What if: RAF 240 bomber fleet in the 1950s

[zen]

What I would say is, the whole concept of trading deaths, limited exchange, is predicated on both control and the assumption both sides play by this 'game'.
In the end it's a mindset that makes actual use more likely.
But massive retaliation turns this into Nuclear Poker and places both sides into a mindset that looks to avoid any use.

 

[JFC Fuller]

This would of course explain limited survivability of the UK's deterrent forces: they weren't intended to face a meaningful attack.

The V-Force/Bomber Command was very much designed to survive, at least in part, a meaningful attack by the force that was envisaged as the primary threat to it in the early 1950s, Soviet Long Range Aviation with Tu-4, Tu-95, M-4 and later M-50 and Tu-22. A fully dispersed V-force, at 60 bases in the 240 aircraft configuration, would have presented a challenging target system to begin with. This was to be covered by Fighter Command with 18 day fighter and 18 all-weather fighter squadrons at a 16 aircraft unit establishment each (Plan L 1955) in addition to ground based defences to ultimately include SAGW (the stage plan), all under GCI through the ROTOR system. Once dispersed, force readiness could be held at 15 minutes, this could be raised for five hour periods to Readiness 05 (crews in cockpits, 5 minutes to takeoff) and a further step-up would take it to 2 minutes readiness. The force could launch almost simultaneously and crews were trained to takeoff in close proximity, even banking in different directions to avoid turbulence from preceding aircraft.

It is true that the technical development of the force's weapons lagged behind the ambition but that does not change the design intent. The, perceived, extensive deployment of IRBMs by the Soviet Union obviously changed the nature of the threat, decreasing the warning time and massively reducing the defensive value of Fighter Command. However, the emphasis on providing silos for Blue Streak and the brief studies into ABM technologies in the late 1950s again demonstrate a clear intent for a survivable deterrent.

Skybolt as the singular means of providing the UK strategic deterrent is the one deviation from this approach, as Hood pointed out, though HMG seems to have wilfully deluded itself into believing that V-bombers armed with Skybolt on QRA would be less vulnerable than Blue Streaks in silos. The explanation for this is parsimony and institutional inertia. The parsimony being the relative cheapness of Skybolt and the institutional inertia being that Skybolt had been on the RAF and Air Ministry's radar since late 1958 as a possible alternative to Blue Steel Mk.II. One might suggest that the adoption of Skybolt was really the retention of a V-bomber carried stand-off weapon in the Defence programme rather than a switch from Blue Streak to something new. It also had the positive side effect of avoiding, or at least postponing, a massive row with the RAF over deterrent ownership by switching to Polaris.

 

[CNH]

Why bother having 240 bombers when we only had 58 Blue Danubes?

 

[Yellow Palace]

One might suggest that the adoption of Skybolt was really the retention of a V-bomber carried stand-off weapon in the Defence programme rather than a switch from Blue Streak to something new.

I've always found it interesting that the USAF viewed Skybolt as a penetration aid for its' bombers, whilst the RAF viewed it as their primary weapon.

Why bother having 240 bombers when we only had 58 Blue Danubes?

Equally, why bother having bombs we couldn't deliver? I'm not 100% clear on the limiting factor for Blue Danube production, but there were certainly various unimplemented options (Windscale Pile #3, Chapelcross reactors 5-8, military fuel cycles at Hinkley Point, Trawsfynydd and Dungeness) to increase availability of fissile material.

 

[Archibald]

In the case of Windscale, the horrific 1957 fire that poisoned the neighborough with nucleides, certainly did not helped, at all...

 

[CNH]

The only contaminant was iodine 131, which has a half life of 8 days.

 

[Yellow Palace]

In the case of Windscale, the horrific 1957 fire that poisoned the neighborough with nucleides, certainly did not helped, at all...

The decision not to proceed with a third pile was made in 1949, well before the 1957 fire.

 

[alertken]

SLL #42: Blue Streak, Thor; Blue Steel, Skybolt.

Because we know what happened tomorrow, we forget how challenging it must have been to have been MoD Duncan Sandys, 1957-59. Operational sovereignty was then just as large an issue as today, so his Party stressed "independence" - UK National Retaliatory War Plan, even while integrating MBF into US SIOP and Saceur's Strike Plans. His negotiations of GW and of AW Agreements with US were economically and militarily profoundly important.

