USAF/US NAVY 6th Generation Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

@BDF : I think you forgot to factor-in the effect of having shared sub-systems and software across different airframe. That will translate into substantial cross-fleet economies. IMOHO you should add a K factor into the above equation and add fleet numbers:

With Ni the N number of airframe of type i fleet, TOC = $160M * K*Sqrt(N1+N2+...+Nn).
With K a function of the level of cross-integration of sub-systems (K>1 and lim(K) =1 when integration is fully optimal). K is an indice of Quality.
This all sounds good in theory until you realize the standardized frameworks and interfaces you need to get your modularizable solution can end up imposing their own performance constraints, especially for hardware with a lot of integrated dependencies. There are serious problems in trying to adapt software development models, which tend to benefit from open ended and adaptive development paths for meeting performance parameters (both as a function of their level of abstraction and in no small part thanks to excess of computational power now available), as well as fast iterative workflows (updating code is a much less burdensome task than tinkering with physical hardware) to hardware domains where constraints are physically based and hitting performance targets require specific integration dependencies that are closed looped.

Often times what ends up happening when these models from software engineering are applied too zealously to hardware is that you end up compounding the cost problem when you find yourself spending time not so much updating components as you are wasting time trying to update the original frameworks to enable greater capability for future technology that works differently from the protocols that the framework was originally configured for. Modular iterative approaches are essentially vulnerable to greater technical debt that accumulates as the framework ages, and this technical debt tends to be a lot more costly when what you’re trying to fit together are complex physical objects rather than abstract logic represented by lines of code. This doesn’t mean that these kinds of iterative open ended program concepts can’t work, but there are a lot of ways they can go horribly wrong, amplifying the time, performance, and resource problems that were originally meant to be solved by its adoption.
after reading this, it once again becomes a big issue...Why manned craft adding continual complication and cost?
Part of the issue is that the component technologies themselves have become more complicated. The more complicated your component technology the more the complications of their integration dependencies multiply by an order of magnitude. Frankly, I think if a modular solution is what you want, it makes more sense to unpack one complex integrated platform into a bunch of distribute and delegated platforms, than to welcome in the contradiction of trying to make a complex integrated platform more modular in its internal construction and design. Alternatively, you can also focus on simplifying your component technologies rather than modularizing your integrated platform. No amount of modularization will make your integrated platform more adaptable if the components that are being integrated only increase in complexity. A lot of what goes into making these kinds of products more program efficient and effective really comes down to managing complexity rather than increasing iteration or modularity.
 
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This all sounds good in theory until you realize the standardized frameworks and interfaces you need to get your modularizable solution can end up imposing their own performance constraints, especially for hardware with a lot of integrated dependencies.
Such as? How would standardized interfaces between engine and airframe impose performance constraints? Between sensor and aircraft?
 
This all sounds good in theory until you realize the standardized frameworks and interfaces you need to get your modularizable solution can end up imposing their own performance constraints, especially for hardware with a lot of integrated dependencies.
Such as? How would standardized interfaces between engine and airframe impose performance constraints? Between sensor and aircraft?
Depends on who’s controlling development of the component systems. Let’s say you standardize the engine diameter in order to avoid having to make modifications to the bulkheads and the arrangement of interior compartments. Suddenly new requirements in a round of future iterations make a wider diameter engine the natural way to go. Now you have to choose between 1) accepting less capability, 2) reworking the airframe, 3) finding a different development route to reach those requirements, all of which end up making your life harder rather than easier.

If you control the *whole* stack of technology and fully develop multiple potential pipeline paths for component systems then you can probably enforce a standardized interface that would be free of these compatibility and dependency risks. If you don’t you’re not really saving yourself more on difficulty and cost, and perhaps even making iteration more difficult and costly because you’re now engineering with an extra set of constraints. But if you are planning that far ahead you might be locking yourself out from some emerging tech as well.

I’m not proposing that this is black and white, just pointing out that the viability and efficacy of this sort of batch iterative process has a lot of extra caveats and conditions that you need to get right in order to make it work, and there are a lot of ways this could go wrong. Organization and program design are still going to matter a whole lot and if there’s no mind paid for the ways this kind of novel product development model can go sideways things can get really ugly really fast. A case example of taking modularity for granted and trying to play the product development game too clever by half, not paying heed to the complex realities of inherent integration dependencies, is the 737 MAX MCAS debacle. Novel product development models always sound like gravy until you get into the thicket of details.
 
