USAF/US NAVY 6G Fighter Programs - F/A-XX, F-X, NGAD, PCA, ASFS news

[MrTopaz]

Where did this 2027 timescale come from?

How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Some in defense circles say the U.S. needs to prepare for Beijing's invasion of Taiwan in 2027. China experts say it isn’t a deadline.

www.defensenews.com

Wasn’t the “Davidson Window” projecting 2027? You kick that around in public discourse enough, eventually people will treat a projection as gospel.

(edited to correct the name of the window)

 

[Forest Green]

Wasn’t the “Davis Window” projecting 2027? You kick that around in public discourse enough, eventually people will treat a projection as gospel.

I think the Chinese military was told to prepare itself for a conflict by 2027 but there was nothing more than that.

 

[Ainen]

Why a j20 sized force if j20 is not competitive enough with f22 (and f35?) to be at near parity?

Do rushed emergency programs with screaming and panic changes tell you that j-20s are uncompetitive?

Because US actions seem to indicate they're not just competitive, they're overcoming US on the original air superiority path - and something has to be done.

F-22 is getting old for the modern software world, and its upgrade path is an uninspiring/forced compromise. F-35 is ultimately stuck not being true air superiority platform, and it's clear its software is stuck.

J-20 is a f-35 generation, f-22 class aircraft. And if by any chance its software development is going smoothly (which isn't unlikely) - I think you see a problem.

J-20a/b/s seem not to be "noncompetitive", rather they're an existential problem for late 2020s-early 30s. Such, that US can't wait for neither fancy stealthy CCAs nor a fancy oversized NGADs.

Also, frankly speaking, I wouldn't be surprised if fighting air superiority battle from half a globe away(still losing precious oversized dominatrixes, because enemy isn't a j-7 zerg, and MRBM/global space targeting are a thing) just doesn't work in models.

Basing cheaper ngad within strike radius isn't a sin - if they're somewhat replaceable.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Where did this 2027 timescale come from?

How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Some in defense circles say the U.S. needs to prepare for Beijing's invasion of Taiwan in 2027. China experts say it isn’t a deadline.

www.defensenews.com

I believe there have been studies which suggest that during the 2027-2028 timeframe China will have its peak population of men of a "fighting age", after that point it will be negative growth in that segment of the population. Take from that whatever you will.

For at least a decade now you've had those constantly predicting that there is going to be some huge economic collapse in the PRC. Any second now. To be fair to the people predicting that there are unhealthy signs and behaviors regarding their economy, but somehow, they've avoided the worst outcomes. Now, I've a very novice understanding of economics, so the next part is pure conjecture, but here it goes. Hypothetically such a still largely command-economy could do whatever they could to "turbocharge" their economic situation, before some inevitable recession or depression. If they delayed it long enough, maybe they could kick off a war for control over the South China Sea and Taiwan before that bottom falls out. If such an economic collapse were inevitable, why not take that gamble if you're crazy/bold enough? Chances are such a war would result in a global economic depression anyway, especially if Taiwan goes scorched earth on their semiconductor production facilities if there is a successful Chinese landing and defeat seems inevitable. In the event of a global economic collapse China suffers but so does the rest of the world including their adversaries. So strategically a victory there would cement their status as a global superpower.

I would never place any bets on what Xi and others in charge might do, but I obviously hope he does not decide upon such an option.

 

[Josh_TN]

I believe there have been studies which suggest that during the 2027-2028 timeframe China will have its peak population of men of a "fighting age", after that point it will be negative growth in that segment of the population. Take from that whatever you will.

I suspect that peak was reached long ago. The Chinese labor force has been dropping since 2016-17 and the total population has been in decline for a couple years now. The 2027 window seems linked to rumored desire by Xi to have the PLA ready for a major conflict by then, which seems linked to the PLA centennial as much as anything else.

 

[okakac]

2027 from 2021 would be the last Midterms the then US President would face. The 2025 from 2023 was based on the Russian recovery and aimed to be a scare tactic to deter support to Moscow. No dates talked about after the failure of the Summer Offensive last year, which also saw the demise of Wagner as a trump card.

 

[Josh_TN]

I suspect Davidson was thinking more in terms of PLA readiness.

There was a separate Mobility Command general who stated such move could come by 2025; in that case I think he implied it would be times with the new president/inauguration and any political instability that might occur with the transition.

 

[Blitzo]

Capability to wage a conflict is very different to intention to initiate a conflict.