So by late-58 we had digested Mk.28 and could Anglicise it as Red Snow, lighter, smaller than designed warheads for Blue Streak, Blue Steel, Yellow Sun.
Sandys had Agreed to buy 60 each Mk.2 Vulcan/Victor (5/3/57); to jointly-man Thor IRBM (22/2/58); to terminate UK-solo Yellow Sun Mk.1 to substitute (Mk.28) YS Mk.2 asap (done wef 5/61); and to increase R&D spend to extend Blue Steel W.105's 100nm to Mk.2/W.114's 600 nm. But: "few (projects caused) such bitter feelings (even in) 1956 (Avro puffed 1,000n.m.: if they) could not perfect (100n.m.) how could they (do 1,000? Wpns.Res. Div., 6 ex-RAE staff) weak mngt.structure (criticisms) recriminations” MoA/A.M, '60/1,Wynn,P202/4. Much the same was said of DH on Blue Streak (CNH,Vertical,P107).
As late as 7/7/63, bereft of Skybolt, AOC/BC, AM Sir K.Cross wailed: “so many basic (Blue Steel faults) doubtful they can be overcome” Moore/Ill,P213.

Surface-sited Blue Streak would do nothing from 1963-ish that Thor would not do from 1960-ish. How sovereign would it be with a US-derived warhead on a US-derived INS in a US-derived airframe in an RV at least US-"influenced", blasted aloft on US-derived propulsion? If silo-sited and charged to a constant Defence Budget, it would unemploy a generation of aircrew. If we thought US would silo-site (or mobile shell-game) its ICBMs, and if we believed in all-for-one NATO Policy...Blue Streak should have been chopped the day we Agreed Thor.

Sandys abandoned Blue Steel Mk.2 12/59 in hope Avro might attend to doing Mk.1 this century. (At MoA he initiated) Mk.1 order 15/12/60 for 36 Vulcan, 24 Victor intending them to be very transient, because UK had Agreed Skybolt, 6/6/60: of course we did: USAF planned 1,000 of them, so it would surely work. On that day only MoD Watkinson showed interest in SSBN/Polaris R.Moore,Nuc.Illusion,P.76. Skybolt was to be 1000nm on a recallable Force, multi-targetted. USS George Washington went on patrol 15/11/60 with Polaris A-1, maybe 1,400nm, challenges of communication v. (un)detection yet to be resolved. It was just one platform in the triad. (It was as 1961 unfolded that Zuckerman, then Mountbatten, then others detected SSBN invulnerability, but then JFK became confused about AW Proliferation, FRG fingers-on-trigger, France...no chance he would give UK as special a deal as Ike/Skybolt).

UK PM Mac by then was disposed to let RAF burn up the fatigue life of Vulcan/Victor with Skybolt to c.1970, maybe then to extend on a less expensive, longer endurance platform (see CJGibson's pofflers), then to let this notion of thermonuclear sovereignty lapse for the nonsense he knew it to be. M.Jones,UK Strat.Nuc.Det./1,P199: 24/2/60: Cabinet Def.Committee agrees: “no military case for a deterrent which could be used in a unilateral fashion (v.USSR)”.

 

[zen]

So the Active Measures continue?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to National Archives file AIR20/8712 the plan at the end of June 1952 was for a force of 304 V-bombers in 38 squadrons of 8 by the end of December 1957. They would consist of 112 Valiants (Mks 1 and 2) in 14 squadrons, 112 Vulcans in 14 squadrons and 80 Victors in 10 squadrons. There would also be 16 Valiant Mk2s in 2 long range photographic squadrons (LRPR) with 8 aircraft each by the end of December 1956.

See below.

 

[Hood]

Given the date of the Plan, I am surprised that there is no mention of the Valiant B.2 and Canberra B.5 for the pathfinder force.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This should have been part of Post 50.

The Valiant B Mk 1 was expected to enter service by the end of June 1954, but No. 138 Squadron wasn't reformed on the type until 1st January 1955 so it entered service about 6 months later than anticipated.

