USAF/US NAVY 6th Generation Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

[bring_it_on]

NG announcing not one but two 6th Gen fighter design teams a week before 4th quarter earnings are disclosed could be construed
as trying to soften the blow.

Can't imagine giving LM both fighters and the bomber.

Boeing is the Prime contractor for the Boeing/Lockheed team. If Northrop were to be selected as the winner, there is nothing contractually stopping them for spreading the work with LMA, a company that they have enjoyed a good working relationship through the F-35 program. Similarly, a win for the Boeing/LMA team could be construed as an effort to give some advanced development work to Boeing that lost out on the JSF program.

 

[sferrin]

NG announcing not one but two 6th Gen fighter design teams a week before 4th quarter earnings are disclosed could be construed
as trying to soften the blow.

Can't imagine giving LM both fighters and the bomber.

Was it my imagination or did Lockheed nearly walk away with both ATF and ATB a generation ago?

No, that would be Northrop Grumman that did that. (At least, IMO their YF-23 had a better chance than the LM ATB.)

 

[sferrin]

NG announcing not one but two 6th Gen fighter design teams a week before 4th quarter earnings are disclosed could be construed
as trying to soften the blow.

Can't imagine giving LM both fighters and the bomber.

Boeing is the Prime contractor for the Boeing/Lockheed team. If Northrop was selected as the winner, there was nothing contractually stopping them for spreading the work with LMA, a company that they have enjoyed a good working relationship through the F-35 program. Similarly, a win for the Boeing/LMA team could be construed as an effort to give some advanced development work to Boeing that lost out on the JSF program.

The reason Boeing's never been chosen is because they haven't been competitive. Regardless of who wins, assuming they don't cut it down to tens of units, I'd think all the major players would be involved to one degree or another.

 

[Sundog]

Do we know who had the lead on the Boeing design? Was it Boeing Seattle or the old McAir? If Boeing won it, then you would have LM with the F-35, Boeing with the LRS-B and Northrop with the RQ-180 and then the division of work out there that is still classified. Of course, Wallstreet really wants the U.S. to have only two primes and they've been talking about Boeing acquiring Northrop if Northrop loses LRS-B.

 

[sferrin]

Do we know who had the lead on the Boeing design? Was it Boeing Seattle or the old McAir? If Boeing won it, then you would have LM with the F-35, Boeing with the LRS-B and Northrop with the RQ-180 and then the division of work out there that is still classified. Of course, Wallstreet really wants the U.S. to have only two primes and they've been talking about Boeing acquiring Northrop if Northrop loses LRS-B.

Why would Wall Street even care? And let's not forget that Boeing also acquired Rockwell (B-1B, XB-70) though what they've done with that pile of data (if anything) is anybody's guess.

 

[bring_it_on]

I am pretty sure that Boeing's design would have been developed by the Phantom Works at St. Louis. Since this is a team effort, there should be a joint team for the project as was the case between LMA, Boeing and GD during the ATF.

 

[sferrin]

I am pretty sure that Boeing's design would have been developed by the Phantom Works at St. Louis. Since this is a team effort, there should be a joint team for the project as was the case between LMA, Boeing and GD during the ATF.

Boeing and LMA weren't on the same team during ATF until the winners going into the last phase had been selected. In any case, it will be interesting to see how this pans out. I wouldn't write of NG just yet.

 

[marauder2048]

NG announcing not one but two 6th Gen fighter design teams a week before 4th quarter earnings are disclosed could be construed
as trying to soften the blow.

Can't imagine giving LM both fighters and the bomber.

Boeing is the Prime contractor for the Boeing/Lockheed team. If Northrop was selected as the winner, there was nothing contractually stopping them for spreading the work with LMA, a company that they have enjoyed a good working relationship through the F-35 program. Similarly, a win for the Boeing/LMA team could be construed as an effort to give some advanced development work to Boeing that lost out on the JSF program.

The reason Boeing's never been chosen is because they haven't been competitive. Regardless of who wins, assuming they don't cut it down to tens of units, I'd think all the major players would be involved to one degree or another.

This was Boeing's contribution to ATF and ATB back when defense revenue was generally less than 25% of total revenue. Defense revenue is now close to 50% of total revenue.

 

[bring_it_on]

I am pretty sure that Boeing's design would have been developed by the Phantom Works at St. Louis. Since this is a team effort, there should be a joint team for the project as was the case between LMA, Boeing and GD during the ATF.

