What if: RAF 240 bomber fleet in the 1950s

lordroel said:
So reading this link: RAF V-Bomber Bases – Unravelling the Original Plan about the early 1950s when the RAF planned for a medium bomber force of 240 aircraft – a mix of the Vickers Valiant, Avro Vulcan and Handley Page Victors.

I start to wonder, how would this effect the RAF in the future if they had a 240 bomber fleet.
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It might have been a bit more achievable had the RAF settled on one V-Bomber and just progressively improved it.

The sheer scale of this imposes a distorting influence on later decisions.
 
zen said:
lordroel said:
So reading this link: RAF V-Bomber Bases – Unravelling the Original Plan about the early 1950s when the RAF planned for a medium bomber force of 240 aircraft – a mix of the Vickers Valiant, Avro Vulcan and Handley Page Victors.

I start to wonder, how would this effect the RAF in the future if they had a 240 bomber fleet.
Click to expand...
It might have been a bit more achievable had the RAF settled on one V-Bomber and just progressively improved it.

The sheer scale of this imposes a distorting influence on later decisions.
Click to expand...
I'd suggest it was good news that they didnt, as the Valiants didnt stand up well, epscially when low level cam into the game.

Please keep in mind these are late 40's designs, late 30 designs were spitfires, P51 etc.

The plan to have 3 and actually 1 spare design was deliberate.
 
Fluff said:
zen said:
lordroel said:
So reading this link: RAF V-Bomber Bases – Unravelling the Original Plan about the early 1950s when the RAF planned for a medium bomber force of 240 aircraft – a mix of the Vickers Valiant, Avro Vulcan and Handley Page Victors.

I start to wonder, how would this effect the RAF in the future if they had a 240 bomber fleet.
Click to expand...
It might have been a bit more achievable had the RAF settled on one V-Bomber and just progressively improved it.

The sheer scale of this imposes a distorting influence on later decisions.
Click to expand...
I'd suggest it was good news that they didnt, as the Valiants didnt stand up well, epscially when low level cam into the game.

Please keep in mind these are late 40's designs, late 30 designs were spitfires, P51 etc.

The plan to have 3 and actually 1 spare design was deliberate.
Click to expand...
Was there not a replacement for these 3 bombers ore would the RAF if they had kept a large bomber fleet in service go the route of the United States and modernize them until and keep them in service like the B-52 is of today.
 
We all know that or we should do. But choosing one once things clarify ought to have happened.
In fact it was 5 as the Sperrin was both prototyping elements and a back up design.

Strictly the Victor was the best of them by criteria of the times.
But Vulcan was easier to reinforce for low level flight later on, once that became the flight regime.
 
zen said:
We all know that or we should do. But choosing one once things clarify ought to have happened.
In fact it was 5 as the Sperrin was both prototyping elements and a back up design.

Strictly the Victor was the best of them by criteria of the times.
But Vulcan was easier to reinforce for low level flight later on, once that became the flight regime.
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To some degree it did, perhaps not the original plan, but valiants were scrapped, the Victors became tankers for the vulcans and the 'fast jets'. Vulcans became the only bomber, until Tornado came along. I'm pleased to say I worked on both, when in service, only just on first, more on the Tonka.
 
lordroel said:
Was there not a replacement for these 3 bombers ore would the RAF if they had kept a large bomber fleet in service go the route of the United States and modernize them until and keep them in service like the B-52 is of today
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Analogue is not correct. USA have standoff distance from USSR, and large space to disperce bomber fleet. UK have neither. As early as in 1957, Soviet IRBM could reach RAF airbases in a matter of minutes, and there weren't much space in Britain to disperce the fleet.
 
South Africa actually was bring lined up for 25 spare production slots of HP Victor....
 
zen said:
South Africa actually was bring lined up for 25 spare production slots of HP Victor....
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If it looks like this one, it looks good, but what if the RAF had the 240 bomber fleet but shared it with the Canadians, Australians and South Africa.

