V-2 with Chemical Warheads plans ?

[Scott Kenny]

Well, as I mentioned before - the truly devastating warhead for V-2 may be the one, filled with N-stoff, chlorine trifluoride (assuming, of course, that Germans figured out some way to handle this horrible stuff without blowing the missile up several hundred times during preparation). When such warhead hit... well, it would basically create a localized firestorm. With the chlorine trifluoride, essentially everything - bricks, cement, iron, sand, water - would combust. Also, its extremely toxic - but since the toxic fumes could be considered a byproduct of incendiary reaction, Germans may claim that it is not de jure a chemical weapon.

P.S. I copyrighted the idea as plot device)

ClF3 is some nasty stuff, that's for sure... it sets asbestos firebrick alight.

I think the only more aggressive oxidizer is FOOF, dioxygen difluoride. Even pure liquid oxygen pales in comparison!

 

[publiusr]

Perhaps omit the warhead entirely in favor of more propellant and or concrete--and have it come in at as shallow an angle as possible to send debris cartwheeling through structures rather than excavating a crater.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

ClF3 is some nasty stuff, that's for sure... it sets asbestos firebrick alight.

I think the only more aggressive oxidizer is FOOF, dioxygen difluoride. Even pure liquid oxygen pales in comparison!

How would you even load that stuff into the missile and keep it from doing nasty stuff before it arrived? Even more important, how do you make tons of it to load to begin with?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

A more effective means would be to use a proximity fuze with the missile to detonate it at low altitude and spray something like explosive incendiary bombs over a wide area. Think the British "sticky bomb" grenade times several thousand over say half a kilometer radius. The proximity fuze could be a extant radar set like Lichtenstein or Neptun where it is set to detonate the missile when the return signal reaches a certain strength.
It doesn't have to be miniaturized, nor does it have to withstand the sort of g forces one fired from a gun does. The Germans clearly understood the concept so it is doable. The V-2 is large enough to fit the system into. All you'd have to do is fine tune the set so it goes off at the right altitude based on the reentry speed of the missile.

 

[Dilandu]

How would you even load that stuff into the missile and keep it from doing nasty stuff before it arrived? Even more important, how do you make tons of it to load to begin with?

Fortunately, Nazi have no idea how to do it) They actually researched CIF3 as "N-stoff", hoping to use it as incendiary substance against fortifications, and even build a plant to produce it. By the end of the war they managed to make several dozen tons of this stuff. But they weren't even able to figure out how to transport it, far less how to deploy it.

 

[Dilandu]

The proximity fuze could be a extant radar set like Lichtenstein or Neptun

Wouldn't work. Those radars weren't accurate enough for something as fast as ballistic missile. Also, Germans were rather pessemistic about throwing any kind of radio control toward Britain; they assumed that British would quickly figure out how to jam the radar, making V-2 even less effective.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Wouldn't work. Those radars weren't accurate enough for something as fast as ballistic missile. Also, Germans were rather pessemistic about throwing any kind of radio control toward Britain; they assumed that British would quickly figure out how to jam the radar, making V-2 even less effective.

Actually, it should. All you need is a continuous wave signal and a receiver that actuates the firing switch when the signal gets strong enough. The impact speed of a V-2 is somewhere between Mach 2 and 3, which isn't so different from the velocity of a shell. Now, jamming it is possible, even doable. The easiest way to do that is use a Giant Tuba jammer (already available) and point the transmitting antenna skyward somewhere near London such that any V-2 dropping in the vicinity goes through the signal.

 

[Scott Kenny]

How would you even load that stuff into the missile and keep it from doing nasty stuff before it arrived? Even more important, how do you make tons of it to load to begin with?

Stainless steel everything, and IIRC purging the entire system with HF to armor the metal against the ClF3. Though I think everyone who uses ClF3 makes it on site.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Stainless steel everything, and IIRC purging the entire system with HF to armor the metal against the ClF3. Though I think everyone who uses ClF3 makes it on site.

And, they're supposed to do this at a point where they can't even use stainless steel in jet engines... ?

 

[1635yankee]

The Germans tried to use it in self-igniting flamethrowers (see https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/sand-won-t-save-you-time).

