USS Bonhomme Richard

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I can believe it, the way fire moves through compartments can get you a fairly untouched space adjacent to one that's gutted. That said, temperature and water damage concerns would still be in effect for those spaces until they're thoroughly inspected.
 
Following all the comments here, the ship sounds like a write-off. I'm wondering why they just didn't tow it to a deep part of the harbor and scuttle it. It would have been cheaper to raise it afterwards ---
Regarding letting her go down to flood the fire and raise her later from the bay bottom, I did think about that yesterday and came to the conclusion that the large hangar (empty volume) could have been holding too much water to make the operation safe structurally.
And it's not like you could have pumped it out easily.
Moreover, as suggested by @TomS , towing her out could have risked blocking the bay for other ships or present a hazard for nearby habitations.
But I am sure San Diego Naval base has a contengency plan and they acted upon.
 
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TomcatVIP's article states that the ship's Halon fire suppression system was down for maintenance work. Not wanting to make any uninformed excuses here, but what a colossal stroke of bad luck there.
 
Following all the comments here, the ship sounds like a write-off. I'm wondering why they just didn't tow it to a deep part of the harbor and scuttle it. It would have been cheaper to raise it afterwards ---

There isn't a ton of deep water around, and worst case you get her into the channel and she turns turtle right there. If they lost her pierside then that side of the pier is tied up but they are a lot better positioned to either refloat her or cut her up in place. But it sounds like they have dewatering underway so it's unlikely that she's going to sink before they get the fires out.

In the latest press briefing, the admiral said they are not aware of fire reaching "critical" machinery spaces. Given that the lower vehicle hold is apparently adjacent to the main machinery spaces, that seems unlikely but a miracle if true.
There's only one channel into San Diego Bay and an unplanned grounding or sinking could trap a big part of the Pacific fleet. Also, scuttling usually requires that someone open valves to flood major spaces - I doubt that those valves are accessible in the ship's current state. Of course, you could just blow holes in the hull with explosives, but that just creates a bigger mess - TomS is correct that the whole situation is easier to manage pierside.
Towing her might have made sense if thaere was a lot of ordinance aboard and a danger of explosion, but the route to open ocean goes right past an air station, an airport, a sub base and downtown San Diego.
 
Holes in the island structure, but not the flight deck as far as I can see. Rebuilding/replacing the island is not easy but it's within what I'd consider the range of the doable. The question is where the hull structure itself has been so weakened by prolonged exposure to high temperatures that it cannot handle the loads associated with operating the ship for the remainder of its service life. There's little chance repairing an extensively compromised hull is going to be acceptable from a cost and time point of view.
Didn't they resurface the flight decks with new insulating materials in response to higher F35 exhaust temperatures? It may be there are holes in the deck material which are being hidden by that layer.
 
TomcatVIP's article states that the ship's Halon fire suppression system was down for maintenance work. Not wanting to make any uninformed excuses here, but what a colossal stroke of bad luck there.
It strikes me that we're likely going to see some change of doctrine on that, or possibly interest in developing portablel fire suppression systems that can be set up when a ship's own system is not operational for whatever reason.

Though I will mention what one friend from the UK mentioned: "It puts things in perspective. For anyone else, this would be a decades long loss, presuming you could get the money to build a new big ship. For America? Bloody hell, we've lost on of our smaller carriers. Pop on over to the reserve yard and see if the ones we have stored in there can be brought out, there you go."
 
Though I will mention what one friend from the UK mentioned: "It puts things in perspective. For anyone else, this would be a decades long loss, presuming you could get the money to build a new big ship. For America? Bloody hell, we've lost on of our smaller carriers. Pop on over to the reserve yard and see if the ones we have stored in there can be brought out, there you go."

Unfortunately, that may not quite the case these days.
 
I know it's possibly not directly relevant here, and the Bonhomme Richard IS a disaster, but there has been a 'history' of ship losses when alongside.
CGM Normandie in New York, RMS Queen Elizabeth in Hong Kong (okay, not alongside, but no proper crew on board) all fire boats/land-based firefighters pumping water aboard).
Unfortunately you need a trained crew (preferably at sea) to combat a fire onboard. There is virtually no danger of capsize due to excessive amounts of water being pumped aboard (Normandie and Queen Elizabeth - okay, Seawise University)...
 
I know it's possibly not directly relevant here, and the Bonhomme Richard IS a disaster, but there has been a 'history' of ship losses when alongside.
CGM Normandie in New York, RMS Queen Elizabeth in Hong Kong (okay, not alongside, but no proper crew on board) all fire boats/land-based firefighters pumping water aboard).
Unfortunately you need a trained crew (preferably at sea) to combat a fire onboard. There is virtually no danger of capsize due to excessive amounts of water being pumped aboard (Normandie and Queen Elizabeth - okay, Seawise University)...

The imperative of getting water out of the ship and avoiding free surface in compartments was always very high on the priority list for damage control training. Some of that was for flooding rather than fire, but the danger of stability issues from firefighting was also a factor. To pick an example, USS Stark got in a bad way due to firefighting water that had nowhere to go until they started cutting drain holes in the hull plating (17 degrees of list, and no penetrations below the waterline, AFAIK).
 