Dkj122i.png
 
Knowing the UK we would have ended up with 200 Sperrins, a bit like the pre war rearmament that gave us a Fairey Battle equipped striking force in 1940.
We were lucky not to get an Avro Manchester or Short Stirling equipped Bomber Command.
 
uk 75 said:
Knowing the UK we would have ended up with 200 Sperrins, a bit like the pre war rearmament that gave us a Fairey Battle equipped striking force in 1940.
We were lucky not to get an Avro Manchester or Short Stirling equipped Bomber Command.
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True, but sometimes luck works for you, and we ended up with lancasters, spitfires, mosquitoes came along, and the us made stuff turned out ok, as well. I'm sure WW2 could have gone many ways, on the turn of one decision.
 
I don't think the Valiant got into service early enough to justify production. I think the B.2 would have made a wonderful platform for ASW/AEW/EW/ELINT, even tankers, to justify production, but not the base Valiant. Better to go with Vulcan and Victor.

The real missed opportunity with Vulcan and Victor is that both were unexpectedly more difficult to spot on radar than expected. Follow up on that and you could wind up with Vulcan evolving into something that looks like a GD/MD A-12, or even a bit like a B-2, while Victor could wind up looking something like this:

vg.jpg

Not that the money was there.
 
The big difference between the UK and US which is worth remembering. RAF bombers see only limited use outside their deterrent role (Suez, Indonesian Confrontation, Falklands) whereas B52s are involved in Vietnam, and from 1979 as an element of the RDF later Centcom.
The deterrent role increasingly lacks credibility (Polaris should have been bought earlier instead of the ridiculous Skybolt).
 
France would love some Vulcans, for sure... tankers included. Solves the Mirage IV and C-135FR with a single aircraft. Maybe Victors would be better.
Vulcain et Victoire ! live long and prosper (you pla boum !)

SNECMA, Concorde - would make a lot of people happy.
 
With regard to the linked article, my understanding was that the original plan was only ever for ten Class 1 airfields to host the main force, 3 squadrons per class 1 airfield each with five associated dispersal airfields. Each V-bomber squadron consisted of two flights of four aircraft so each Class 1 airfield would house six flights, on dispersal five would be dispatched to the dispersal airfields and one would remain at the main base, creating a requirement for 50 dispersal airfields. The original plan was not implemented and later many dispersal bases only took two aircraft at a time, at one point 22 out of 36.

The Strategic Reconnaissance force was generally not included as part of the planning assumptions so it makes sense that it would have its own Class 1 airfield at Wyton. Similarly, a separate Class 1 airfield for training, test and evaluation also seems appropriate. Thus, Robert has identified the ten bases that would have each housed three 8UE main force squadrons under the original 240 V-bomber force structure plan:

No.1 Group (HQ Bawtry):
Waddington
Scampton
Coningsby
Finningley
Bassingbourn ??? - seems bit far south for No.1 group, maybe it would have been assigned to No.3?
Faldingworth - Bomb Storage and Maintenance

No.3 Group (HQ Mildenhall):
Wittering
Marham
Honington
Cottesmore
Watton
Wyton - Strategic reconnaissance base and not included in the 240 total
Gaydon - Training and test base
Barnham - Bomb Storage and Maintenance

Also not included in the total was the Special Signals squadron (ELINT), initially 192 Squadron and then 51.

The two pathfinder/marker squadrons were included in the 240 total, they were 109 and 139 Squadrons, they operated Canberras from Hemswell. The 17 Valiant B.2s that were ordered and then cancelled would have replaced these and likely gone to the same squadrons.

Bomber Command did manage a 30 squadron light bomber force with Canberras in the 1950s, it was the upgrade to the medium bomber force on the same scale that was not achieved. The 144 aircraft force was organised into eighteen eight aircraft squadrons with nine squadrons assigned to each of No.1 and No.3 groups. Each of those groups also got ten three missile Thor squadrons.

It is fun to ignore economic and political reality and mash together various bomber command equipment programmes and operational requirements from the mid-late 1950s and imagine how such a force may have developed. OR.324 for a low altitude bomber could have been pursued to equip half the medium bomber force in the 1960s. With HP selected for that requirement all Mk.2 V-bombers could have been Vulcans, as we are ignoring practicality perhaps they have the Phase 3 wing too and from the early 1960s they carry Blue Steel Mk.II as the other half of the medium bomber force. Finally, OR.330 could have remained reconnaissance only with 30 aircraft procured to replace the Valiants and Canberras at Wyton.
 