Boeing and LMA weren't on the same team during ATF until the winners going into the last phase had been selected. In any case, it will be interesting to see how this pans out. I wouldn't write of NG just yet.

They agreed to get together regardless of the eventualities. This situation may be a bit different since they agreed to work on the NGJ years ago, and extended that partnership to the LRS-B.

From the Sherman N. Mullin Book on the ATF:

Then we came up with the idea of a three company team: Boeing, General Dy- namics, and Lockheed. Richard “Dick” Adams, Executive Vice President of General Dynamics, a man short on words and fast on decisions, instantly endorsed this approach. And, in late May, Lockheed promptly but courteously rejected a very ag- gressive late effort by McDonnell’s Malvern to engage us in a teaming agreement.
Finally, in June 1986, the CEOs of Lockheed, Boeing, and General Dynamics ap- proved the three company approach—the long mating dance was over. On June 27, 1986, we signed a memorandum of agreement. Basically, the three companies would continue to compete, but, if one company won, that company would be team leader and prime contractor, and we would split the work one third each by dollar value.
On Oct. 13, 1986, the three CEOs signed the formal Teaming Agreement. It was a 48-page document plus a nine-page appendix. Blanchard primarily orchestrated the agreement, leading a small team of business managers and lawyers from the three companies. The agreement was developed—surprisingly harmoniously—in one intense week in Seattle.
This unique effort had lasted 18 months. We were now happily mated. And, this team has stayed mated since 1986.

....

With that firmly in mind, the Lockheed-Boeing-General Dynamics Team began work at the crack of dawn on Monday, Nov. 3, 1986. I was now running a powerful team, and although we hardly knew each other that changed quickly. I was determined to use Skunk Works program management methods as much as possible in this complicated team lash-up.
USAF designated our team’s ATF the F-22 and the Northrop team’s airplane the F-23. The Dem/Val round of the competition was set to last 50 months and end Dec. 31, 1990.
The broad Air Force requirements were well thought out, focused, comprehensive, and extremely demanding. The average production cost was not to exceed $35 million per airplane. The maximum gross takeoff weight was not to exceed 50,000 pounds. The aircraft was to be very stealthy, be able to supercruise, have excellent maneuverability, and have a very advanced integrated avionics system. It was to be superior to the F-15 Eagle by a large margin: more reliable, easier to maintain, and far easier to support when operating deployed anywhere on Earth. Other than that, we could do anything to the design we thought was the right engineering thing to do. The airplane was to be a “clean sheet of paper” design. Everything in it would be new. This turned out to be very hard work—sometimes almost unbearable, but sometimes joyous.
The prototyping of the aircraft and avionics system were “best efforts” programs, aimed at reducing risk in the production phase of the program. There were no detailed contract specifications, just a general statement of requirements. One exception was the maneuvering capability, which USAF specified in more detail than any other performance requirement. It was clear that the Air Force was insisting on outstanding fighter combat maneuvering performance and would not allow it to be compromised to achieve the demanding stealth objectives. This did not change during the four-year competition.
Employing the “best efforts” approach meant that our team had to decide what we would do and what we would not do. Example: We decided that one of our prototype aircraft would have missile launch capability, which was not required. In the case of the avionics system, our team and its subcontractors had to decide what avionics equipment and how much mission software to prototype. Early in the program we strenuously debated and rapidly resolved these issues. And, once resolved, they were not changed. (We later realized our team had made some very good decisions in 1987.)