There was to be a flight of 4 LRPR Valiants by the end of September 1954 and a full squadron of 8 aircraft by the end of March 1955. No. 543 Squadron reformed on 1st April 1955.

There as to be a flight of 4 Vulcans by the end of March 1956 and 12 aircraft in 1½ squadrons by the end of June 1956. No. 83 Squadron reformed on 21st May 1957.

There as to be a flight of 4 Victors by the end of March 1956 and 12 aircraft in 1½ squadrons by the end of June 1956. No 10 Squadron reformed on 15th April 1958.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Given the date of the Plan, I am surprised that there is no mention of the Valiant B.2 and Canberra B.5 for the pathfinder force.

There are two mentions of the Valiant Mk 2. The 14 medium bombers squadrons to be formed on Valiants were to be a mix of Mks 1 and 2, but not does not say what the mix of them were to be. The other is that there were to be 2 Valiant PR squadrons equipped with the Mk 2.

However, as the note at the bottom of the chart says, the Valiant Mk 1 and Mk 2 PR squadrons have a line drawn through them and there is a handwritten note saying that that both Valiant PR squadrons would be equipped with the Mk 1. There's no corresponding amendment to the Valiant medium bombers in the chart. All I can guess is that they didn't cross the 2 out where it says Valiant B.1/2 to read Valiant B.1 OR they decided to have an extra Mk 1 LRPR squadron and an extra Valiant medium bomber squadron.

2 prototype and 15 production Mk 2 Valiants were ordered. However, strictly speaking only the second prototype was cancelled. The production aircraft were built, but the contract was amended so that they were completed as additional Mk 1s.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Given the date of the Plan, I am surprised that there is no mention of the Valiant B.2 and Canberra B.5 for the pathfinder force.

The Pathfinder Force had been renamed the Target Marker Force.

The table shows 2 squadrons of Mosquito B Mk 35 in this role at the end of June 1952 which were to convert to the Canberra B Mk 2 by December 1952. However, both squadrons were to be disbanded by the end of September 1956. This document doesn't say so but later documents of this type say that the Target Marker role was to be a secondary task of two of the Canberra light bomber squadrons.

I think that the plan at June 1952 was to send all the Canberra Mk 5s to RAF Germany, which at this point was still called the Second Tactical Air Force.

Page 5 which has the squadron patterns for RAFG on it says that there were to be 96 night intruders in 6 squadrons of 16. The first 2 squadrons were to be formed in the second quarter of 1954 and the full force of 6 squadrons would be formed by the end of June 1955. However, the table says that the squadrons would have Balliols, which I think is a mistake and it is a typo for the Canberra.

I think it's a mistake because the line is crossed out and replaced by 48 Canberra B Mk 2 in 3 squadrons of 16. The first squadron was to be formed by 30th June 1954 and the full force of 3 squadrons would be ready by 30th September 1954.

 

[alertken]

Instead of B.5 we sent 4xB.2 Sqdns to Gutersloh, 9/54-8/56, replaced by B.(I).6/8, all SACEUR-assigned for his Scheduled Strike Program (fixed targets), all HE-armed until US Project E Mk.7s were loaded wef 15/9/60.

Mindset.

We should be so grateful that we (here, commentators) did not carry these burdens. 240 (320, what you will) Medium Bombers-with-useful-Bombs arose from an HE-mindset: lots ot targets, lots of attrition, lots of misses, lots of bombs. It took until 1955-ish for all to realise that Big Bombs meant Big Cost, so Force must be small but beautifully formed. We could only afford that, if at all, in close collaboration with Allies. One in DC paid 50% of the Unit cost (not ownership-for-a-decade) of 104 Valiants (and contributed to the production cost of 768 RAF Canberras). Sandys tried to extract similar largesse for Vulcan and Victor: failing, Ministers had to choose: a modest force of Mediums, plus presence in Tactical and East of Suez, or more of one, less or none of other(s).

We tried of course to do some of everything. Trying ditto broke USSR. We had garrisons and warships in Jamaica and Trinidad into 1962; 5-crew Mediums were all-Regular, all-Officer, all £1,000-a-year men (+ lustrous pension) in mid-50s when average earnings were...less.