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I was going to share a link here, but I see lordroel got to it first....

Realistically, the 240-bomber force wasn't affordable, and it was cut to pay for adequate fighter defence. So that's what it would cost to pay for building it. There'd probably also have to be standardisation on either the Victor or the Vulcan, rather than both, on simple economic grounds. And probably before the end of 1955.

Any notions of upgrading either the Victor or Vulcan to a stealth bomber are so ludicrous as to not be worth considering. Some RCS reduction would probably be possible, but it would be pointless as by the time it was possible the deterrent would have shifted to ballistic missile submarines.
JFC Fuller said:
With regard to the linked article, my understanding was that the original plan was only ever for ten Class 1 airfields to host the main force, 3 squadrons per class 1 airfield each with five associated dispersal airfields. Each V-bomber squadron consisted of two flights of four aircraft so each Class 1 airfield would house six flights, on dispersal five would be dispatched to the dispersal airfields and one would remain at the main base, creating a requirement for 50 dispersal airfields. The original plan was not implemented and later many dispersal bases only took two aircraft at a time, at one point 22 out of 36.
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That makes a lot of sense - it hinges on the bomb stores to my mind, and I've not been able to definitely establish whether Gaydon and Wyton were planned to have the same storage as the operating bases. If not, then ten bomber bases plus two for training and strategic reconnaissance make sense.

What I'd really like to do is nail down the dispersal plan for the 240-aircraft force. Apparently it was worked out in reasonable detail - a few more than 50 dispersal fields and 7 regional maintenance bases were called for. Whether the regional maintenance bases were included as dispersals, and to what extent the main operating bases counted towards either number, I don't know.
JFC Fuller said:
Also not included in the total was the Special Signals squadron (ELINT), initially 51 Squadron and then 192.
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Other way around, it was 192 then 51. They were initially at Watton then moved to Wyton, so I'd imagine the same would happen with the 240-aircraft force. It's worth noting in passing that the US DROPSHOT contingency plan assumed an RAF strength of 210 medium bombers and 36 strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which may hint at the strategic reconnaissance force having been planned by the UK to be rather larger. Or else the US was just making assumptions that seemed reasonable, which is a distinct possibility.
The two pathfinder/marker squadrons were included in the 240 total, they were 109 and 139 Squadrons, they operated Canberras from Hemswell. The 17 Valiant B.2s that were ordered and then cancelled would have replaced these and likely gone to the same squadrons.
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I remain rather unconvinced by the logic of pathfinders in the nuclear age, but it's interesting that they were a definite plan for the V-force. It's equally interesting that no pathfinder version of the Victor or Vulcan has come to light, even as a desk study to keep Vickers honest.
JFC Fuller said:
It is fun to ignore economic and political reality and mash together various bomber command equipment programmes and operational requirements from the mid-late 1950s and imagine how such a force may have developed. OR.324 for a low altitude bomber could have been pursued to equip half the medium bomber force in the 1960s. With HP selected for that requirement all Mk.2 v-bombers could have been Vulcans, as we are ignoring practicality perhaps they have the Phase 3 wing too and from the early 1960s they carry Blue Steel Mk.II as the other half of the medium bomber force. Finally, OR.330 could have remained reconnaissance only with 30 aircraft procured to replace the Valiants and Canberras at Wyton.
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If ignoring economic realities, one may as well throw in V1000s for 192 Squadron.... if OR.324 and OR.330 make it on the scene, a subsonic airliner with some clever electronic gubbins in the back is hardly worth comment!
 
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RLBH said:
I was going to share a link here, but I see lordroel got to it first....

Realistically, the 240-bomber force wasn't affordable, and it was cut to pay for adequate fighter defence. So that's what it would cost to pay for building it. There'd probably also have to be standardisation on either the Victor or the Vulcan, rather than both, on simple economic grounds. And probably before the end of 1955.
Click to expand...

