in 1941 & 1942 respectively, but my source doesn't have the planned completion dates.
    • The lead ship was to be built on the same slipway as Joffre and according to my source had priority over the aircraft carrier Painlevé which was on order from the same shipyard (A C de St-Nazaire-Penhoët).
    • The second ship was to be built in the new building dock at Brest Naval Dockyard.
• Cruisers
  • 1922 - Duguay Trouin, Lamotte-Piquet & Primaguet.
  • 1924 - Duquense & Tourville.
  • 1925 - Suffren & Pluton.
  • 1926 - Colbert.
  • 1927 - Foch.
  • 1928 - Dupleix.
  • 1929 - Jeanne d' Arc.
  • 1930 - Algérie & Emile Bertin
  • 1931 - La Galissonnière, Jean de Vienne
  • 1932 - Marseillaise, Glorie, Montcalm & Georges Leygues.
  • 1937 - De Grasse - When laid down (in November 1938) she was due to enter service in September 1942.
  • 1938 - Chateaurenault & Guichen.
    • Chateaurenault was planned to enter service in 1944.
    • The source didn't say when Guichen was planned to enter service, but my guess is 1944.
  • 1940 - 3 St Louis class Heavy Cruisers to replace the 3 Duguay Trouin class Light Cruisers in 1946.
• Destroyers.
  • DL are Contre-Torpilleurs.
    • 6 Chacal class - 1922 Programme.
    • 6 Guépard class - 1925 & 26 Programmes.
    • 6 Aigle class - 1927 Programme.
    • 6 Vauquelin class - 1928 Programme.
    • 6 La Fantasque class - 1930 Programme.
    • 18 Mogador class - 1932-40 Programmes.
  • DD are the Standard Destroyers.
    • 12 Bourrasque class - 1922 Programme.
    • 14 L'Adroit class - 1924-26 Programmes.
    • 28 Le Hardi class - 1932-40 Programmes.
  • DE are the Small Destroyers/Torpedo Boats.
    • 12 La Melpomène class - 1931 & 32 Programmes.
    • 14 Le Fier classes - 1937 & 38 Programmes.

 

[Archibald]

I often whether another Normandie battleship hull (there five or six unfinished ones on slips from 1914 until at least 1924 or even 1926) could have been turned into a second carrier except 200% better than Bearn - learning from countless mistakes made on that poor ship. Wikipedia has lots of details about faster Normandies - up to 26 kt rather than 21 kt. Could be applied to a better Bearn follow on.

I have a meta "French carrier TL" where this is the (minor) POD: a second much better Bearn won't change France (and the world) path toward the 1940 cataclysm. Until perhaps De Gaulle last ditch offensive in Abbeville, May 28, 1940, where that second Bearn dive bombers could make themselves useful. Still France is lost and Jean Bart battleship is running away the daring way with Cdr Ronarc'h. Except it sticks with Scotland rather than Casablanca as its final destination, and de facto escape Darlan and Vichy and Torch sad OTL fate.
Fast forward to 1943 when the Free French found a way to convince the Americans to turn it into an aircraft carrier... history doesn't repeats, but it rhymes (Mark Twain).
That Jean Bart carrier whatever its limits will get itself a post war role similar to OTL Arromanches & Lafayette & Bois Belleau - stopgap until Foch & Clem in 1961. Except bigger and faster, it will able to handle early naval jets more easily...

 

[lancer21]

You mean the proposals with lenghtened hull and 80,000 HP engines for 26kts? Yeah it would be light years better than Bearn, even better if Bearn is modernized in the same way, or modified during conversion.

Wasn't also the case of being entitled for a replacement for the sunk France? But finishing jus a single Normandie as a replacement would probably be awkward in term of tactical cohesiveness, so it needs to be a pair at least. Not sure if the WNT allows that, or since France was supposed to be entitled to lay down new BBs starting in 1927, perhaps the second Normandie could be finished against that provision?