Chlorine trifluoride is actually used in industry today, where it's used to clean semiconductor manufacturing equipment (note to self: do not move near one of those), resulting in truckloads of ClF3 being driven around by what one hopes are well-trained, well-rested, very careful drivers in very well maintained vehicles.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The Germans tried to use it in self-igniting flamethrowers (see https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/sand-won-t-save-you-time).

Chlorine trifluoride is actually used in industry today, where it's used to clean semiconductor manufacturing equipment (note to self: do not move near one of those), resulting in truckloads of ClF3 being driven around by what one hopes are well-trained, well-rested, very careful drivers in very well maintained vehicles.

Yup. Boise, Idaho has a lot of chip makers (including a big Micron plant). It doesn't take a lot of ClF3 per cleaning, thankfully.

 

[iverson]

I doubt that any conceivable warhead would make any improvement: the V2 was simply not a pratical weapon. It was essentially a very fast, high-flying, light bomber with a 1000-kg payload and a 300-km range that you only got to use once. Given Germany's war situation and what it must have cost to design, develop, manufacture, stock, transport, and fuel the V2 rockets, putting the effort into making more Panzerfausts would have had greater effect on the war.

 

[edwest4]

I doubt that any conceivable warhead would make any improvement: the V2 was simply not a pratical weapon. It was essentially a very fast, high-flying, light bomber with a 1000-kg payload and a 300-km range that you only got to use once. Given Germany's war situation and what it must have cost to design, develop, manufacture, stock, transport, and fuel the V2 rockets, putting the effort into making more Panzerfausts would have had greater effect on the war.

The great damage caused by the V-1 and V-2 has been documented. Panzerfausts were liberally distributed. I saw a captured German film that showed a civilian, a woman, firing one into an open area.

The British were quite concerned that an atomic warhead would be placed on the V-2.

 

[iverson]

There was never the slightest chance of a nuclear warhead on a V2. As we have discussed before in other threads, there was nothing like a viable nuclear weapons program in Nazi Germany.

As far as damage goes, V1s and V2s were roughly as destructive as 1000-kg bombs. But there were far fewer of them compared the bombs dropped during the Blitz. V1s were a bit more practical, given their relative cheapness. But neither were ever going to win or even delay the war. Allied advances quickly put the UK beyond their short range in any case.

 

[edwest4]

There has been no such discussion here. I have an original copy of a formerly Restricted report dated May, 1946. People here, due to the passage of time, have no context regarding the V-1 and V-2 attacks. A quote from the document:

"On the night of 12 June 1944, attacks were begun on London with the V-1, a winged missile propelled by an aeropulse motor and ground-launched from special ramps in France, Belgium and Holland. Between this date and September 3, 8205 missiles were launched, of which 5471 crossed the English coast. Of those missiles crossing the coast 2354 landed, causing 5476 deaths, 15,918 serious injuries and 29,812 slight wounds. About 23,000 homes were destroyed and 1,104,000 damaged. In spite of much controversy about the effectiveness of this type of missile as compared to conventional bombers to which the large number of man-hours might have been devoted, the results obtained in the attack on London definitely herald a new type of aerial attack."

Full document title: Guided Missiles and Pilotless Aircraft - A Report to the AAF Scientific Advisory Group by H.L. Dryden, W.H. Pickering, H.S. Tsien and G. B. Schubauer. Published by Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Publication Branch, Intelligence T-2, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The British were quite concerned that an atomic warhead would be placed on the V-2.

There was never the slightest chance of a nuclear warhead on a V2. As we have discussed before in other threads, there was nothing like a viable nuclear weapons program in Nazi Germany.

These two statements are not mutually exclusive.

 

[edwest4]

These two statements are not mutually exclusive.

That was vague. There are enough declassified documents available to show that the Germans had a massive nuclear weapons program.

"In attempting to locate plants that might be used to produce bomb material, Oppenheimer advised that they were unlikely to be 'smaller than one city block' and would require large amounts of power. In addition, it was likely that any plants would be heavily guarded, out of bombing range from Britain, and not too near the Russian border - making Bohemia a likely location. If the Germans were to operate a reactor for the production of plutonium, 'they will be operating it where water is plentiful and where the flow from the plant passes either through open country or through country inhabited by an "inferior race" whom they don't mind killing off.'