So what cuts would be needed to get this 240 bomber fleet in service.
 
lordroel said:
RLBH said:
I was going to share a link here, but I see lordroel got to it first....

Realistically, the 240-bomber force wasn't affordable, and it was cut to pay for adequate fighter defence. So that's what it would cost to pay for building it. There'd probably also have to be standardisation on either the Victor or the Vulcan, rather than both, on simple economic grounds. And probably before the end of 1955.
Click to expand...

So what cuts would be needed to get this 240 bomber fleet in service.
Click to expand...
A significant chunk of the RAF's modern fighters, required to defend the V-bomber bases. 240 undefended bombers is inferior to 144 defended ones, at least in the days when attack was expected to be by bomber rather than missiles.

That's covered in the RAF Air Power Review edition you referred to elsewhere.
 
RLBH said:
lordroel said:
RLBH said:
I was going to share a link here, but I see lordroel got to it first....

Realistically, the 240-bomber force wasn't affordable, and it was cut to pay for adequate fighter defence. So that's what it would cost to pay for building it. There'd probably also have to be standardisation on either the Victor or the Vulcan, rather than both, on simple economic grounds. And probably before the end of 1955.
Click to expand...

So what cuts would be needed to get this 240 bomber fleet in service.
Click to expand...
A significant chunk of the RAF's modern fighters, required to defend the V-bomber bases. 240 undefended bombers is inferior to 144 defended ones, at least in the days when attack was expected to be by bomber rather than missiles.

That's covered in the RAF Air Power Review edition you referred to elsewhere.
Click to expand...
Well, reputedly, BAC offered the RAF 144 Jaguar with spare parts, or for the same money, 200 Jaguar - no spare parts, the RAF took the second option.
 
Fluff said:
RLBH said:
lordroel said:
RLBH said:
I was going to share a link here, but I see lordroel got to it first....

Realistically, the 240-bomber force wasn't affordable, and it was cut to pay for adequate fighter defence. So that's what it would cost to pay for building it. There'd probably also have to be standardisation on either the Victor or the Vulcan, rather than both, on simple economic grounds. And probably before the end of 1955.
Click to expand...

So what cuts would be needed to get this 240 bomber fleet in service.
Click to expand...
A significant chunk of the RAF's modern fighters, required to defend the V-bomber bases. 240 undefended bombers is inferior to 144 defended ones, at least in the days when attack was expected to be by bomber rather than missiles.

That's covered in the RAF Air Power Review edition you referred to elsewhere.
Click to expand...
Well, reputedly, BAC offered the RAF 144 Jaguar with spare parts, or for the same money, 200 Jaguar - no spare parts, the RAF took the second option.
Click to expand...
So 144 Jaguars would fly and 56 would become spares.
 
lordroel said:
Fluff said:
RLBH said:
lordroel said:
RLBH said:
I was going to share a link here, but I see lordroel got to it first....

Realistically, the 240-bomber force wasn't affordable, and it was cut to pay for adequate fighter defence. So that's what it would cost to pay for building it. There'd probably also have to be standardisation on either the Victor or the Vulcan, rather than both, on simple economic grounds. And probably before the end of 1955.
Click to expand...

So what cuts would be needed to get this 240 bomber fleet in service.
Click to expand...
A significant chunk of the RAF's modern fighters, required to defend the V-bomber bases. 240 undefended bombers is inferior to 144 defended ones, at least in the days when attack was expected to be by bomber rather than missiles.

That's covered in the RAF Air Power Review edition you referred to elsewhere.
Click to expand...
Well, reputedly, BAC offered the RAF 144 Jaguar with spare parts, or for the same money, 200 Jaguar - no spare parts, the RAF took the second option.
Click to expand...
So 144 Jaguars would fly and 56 would become spares.
Click to expand...
Correct.
 
The only competition the Valiant B.2 had was the Canberra B.5 designed against B.22/48. It was very much an early 1950s requirement though I note that the tactic was used during the Suez bombing campaign in 1956. My guess is it survived so long because the Canberra force was still dependent on visual bomb aiming and it wasn't until 1956 that the NBS in the Valiant really started to work.