 

[lancer21]

(presently scratching my head in perplexity)
Can't remember doing this. I actually hate the WNT because it screwed battleship ascent to 18 inch and 70 000 tons grandiosity
(except for the Yamatos)
You British and Americans have craptons of battleships to fantasize on, but I shall remind you that in the case of France, WWI and WWII screw both Normandie and Richelieu classes almost the same way.
- five or six uber-battleship planned, a few started
- world war and invading Germans crash the party for the worse
(miracle on the Marne - works only once - battle of the frontiers, you nightmare - 1870, 1914 and 1940 in a row - crap)
- too few uber-battleships, if none, ever finished as a result
- only a handful of hulls here and there, rotting on shipyards, as a result
- too expensive except perhaps as an aircraft carrier (or not: Jean Bart almost went the way of the Bearn)

This is the current version of my French Naval Programmes table.

View attachment 698443​

NOTES:

• The list for Submarines may be incomplete.
• Aircraft Carriers
  • The ship in the 1926 Programme is the Seaplane Carrier Commandant Teste.
  • The ships in the 1938 Programme are Joffre and Painlevé.
    • Joffre laid down on 26.11.38 and it was planned that she would be launched in 1941 but my source didn't have a planned completion date.
    • Painlevé hadn't been laid down before France fell and it looks like the 40,000 ton Battleship ordered from the same yard was given priority over her.
• Capital Ships.
  • 1931 - Dunkerque.
  • 1932 - Strasbourg.
  • 1935 - Richelieu & Jean Bart.
  • 1938 - Clemenceau & Gascoigne.
    • Clemenceau was laid down on 17.01.39 and it was planned that she would be launched in 1941 and be completed at before the end of 1943.
    • Gascoigne was to be laid down in the Summer of 1940, launched in the Spring of 1942 and completed in June 1944.
  • 1940 - Two 40,000 ton ships.
    • Possible names were Alsace, Normandie, Flandre & Bourgogne.
    • They were to be laid down in 1941 & 1942 respectively, but my source doesn't have the planned completion dates.
    • The lead ship was to be built on the same slipway as Joffre and according to my source had priority over the aircraft carrier Painlevé which was on order from the same shipyard (A C de St-Nazaire-Penhoët).
    • The second ship was to be built in the new building dock at Brest Naval Dockyard.
• Cruisers
  • 1922 - Duguay Trouin, Lamotte-Piquet & Primaguet.
  • 1924 - Duquense & Tourville.
  • 1925 - Suffren & Pluton.
  • 1926 - Colbert.
  • 1927 - Foch.
  • 1928 - Dupleix.
  • 1929 - Jeanne d' Arc.
  • 1930 - Algérie & Emile Bertin
  • 1931 - La Galissonnière, Jean de Vienne
  • 1932 - Marseillaise, Glorie, Montcalm & Georges Leygues.
  • 1937 - De Grasse - When laid down (in November 1938) she was due to enter service in September 1942.
  • 1938 - Chateaurenault & Guichen.
    • Chateaurenault was planned to enter service in 1944.
    • The source didn't say when Guichen was planned to enter service, but my guess is 1944.
  • 1940 - 3 St Louis class Heavy Cruisers to replace the 3 Duguay Trouin class Light Cruisers in 1946.
• Destroyers.
  • DL are Contre-Torpilleurs.
    • 6 Chacal class - 1922 Programme.
    • 6 Guépard class - 1925 & 26 Programmes.
    • 6 Aigle class - 1927 Programme.
    • 6 Vauquelin class - 1928 Programme.
    • 6 La Fantasque class - 1930 Programme.
    • 18 Mogador class - 1932-40 Programmes.
  • DD are the Standard Destroyers.
    • 12 Bourrasque class - 1922 Programme.
    • 14 L'Adroit class - 1924-26 Programmes.
    • 28 Le Hardi class - 1932-40 Programmes.
  • DE are the Small Destroyers/Torpedo Boats.
    • 12 La Melpomène class - 1931 & 32 Programmes.
    • 14 Le Fier classes - 1937 & 38 Programmes.

That's fantastic, i was just thinking we need details for France and Italy programs too to complete the overview! The japanese wiki has great details for the japanese 1923 and 1927 programs, that is to complete your excellent IJN programs table on the previous page.
So if you have something similar for Italy too that would be awesome.

 

[Hood]

Just as an aside regarding intelligence on Japanese naval programmes, its worth noting the cover ships the IJN claimed they were building to hide the expenditure on the Yamatos:

2x additional B1 Type submarines - which would have taken the class total to 22
3x additional Kagero-class destroyers - which would have taken the class total to 22
2x additional Yugumo-class destroyers

 

[Hood]

1938 - Chateaurenault & Guichen.