"Oppenheimer also noted that a large chemical company, such as I.G. Farben, could carry out a bomb program. In that case 'it would be quite possible to conceal the plant among other war projects on the grounds of the company.' While the need to keep unwitting employees in the dark about such activities seemed to mitigate against such an approach, 'it may not be ruled out.' Further complicating the intelligence task was the fact that 'the physical nature of the plant is sufficiently flexible so that external inspection can probably not identify it.' "

Spying on the Bomb by Jeffrey T. Richelson, pp. 33 and 34. ISBN 0-393-05383-0

So next time someone states the Germans were nowhere near... do some actual research.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

There has been no such discussion here. I have an original copy of a formerly Restricted report dated May, 1946. People here, due to the passage of time, have no context regarding the V-1 and V-2 attacks. A quote from the document:

"On the night of 12 June 1944, attacks were begun on London with the V-1, a winged missile propelled by an aeropulse motor and ground-launched from special ramps in France, Belgium and Holland. Between this date and September 3, 8205 missiles were launched, of which 5471 crossed the English coast. Of those missiles crossing the coast 2354 landed, causing 5476 deaths, 15,918 serious injuries and 29,812 slight wounds. About 23,000 homes were destroyed and 1,104,000 damaged. In spite of much controversy about the effectiveness of this type of missile as compared to conventional bombers to which the large number of man-hours might have been devoted, the results obtained in the attack on London definitely herald a new type of aerial attack."

Full document title: Guided Missiles and Pilotless Aircraft - A Report to the AAF Scientific Advisory Group by H.L. Dryden, W.H. Pickering, H.S. Tsien and G. B. Schubauer. Published by Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Publication Branch, Intelligence T-2, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.

That looks at it in isolation to the larger picture around the use of the V-1.

The US produced a working copy of the V-1, the JB-2 / Loon (USAAF / Navy designations respectively) just 60 days after the first V-1 fell on England. At one point, the USAAF was planning to produce as many as 5,000 of their version a month--involving Ford Motor Co, Republic Aircraft, and Willy's Overland-- to fire into Germany, then Japan. The plan was nixed because it was deemed inefficient and costly.

The V-1's effectiveness diminished almost exponentially as the firing program continued. The Allies authorized the use of VT fuzes for AA guns involved in defense against V-1 firings and moved more and more batteries into the flight paths. The number of V-1 that successfully got through plummeted. Add in the Diver air intercepts and attacks on V-1 launch sites and you get a program that started out with great potential that crashed and burned into little more than an annoyance within months of it starting.
Firing the V-1 at night made little or no difference. Allied (US or British) AA batteries were radar controlled at the time. The US 90mm M2 with an SCR 584 radar fire control set was particularly effective. The guns were linked electronically to the fire control set, and the mounts were powered so the guns could be slaved to the radar and automatically fired. All the crew had to do was load the gun. With VT fuzes they proved extremely effective at shooting down V-1's that flew within their firing range.

The overall context was the V-1 was a viable system for an early cruise missile, but its crudity, relatively low speed, and low altitude of flight combined to make it very vulnerable to countermeasures. As the Germans had little means to analyze the results of firings--having no reliable spy network in England, no means to do regular and accurate photo reconnaissance, etc., they really had little idea how effective or ineffective their strikes were.

Had they known how the effectiveness of their firings had plummeted, I would think they'd have made a concerted effort to up the V-1's capabilities to fly faster, higher, and increase its accuracy. They might have worked towards giving it a programmable course correction to allow it to fly to a target other than in a straight line. But without that knowledge, it was difficult for them to know what improvements needed to be made.

I will say it was more effective both in results and costs than the V-2 was by a wide margin.

 

[Orionblamblam]

That was vague. There are enough declassified documents available to show that the Germans had a massive nuclear weapons program.