I just hope our overlords consider how ants feel, as their heel strikes the delete key....
 
TomcatVIP's article states that the ship's Halon fire suppression system was down for maintenance work. Not wanting to make any uninformed excuses here, but what a colossal stroke of bad luck there.
It strikes me that we're likely going to see some change of doctrine on that, or possibly interest in developing portablel fire suppression systems that can be set up when a ship's own system is not operational for whatever reason.

Though I will mention what one friend from the UK mentioned: "It puts things in perspective. For anyone else, this would be a decades long loss, presuming you could get the money to build a new big ship. For America? Bloody hell, we've lost on of our smaller carriers. Pop on over to the reserve yard and see if the ones we have stored in there can be brought out, there you go."
They can probably cover the gap by reworking training and 'time alongside'. You still have the crew, so they can roster them around, and then they will have to get their cheque book out.

On fire suppression, some form of remote controlled unit could be possible? Heat detector and suppressant, like the big fire extinguishers for aircraft ground use.
 
On fire suppression, some form of remote controlled unit could be possible? Heat detector and suppressant, like the big fire extinguishers for aircraft ground use.

Independent from a ships main fire fighting system you mean? Well the USN have been recently developing & testing SAFFiR (Shipboard Autonomous Firefighting Robot).
 
On fire suppression, some form of remote controlled unit could be possible? Heat detector and suppressant, like the big fire extinguishers for aircraft ground use.

Independent from a ships main fire fighting system you mean? Well the USN have been recently developing & testing SAFFiR (Shipboard Autonomous Firefighting Robot).
Yes, a self contained - battery powered, sensor and extinguisher/suppressor. Obviously you would need 1 in every room/void. This is while the central system is disabled.
 
Is it usual to disable so much of a ships fire fighting capacity, disabling extinguishers, blocking fire doors, etc? Can't help thinking that they've accepted the risks for doing a lot of work in parallel here because it reduces expensive time in dock, but this time it's all gone horribly wrong. Wouldn't there be regs for ensuring the vessel isn't left in too vulnerable a state while work's being carried out?
 
Is it usual to disable so much of a ships fire fighting capacity, disabling extinguishers, blocking fire doors, etc? Can't help thinking that they've accepted the risks for doing a lot of work in parallel here because it reduces expensive time in dock, but this time it's all gone horribly wrong. Wouldn't there be regs for ensuring the vessel isn't left in too vulnerable a state while work's being carried out?

Pretty typical for a yard availability. The fact that the Halon system was specifically down for maintenance was more unusual, but it had to happen at some point.

They are supposed to take extra precautions -- more rovers, firewatch standing by whenever a contractor is doing hot work, daily drills (which tend to become routine, not useful drills), etc. But with such a small duty section on board, they might have been overstretched.

The Navy has said there was no welding going on where the fire started, which to me suggests it might be an oily rag situation -- oils and paints on rags can spontaneously combust if not properly disposed of. There should be water barrels for rag disposal, but if someone just left a pile in a corner somewhere, they could autoignite and set off other combustables.
 
While working as a security escort for contractors while the reconstruction of YYC* was going on while it was still in operation (*Calgary International and for nearly ten years), the fire alarm sound were disabled in the control room around the construction areas, mostly because just dust would actually set them off. To offset that, there was/is 'fire watch' people 24-7 ---
 
So overnight last night, it seems the list on the ship reversed from starboard (away from the pier) to port (toward the pier) prompting a temporary evacuation of the ship and pier. That's more than a bit concerning. They really need to get a handle on the ship's stability and dewatering efforts.

Interesting editorial here: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ost-vulnerable-in-port-and-how-to-change-that

Can't entirely agree with his conclusions that adopting principles from nuclear power ship maintenance would solve this problem, given that catastrophic fire on Miami, also in a maintenance availability. Of course, that was an arson, but clearly that "clean" nuclear ship had plenty to burn once the fire got going.
 
I don't think it would solve the problem, but a more Rickover-ian the mindset would at least be an improvement.

I'm hopeful there's some dewatering discussion in the next PC. While getting to the point they can declare the fire "out" is no doubt a focus, massive list trim changes like we've seen should put stability right back at the top of the priority list.
 
Finger crossed to see the fate of that unfortunate ship... will probably takes weeks or months to see whether it is a total loss or not.
MN Perle, we still don't know.
 
It depends on the hull and flight deck. If the ribs are heavily heat stressed to the point that they've warped/weakened, she'll be a total loss. The more intractable problem is how much of the interior of the ship so they need to replace. If the majority of the ship has been gutted, it may very well be deemed not worth the cost to repair her given she only has 10-12 years of service left in her. Strictly a wild guess, but if the repairs cost over 50% of the cost of a replacement, they'll scrap her. And the actual percentage they use may be even lower given she only has about 1/3 of her life left.
 
I don't even think it's going to be based on cost versus future service life, it's going to be cost versus "what else would that money buy in next year's budget." Because I really don't think they can expect a topline increase to cover it, so if they want to spend it on LHD-6, they're going to have to cut it from somewhere else.