• Chateaurenault was planned to enter service in 1944.
• The source didn't say when Guichen was planned to enter service, but my guess is 1944.

Chateaurenault was authorised in 1939, allocated to F&C La Seyne but never formally ordered before the events of May/June 1940.
Guichen was added under the 1938bis Programme, allocated to F&C de la Gironde, but again never formally ordered.

It took nearly a year before De Grasse was laid down following her order, most French light cruisers seem to take around four years to build on average. So De Grasse would be more likely to complete around 1944.
Assuming the second pair had their contracts issued later in 1940, laying down would probably be 1941 with completion in 1945 given realistic building times.

Painlevé hadn't been laid down before France fell and it looks like the 40,000 ton Battleship ordered from the same yard was given priority over her.

I've seen pre-internet claims that Painlevé had been laid down in 1939 (Roger Chesneau) but indeed these claims seem to be in error. Its tempting to speculate whether the yard was too eager and had begun preparations on the slipway before the Alsace was given priority.

The story of a third carrier is equally hazy - some accounts say it was approved in April 1940, others that approval was intended during 1940.

The destroyer programme seems to have degenerated into one of confusion. The four Improved Mogadors (3 added to the 1938 Programme in April 1939 and a fourth - to make up two divisions - in April 1940) were delayed by indecision over their main armament with arguments right up to the Fall of France in June. The planned completion was September 1942 (Marceau) to December 1943 (Hoche) (Kleber and Desaix would be within that period) - assuming they laid down during 1940 (the suspension was lifted in February but as I've said armament tussles would have gone on long into the summer).

The Le Hardi-class had been hampered by slow orders. The design taking from 1932 to August 1934 to complete. One was ordered in 1934, two in 1935, three in 1936, two in 1937 and three in 1938. the 1938bis Programme was to have included five but four were deleted for the Improved Mogadors. By 1940 only eight had launched, and were either still on trials or fitting out. The last four were never laid down - thought was given to completing them and three of the ships that were still building with 5.1in DP guns (a fourth ship would have 2x2 100mm instead).

The Le Fier approvals were: four in 1937, three in 1938 Programme, five under 1938bis and three under 1938c Programme in April 1939. Only 7 had been laid down by January 1940.

Submarines:
9 Requin-class - 6 1922 Programme, 3 1923 Programme
4 Sirene-class - 1922 Programme
4 Ariane-class - 1922 Programme
4 Circe-class - 1922 Programme
29 Redoubtable-class - 2 1924 Programme, 7 1925, 5 1926, 5 1927, 6 1928-29, 6 1930
6 Saphir-class - 2 1925 Programme, 1 per year 1926-29
Surcouf - 1926 Programme
5 Argonaute-class - 2 1926 Programme, 1 1927, 2 1929
9 Diane-class - 2 1926 Programme, 3 1927, 2 1928, 2 1929
2 Orion-class - 1928 Programme
6 Minerve-class - 4 1930 Programme, 2 1936 Programme
15 Aurore-class - 1 1934 Programme, 4 1937, 10 1938 (only Aurore completed by June1940, only 8 laid down)
13 Roland Morillot-class - 1 1934 Programme, 1 1937, 3 1938, 8 authorised 1940 (only 3 laid down by 1940)
4 Emeraude-class - 1 1937 Programme, 3 1938 (only 1 laid down by 1940)
13 Phenix-class - 1 1939 Programme, 12 authorised in 1940 (none laid down)

If we want to add escorts/sloops into the mix:
10 Bouganville-class - (3 planned as survey ships)
?x 1939 design - never ordered
14 Elan-class (minsweeper sloops)
15 Chamois-class (minesweeper sloops) - 3 1938 Programme, 12 1939
22 Flower-class (the UK design) - 4 1939 Programme, 18 joint UK-French production
4 Sans Souci-class (seaplane tenders)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm having a blond moment. I can't tell whether you're criticising me or supporting me.

1938 - Chateaurenault & Guichen.

• Chateaurenault was planned to enter service in 1944.
• The source didn't say when Guichen was planned to enter service, but my guess is 1944.