The Wonder is not that we never did 240 Front-Line Mediums, but that we coped as long as we did, as well as we did.

 

[Yellow Palace]

According to National Archives file AIR20/8712 the plan at the end of June 1952 was for a force of 304 V-bombers in 38 squadrons of 8 by the end of December 1957

That's a lot of bombers. And it's a lot of bombers very quickly – in reality, of course, the first Victor squadron wasn't formed until April 1958!

I suspect this is the reason why two B.35/46 types were ordered – one firm alone couldn't build the anticipated numbers quickly enough. The orders for both types persisted longer than justified on those grounds, presumably due to institutional inertia and political considerations.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to National Archives file AIR20/8712 the plan at the end of June 1952 was for a force of 304 V-bombers in 38 squadrons of 8 by the end of December 1957

That's a lot of bombers. And it's a lot of bombers very quickly – in reality, of course, the first Victor squadron wasn't formed until April 1958!

I suspect this is the reason why two B.35/46 types were ordered – one firm alone couldn't build the anticipated numbers quickly enough. The orders for both types persisted longer than justified on those grounds, presumably due to institutional inertia and political considerations.

None of the V-bombers entered service on time. This is Post 52.

This should have been part of Post 50.

The Valiant B Mk 1 was expected to enter service by the end of June 1954, but No. 138 Squadron wasn't reformed on the type until 1st January 1955 so it entered service about 6 months later than anticipated.

There was to be a flight of 4 LRPR Valiants by the end of September 1954 and a full squadron of 8 aircraft by the end of March 1955. No. 543 Squadron reformed on 1st April 1955.

There as to be a flight of 4 Vulcans by the end of March 1956 and 12 aircraft in 1½ squadrons by the end of June 1956. No. 83 Squadron reformed on 21st May 1957.

There as to be a flight of 4 Victors by the end of March 1956 and 12 aircraft in 1½ squadrons by the end of June 1956. No 10 Squadron reformed on 15th April 1958.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to National Archives file AIR20/8712 the plan at the end of June 1952 was for a force of 304 V-bombers in 38 squadrons of 8 by the end of December 1957

That's a lot of bombers. And it's a lot of bombers very quickly – in reality, of course, the first Victor squadron wasn't formed until April 1958!

I suspect this is the reason why two B.35/46 types were ordered – one firm alone couldn't build the anticipated numbers quickly enough. The orders for both types persisted longer than justified on those grounds, presumably due to institutional inertia and political considerations.

As far as I know the intention was to order one of the B.35/46 aircraft into production after the prototypes had been evaluated. But instead of all of them being build by Avro or Handley Page my suspicion is that the production would be divided among a number of factories as other types were being built by more than one firm at that time. For example:

• The Canberra was built by Avro, Handley Page and Short Brothers as well as English Electric;
• The Javelin was built by Armstrong Whitworth as well as Gloster;
• The Hunter was built by Armstrong Whitworth as well as two Hawker factories;
• The Swift was to have been built by Short Brothers as well as Supermarine.

I don't know, but my suspicion is that the Korean War led to that plan being abandoned and both types being ordered into production to get an aircraft that met the B35/46 specification into service as soon as possible by cutting out the evaluation of the prototypes stage.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Given the date of the Plan, I am surprised that there is no mention of the Valiant B.2 and Canberra B.5 for the pathfinder force.

This is from National Archives Document AIR 20/7409 for Bomber Command in Plan H, which was the RAF's part of the 1951 Rearmament Plan.



The table in Post 50 was made from a full-size photocopy of the original document. This table has been constructed from some handwritten notes. I didn't record the date of the original document, but my guess is that it was produced in the third quarter of 1951 because it covers the period from 30th September 1951 to 31st March 1956.

The original document didn't say how many aircraft each squadron would have, but according to other documents that I have for the 1950s medium bomber and PR squadrons normally had 8 aircraft per squadron while light bomber an target marker squadrons normally had 10 aircraft per squadron.

The Canberra B.22/48 is the B Mk 5 because it was designed to meet Specification B.22/48. Therefore, at the time this document was produced the Canberra Mk 5 was to replace the Mosquito in the target marker force in the middle of 1953.