The US number of RAF strategic reconnaissance aircraft seems optimistic but not impossible depending on when it was generated. At one point there were four Canberra reconnaissance squadrons under Bomber Command so its plausible that 36 could have been scraped together for a maximum effort.
 
JFC Fuller said:
The only competition the Valiant B.2 had was the Canberra B.5 designed against B.22/48. It was very much an early 1950s requirement though I note that the tactic was used during the Suez bombing campaign in 1956. My guess is it survived so long because the Canberra force was still dependent on visual bomb aiming and it wasn't until 1956 that the NBS in the Valiant really started to work.
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The timeline seems right for the Bristol RA.6 to have been aimed at the same function, though it's possibly more on the Canberra B.5 end of the spectrum.
JFC Fuller said:
The US number of RAF strategic reconnaissance aircraft seems optimistic but not impossible depending on when it was generated. At one point there were four Canberra reconnaissance squadrons under Bomber Command so its plausible that 36 could have been scraped together for a maximum effort.
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DROPSHOT was produced in 1949; some measure of the plan can be judged from the fact that it projected that the Royal Navy would have eighteen aircraft carriers, five battleships and two monitors, and that the British Army could be brought up to 30 divisions within 1 year of war breaking out.
 
RLBH #20: nail down the dispersal plan for the 240-aircraft force. JFCF #19, dispersal.

We are allowed to be confused as there was no Authorised (=Treasury-funded) Plan, only aspirations. 240 Medium Bombers was always that. Every A.M. Requisition for a batch of Mediums was argued over cost and need. The only reason RAF received 104 Valiants was that Minister of Defence Shinwell extracted 50% of their cost from US. Sandys tried to do that for Mk.2 Vs, 22/3/57, and received "a blunt rebuff" I.Clark,Nuc.Diplomacy & the Special Relationship, OUP, 94,P.43. Treasury Approvals (for anything) were released in budget silos i.e.: the Bricks & Works chap funded Operational Readiness Platforms (ORPs); the In-Service ("ownership") chap funded Rapid Start (RS) Engine and Blue Steel QRA mods. There was no one chap for Readiness. So we dribbled, un-joined up.

RAuxAF was disbanded 10/3/57, Fighter Cmnd. (FC) reduced to a few Javelins - 9/64, a few Lightnings >10/60 because they+Bloodhound Ring of Steel could cover MBF/SMF Launch on Warning: A.M. brief to new SoS/Air Amery,10/60: we need FC “to police the skies against intruders (not much more.) defensive side (relied on dispersal)” Move to Sandys White Paper,M.D.Kandiah/G.Staerck,ICBH/KCL Seminar 7/88, 2002,Pp44/5. But:

- we had no Warning until 29/8/63 - CIA/Hiller KH-5 Argon ELINT satellite, and 17/9/63 - BMEWS/III, Fylingdales live, limited until Elliott/RRE data-handling Project Legate in 1964 gave 8 mins.{ICBM/ex-USSR}/2½ mins. {IRBM/ex-DDR}. Lovell Telescope, Manchester Uni. was brought to “a state of military vigilance” in 10/62 Cuban Missile Crisis. sas-space.sas.ac. uk/3387/1/Journal_of_International_History 2000_ n3_Twigg_and_Scott. 26/1/12, pp.3/4.

Upto 72 V-Bombers, 1/10/58-17/3/62 had US Bombs, so could not disperse (the USAF Munitions custodials issue). Blue Steel must be close to its drainage pits on Main Base. Valiant first rehearsed dispersal, e.g.: Tarrant Rushton...they had no Bomb, for 2 reasons: RAF never carried potential Broken Arrows; and until Yellow Sun 2, 5/61, they had none operable remote from Armourers. Red Beard should always have been so cosseted, but must be dispersed from vulnerable Akrotiri from 28/11/61: only 24 Valiant carried it in UK, 1/9/60-{last:} 30/9/62, probably to be stream-launched from Wittering.