Chateaurenault was authorised in 1939, allocated to F&C La Seyne but never formally ordered before the events of May/June 1940.
Guichen was added under the 1938bis Programme, allocated to F&C de la Gironde, but again never formally ordered.

The book about French Cruisers that I read on Scribd said Chateaurenault was authorised on 31 December 1937 under the 1938 Estimates.

The first of the three cruisers, De Grasse, was authorised on 31 December 1936 under the 1937 tranche. The order was placed with the Lorient Naval Dockyard, and the ship was laid down on 28 August 1939, a few days before the outbreak of the Second World War; she was due to enter service in September 1942. The second ship, Châteaurenault, was authorised on 31 December 1937 under the 1938 Estimates and ordered from the private shipyard Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée, which had recently completed the 7600-ton cruiser Montcalm; her entry into service was projected for 1944. A third ship, Guichen, was authorised on 2 May 1938 under the supplementary 1938 bis Estimates, and was to have been built by Forges et Chantiers de la Gironde at Bordeaux, which had recently completed the Gloire.

Painlevé hadn't been laid down before France fell and it looks like the 40,000 ton Battleship ordered from the same yard was given priority over her.

I've seen pre-internet claims that Painlevé had been laid down in 1939 (Roger Chesneau) but indeed these claims seem to be in error. Its tempting to speculate whether the yard was too eager and had begun preparations on the slipway before the Alsace was given priority.

The book on Scribd about French Battleships said.

Two battleships of 40,000 tons were duly authorised on 1 April 1940. The first was to be laid down on the Penhoët No. 1 slipway following the launch of the carrier Joffre in 1941;⁸ the second in the new building dock at Brest Naval Dockyard before the end of 1942. All materials for their construction were to have been ordered in mid-1940, and an EMG note of 15 May 1940 proposed two names from Alsace, Normandie, Flandre and Bourgogne, to be chosen by the Navy Minister. These plans were to come to nothing when the French Army collapsed in June 1940, and the latter month effectively marked the end of the French battleship programme, which had begun with the laying down of Dunkerque in December 1932.

⁸ This, however, raises the question of where the second carrier, Painlevé, would have been built. For the Marine Nationale, the battleship clearly had priority over the carrier.

The story of a third carrier is equally hazy - some accounts say it was approved in April 1940, others that approval was intended during 1940.

For what it's worth it's not mentioned in this quote from the book about French Cruisers on Scribd.

Saint Louis

Following the outbreak of the Second World War, construction of all ships not able to be completed in the short term was suspended, and the naval programme was reviewed. Note 162 FMF 3, dated 23 January 1940, authorised a new study for a cruiser with a standard displacement of 13,000 tons, and three of these ships featured in a decree dated 1 April 1940. Besides the new cruisers, the programme was to comprise two new battleships of 40,000 tons, ³ a light cruiser, six contre-torpilleurs, sixteen destroyers (torpilleurs) and six submarines. In a later modification to the programme dated 27 May (i.e. just before the collapse of the French Army which preceded the Armistice) the single light cruiser was deleted in favour of six more contre-torpilleurs. In the meantime the displacement of the proposed heavy cruisers had grown to 14,770 tons standard – remarkably close to that of the German Admiral Hipper class as completed. ⁴

The destroyer programme seems to have degenerated into one of confusion. The four Improved Mogadors (3 added to the 1938 Programme in April 1939 and a fourth - to make up two divisions - in April 1940) were delayed by indecision over their main armament with arguments right up to the Fall of France in June. The planned completion was September 1942 (Marceau) to December 1943 (Hoche) (Kleber and Desaix would be within that period) - assuming they laid down during 1940 (the suspension was lifted in February but as I've said armament tussles would have gone on long into the summer).

The Le Hardi-class had been hampered by slow orders. The design taking from 1932 to August 1934 to complete. One was ordered in 1934, two in 1935, three in 1936, two in 1937 and three in 1938. the 1938bis Programme was to have included five but four were deleted for the Improved Mogadors. By 1940 only eight had launched, and were either still on trials or fitting out. The last four were never laid down - thought was given to completing them and three of the ships that were still building with 5.1in DP guns (a fourth ship would have 2x2 100mm instead).