Launching the F-22 Team

For about 100 key members of the Lockheed-Boeing-General Dynamics F-22 Team Nov. 3-7, 1986, was a memorable week, with some truly new experiences. The team gathered in Burbank on Sunday evening, Nov. 2, ready for the kickoff meeting on Nov. 3. It was a unique experience for everyone, an all day long show and tell, with each company summarizing its own proposal.
On Thursday, Nov. 6, Eric “Rick” E. Abell, Technical Director (Chief Engineer) of the Air Force ATF System Program Office (SPO), gave the team management a formal debrief of the Air Force’s assessment of the proposals that had been presented by each of the three companies. He specifically cited their strengths and weaknesses. It was clear that the Lockheed Systems Engineering volume and detailed risk re- duction plans had been a significant factor in the Lockheed win. Abell impressed the F-22 Team with his straight forward approach, frankness, and objectivity. This impression of him would not change over the next 50 months.
As the Team Program Office General Manager, I had the Boeing, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Program Managers reporting directly to me.
Dick Hardy. Boeing Program Manager Hardy had come to Boeing as an aeronautical engineer directly out of MIT in 1959. He was tersely articulate, strong minded, very systematic, and, it turned out, very loyal. His will to win was very strong. Like me, he was a native Northeasterner who had become a permanent Westerner.
Randy Kent. Kent, the General Dynamics Vice President and F-22 Program Director, had been a combat infantryman in Europe in World War II. He was a veteran aero- dynamicist, very analytical, and a very experienced engineer and manager. He had by far the most fighter aircraft development experience in our team program office and was out to win in this last competition of his career.
Jack Gordon. Gordon, who had been the Skunk Works Chief Engineer for the F- 117A, became the Lockheed F-22 Program Manager. He had 23 years aerospace experience and a Stanford master’s degree in mechanical engineering. He was a strong, confident manager, solid as a rock. He helped significantly in launching the F-22 program before he became Assistant General Manager of Skunk Works.
Bob Blanchard. Blanchard continued as Lockheed F-22 Vice President and the team’s Assistant General Manager.
We became a very cohesive management team, working intensely together, with mutual respect and mutual support. Our emotional commitment to winning the competition was very strong.

Team Relationships

We ran the F-22 team as a tightly knit—really tight—joint venture. This is an easy statement to make. What made it a reality every day for the entire 50 months was the relationship of Hardy, Kent, and me. All decisions and direction were made by us jointly in real time—often only in verbal form. At Boeing in Seattle, General Dynam- ics in Fort Worth, and Lockheed in Burbank, the F-22 had separate, classified work areas with security guards. The Team Program Office managed all work, not local company management, although they sometimes rose up and had to be put down.
The ExCom repeatedly urged me to divorce myself from internal Lockheed opera- tions—I did, but the withdrawal took awhile—to spend all my time and energy lead- ing the team. In the last years of the competition, I did not go to any Lockheed staff meetings and refused to be involved in any Lockheed activities not directly related to the ATF competition.
Within the F-22 Team, we had our own simple operating policies and procedures, none of which were well documented or followed rigorously. However, our paramount driver was time—and we did not let anybody take it away from us.

As agreed in the Teaming Agreement, each company was to get one third of the work by dollar value, meaning that each committed to making 33 percent of the investment. I did not attempt to use standard Lockheed subcontracting policies and procedures. And, there was no effort spent deciding who shot John when problems popped up that would cost money to fix. (There were plenty of them.)
The equal one-third split really helped build team cohesiveness. It also precluded having administrators and lawyers—generating piles of paperwork—fight over who was going to pay what bill. We each paid 33 percent of the total bill and that was that. The team had few paper shufflers—a damned delight.
Our goal was to have completely open relationships within the team and with the Air Force across all elements of the program: technical performance, detailed plans and schedules, budgets, and financial performance. This proved painful sometimes, but that was the way we operated.
Blanchard, by far the most experienced subcontracting manager in the Team Pro- gram Office, was the chief architect for the team approach to subcontracting, which was straightforward: Any company that won an F-22 subcontract would advance with us if the F-22 Team won. They needed that assurance since most subcontracts were fixed price, requiring the subcontractor to invest. The only catch: The subcon- tractor had to deliver in this final selection phase. This way the Air Force would get what might be called a package deal.
We maintained very close relationships with the major subcontractors at all levels, frequently violating policy by circumventing the management chain of command. However, we trusted them and they trusted us.
We also had very close relationships, at all levels, with the competing jet engine contractors—General Electric and Pratt & Whitney. Both were designing low observ- able engine exhaust nozzles to meet our specific requirements. We trusted them to protect our competitively sensitive information and vice versa. We developed very strong program management and engineering bonds with both engine companies.
As part of the F-22 Team operating mode, we made no effort to gather competi- tive intelligence and perform competitive analysis. We simply ignored the Northrop- McDonnell Douglas F-23 team. We had decided that the right strategy was to focus on what the Air Force wanted and, if possible, give it to them. There would be no gamesmanship, no political persuasion. We did briefly debate conducting a sub- stantial advertising campaign, but both the ExCom and the F-22 Team Program Office saw no value in it.
The three company CEOs and the ExCom were critical in keeping the many non- ATF managers out of the F-22 Team’s way. These top execs managed that nearly flawlessly throughout the program. One succeeded totally: Boeing CEO Frank A. Schrontz, who was the only CEO in office throughout the program, would ask me privately, whenever he saw me, if I was having a problem with anyone in Boeing; my answer was always no.