USAF/SAC dispersed in US very visibly, for Cuba, 10/62: PM Macmillan has been commended for his measured sanity in not also dispersing, a provocation. He did not because he could not. RAF could not scramble rapidly until RS mod was in Vulcan 2 (32 a/c by 12/63), and ORPs were ready (1st./Waddo, 2/63). No ORP: so large impediments at runways' ends to ground the day's business - bad for Fighter QRA or MR/ASW Forces. Ringway had an MBF Awayday. The quickest way to generate these a/c was streamed from Main Base, launched on a calm judgement of "the position". It would not be a British First Strike if we recalled the Demonstration. Dispersal seemed such a good idea...but it was valid only for a/c (and Bombs) with some semblance of reliability - so WE177B from 9/66. How would groundcrew ever get to Machrihanish?

57+ dispersals were never more than pipe dreams. The best I have been able to assemble, such as from real people remembering on Pprune &tc is:
Coningsby Wing Vulcan 2: c.8 Yellow Sun 2: (7/62)-11/64. (dispersal sites same as Cottesmore below?);

Cottesmore Wing Victor 1: 16 Yellow Sun 2, (9/62)-9/64; Vulcan 2: Yellow Sun 2, 11/64-9/66; WE177B, 9/66-2/69: Ballykelly, A&AEE Boscombe D, RRE Pershore, Leconfield, Lyneham, St.Mawgan, Valley, RNAS Yeovilton;

{Honington Wing Victor 1: 16 Yellow Sun 2: (1/7/61)-6/11/65 : and: .
{Scampton Wing {Vulcan 2: c.11 Yellow Sun 2}: (1/61) and (6/62-12/62): RAE Bedford, RNAS Brawdy/Lossiemouth, Kinloss, Leeming;

Waddington Wing 24 YS2: Vulcan 1: (1/4/62)-late-67; Vulcan 2: 1/7/68-30/5/68: Filton, Finningley, Leuchars, Machrihanish, Manston, Wattisham;

Wittering Wing {Victor 2: c.8 Yellow Sun 2}: (mid-62 - late-62: probably stream-launched from Main Base).

NB ( ) dates precede ORPs; { } Sqdns. with pre-Blue Steel a/c accessed YS2, though how "operational", recent, they were is unclear.
H.Wynn, RAF Strategic Deterrent Forces,Pp302/304/339; Agar/Hughes,P236, in R.Bud/P.Gummett,Cold War Hot Science,Harwood,1999; B.Clarke,4Mn.Warning, Tempus,05,P82; much in (our) CJ.Gibson, Battle Flight, inc.P.48.
 
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alertken said:
We are allowed to be confused as there was no Authorised (=Treasury-funded) Plan, only aspirations
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Many thanks, Ken - I was hoping for your inputs! My copy of Wynn is finally due to arrive tomorrow, after entirely too long vacillating over it,.

My thinking in this (rather loose) project is that the RAF must have had something in mind when presenting its aspirations to the Treasury. What was viewed as desirable from a military perspective, and what could be afforded from a political or economic perspective, are necessarily very different. Seeing the one solely through the light of the other will always give an incomplete view.
 
There was an article on the efforts to develop the British H-bomb in Aviation World, the magazine of Air-Britain in the last issue.
There is a map of the bases and dispersals as of February 1962 from the official history.

Scotland
Prestwick 2
RAF Machrihanish 2
RAF Kinloss 4
RNAS Lossiemouth 2
RAF Leuchars 2

Northern Ireland
RAF Ballykelly 4

England
Boscombe Down 2
RAE Bedford 4
RAF Bruntingthorpe 2
RAF Burtonwood 4
RAF Cranwell 2
RAF Coltishall 2
RAF Elvington 2
Filton 2
RAF Leconfield 2
RAF Leeming 2
RAF Lyneham 2
RAF Manston 2
RAF Middleton St George 2
RRE Pershore 2
RAF St Mawgan 4
Stansted 2
RAF Wattisham 2
RNAS Yeovilton 2

Wales
RNAS Brawdy 2
RAE Llanbedr 2
RAF Valley 2

The author though points out that the list is not entirely correct, for example RAF Leconfield actually had four disperal hardstandings and the author saw four Waddington wing Vulcans using them on 7th May 1962.
Tarrant Rushton may have replaced RAF Middle St George when the latter closed in 1964 and had an ORP but that is unconfirmed.
 