The Le Fier approvals were: four in 1937, three in 1938 Programme, five under 1938bis and three under 1938c Programme in April 1939. Only 7 had been laid down by January 1940.

That corresponds to my table to 1938. The 12 Contre-Torpilleurs and 16 "normal" Destroyers in 1940 came from this paragraph on the book on French Cruisers on Scribd.

Saint Louis

Following the outbreak of the Second World War, construction of all ships not able to be completed in the short term was suspended, and the naval programme was reviewed. Note 162 FMF 3, dated 23 January 1940, authorised a new study for a cruiser with a standard displacement of 13,000 tons, and three of these ships featured in a decree dated 1 April 1940. Besides the new cruisers, the programme was to comprise two new battleships of 40,000 tons, ³ a light cruiser, six contre-torpilleurs, sixteen destroyers (torpilleurs) and six submarines. In a later modification to the programme dated 27 May (i.e. just before the collapse of the French Army which preceded the Armistice) the single light cruiser was deleted in favour of six more contre-torpilleurs. In the meantime the displacement of the proposed heavy cruisers had grown to 14,770 tons standard – remarkably close to that of the German Admiral Hipper class as completed. ⁴

Submarines:

9 Requin-class - 6 1922 Programme, 3 1923 Programme
4 Sirene-class - 1922 Programme
4 Ariane-class - 1922 Programme
4 Circe-class - 1922 Programme
29 Redoubtable-class - 2 1924 Programme, 7 1925, 5 1926, 5 1927, 6 1928-29, 6 1930
6 Saphir-class - 2 1925 Programme, 1 per year 1926-29
Surcouf - 1926 Programme
5 Argonaute-class - 2 1926 Programme, 1 1927, 2 1929
9 Diane-class - 2 1926 Programme, 3 1927, 2 1928, 2 1929
2 Orion-class - 1928 Programme
6 Minerve-class - 4 1930 Programme, 2 1936 Programme
15 Aurore-class - 1 1934 Programme, 4 1937, 10 1938 (only Aurore completed by June1940, only 8 laid down)
13 Roland Morillot-class - 1 1934 Programme, 1 1937, 3 1938, 8 authorised 1940 (only 3 laid down by 1940)
4 Emeraude-class - 1 1937 Programme, 3 1938 (only 1 laid down by 1940)
13 Phenix-class - 1 1939 Programme, 12 authorised in 1940 (none laid down)

I have to finish the housework so I don't have time to check that against my list of French Submarines, but I've got 6 submarines authorised in 1940 from my quote above and it doesn't say what the class would have been.

If we want to add escorts/sloops into the mix:

10 Bouganville-class - (3 planned as survey ships)
?x 1939 design - never ordered
14 Elan-class (minsweeper sloops)
15 Chamois-class (minesweeper sloops) - 3 1938 Programme, 12 1939
22 Flower-class (the UK design) - 4 1939 Programme, 18 joint UK-French production
4 Sans Souci-class (seaplane tenders)

Due to the time and effort that went into writing Post 69 you're using the "royal we".

 

[Hood]

I'm having a blond moment. I can't tell whether you're criticising me or supporting me.

Just adding some additional information that's all. Certainly not criticising your research work.

Again, on the De Grasse cruisers I'm probably using older refs that have been superseded by newer texts and research. I presume the Scribd books you're referring to are by John Jordan? If so, I'd back them as being more accurate than the 1990s texts I'm looking at.
But it does show how 'woolly' understanding is of the French programmes around 1938 - whether that reflects a lack of research during the 80s and 90s or whether its just because things really were muddled on the ground in those hectic years I'm not sure.

My impression is that the 1938bis Programme is the rearmament programme once it was clear war was coming. 1938c Programme in April 1939 seems to be the panic programme for smaller vessels. The April 1940 approvals tend to be bigger warships. These programmes probably skewed the pre-war plans slightly, certainly the backlog of construction would have stretched well into 1941-43. The Improved Mogador/Le Hardi armament crisis was brought about by Spanish Civil War lessons so that was quite commendable quick responses in terms of improving AA defences even if it meant recasting the ship designs to some extent.

I have to finish the housework so I don't have time to check that against my list of French Submarines, but I've got 6 submarines authorised in 1940 from my quote above and it doesn't say what the class would have been.