The B.9/48 is the Valiant B Mk 1 because it was designed to meet Specification B.9/48. The Mk 2 was designed to meet Specification B.104. I don't know whether the B.9/48 squadrons in the chart included any Valiant Mk 2 squadrons. However, the chart in Post 50 doesn't separate them.

Edit
The other documents that I have on Plan H say that the Canberra light bombers squadrons assigned to SHAPE were to be based in Germany and not be part of Bomber Command.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Instead of B.5 we sent 4xB.2 Sqdns to Gutersloh, 9/54-8/56, replaced by B.(I).6/8, all SACEUR-assigned for his Scheduled Strike Program (fixed targets), all HE-armed until US Project E Mk.7s were loaded wef 15/9/60.

Mindset.

We should be so grateful that we (here, commentators) did not carry these burdens. 240 (320, what you will) Medium Bombers-with-useful-Bombs arose from an HE-mindset: lots of targets, lots of attrition, lots of misses, lots of bombs. It took until 1955-ish for all to realise that Big Bombs meant Big Cost, so Force must be small but beautifully formed. We could only afford that, if at all, in close collaboration with Allies. One in DC paid 50% of the Unit cost (not ownership-for-a-decade) of 104 Valiants (and contributed to the production cost of 768 RAF Canberras). Sandys tried to extract similar largesse for Vulcan and Victor: failing, Ministers had to choose: a modest force of Mediums, plus presence in Tactical and East of Suez, or more of one, less or none of other(s).

We tried of course to do some of everything. Trying ditto broke USSR. We had garrisons and warships in Jamaica and Trinidad into 1962; 5-crew Mediums were all-Regular, all-Officer, all £1,000-a-year men (+ lustrous pension) in mid-50s when average earnings were...less.

The Wonder is not that we never did 240 Front-Line Mediums, but that we coped as long as we did, as well as we did.

You haven't read anything yet!

This is from National Archives File AIR20/8712/31265. In common with the document in Post 50 it's dated 30th June 1952. The last 5 columns weren't in the original document. I added them to show the differences between the 3 plans at March 1955.



3,600 first-line aircraft in March 1955 under Plan H, with "only" 3,359 and 2,707 at that date under Extended Plan H and Plan J respectively.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

DROPSHOT was produced in 1949; some measure of the plan can be judged from the fact that it projected that the Royal Navy would have eighteen aircraft carriers, five battleships and two monitors, and that the British Army could be brought up to 30 divisions within 1 year of war breaking out.

Be still, my beating heart.

Only in a universe I know as Dark Earth by Simon Darkshade.

I came across this looking for something about the Short Sperrin that I thought I'd posted.

For what it's worth most of the 5 battleships, 2 monitors and 18 aircraft carriers existed in 1949.