"In attempting to locate plants that might be used to produce bomb material, Oppenheimer advised that they were unlikely to be 'smaller than one city block' and would require large amounts of power. In addition, it was likely that any plants would be heavily guarded, out of bombing range from Britain, and not too near the Russian border - making Bohemia a likely location. If the Germans were to operate a reactor for the production of plutonium, 'they will be operating it where water is plentiful and where the flow from the plant passes either through open country or through country inhabited by an "inferior race" whom they don't mind killing off.'

"Oppenheimer also noted that a large chemical company, such as I.G. Farben, could carry out a bomb program. In that case 'it would be quite possible to conceal the plant among other war projects on the grounds of the company.' While the need to keep unwitting employees in the dark about such activities seemed to mitigate against such an approach, 'it may not be ruled out.' Further complicating the intelligence task was the fact that 'the physical nature of the plant is sufficiently flexible so that external inspection can probably not identify it.' "

Spying on the Bomb by Jeffrey T. Richelson, pp. 33 and 34. ISBN 0-393-05383-0

So next time someone states the Germans were nowhere near... do some actual research.

The Germans were NOOOOOOOOOOWHERE near producing a nuclear weapon. The text you quoted does not argue otherwise, only that they "could" carry out and/or hide such a program. But they never had a competent plan for a bomb, much less the infrastructure to make one.

 

[edwest4]

The Germans were NOOOOOOOOOOWHERE near producing a nuclear weapon. The text you quoted does not argue otherwise, only that they "could" carry out and/or hide such a program. But they never had a competent plan for a bomb, much less the infrastructure to make one.

Really? And your evidence for this is what?

 

[ArmchairSamurai]

That looks at it in isolation to the larger picture around the use of the V-1.

The US produced a working copy of the V-1, the JB-2 / Loon (USAAF / Navy designations respectively) just 60 days after the first V-1 fell on England. At one point, the USAAF was planning to produce as many as 5,000 of their version a month--involving Ford Motor Co, Republic Aircraft, and Willy's Overland-- to fire into Germany, then Japan. The plan was nixed because it was deemed inefficient and costly.

The V-1's effectiveness diminished almost exponentially as the firing program continued. The Allies authorized the use of VT fuzes for AA guns involved in defense against V-1 firings and moved more and more batteries into the flight paths. The number of V-1 that successfully got through plummeted. Add in the Diver air intercepts and attacks on V-1 launch sites and you get a program that started out with great potential that crashed and burned into little more than an annoyance within months of it starting.
Firing the V-1 at night made little or no difference. Allied (US or British) AA batteries were radar controlled at the time. The US 90mm M2 with an SCR 584 radar fire control set was particularly effective. The guns were linked electronically to the fire control set, and the mounts were powered so the guns could be slaved to the radar and automatically fired. All the crew had to do was load the gun. With VT fuzes they proved extremely effective at shooting down V-1's that flew within their firing range.

The overall context was the V-1 was a viable system for an early cruise missile, but its crudity, relatively low speed, and low altitude of flight combined to make it very vulnerable to countermeasures. As the Germans had little means to analyze the results of firings--having no reliable spy network in England, no means to do regular and accurate photo reconnaissance, etc., they really had little idea how effective or ineffective their strikes were.

Had they known how the effectiveness of their firings had plummeted, I would think they'd have made a concerted effort to up the V-1's capabilities to fly faster, higher, and increase its accuracy. They might have worked towards giving it a programmable course correction to allow it to fly to a target other than in a straight line. But without that knowledge, it was difficult for them to know what improvements needed to be made.

I will say it was more effective both in results and costs than the V-2 was by a wide margin.

With the benefit of hindsight, I would argue that the V-1 could have benefitted more as a naval weapon, whether launched from carriers, destroyers, or submarines, manned or unmanned; I can see its naval potential as a ship-bourne flying torpedo, pin-point shore bombardment missile, Kamikaze-style suicide weapon or mass deployable decoy, depending on the scenario and from what type of ship it is deployed from. I recall Italy had something in that vein, in the works, for the RN Impero, but nothing ever materialized from that concept. Meanwhile, I can see the V-2 easily being an area-denial weapon rather than a terror weapon, considering that if its range could be increased or the flight path data more observable (which is asking a lot), and means of manufacture were secure, say underground (e.g. U-Verlagerung Wittringthen), then mobile launching teams could harass enemy logistics or hamper enemy front-line operations (if reconnaissance is on point), in lieu of artillery. Could it have psychological effects on enemy troops? Most certainly. Would that be a war-winning weapon, however? Absolutely not. I'd consider it like a much more intense Nebelwerfer, except you only hear it after its hits the target. Just my two cents.