When this is said done, I hope someone writes about what was going on in boardrooms that led to these teams. Why did Boeing go along with Lockheed and not Northrop, and what prompted Northrop to go it alone (if indeed they did not seek an alliance pre down-select). I think the answer to these strategic decisions lie in the amount of classified work these firms have been doing in capability development.

Defense publications have reported on this in the past, so I don't think that the talk about NG being behind as far as a contender is concerned is something that has propped up in the last few months:

AvWeek:

Following Boeing and Lockheed Martin's announcement, Northrop Grumman declined to say whether it would compete in LRS-B, or to disclose whether such a decision was under discussion. "Northrop Grumman views the Long Range Strike-Bomber program as vital to both national security and the power projection capability of the U.S. Air Force," the company stated. "We do not comment on other companies' business arrangements and have no further comment on the program at this time."
The noncommittal statement is surprising because the defense manufacturer has been promoting its qualifications to build USAF's next bomber, based on its B-2 experience, for more than a decade. That campaign continued through September's Air Force Association show via advertising and the release of a specially commissioned book about the B-2's history.
But Northrop Grumman elected to no-bid the final stage of the Air Force's tanker program after investing many years and a great deal of money in its Airbus A330-based proposal. With LRS-B, industry observers suggest, the company may not like its competitive position now that the two other U.S. military aircraft primes have teamed against it. With a strong business portfolio, particularly in unmanned systems (including the secret stealth UAS) and surveillance, the defense manufacturer could thrive without LRS-B, one industry executive suggests.
Northrop Grumman may believe that the Pentagon, in giving its blessing to the Boeing-Lockheed Martin pact, has anointed a favorite and relegated Northrop Grumman to the status of an insurance policy. The new team appears to have the largest and most important risk-reduction contract in the shape of the NGB demonstrator. When it comes to investing company funds in risk reduction, Boeing and Lockheed Martin combined are five times larger (in annual sales) than Northrop Grumman. Nor has the latter integrated a new manned aircraft system for many years.

 

[Flyaway]

Seen talk recently of NG getting out of the military aerospace business. Surprised with those kind of rumours as they are the alleged prime in the RQ-180 project & I'd thought that would be enough work to keep them in the game at least for now.

 

[bring_it_on]

Seen talk recently of NG getting out of the military aerospace business. Surprised with those kind of rumours as they are the alleged prime in the RQ-180 project & I'd thought that would be enough work to keep them in the game at least for now.

The article spoke of them possibly (as per the opinion of one analyst) spinning off their airframe devision. They currently produce or are a large partner in the Global Hawk, Triton, E-2, X-47B (possibly a strong contender to win the UCLASS), F-35, F-18E/F etc. Will they spin off just the manned aspect, or would they also consider spinning off their unmanned programs which many believe is there strong suite given that they had made those investments to get to a particular capability in that domain. Wes Bush claims that investing in unmanned capability was a conscious decision for the company from a strategic perspective moving forward. Cyber was another such move. Putting all that in context, i do not think they are going to easily fold up their airframe work and offload it.

 

[Sundog]

Why would Wall Street even care?

Because profits and share holders. Wall street has a lot of say in what happens to these companies because they're the ones who rate them and that effects the CEO's and the share holders. I don't think Wall Street should have that kind of influence, but they do.

 

[bring_it_on]

Finaly who said that the RQ-180 may be a Northrop product, it can be a Lockheed or Boeing product too. I would like to see a Northrop fighter for the futur , YF-23 was so sexy and sadly it lost. I hope Northrop will stay in the military aircraft for the futur. May be they feel bad for the futur LRS-B contract and they jump to the next contest, the 6th gen fighter.

Well if there is some truth to the fact that the current tentative plans call for a Milestone A activity on the F-X around 2018, it would be logical for each interested party to start an internal process to get something ready to be competitive. Boeing has been working on its 6th gen plan and has been talking about it, even promoting it. Does this mean that they had no faith in the LRS-B a few years back and moved on to fighters . Next generation of fighters is an important product for all those interested to remain in the fighter business for years to come. It would be logical for the big three to have active teams and internal investments that put them in a competitive position when it comes time to start offering solutions.

 

[sferrin]

Why would Wall Street even care?

Because profits and share holders. Wall street has a lot of say in what happens to these companies because they're the ones who rate them and that effects the CEO's and the share holders. I don't think Wall Street should have that kind of influence, but they do.