• Vanguard and 4 King George V class battleships
  • Vanguard was an operational battleship until November 1949 when she joined the Home Fleet Training Squadron and became an operational battleship again in September 1950.
  • King George V was an operational battleship until paying off in 1950.
  • Duke of York was the Home Fleet's Flagship until 1949 when she became Flagship of the Reserve Fleet for two years and reduced to Reserve status in November 1951.
  • Anson was in the Home Fleet's Training Squadron 1946-49 when she paid off into reserve.
  • Howe was the Flagship of the Home Fleet's Training Squadron 1946-50 when she paid off and became headquarters of the Devonport Division of the Reserve Fleet.
• The 2 monitors were.
  • Abercrombie which replaced Erebus as the Turret Drill Ship at Chatham in July 1946 and served in that role until becoming a living ship for the Nore Command Reserve Fleet in 1949. She was towed to Portsmouth to be laid up in Fareham Creek in 1953 and on 17.12.54 was towed from Portsmouth for breaking up at Barrow, presumably she was a victim of the Radical Defence Review of 1954.
  • Roberts was the Devonport Turret Drill Ship from 22.11.45. At an unspecified point by Critchley (in the relevant British warships since 1945 book) she became an accommodation ship for the Reserve Fleet in Devonport until 1963, when she was placed in Reserve in the Hamoaze. She left Devonport for breaking up at Inverkeithing on 19.07.65.
• 6 Illustrious class
  • Implacable as an operational aircraft carrier.
  • Illustrious as trials & training carrier.
  • Victorious was in the Home Fleet Training Squadron.
  • Indomitable was being refitted.
  • Formidable was in reserve
  • Indefatigable was in reserve.
• 6 Colossus class
  • Glory, Ocean, Theseus & Triumph were operational aircraft carriers.
  • Ocean and Warrior were trooping.
• 1 Majestic class (Magnificent) on loan to the RCN and 4 more suspended.
  • Majestic wouldn't be sold to Australia until 1949.
    • Edit 28.12.23 she shouldn't be in the list because it's about the situation in 1949.
  • Powerful wouldn't be sold to Canada until 1952.
  • Hercules wouldn't be sold to India until 1957.
  • Leviathan never would be completed.
  • Maybe they could have been completed to the same standard as Sydney and Majestic in a year.
• 3 Maintenance carriers.
  • Perseus was being fitted with the prototype steam catapult.
  • Pioneer was in reserve.
  • Unicorn was in commission.
• 2 Audacious class & 3 Centaur class under construction & one Centaur suspended.
  • Eagle was launched in 1946 and would be completed in October 1951. Perhaps her fitting out could have been completed in a year if given top priority.
  • Albion, Bulwark & Centaur were launched 1946-47 they wouldn't be completed until 1953-54. Maybe they could have been completed in a year if given top priority.
  • Ark Royal wouldn't be launched until 1950 and had it not been decided to add the steam catapults would have been completed before the end of 1952. Therefore, it's unlikely that she could have been completed in a year.
  • My information is that Hermes was suspended at the same time as the Majestics and wouldn't be resumed until 1952, but @EwenS may have more accurate information.

My guess is that there were many people with World War II service and a reserve obligation that could be recalled to the colours in 1949. Most of the ships were still in their World War II state so a minimum of training to operate new equipment would be required.

Similarly for the 30 army divisions. And for what it's worth the 1951 Rearmament Programme was for the equivalent of 30 divisions of which 10 were Regular, 10 TA and the equivalent of 10 divisions in Anti-Aircraft Command.

 

[Yellow Palace]

My guess is that there were many people with World War II service and a reserve obligation that could be recalled to the colours in 1949.

Except, of course, that DROPSHOT assumed an outbreak of war in 1956-1957, when such things couldn't reasonably be assumed.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Except, of course, that DROPSHOT assumed an outbreak of war in 1956-1957, when such things couldn't reasonably be assumed.

Fair enough and of course the people who wrote DROPSHOT could reasonably assume that Ark Royal, Eagle and all 4 Centaur class would have been completed by 1956-57, that at least 3 out of 6 Illustrious class would have been modernised by that date too and that Hercules, Leviathan & Powerful might have been completed.

Of course they could have reasonably assumed a steady flow of National Servicemen joining the naval reserves after leaving the colours between 1949 & 1956-57 which would be mobilised in World War III and man the Reserve Fleet which as far as I know was the main purpose of the National Service for the Royal Navy. Similarly one of the purposes of National Service for the British Army was to keep the TA's field force and AA Command at its authorised strength.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I would suggest rather the opposite case, since the Strath Report of 1955 a thermonuclear war was deemed completely destructive, there would be little left to bother with a second strike capability, the V-Force and Polaris was a way to exact some revenge on what remained of the human race.
It was laughable to suggest that V-bomber sitting next to a runway were more protected than Blue Streak snuggled up inside a silo. Yet this absurd view was readily accepted at the MoD. The nuclear deterrent only has value as a deterrent, once you have to use it then it is dispensable because the rest of the country is equally dispensable.

A missile in a silo is a first strike weapon. It knows exactly where it's starting from, so is the most accurate. Unfortunately, both sides know exactly where those silos are, so they have weapons targeting the silos. Which makes your silo-based weapons "Use or lose".

Bombers are useful because you can make obvious posture changes, increasing alert levels, dispersing aircraft, or even putting half or more of the force in the air 24/7. And step back down on posture changes.

SLBMs are second strike, but at least for Polaris are only accurate enough to hit cities, not air bases and definitely not silos.