Although not the greatest analogy auto assembly plants are hugely complex systems utilizing automation, robotics humans and information systems to produce cars routinely 240 days a year. It takes interfacing all the systems they contain to produce the flow thru the plant and the outcome, a new vehicle, out the door. By the standards employed by the auto industry the design of a new aircraft would be easy. Systems constantly change and there is no magic control of that. It just takes good old fashioned engineering. Over the years design teams amass the "institutional knowledge" that reduces their chances of going down the wrong path. It may seem daunting to an individual who has not done sophisticated engineering but for the many who have it's another day at the office. The key isn't so much the system but the individuals that know how to put it all together and the only way you get there is thru experience.
 
"Depends on who’s controlling development " yes as the suspicion of which agendas are at play is always more important than the technology. B-17s where massed produced quickly during WWII and one would assume sped up assembly could evolve quickly even in the modern complex context if there where intent.

Engine diameter is another argument for the optimum baseline craft, for instance. Most efficient Intake size would seem to be an easy calculation for multi-mission baseline for next 20yrs... A"peer reviewed Plato's perfect form" capability/size, lift to weight, endurance/speed, multi-mission baseline aircraft could easily be calculated. Internal volumn for stealth and the gun(s) options would seem to be key also.
 
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Although not the greatest analogy auto assembly plants are hugely complex systems utilizing automation, robotics humans and information systems to produce cars routinely 240 days a year. It takes interfacing all the systems they contain to produce the flow thru the plant and the outcome, a new vehicle, out the door. By the standards employed by the auto industry the design of a new aircraft would be easy. Systems constantly change and there is no magic control of that. It just takes good old fashioned engineering. Over the years design teams amass the "institutional knowledge" that reduces their chances of going down the wrong path. It may seem daunting to an individual who has not done sophisticated engineering but for the many who have it's another day at the office. The key isn't so much the system but the individuals that know how to put it all together and the only way you get there is thru experience.
Modern military aircraft are far more complex pieces of technology than cars. Cars don't even need deep software integration to operate all their basic functions. Furthermore, your "institutional knowledge" is only as good as the last iteration of your design.
 
This all sounds good in theory until you realize the standardized frameworks and interfaces you need to get your modularizable solution can end up imposing their own performance constraints, especially for hardware with a lot of integrated dependencies.
Such as? How would standardized interfaces between engine and airframe impose performance constraints? Between sensor and aircraft?
Depends on who’s controlling development of the component systems. Let’s say you standardize the engine diameter in order to avoid having to make modifications to the bulkheads and the arrangement of interior compartments. Suddenly new requirements in a round of future iterations make a wider diameter engine the natural way to go. Now you have to choose between 1) accepting less capability, 2) reworking the airframe, 3) finding a different development route to reach those requirements, all of which end up making your life harder rather than easier.

Not necessarily. Standardizing interfaces would, almost by definition, include a degree of future-proofing. You're not going to suddenly decide to put a 6 foot diameter engine in a fighter so that would almost be trivial.
 
"Lethality" and "business case" says Roper but what ever happened to 'Full Spectrum Effects'. If these things are as expensive and remain manned they need to do a little bit of just about everything in High Intensity Conflict.
 
DARPA ACE AI soars as an Albatros:
The overall focus of ACE is to develop and measure human trust in artificial intelligence (AI). The technologies developed within the ACE program will ultimately enable future pilots to confidently offload some high workload tactical tasks like visual air-to-air engagements so they can better focus on managing the larger battlespace.

Under this contract Calspan Flight Research will modify up to four Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatros jet trainers with Calspan’s proprietary autonomous fly-by-wire flight control system technology to allow implementation and demonstration of advanced Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) and AI algorithms. Flight tests and demonstrations will be conducted from the Calspan Flight Research Facility at the Niagara Falls, NY, International Airport and flown in the Misty Military Operating Area (MOA) over nearby Lake Ontario.

“Calspan is proud of our selection by DARPA to build an airborne air combat experimentation lab for the ACE program,” said Peter Sauer, Calspan President. Louis Knotts, Calspan Owner and CEO added “Since 1947, Calspan has been the world’s premier innovator, developer, and operator of in-flight simulators and UAV surrogates. This program presents an outstanding opportunity for Calspan to partner with DARPA for the use of our programmable flight control technology and provide them with a safe and flexible means to flight test these advanced algorithms.”