That said, this recent announcement about NG 6th fighter research could be for Wall Street's benefit, and have absolutely nothing to do with their confidence in their LRS-B chances.

 

[bring_it_on]

That said, this recent announcement about NG 6th fighter research could be for Wall Street's benefit, and have absolutely nothing to do with their confidence in their LRS-B chances.

My point as well. If one were to take that as a sign then Boeing have been demoralized for quite a while since their PR machinery was in full swing supporting their FA-XX designs . You could also say that Lockheed had all but lost hope

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2014/ahead-of-the-curve.html

We also have to account for the fact that there would/should be some amount of disinformation being spread to throw off folks that may want to get inside scoops on the inner workings of the program.

 

[flateric]

The first F/A-XX concept ever publicly released was in fact from NG. And configurations shown could be traced back to as early as 2000.

 

[LowObservable]

Where you stand depends on where you sit. For instance, if you didn't want anyone to even talk about 6gen you might want to throw out designs so weird and obviously unaffordable that people would nearly spit-take their coffee at press conferences.

 

[jsport]

some would like to see this self healing stuff, for instance, actually work even in micro-scale in a lab .. ;D

 

[Flyaway]

some would like to see this self healing stuff, for instance, actually work even in micro-scale in a lab .. ;D

Don't even get started on visual stealth. ;D

 

[LowObservable]

That particular four-engined joined-wing design is visually stealthy, because you'll never see it flying.

 

[sferrin]

That particular four-engined joined-wing design is visually stealthy, because you'll never see it flying.

LOL! I wonder why they even do that. People at NG had to be laughing when that went up.

 

[bobbymike]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/kendall-unveils-sixth-gen-fighter-project-for-2016/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/01/28/sixth-generation-fighter-2016-budget/22477329/

 

[bring_it_on]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/kendall-unveils-sixth-gen-fighter-project-for-2016/

I think we can now put the PR effort from Northrop Grumman in proper perspective

 

[marauder2048]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/kendall-unveils-sixth-gen-fighter-project-for-2016/

I think we can now put the PR effort from Northrop Grumman in proper perspective

The DARPA Air Dominance initiative goes back a couple of years now. Interestingly, it's headed by the guy who leads the T3 effort.

In other news, from Jim McNerney, Boeing's Chairman and CEO today:

"And there is no question that when we win Long-Range Strike and I'm sounding as confident as I can, because I do believe we will, that it will solidify the future of St. Louis for many, many years to come."

 

[bring_it_on]

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/kendall-unveils-sixth-gen-fighter-project-for-2016/

I think we can now put the PR effort from Northrop Grumman in proper perspective

The DARPA Air Dominance initiative goes back a couple of years now. Interestingly, it's headed by the guy who leads the T3 effort.

In other news, from Jim McNerney, Boeing's Chairman and CEO today:

"And there is no question that when we win Long-Range Strike and I'm sounding as confident as I can, because I do believe we will, that it will solidify the future of St. Louis for many, many years to come."

I am aware of the ADI, but was commenting on the timing of northrop's release. Interesting bit about the PM...you are tempting me to dig deeper to update my notes on the program

 

[bring_it_on]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k_4KSE0WrAo

 

[bobbymike]

http://aviationweek.com/defense/ge-details-sixth-generation-adaptive-fighter-engine-plan?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20150129_AW-19_838&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_2&YM_RID=CPEN1000000230026&YM_MID=1622


http://aviationweek.com/defense/successful-rotating-cmc-part-demo-future-ge-fighter-engines-staged?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20150129_AW-19_838&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_3&YM_RID=CPEN1000000230026&YM_MID=1622

 

[Triton]

"CNO Greenert: Navy’s Next Fighter Might Not Need Stealth, High Speed"
by: Sam LaGrone
February 4, 2015 10:14 AM

Source:
http://news.usni.org/2015/02/04/cno-greenert-navys-next-fighter-might-not-need-stealth-high-speed

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Navy’s planned next generation fighter will likely rely less on the speed and stealth that has defined the current generation of U.S. tactical aircraft and could feature an unmanned option, the Chief of Naval Operations said on Wednesday.

CNO Adm. Jonathan Greenert described options for the next Navy fighter – the F/A-XX – that would overwhelm or suppress enemy air defenses instead of outrunning or hiding from threats.

“You know that stealth maybe overrated,” Greenert said during a keynote at the Office of Naval Research Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo.
“I don’t want to necessarily say that it’s over but let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat – I don’t care how cool the engine can be – it’s going to be detectable.”

