Circling back to the digital century series discussion for a sec…
I’ve been under the impression that the argument for it operates in two parts, and I’m wondering if others agree in their interpretation or not.
As I hear it, the main argument is that if you look at the life cycle costs of your generic fighter aircraft program, MRO and upgrades are more expensive than R&D and acquisition. And, this goes double (or some other financially painful multiplier) for stealth, as well as for aircraft late in their fatigue lifetimes.
Therefore, according to this argument, we are irrational in our tendency to try to buy future-proofed, long-fatigue-life airplanes that push the state of the art rather than embody it. Instead, we should cut back on sustainment costs by building mechanically less robust airframes with off-the-shelf avionic systems (though we should evolve what off-the-shelf means in a steady, independent way). A new generation of cheaper, shorter lifetime systems can provide equal capability for less cost, or greater fleet size for equal cost, and then when it ages quickly out of service, it can be replaced by new tails that do the same. And so we just buy more tails per decade, while retiring more tails per decade. 10 year airplanes rather than 30 year, say.
And then the second part of the argument comes in as an independent premise: that digital engineering tech has more or less advanced to the point where projects can go from RFP to squadron service in approximately the fatigue lifetime stated above.
Since cleansheet designs can appear so rapidly, tail churn can be equivalent to type replacement, resulting in a new jet type each decade, or mutatis mutandis for fleets with multiple types at any given time. If you had a future fighter force of two types at any time, for example, you could have a new type entering every five years if you staggered things.
So, again according to the argument, if we just have the courage to make the up-front investment in new airplanes, we can address the problems of the current thirty fatigue year model in general, and the sustainment costs of the F-35 in particular, all basically for free, while also getting to refresh our fleet decadally and therefore to tune its parameters against specific threats on something like a decadal basis.
Does that sound like a fair rendering of the argument? I seem to be hearing it as much less whiz-bang than others, who seem to hear “glittering edge faster!” and “cool new stylez!” much more. To me it all seems worrisome…with platform characteristics taking center stage and practicalities of testing, validation, maintenance, pilot familiarization, tactics development, and the like being potentially shortchanged. IMO, the fighter fleet needs range and maybe a second crewmember for battle management, but after that I don’t think platform design will win wars, unless maybe laser needs dictate constantly evolving platforms, which I doubt. Would love to hear other opinions though.
Would also appreciate it if anyone could comment on (my names for them) NGAD-C and NGAD-R being examples of this. My impression is that modern digital tools have been in use, but the digital century series hasn’t been implemented for crewed fighters, and is increasingly seen as more expensive and perhaps less practical than advertised…fighters not being smartphones after all…