The Navy is already struggling with the new Commandant's desire for smaller amphibs, and how the heck they are going to crew those new ships (assuming they happen). Procurement money is actually secondary, because they should be really cheap ships with no notable combat systems; manning is the actual limiting factor the Navy set on the possible size and numbers of those new ships. In a way, this disaster is going to be seen as a godsend, because they can now steal reallocate those billets to new platforms in the next couple of years without a major upheaval elsewhere in the Navy.
 
The fire on the Bonhomme Richard started Sunday morning in a storage cargo hold. Navy officials said no welding or other hot work was being done in the hold, to their knowledge. The blaze traveled up a well deck — a hangar-like structure — and shot through upper decks, scorching and melting the ships’ superstructure and toppling its forward mast.
Navy leaders said the ship’s system that starves fires of oxygen was not in operation during ship repairs. Also crew members preparing to launch another system that puts foam on flames were forced to evacuate by an explosion.

 
This discussion gives an excellent view of the dangers of shipyard time, most of it obviously correct, once pointed out. But an inherently dangerous situation does not make something like this inevitable. Dangerous situations just require more contingency planning and extra precautions. While sound preparation can't prevent every accident, it can prevent the most likely ones and, in most cases, limit the damage caused by the unexpected. Yes, the ship lacked the full damage control capabilities it would have while fully manned and under way. But that just raises a bigger question: knowing this, how did the Navy address this danger? What damage control capabilities were in place to contain fire while under shipyard conditions? Oily rags and cable runs blocking fire doors are good examples, whether or not they actually contributed to fire. These are known hazards, even in the shore-side construction industry where I once worked, and there are standard precautions for dealing with them. Sure, people violate the rules. But in a well-run organization someone (me back in the day) was tasked with looking for piles of oily rags and blocked fire doors.

So one has to wonder about negligence and command responsibility. Someone was in command of the ship while it was under refit and someone was in command of the Navy yard. And so on up the chain of command. Each of these officers was responsible for his or her command. Now if this were a one-off fluke, we might be able to put it down to bad luck. But it isn't. The Navy has had a series of preventable disasters in the last few decades where senior officers appear to have been derelict in their duties yet were never called to account, from the 16-in gun explosion in the '80s through multiple ship collisions and groundings and the Marine air-refueling catastrophe covered extensively in Pro Publica. In each of these cases, the Navy turned out to have cut funding for relevant training and maintenance (to save money for prestigious acquisitions) and to have undermanned to the point that crews were overly tired and stretched to the limit. In each case negligent middle-ranking officers compounded the problems. Instead of investigating and reestablishing discipline, the Navy chose to misrepresent facts and cover up. It blamed crew and low-ranking officers for decisions that they hadn't (and couldn't have) made in order to protect the all-important careers of the high-ranking officers that actually made the decisions.

Until that stops, ships are going to be lost. In this case, thank heaven, no one was killed at least.
 
A lot of post-Cold War and more recent 'Cost Efficiencies' doubtless contributed to this disaster.
 
Depending on the type and on where in the maintenance period the ship was it could be either under naval material control or this could have been transferred to the contractor managing the project. Under naval control the crew will fight to save the ship, under commercial control the priority switches to life, i.e. a ship undergoing trials with a civilian crew under civilian command will be abandoned and allowed to burn to the waterline as that is the legal requirement on the civilian project manager and the civilian master (if there is one) the preservation of life. This was very clear on every project I worked on, don't be a hero, save yourself, then if safe to do so, save others, and only then worry about the ship.
 
The good news of the sad story is that shipyards around tthe world are facing a major economic crisis of a type as never seen before, putting de-facto the Navy on the strong position to bargain prices and compress schedule.
 
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So this is how it's supposed to happen (minus the stop-work order)

A rapidly extinguished fire aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge prompted the Navy to issue a “stop work order” Friday to General Dynamics NASSCO shipyard in Norfolk, Naval Sea Systems Command told Defense News Saturday.

The incident started when a spark from welding landed on nearby material, which was then quickly put out by the fire watch. Fire watch is a sailor or contractor who stands nearby with a fire hose and/or extinguisher to stop a larger blaze in its tracks.

In a statement, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Rory O’Connor said the “stop work” was to ensure the company followed fire safety protocols.


 
Wow. Looks like an old T-Top camaro pulled out of the barn (1st pic).
Show us how brave are all those young sailors.
 
That thing is bound to become a coral reef somewhere...
 
That thing is bound to become a coral reef somewhere...
Nah. She's too damaged. They can't properly remove hazardous materials. She'll be scrapped. Plus, she's pretty modern. The US won't want to sink her anywhere she's easily accessible. It's why USS America was sunk in such deep water.
 
If this was a Royal Canadian Navy ship, cost is not that simole to calculate, because new purchases require years' long debates in Parliament while repairs are paid from a different "shoe box."
Sometimes repairs and over-hauls require "creative accounting." For example, when HMCS Bonaventure was last re-fitted (mid 1960s) no-one budgeted for repairs to the ring fire main, but it was found badly rusted, so repairs were covered under $1000. "locker repairs."
 
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