Comes from Conway 1922-46, so caveats on that I know (Conway isn't always the most reliable source) but should be broadly accurate.

Due to the time and effort that went into writing Post 69 you're using the "royal we".

Not really. I wasn't sure if the author and followers of this thread were specifically interested in Treaty-limited warships or all construction during that period. These aren't treaty limited so less relevant perhaps but they show that other larger ships were being built in the period. France seems to have been latecomers to building adequate colonial sloops and other escorts, waiting until the late 1930s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

My gut feeling is that the KGVs will have a larger displacement with twelve 14in, nine 15in or nine 16" with the same (or better) scale of protection as the KGVs as built. The nine 16in gun ship will effectively be the Lion class built 2 years earlier.

Anson & Howe will not be cancelled.

It almost adds up to the same thing, but you make a good point.

A different route to the same result. Fair enough.

I've done some more thinking about this and come to the conclusion that the if there's a total breakdown of the Treaty System or at least a less restrictive 2nd LNT, i.e. one that allows Capital Ships to displace 45,000 tons and be armed with 16in guns from 1st January 1937 instead of 35,000 tons and 14in guns the North Carolina & South Dakota classes of the "Real World" will be additional units of the Iowa class in this "Version of History". Wishful thinking makes me want 3 additional Iowas to be laid down instead of the Alaska class so that a grand total of 15 Iowas would be laid down and 12 would be completed. However, that's probably a wish too far.

Meanwhile, with the British I think the ALT-King George V class would be armed with sixteen 14in guns in four quadruple turrets or twelve 15in guns in four triple turrets rather than being built as Real-Lion class with nine 16in guns in three triple turrets. That's because as I understand it the "Top Brass" of the Royal Navy at that time thought the maximum possible number of hits was better than a smaller number of heavier hits.

Wishful thinking also wants the ALT-King George V class (and all subsequent capital ship designs) to be armed with twenty 4.5in in ten twin turrets in place of sixteen 5.25in in eight twin turrets. That's not a reflection on the quality of the gun and its mounting, it's because I want fewer gun calibres & gun mountings to ease the production & logistical burdens.

On Alternatehistory.com when British Capital Ship construction in the 1930s is discussed a "Treaty Vanguard" is suggested, i.e. a reduced version of the Real-Vanguard that fits the 35,000 ton displacement limit. It's not something that I would do, but in this "Version of History" it would be possible to build Real-Vanguards in the second half of the 1930s. Yes it would avoid having to build new main gun turrets, but the existing turrets would have to be refurbished (as Vanguard's turrets were) plus it would still be necessary to manufacture the machinery, fire control equipment, secondary & tertiary armaments, armour & structural steel, plus the labour to put them together and a slipways to build them on.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth I think a one-to-one substitution of Edinburgh class cruisers for the Colony class and its successors would have been easy.

Looking through Friedman again, offers some hints at what might have been had Second London not been agreed at all.

I've given this some more thought.

Part One

I think that all 11 Edinburghs that I think will be built instead of the 11 Colonies would have twelve 6in in four triple turrets. This is because Belfast kept all four of her 6in turrets and lost two of her six twin 4in AA gun mountings.

My gut feeling is that the 3 Edinburgh class built instead of the Swiftsure class with will have twelve 6in in four triple turrets too. However, if they only have nine 6in in three triple turrets like the Real-Swiftsures that would be to allow a secondary armament of ten 4.5in in five twin Mk III mountings (as fitted to Ark Royal) instead of the ten 4in in five twin mountings that the Real-Swiftsures had.

In common with the "Real World" there'd be design studies for converting the ALT-Colony & ALT-Swiftsure classes to Guided Missile Cruisers armed with Seaslug. However, as they used the larger Edinburgh class hull they would be able to carry more missiles and more of the original gun armament could be retained. Or the Type the 984 radar with CDS & DPT could be fitted instead of keeping more of the original gun armament. However, I think that none of the ships would be converted as the "powers that be" would decide that new Guided Missile Cruisers were more cost-effective.