 
"Lethality" and "business case" says Roper but what ever happened to 'Full Spectrum Effects'. If these things are as expensive and remain manned they need to do a little bit of just about everything in High Intensity Conflict.

Corporate style thinking is indeed one of the reasons that the defenses of the United States are in such a mess.
 
Corporate style thinking is indeed one of the reasons that the defenses of the United States are in such a mess.
Imagine if defense contractors weren't publicly owned.
Privately owned companies.... What a threat? lol

I didn't see anything said about "ownership". Grey Havoc remarked on "corporate thinking", which, as any rational person who has worked within a large modern corporation knows, is not thinking at all, at least not in any good sense.

"Corporate thinking" incorporates all the shortcomings of collective group-think but replaces the latter's commitment to democracy and social solidarity with naked self interest. NOT corporate interest--self interest, the interests of executive management and those determined to kiss up and kick down in the generally futile hope of replacing those above them. Corporate think sees business as a zero-sum game, where the all important CEO and his cronies can only win to the extent that others lose. So it prioritizes corporate politics over economic reality. It seeks short-term gains that make internal stock options profitable over sustainable, year over year profits or investment in the company. Monopoly is more profitable than competition, so it makes "sense" to buy competitors instead of developing new and better products of its own.

Defense corporations are probably worse than normal in this respect, because they generally have only one essential customer--a sovereign state in which they are incorporated and that has to use their products. So requirements can, in most cases, be ignored. The corporation just needs to cozy up to the right government officials and promise cushy, high-paying, post-retirement jobs/consultancies to selected generals, admirals, bureaucrats, and/or politicians. Sometimes, corporate think simplifies things even further and just pays bribes (Cunningham, the Hunters, and many other examples).

Corporate think can accept all of the above while trying to make its non-executive-track employees believe the exact opposite. Mere workers get business ethics classes that say that the company's high ethics forbid exactly what it does--at least in the case of mere workers. They enjoy the privilege of attending workshops, reading email from the CEO, and seeing posters in the cafeteria, all proclaiming the new quality management methodology. These all rest on the assertion that quality and innovation do not depend on investment in R&D, tooling, or even quality inspectors. Quality is not a characteristic of the things the company makes. Instead, quality is something happens when we embrace methodology and learn and use its terminology (and acronyms): Total Quality Management (TQM), Six Sigma (the one that corporatist demigod Jack Welch used to make his fortune while driving the reliably profitable GE to the brink of bankruptcy), SMART goals, Agile, and many many more that I've thankfully forgotten. If quality problems emerge thereafter, someone didn't use the right wording (or possibly colors) in their PowerPoint slide.

No, at this point, private ownership has nothing to do with the state of the defense industry or of the economy in general. Remember the USSR? The much derided centrally planned economy? The Five-Year Plans? It was a corporation managed by boards (soviets) and a chairman who supposedly ran the economy for the benefit of the owners (the people) but instead made a good thing out of it for themselves by issuing Plans instead of making stuff the owners needed. Who does or does not own resources is immaterial. What counts is control. In the Soviet state that was, the neo-Soviet/mafia state that replaced it, in the US, the UK, or most of Europe, control has long since fallen into the hands of unelected bureaucrats. If you happen to own shares in a major corporation, ask yourself, how much control does that give you? Whether you vote your shares at the annual meeting, don't vote, or don't even own shares, your effect on current corporate governance is the same: nil, just as when Russians voted for the Chairman and Central Committee of the Soviet-era Communist Party. In both systems, you get the slate of officers and members recommended by the current officers and members The fact that said officers and members no longer draw government salaries the way that they did under Stalin does not seem significant to me.

If more people actually read Adam Smith and David Ricardo, these myths about ownership would go away.
 
So how many F-15EX will the USAF eventually buy? According to the article the USAF are currently buying an initial order for eight aircraft, I suppose that there will be more orders to come for Boeing.
 
It is so weird, to think brand new F-15s will be bought by USAF. For the record, that bird while still formidable, will be 50 years old in 2022.
 
It is so weird, to think brand new F-15s will be bought by USAF. For the record, that bird while still formidable, will be 50 years old in 2022.

It would not surprise me if the F-15 were to go on to become 60 or even 70 years old by the time that the USAF finally get around to retiring the F-15.
 
Well those F-15C are in service since the days I was a voracious toddler - the mid-80's. So they lasted 30 years or more.