 

[Dilandu]

These two statements are not mutually exclusive.

They aren't. Allies greatly overestimated the actual state of German nuclear research. They knew that Germany was one of the leading nations in atomic research in 1930s, and assumed that they MUST have well-developed nuclear program. The total inability of Allied intelligence to find anything about it was interpreted as total secrecy surrounded German atomic project - and therefore the assumption was made that it must be something VERY important, if Germans put so much efforts in hiding it.

Only after entering the Germany and capturing German scientists, they realized the truth: there was no German atomic project at all. There were a lot of tiny atomic research programs from multiple institutions, that mostly quarrled with each other over the miniscule resources. By 1945, Germans didn't even reach the US level of 1942; the pathetic German "reactor" never worked, they have zero idea about plutonium, and they assumed atomic bomb to be a purely theoretical possibility (as some kind of "exploding reactor")

 

[Dilandu]

The US produced a working copy of the V-1, the JB-2 / Loon (USAAF / Navy designations respectively) just 60 days after the first V-1 fell on England. At one point, the USAAF was planning to produce as many as 5,000 of their version a month--involving Ford Motor Co, Republic Aircraft, and Willy's Overland-- to fire into Germany, then Japan. The plan was nixed because it was deemed inefficient and costly.

To clarify; the US version was more advanced, since it have radio control system and radar transponder, which actually made her capable of hitting the target, not the general area. While JB-2 weren't as accurate as TDR series strike drones of USN, they were much cheaper, and could be produced in large quantities. General Arnold from USAAF really loved them, and wanted JB-2 to be a major part of pre-invasion bombardment of Japan, with hundreds of missiles launched per day. He ordered missile in mass production... but it was calculated, that the production numbers Arnold demanded would require a significant diverting of industrial capabilities, raw materials (the bomb production was supposed to drop about 20% due to explosives being used for JB-2 production) and naval transport (several dozens cargo ships were supposed to be used just to haul missiles from America to Japan).

Furthermore, he wasn't able to figure out how to launch so many missiles per day. Launching them from bombers would clearly be inefficient - even B-29 could carry at most two missiles, a fraction of its normal bomb load. There were plans to launch JB-2 from Navy ships (escort carriers, or LST's), but Navy was reluctant to send those vulnerable, slow ships to lotier near Japanese coastline for weeks. Navy agreed for test launches, thought, and one escort carrier was sent to took the first batch of missiles, but war ended before it returned from California.

Eventually, Arnold was forced to seek army command cooperation: the idea was to launch missiles from beacheads. Army actually liked the idea (after Ardennes, when bad weather paralyzed air support, they have great interest in all-weather missiles), but USAAF weren't eager to handle the missile program to army.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Really? And your evidence for this is what?

The fact that no evidence of an advanced German atomic program has ever been found, and that those who actually worked on it were completely clueless as to *how* to go about building a practical bomb.

 

[edwest4]

The fact that no evidence of an advanced German atomic program has ever been found, and that those who actually worked on it were completely clueless as to *how* to go about building a practical bomb.

That is not consistent with a number of declassified documents and recent scholarly research.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

With the benefit of hindsight, I would argue that the V-1 could have benefitted more as a naval weapon, whether launched from carriers, destroyers, or submarines, manned or unmanned; I can see its naval potential as a ship-bourne flying torpedo, pin-point shore bombardment missile, Kamikaze-style suicide weapon or mass deployable decoy, depending on the scenario and from what type of ship it is deployed from. I recall Italy had something in that vein, in the works, for the RN Impero, but nothing ever materialized from that concept. Meanwhile, I can see the V-2 easily being an area-denial weapon rather than a terror weapon, considering that if its range could be increased or the flight path data more observable (which is asking a lot), and means of manufacture were secure, say underground (e.g. U-Verlagerung Wittringthen), then mobile launching teams could harass enemy logistics or hamper enemy front-line operations (if reconnaissance is on point), in lieu of artillery. Could it have psychological effects on enemy troops? Most certainly. Would that be a war-winning weapon, however? Absolutely not. I'd consider it like a much more intense Nebelwerfer, except you only hear it after its hits the target. Just my two cents.