Hood said:
There was an article on the efforts to develop the British H-bomb in Aviation World, the magazine of Air-Britain in the last issue.
There is a map of the bases and dispersals as of February 1962 from the official history.
Click to expand...

Is this also good.

nthyddnhthn.jpg
 
Deliberate ambiguity, unpredictability, is core to any negotiation - in Arms Limitation talks with USSR Reagan played on the possibility that he was geriatric.

The public position of UK was no First Strike. US was never so precise. NATO presumed USSR's preference was for First Strike, so we must invest for Second Strike credibility: that meant we had to guess the megadeath that would deter an opponent who had recently accepted >20 Mn. When CDG was budgeting for his Deterrent he took the logic that 40 Mn. French citizens must be avenged by that number of Sovs, and he cared not where they were - he was not Moscow-centric, so ignored ABM - he would delete whatever even a Vautour could reach. For 2 decades China invested sufficiently to delete any 2 Capitals that might concurrently point nukes at them. USSR and US each deployed >30,000 nuclear warheads. How much is enough?

No First Strike addressed 3 constituencies: UK voters, who knew that would be suicide; UK Ministers, who wished to reassure taxpayers that we had no such death wish; and the Presidium, who knew that prior to ELINT satellites, their First Strike on W.Europe could be assembled as a large Exercise turned into a bolt-from-the-blue on a dark, snowy night, probably quite well. They knew we knew that too, so they never believed no Western First Strike, so dispersed and duplicated to secure Second Strike credibility. So >30,000 warheads. They could have made do with sufficient for a 2nd. Strike on NYC+SHAPE/HQ.

QRA, USAF/SAC Continuous Airborne Alert, dispersal were for the one purpose of demonstrating credible Second Strike: if we had not done those things we would have broadcast intent for First Strike, thus provoking exactly that from USSR.

UK had great difficulty doing any of those things. Wynn's Official History, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces has ache and pain in sustaining 1 permanent QRA a/c per Sqdn. of 8 and did so only 1/1/62-30/6/69 (3 Valiant TBF Sqdns. held 4 in all on QRA, 10/62-26/1/65). Stuff breaks...when on Main Base, with a short-notice back-up a/c+crew, stocks of spares, mobs of maintainers. How long would 2 a/c exiled to empty Elvington remain even marginally serviceable? I was inconvenienced by a 747 engine change in Bahrein: it took 5 hours. Main Base engineers could not expose a Conway or Olympus in that time, and then had no spare - RAF did not pre-position engine, nay nothing, at dispersals, and would not ferry a live weapon on 3 engines. Stuffed. Dispersal was a nonsense. Stream from Main Base. That is why we find inconsistencies in write-ups of all this, and maps with alleged dispersals on a gliding club in Manchester's suburbs, empty for years.

The sole periods where dispersal (might have) gained time to launch were between Waddington ORP ready, 2/63 and torch passing to RN, 30/6/69:
Coningsby Wing, Vulcan 2/Yellow Sun 2: (ORP ready)- 11/64, sharing dispersal sites assigned to:
Cottesmore Wing, Victor 1/YS2: (ORP ready)- 9/64; Vulcan 2/YS2: 11/64-9/66, /WE177B: 9/66-2/69,
Honington Wing, Victor 1/YS2: (ORP ready)- 6/11/65, sharing:
Waddington Wing, Vulcan 1/YS2: 2/63-late-67; Vulcan 2/WE177B 1/7/68-30/6/69.
(Scampton and Wittering Blue Steel: never: no CA Release for dispersal per Wynn,P.220).
All other/earlier dispersals served no purpose, least of all those to civil sites.
 