Hence so F-15EX should be retired by 2055... :eek: Well if they pull a U-2, that will be 2080 or even beyond.
 
My $0.02 is this is a misplaced procurement. IMO we should be accelerating the F-35, putting more money into PCA & F-22 upgrades and increasing B-21 buys. Personally I'd like to see the fighter fleet in the USAF truncated down to F-22 and F-35 with a large increase in B-21 buy. While this new F-15 is undoubtedly more capable than the F-15C fleet its still a 4th gen jet and the reasons for its acquisition are marginal IMO.
 
Buying the F-15EX is one of the smartest moves the USAF ever made. Not everything needs to be stealthy. we're still going to be fighting wars similar to what we've been fighting for the past two decades and you don't need stealth for that. Unless you just want to spend more money than you have to needlessly. That kind of thinking reminds me of the decades the USAF spent trying to replace A-10s with F-16s because they aren't pointy enough.

Also, neither the F-22 or F-35 are going to be carrying loadouts like this: The F-22 doesn't have the room and the F-35 doesn't have the altitude capability to maximize the effectiveness of the hypersonic weapon. View: https://twitter.com/TheDEWLine/status/1282796274836746247/photo/1
 
The United States needs more F-22s, full stop. The F-35 is a disastrous dead end at best, and that is if one is being generous.
 
Buying the F-15EX is one of the smartest moves the USAF ever made. Not everything needs to be stealthy. we're still going to be fighting wars similar to what we've been fighting for the past two decades and you don't need stealth for that. Unless you just want to spend more money than you have to needlessly. That kind of thinking reminds me of the decades the USAF spent trying to replace A-10s with F-16s because they aren't pointy enough.

Also, neither the F-22 or F-35 are going to be carrying loadouts like this: The F-22 doesn't have the room and the F-35 doesn't have the altitude capability to maximize the effectiveness of the hypersonic weapon. View: https://twitter.com/TheDEWLine/status/1282796274836746247/photo/1

How many LRASM/JASSM-ERs can the F-15EX carry? 2? 4? or more?
 
The United States needs more F-22s, full stop. The F-35 is a disastrous dead end at best, and that is if one is being generous.

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My $0.02 is this is a misplaced procurement. IMO we should be accelerating the F-35, putting more money into PCA & F-22 upgrades and increasing B-21 buys. Personally I'd like to see the fighter fleet in the USAF truncated down to F-22 and F-35 with a large increase in B-21 buy. While this new F-15 is undoubtedly more capable than the F-15C fleet its still a 4th gen jet and the reasons for its acquisition are marginal IMO.
It's basically a missile truck that can defend itself.
 
Buying the F-15EX is one of the smartest moves the USAF ever made. Not everything needs to be stealthy. we're still going to be fighting wars similar to what we've been fighting for the past two decades and you don't need stealth for that. Unless you just want to spend more money than you have to needlessly. That kind of thinking reminds me of the decades the USAF spent trying to replace A-10s with F-16s because they aren't pointy enough.

Also, neither the F-22 or F-35 are going to be carrying loadouts like this: The F-22 doesn't have the room and the F-35 doesn't have the altitude capability to maximize the

Don't agree here. A big killer of the USAF's budget is O&S costs; a big factor in this is fragmented fleet types. See CSBA's recent USAF budget analysis. Which is why I would prefer to consolidate the fighter fleet to 3 airframe types: F-22, F-35 and PCA. Additionally this new F-15 is costly. They're talking about $23B to buy 144 jets which translates to $160M per jet. Lot 12-14 F-35 contract bought 478 for $34B which is $72M per jet. For $23B you could theoretically buy another 319 F-35s. If you were to substitute those 144 F-15 for F-35s you could theoretically save over $1.5B a year in O&S costs and have greater capability to operate in contested environments. Buying 319 F-35s instead of 144 F-15EX still saves you $1B a year in O&S. Divest the entire F-15 fleet you save even more.

Finally you don't need fighters to employ large hypersonics. As I said I'd very much like to see a greatly increased B-21 buy. That way it'll be much easier to divest the F-15E fleet and have increased strike capability. I realize that acquisition costs are going to be problematic and it'd be interesting to see a analysis for what I'm proposing. I know CSBA is pushing for a much larger bomber fleet which is something I've been advocating for years.
 