That also may mean developing new weapons for future threats.

“It has to have an ability to carry a payload such that it can deploy a spectrum of weapons. It has to be able to acquire access probably by suppressing enemy air defenses, Greenert said.
“Today it’s radar but it might be something more in the future.”

As for speed, he said the proliferation of high-speed anti-air weapons could lead the Navy to develop an aircraft that would not need to travel at a high speeds.

“I don’t think it’s going to be super-duper fast, because you can’t outrun missiles,” he said.

Greenert also said the aircraft should have an option to be optionally manned.

“The weight that we put on an aircraft due to the pilot is kind of extraordinary. You take that off and put sensors on there instead,” he said.
“That’s my signal for modularity.”

Greenert’s comments come as the Navy scheduled to start the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for F/A-XX the aircraft to replace the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet stating in the 2030s. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have both released early concepts for F/A-XX

The Navy’s newest fighter – the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) – does rely on stealth. USNI News understands its emerging role in the carrier air wing will be – in part – as a forward sensor node for the carrier strike group to relay targeting information via the Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control Counter Air (NIFC-CA) concept.

The Navy has said the F/A-XX will likely match or exceed the larger payload of the current Super Hornets.

“We’re looking to replace the F/A-18E/F with an understanding already of what the F-35C has brought to the air wing,” Rear Adm. Mike Manazir told USNI News in late 2013.

 

[TomS]

The return of the Missileer?

 

[bobbymike]

The return of the Missileer?

With EW and DEW for self defense? Nothing can outrun light.

 

[Sundog]

If that's his thinking, he is going to need a new missile far superior to AMRAAM.

 

[sferrin]

The return of the Missileer?

I was just about to post a picture of that tub. I think somebody is off his rocker myself.

 

[bring_it_on]

The return of the Missileer?

With EW and DEW for self defense? Nothing can outrun light.

And would the Navy fund that? They have said that Adaptive engines are not all they are made out to be. Stealth isn't that great. Speed is unimportant since one cannot outrun missiles.

And his support for multispectral weapons is clearly reflected in the USN's actions of canning the 9X Blk III.

 

[XP67_Moonbat]

That new plan's about as ludicrous as an optionally-manned, navalized A-10.

 

[tacitblue]

The return of the Missileer?

With EW and DEW for self defense? Nothing can outrun light.

And would the Navy fund that? They have said that Adaptive engines are not all they are made out to be. Stealth isn't that great. Speed is unimportant since one cannot outrun missiles.

I highly doubt NAVAIR is calling for "missilier". More likely 2+ Mach isn't needed as a dash speed.
Didn't the USAF decide dash and cruise speed is not important? Look at the slug known otherwise known as the Lightning II. Hell they decided kinematics were not even that important. Can't out turn a missile after all. As for guns, stay out of a gun fight. SA and radar LO rule the day.
NAVAIR does recognize that the -35C ain't their future fighter, which only means someone in the Navy has their thinking cap on straight.

 

[TomS]

You know, this is probably fair. It's more likely that they're laying the groundwork for why FA-XX doesn't have performance like the F-22.

 

[Triton]

Do the comments made by CNO Adm. Jonathan Greenert actually represent the current thinking of NAVAIR concerning the F/A-XX program?

 

[sferrin]

Look at the slug known otherwise known as the Lightning II. Hell they decided kinematics were not even that important.

They did? Where did they do that? Last I checked the F-35A was a 9G aircraft just like the F-16. Let me guess, you think when an F-16 pulls 9Gs it turns sharper than when an F-35 does it right? Right?

 

[bobbymike]

Look at the slug known otherwise known as the Lightning II. Hell they decided kinematics were not even that important.

They did? Where did they do that? Last I checked the F-35A was a 9G aircraft just like the F-16. Let me guess, you think when an F-16 pulls 9Gs it turns sharper than when an F-35 does it right? Right?

In their haste to ABC (Always Be Criticising) the F-35 physics changes of course.

 

[marauder2048]

They have said that Adaptive engines are not all they are made out to be. Stealth isn't that great. Speed is unimportant since one cannot outrun missiles.

The reality is that NAVAIR simply doesn't have the funding for much (any?) of the above as it's being squeezed by surface and subsurface recapitalizations; the fumbling with UCLASS hasn't helped their credibility with Congress either.

So rather than just saying "We are not acquiring these capabilities because we cannot afford them" they have to generate a more politically palatable pretext in the form of "We are not acquiring these capabilities because they are not important or effective."