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alertken said:
The public position of UK was no First Strike. US was never so precise. NATO presumed USSR's preference was for First Strike, so we must invest for Second Strike credibility
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I'm currently reading Herman Kahn's 'On Escalation', in which he claims that European (presumably both French and British) nuclear strategy in the mid-60s - when he was writing - was based on 'pre-emptive surrender'. That is, use deterrence to improve a negotiating position during a crisis. But if deterrence fails, surrender first before an enemy strike can seriously affect the country.

This would of course explain limited survivability of the UK's deterrent forces: they weren't intended to face a meaningful attack.
 
How could a country surrender in 3 minutes? Good luck making that phone call from Downing Street,
*dialing tone* *still more dialling tone* "Good morning Premier Kissoff, you know those missiles heading this way, we'll old boy we've decided..." *flash*

If Kahn is suggesting that there would be a period of prolonged negotiation then surely that would have meant the deterrence had worked as neither side would be prepared to launch a surprise strike while such talk continued and the fact both has had agreed to talk would have been due to the consequences of MAD looming in the background.

I would suggest rather the opposite case, since the Strath Report of 1955 a thermonuclear war was deemed completely destructive, there would be little left to bother with a second strike capability, the V-Force and Polaris was a way to exact some revenge on what remained of the human race.
It was laughable to suggest that V-bomber sitting next to a runway were more protected than Blue Streak snuggled up inside a silo. Yet this absurd view was readily accepted at the MoD. The nuclear deterrent only has value as a deterrent, once you have to use it then it is dispensable because the rest of the country is equally dispensable.
 
Hood said:
How could a country surrender in 3 minutes?
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Probably about as easily as you could stream-launch bombers carrying Blue Steel from a handful of bases in three minutes!

Remember that Kahn was a 'nuclear warfighter', didn't believe MAD was rational or realistic, and anticipated that there'd be a prolonged period of tension, ultimatums and low-level nuclear warfare before an all-out central nuclear war between superpowers. In fact, he doubted very much whether a central nuclear war between the superpowers would actually emerge, but envisaged a range of scenarios where they would engage in nuclear attacks on satellites.

To take an example: the USSR might demand that the UK ejects US strategic forces from the country, in something of a parallel to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US would probably be unwilling to do so, and the crisis might escalate to the point where the USSR makes an ultimatum to remove US forces, or else the USSR will launch missiles to destroy them. Say that they are very clear, the missiles will have these yields, be targeted at these bases, and kill this many people.

If the attack goes ahead, the US will probably launch a comparable retaliation strike - say against Soviet bomber staging bases in the Arctic - but the centre isn't threatened. It's unlikely that this would escalate into an all-out US-USSR central nuclear war. The US might take the view that this course of action is preferable to giving in to the USSR.

To the UK, though, such an attack might very well be intolerable, and they would threaten a response directed
at Soviet central interests. This would weaken the Soviet strength against the US, making the USSR more likely to negotiate. But if the USSR isn't willing to back down, for whatever reason, Kahn anticipates that the UK will surrender - that is, demand that the US forces leave - rather than face a substantial attack itself.
 
Do you trust your enemy?
Oh he said it was only 6 missiles of 1Mton each.....all directed at Portugal.

Are you willing to believe that?

And what happens if it's not....?
Because launch detection is one thing but getting accurate fixes on flightpath and prediction of targets is time-consuming.
And by the time you realise it's 20 missiles aimed at you instead, how long have you got left to do anything?

And what does it say, even assuming Kahn is right, to your allies, when you say "hey we're not starting WWIII for Portugal".....who wants to be your ally after that?

Who is going to trust you?

I would say, if you believe Kahn and you're the government of a ally of the US on what it judges as the periphery. Then you know you can't rely on US assurances and ought to pursue your own Deterrent if you believe you are threatened by another nuclear power.
 
zen said:
Then you know you can't rely on US assurances and ought to pursue your own Deterrent if you believe you are threatened by another nuclear power.
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Moves and countermoves, yes. The US might be willing to accept six warheads on Portugal. It might even tolerate twenty on the UK. But threatening one and carrying out the other would escalate the conflict significantly - even without the UK's nuclear forces.

It's really worth reading Kahn to get into the mindset of the Cold War nuclear warfighter - and very difficult to get into that mindset as a European.
 

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