Which brings me to the ALT-Tiger class. I think the larger hull would allow a sixth gun turret as follows:

• Three twin 6in in A, B & Y positions and three twin 3in in P, S & Y positions.
  • Or.
• Two twin 6in in A & Y positions and four twin 3in in B, P, S & X positions.
• The larger hull might also allow the Type 984 radar with CDS & DPT to be fitted as well.
  • Or.
• If it's a choice between the sixth turret and Type 984 the sixth turret would be sacrificed in favour of the Type 984 radar.

They would cost more to complete and require a larger crew, but I think the capability of the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT justifies it and they'd be kept in service in their original form for longer in this "version of history" in spite of requiring an even larger crew than the Real-Tiger class. E.g. the money spend on converting 4 Battle class Destroyers to Fleet Pickets 1958-62 might be spent on fitting the Type 984, CDS & DPT to the ALT-Tigers and the manpower released would be used to help keep the ALT-Tigers in service.

Although I'm not a fan of the Helicopter Cruiser version of the Real-Tiger class the ALT version might have a larger hangar that could accommodate 6 helicopters instead of the 4 carried by the Real-Tiger class plus the conversion may not cost significantly more or take longer to complete. I also want the Type 984 radar to be retained and CDS replaced by the version of ADAWS that was to be fitted to CVA.01 although the latter would increase the cost significantly.

Another gut feeling is that Hawke, the Swiftsure class cruiser that was cancelled at the end of the war and scrapped on the slipway in the "Real World" will be launched and laid up with Blake, Lion & Tiger and like them be completed as an ALT-Tiger class ship 1954-circa 1960.

Similarly, I think the refit of Swiftsure that was begun in 1956 and abandoned in 1960 in the "Real World" will be completed in the early 1960s in this "version of history" as she'd be refitted to ALT-Tiger standard with the Type 984, CDS & DPT as well as the new gun armament and that will make completing the refit worthwhile in spite of the extra cost. I also think that Superb would be rebuilt to ALT-Tiger standard in the late 1950s too.

That means there'd be 6 ALT-Tigers in service in the early 1960s putting 6 extra Type 984 radars to sea for a total of 9 when Eagle completed her 1959-64 refit. It would also put another 6 full-size CDS systems to sea for a total of 8 plus the ADA system on Eagle.

However, this probably means that Belfast doesn't have her big refit of the 1950s and the refit of Superb to ALT-Tiger standard takes its place. As I understand it the plan was to remove the triple 6in turrets and replace them with twin 6in Mk 26 turrets but this was not done. As I also understand it the Admiralty also wanted to replace the twin 4 in mountings with some twin 3in turrets, but it wasn't possible due to how the ship was designed. Therefore, I think Superb takes her place because she is newer, and because she was built to a development of the Edinburgh class design can take the same number of Mk 26 turrets and the twin 3in turret.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm having a blond moment. I can't tell whether you're criticising me or supporting me.

Just adding some additional information that's all. Certainly not criticising your research work.

No problem. Thank you for clarifying.

Again, on the De Grasse cruisers I'm probably using older refs that have been superseded by newer texts and research. I presume the Scribd books you're referring to are by John Jordan? If so, I'd back them as being more accurate than the 1990s texts I'm looking at.

Yes I was referring to his books.

But it does show how 'woolly' understanding is of the French programmes around 1938 - whether that reflects a lack of research during the 80s and 90s or whether its just because things really were muddled on the ground in those hectic years I'm not sure.

I wouldn't be surprised if it was a bit of both.

My impression is that the 1938bis Programme is the rearmament programme once it was clear war was coming. 1938c Programme in April 1939 seems to be the panic programme for smaller vessels. The April 1940 approvals tend to be bigger warships. These programmes probably skewed the pre-war plans slightly, certainly the backlog of construction would have stretched well into 1941-43. The Improved Mogador/Le Hardi armament crisis was brought about by Spanish Civil War lessons so that was quite commendable quick responses in terms of improving AA defences even if it meant recasting the ship designs to some extent.

That sounds rather plausible.

However, I also get the impression from John Jordan's books on Scribd that French naval shipbuilding in the 1930s was handicapped by inadequate infrastructure. In addition to being a problem for the Aircraft Carriers and Capital Ships it was also why construction of the Le Hardi class didn't begin until the second half of the 1930s. I think it might have been why only 2 Mogador class were built when French destroyers operated in divisions of 3. However, I didn't check the book first. This is why I think France wouldn't be able to build more warships from December 1934 even if they wanted to.