Buying the F-15EX is one of the smartest moves the USAF ever made. Not everything needs to be stealthy. we're still going to be fighting wars similar to what we've been fighting for the past two decades and you don't need stealth for that. Unless you just want to spend more money than you have to needlessly. That kind of thinking reminds me of the decades the USAF spent trying to replace A-10s with F-16s because they aren't pointy enough.

Also, neither the F-22 or F-35 are going to be carrying loadouts like this: The F-22 doesn't have the room and the F-35 doesn't have the altitude capability to maximize the

Don't agree here. A big killer of the USAF's budget is O&S costs; a big factor in this is fragmented fleet types. See CSBA's recent USAF budget analysis. Which is why I would prefer to consolidate the fighter fleet to 3 airframe types: F-22, F-35 and PCA. Additionally this new F-15 is costly. They're talking about $23B to buy 144 jets which translates to $160M per jet. Lot 12-14 F-35 contract bought 478 for $34B which is $72M per jet. For $23B you could theoretically buy another 319 F-35s. If you were to substitute those 144 F-15 for F-35s you could theoretically save over $1.5B a year in O&S costs and have greater capability to operate in contested environments. Buying 319 F-35s instead of 144 F-15EX still saves you $1B a year in O&S. Divest the entire F-15 fleet you save even more.

Finally you don't need fighters to employ large hypersonics. As I said I'd very much like to see a greatly increased B-21 buy. That way it'll be much easier to divest the F-15E fleet and have increased strike capability. I realize that acquisition costs are going to be problematic and it'd be interesting to see a analysis for what I'm proposing. I know CSBA is pushing for a much larger bomber fleet which is something I've been advocating for years.

That's not the flyaway cost...
 
Don't forget that the budget is open for up to 144 airframe. It doesn't mean that all those will be bought. But it allows the Air force to manage the obsolescence of their Eagle fleet with one more degree of freedom.

Imagine that a same opportunity with the B-1, would you think that anybody would cancel or reduce in any way the number of B-21 on order? No... But the number of Bomber in service would be left constant.
 
It's a versatile missile truck, the US is going to have a large gap in capabilities when the B-1Bs get retired. The missile truck doesn't need stealth. What the US really needs is something along the lines of the YA-7F.
 
TomcatViP's taken down posting seems to have claimed not everyone as the same acces to digital technology as Roper claims.
 
The United States needs more F-22s, full stop. The F-35 is a disastrous dead end at best, and that is if one is being generous.
How is the F-35 "disasterous"? In what way is it inferior to the aircraft it is meant to replace (F-16, legacy Hornet, and Harrier)?
Probably means kinematics are same as a legacy.

I do admit on the lack of internal 9x capability I am dissatisfied.

What's the launch envelope of its slammers when in a turning fight? It's got to punch them out with force before the rocket fires. Not like a rail launch from another platform.

On the 15x, I think they could be hedging their bets if pca iis cancelled by a Democrat controlled DC. It's easier to keep the 15x going than to spend 120B+ on something new.
 
The United States needs more F-22s, full stop. The F-35 is a disastrous dead end at best, and that is if one is being generous.
How is the F-35 "disasterous"? In what way is it inferior to the aircraft it is meant to replace (F-16, legacy Hornet, and Harrier)?
Probably means kinematics are same as a legacy.

Except they're not. Don't make the mistake of comparing a clean F-35 to a clean F-16. Compare the two going into battle. The F-35 wins hands down.

What's the launch envelope of its slammers when in a turning fight? It's got to punch them out with force before the rocket fires. Not like a rail launch from another platform.

How's that different than an F-22 or F-15?
 
House appropriators propose $506M NGAD cut as Air Force finalizes business case
House appropriators are recommending a $506 million cut to the Next-Generation Air Dominance program in effort to stem the Air Force's fighter aircraft shortfall
As long as the USN cant get there Sh togrhter on what a Large Surface Combatant or LUSV should look like they should get no money, likewise the USAF should not get any money until they know what Family of Sys , FA-xx, Persistent Air Supp, NGAD, Digital Series or whatever hell it is this week. Lastly, the USA should get no money for NGCV until they know what is survivable in future robotic ground combat.

F-16s w an engine upgrade which the newest likely have, plus a F-35 sensor retrofit would render 16 uber F-35 all day as 16 is light and more maneuverable writ large. This forum has spent plenty o time on how lagard the 35 is as dogfighter.
 

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