It would have worked in that capacity, if--and it's big IF--the Germans could have figured out an autonomous terminal homing system to use with it. What they would have needed was something like the USN's Pelican or Bat glide bombs used, a precision conical scan radar that could lock onto a target and allow terminal homing from several miles out. All they'd need aside from that is a means to find targets at longer range and get the missile headed to the general vicinity of that target on its own, or with something like command guidance until it goes terminal.

Quite frankly, that was completely beyond the German state-of-the-art in guidance systems up through the end of the war. The Germans only got as far as defining what such a system would require and some very basic research into how it would actually work. Most of this can be seen with the experimental guidance systems under development for surface-to-air missiles, like Elass, Brabant, or Hawaii II. Even these weren't really as good as the US system used on Pelican or Bat, but they are getting there.

Without a nuclear warhead, the V-2 simply wasn't worth the time and money it cost to develop it. Speaking of nebelwerfer...

In February 1945, the 113th Cavalry Group (US Army) was fired on by several Sturmtigers (38 cm rockets). They initially thought they were hit by V-2 rockets, and the experience was more one of shock than damage. They found out about a week later what the culprit was when a couple of these tanks were captured and they got a look at one.

As a battlefield tactical missile, the V-2 was worthless.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

That is not consistent with a number of declassified documents and recent scholarly research.

This is nothing but an irrelevant Appeal to authority. Scholarly research is often wrong, and you need to let others see the documents you are making the claim about.

 

[Dilandu]

That is not consistent with a number of declassified documents and recent scholarly research.

Erm, are you sure you are willing to go "documents" path again? Because I kinda recall when you paraded a supposedly-Soviet document about German nuclear tests in 1944, and I easily found a number of obvious mistakes in it...

 

[edwest4]

This is nothing but an irrelevant Appeal to authority. Scholarly research is often wrong, and you need to let others see the documents you are making the claim about.

And yet you would prefer any book that supports your claims. That's not research. I have full document titles and archive locations. The information they contain is unambiguous.

 

[edwest4]

Erm, are you sure you are willing to go "documents" path again? Because I kinda recall when you paraded a supposedly-Soviet document about German nuclear tests in 1944, and I easily found a number of obvious mistakes in it...

I did not post the Soviet document. My documents are of American origin primarily, with some British.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

To clarify; the US version was more advanced, since it have radio control system and radar transponder, which actually made her capable of hitting the target, not the general area. While JB-2 weren't as accurate as TDR series strike drones of USN, they were much cheaper, and could be produced in large quantities. General Arnold from USAAF really loved them, and wanted JB-2 to be a major part of pre-invasion bombardment of Japan, with hundreds of missiles launched per day. He ordered missile in mass production... but it was calculated, that the production numbers Arnold demanded would require a significant diverting of industrial capabilities, raw materials (the bomb production was supposed to drop about 20% due to explosives being used for JB-2 production) and naval transport (several dozens cargo ships were supposed to be used just to haul missiles from America to Japan).

Furthermore, he wasn't able to figure out how to launch so many missiles per day. Launching them from bombers would clearly be inefficient - even B-29 could carry at most two missiles, a fraction of its normal bomb load. There were plans to launch JB-2 from Navy ships (escort carriers, or LST's), but Navy was reluctant to send those vulnerable, slow ships to lotier near Japanese coastline for weeks. Navy agreed for test launches, thought, and one escort carrier was sent to took the first batch of missiles, but war ended before it returned from California.

Eventually, Arnold was forced to seek army command cooperation: the idea was to launch missiles from beacheads. Army actually liked the idea (after Ardennes, when bad weather paralyzed air support, they have great interest in all-weather missiles), but USAAF weren't eager to handle the missile program to army.