I have to finish the housework so I don't have time to check that against my list of French Submarines, but I've got 6 submarines authorised in 1940 from my quote above and it doesn't say what the class would have been.

Comes from Conway 1922-46, so caveats on that I know (Conway isn't always the most reliable source) but should be broadly accurate.

Conway's isn't immune from typos either. My copy says Jean Bart was laid down in January 1939.

Due to the time and effort that went into writing Post 69 you're using the "royal we".

Not really. I wasn't sure if the author and followers of this thread were specifically interested in Treaty-limited warships or all construction during that period. These aren't treaty limited so less relevant perhaps but they show that other larger ships were being built in the period. France seems to have been latecomers to building adequate colonial sloops and other escorts, waiting until the late 1930s.

No problem and no offence meant.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth I think a one-to-one substitution of Edinburgh class cruisers for the Colony class and its successors would have been easy.

Looking through Friedman again, offers some hints at what might have been had Second London not been agreed at all.

I've given this some more thought.

Part Two

In the "Real World" a mix of 8,500 ton Colony class (but they were intended to displace 8,000 tons) and 5,600 ton Dido class was built after the Edinburgh class.

I've already written that I think they'd continue to build Edinburgh class instead of the Colony class and its successors if there was no 2nd LNT or a less restrictive Treaty retained the 10,000 ton limit for Cruisers in the previous Treaties. Now I think that they'd also build another 16 Amphion class Cruisers of 7,000 tons instead of the 16 Dido class.

Yes, they displace 25% more and have machinery that was 16% more powerful. However, as I understand it there was the capacity to build the larger hulls & more powerful machinery and it was the industrial capacity to produce armour, fire control gear, guns & gun-mountings in the quantities required that handicapped naval rearmament in the second half of the 1930s.

• The Amphion class had more armour than the Dido class, but the armour supply situation had greatly eased off by 1939 and shortages elsewhere (above all in gun mountings and fire control gear) was delaying the construction of new ships just as much if not more than the shortage of armour (according to the Official History on British War Production) so their completion aught not to be delayed on that account.
• The Amphions & Didos were provided with the same scales of fire control equipment so 16 Amphions instead of 16 Didos won't require the production of more fire control equipment.
• It aught to be easier to supply the main armament. The Amphions had eight 6in guns in four twin turrets and the first 11 Didos were to have ten 5.25in guns in five twin turrets.
  • So that's 88 guns and 44 turrets for 11 Amphions against 110 guns and 55 turrets for 11 Didos.
  • Furthermore, the guns & turrets for the Amphions were existing designs already in production and the guns & turrets for the Dido class weren't.
  • In the "Real World" Bonaventure, Dido & Phoebe had to be completed with 4 turrets instead of 5 due to supply difficulties while Charybdis & Scylla had to be completed with eight 4.5in DP gun in four twin Mk III mountings for the same reason.
  • I think the supply of twin 6in turrets would be sufficient to allow all 11 Amphions built in place of the first 11 Didos to be completed with four twin 6in turrets each on the same dates as the 11 Dido class they were built instead of.
  • Although, the Amphion class carried 20% fewer main guns than the Dido class the rate of fire of the guns was the same and the 6in guns fired heavier ammunition and only 6 of the 11 were completed with ten 5.25in guns in any case.
• The Amphions had a secondary armament of eight 4in in four twin mountings and supplying them will require more production capacity.
  • That's also fewer guns firing lighter ammunition than the ten 5.25 in guns on the first 11 Didos when firing in the AA role, but that would be offset by the eight 4in guns having 2.5 times the rate of fire.
  • Plus only 6 out of the first 11 Didos were actually completed with ten 5.25in guns.
  • As already related 3 were completed with eight 5.25in guns and 2 were completed with eight 4.5in guns.

Another reason why I want to build 16 Amphions instead of the 16 Didos is to eliminate the 5.25in gun & its turret to simplify gun & mounting production and ammunition supply. That's also why all the new Capital Ships in this "version of history" have twenty 4.5in guns in ten twin turrets instead of sixteen 5.25in guns in eight twin turrets. However, this is something that I want to happen rather than something that I think will happen because of a complete breakdown of the Treaty System at the end of 1934.