Sorry, I just didn't want to get into the weeds on the JB-2 / Loon in this thread. If there were one specifically for it...

 

[Dilandu]

I did not post the Soviet document. My documents are of American origin primarily, with some British.

My bad. I recalled this theme and it wasn't you. My apologies.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

And yet you would prefer any book that supports your claims. That's not research. I have full document titles and archive locations. The information they contain is unambiguous.

No, I want stuff that's accurate and reasonably well documented. Just because someone writes a book and puts in a bibliography doesn't mean they're correct. When you make extraordinary claims in particular, you better have damn good evidence to back them up. With ordinary claims, it's easier to produce some evidence as there are many other sources that will confirm your claim. When you are claiming something contrary or new to existing evidence, you need a stronger proof.

 

[edwest4]

No, I want stuff that's accurate and reasonably well documented. Just because someone writes a book and puts in a bibliography doesn't mean they're correct. When you make extraordinary claims in particular, you better have damn good evidence to back them up. With ordinary claims, it's easier to produce some evidence as there are many other sources that will confirm your claim. When you are claiming something contrary or new to existing evidence, you need a stronger proof.

I'm talking about original documents not books. A number of German language books have added significant amounts of information and photos. For example, the book Kernfusion and Kernwaffenentwicklung contains a photo of an Ultracentrifuge that is in the Deutsches Museum in Munich. You can go there to view it in person.

 

[Dilandu]

For example, the book Kernfusion and Kernwaffenentwicklung contains a photo of an Ultracentrifuge that is in the Deutsches Museum in Munich. You can go there to view it in person.

And how the well-known existence of ultracentrifuge proves anything besides that German have one such apparatus - an experimental setup?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I'm talking about original documents not books. A number of German language books have added significant amounts of information and photos. For example, the book Kernfusion and Kernwaffenentwicklung contains a photo of an Ultracentrifuge that is in the Deutsches Museum in Munich. You can go there to view it in person.

So? As I pointed out elsewhere, ultracentrifuges had been around since 1924 and were known to everyone in those industries and areas of research. They weren't some new and suddenly unknown outside of Germany development. They were also very limited in size due to their speed of operation and need for very precise balancing.

As for original documents... These can be useful, but they aren't some panacea. They can be factually wrong as at the time they were produced information that went into them was limited or even wrong. A vague original document is often nearly worthless other than possibly as a starting point to look for more information.

 

[Orionblamblam]

That is not consistent with a number of declassified documents and recent scholarly research.

*You* made the positive claim, it's therefore up to *you* to back it up. Something that provides evidence of, say, the production of at least dozens of grams of plutonium 239, kilos of uranium 235. Evidence, not claims.

We're waiting.

 

[edwest4]

So? As I pointed out elsewhere, ultracentrifuges had been around since 1924 and were known to everyone in those industries and areas of research. They weren't some new and suddenly unknown outside of Germany development. They were also very limited in size due to their speed of operation and need for very precise balancing.

As for original documents... These can be useful, but they aren't some panacea. They can be factually wrong as at the time they were produced information that went into them was limited or even wrong. A vague original document is often nearly worthless other than possibly as a starting point to look for more information.

You are employing the wishful thinking approach. You want, very much, what you want. You believe the common story. Anything outside of the common story returns you to a state of wishful thinking. Oh well.

 

[edwest4]

*You* made the positive claim, it's therefore up to *you* to back it up. Something that provides evidence of, say, the production of at least dozens of grams of plutonium 239, kilos of uranium 235. Evidence, not claims.

We're waiting.

I have it, but I know the Standard Operating Procedure here. Ridicule followed by questioning the mental state of the poster(s). Followed by thread locking.

I'll just finish my book.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I have it, but I know the Standard Operating Procedure here. Ridicule followed by questioning the mental state of the poster(s). Followed by thread locking.

I'll just finish my book.

You are aware of just how many ultracentrifuges are required for a refining cascade, right? Thousands. IIRC the Iranian cascade has over 17,000 centrifuges in a single complex.

How many have been found in Germany? And in how many different places?