Much of the reporting and narrative around the 2027 window conflates the two.

 

[RaptorBoi]

All valid considerations. My guess is that a potential IG investigation, Sentinel overrun and the election season played some role here. There is a chance that the requirements get validated in a couple of months and the program proceeds. In the absence of that, there will most likely be more public congressional scrutiny leading up to the FY26 budget rollout. If not, then its pretty much going back to square one and starting from scratch (programmatically speaking)

If the service doesn't want and can't afford an all-aspect VLO, very long-range super cruiser with stand-off CONOPS and wants a stand-in platform, the obvious question is what can a $100M reimagined NGAD deliver that an upgraded F-35 can't? Is that extra performance really worth the opportunity cost?

Kendall knows budget politics (e.g. F-15EX maneuvering and trimming legacy programs to fund B-21 & F-35). With the $63 bn+ overrun from Sentinel, its plausible he's trying to create budgetary space for CCAs and to a lesser extent NGAS at the cost of effectively kicking NGAD down the road. Any decision made by Kendall is going to be reviewed by a new administration.

People = policy. In a normal world, I'd imagine the next Air Force Secretary to be less influential relative to uniformed leadership. However, its worth remembering the uniformed leadership prior to Kendall arguably had their own problems such as the much troubled "fighter roadmap" with concepts like the "5th gen minus"/MR-X and potential armed T-7 to replace some of the F-16 fleet.

 

[dark sidius]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXjaqKrhVPo

Interesting shape of species 1

 

[Scott Kenny]

Where did this 2027 timescale come from?

How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Some in defense circles say the U.S. needs to prepare for Beijing's invasion of Taiwan in 2027. China experts say it isn’t a deadline.

www.defensenews.com

Xi made a statement about being ready to fight.

Plus it's the 100th anniversary of the PLA.

In addition, their fighting mass of military age men is falling pretty rapidly, I suspect there is an even stronger drop coming around 2027.

If your military ability to take and hold ground is weakening, you get stuck in a mentality of "use it or lose it".

Also, there's Xi's age to consider.

Were the mainland willing to let the economic ties drag the island back under mainland control in the ~2050s, it wouldn't be much of an issue to anyone.

But the political apparatus at the mainland is not making noises like they are happy with that plan any more. Probably because it's gotten even less likely to work since the mid 2010s.

 

[NMaude]

Were the mainland willing to let the economic ties drag the island back under mainland control in the ~2050s

In addition to the PRC's acute and worsening demographic issues it also has severe, intractable economic problems that will only get worse (I strongly suspect that by 2030 the PRC will be economically and demographically buggered). The PRC has only about four-five years realistically to attempt and amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

 

[Josh_TN]

Xi made a statement about being ready to fight.

Plus it's the 100th anniversary of the PLA.

In addition, their fighting mass of military age men is falling pretty rapidly, I suspect there is an even stronger drop coming around 2027.

If your military ability to take and hold ground is weakening, you get stuck in a mentality of "use it or lose it".

Also, there's Xi's age to consider.

Were the mainland willing to let the economic ties drag the island back under mainland control in the ~2050s, it wouldn't be much of an issue to anyone.

But the political apparatus at the mainland is not making noises like they are happy with that plan any more. Probably because it's gotten even less likely to work since the mid 2010s.

The crackdown on Hong Kong largely slammed the door shut on a peaceful reunification, or at least a peaceful reunion not forced under the explicit threat of military confrontation. The idea of “two systems, one country” was proven a long term sham that amounted to total surrender of sovereignty, and I think that realization by both sides also influenced military preparations.

 

[Josh_TN]

In addition to the PRC's acute and worsening demographic issues it also has severe, intractable economic problems that will only get worse (I strongly suspect that by 2030 the PRC will be economically and demographically buggered). The PRC has only about four-five years realistically to attempt and amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

There are systematic economic problems that may or may not be addressed, and long term demographics that are basically unsolvable without largely divorcing productivity from labor force. That in no way changes the capabilities of the PLA; given enough political will they could easily be in position to force reunification indefinitely. It’s just a question of resource allocation, and even a faltering PRC would have more resources than practically anywhere else.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The crackdown on Hong Kong largely slammed the door shut on a peaceful reunification, or at least a peaceful reunion not forced under the explicit threat of military confrontation. The idea of “two systems, one country” was proven a long term sham that amounted to total surrender of sovereignty, and I think that realization by both sides also influenced military preparations.

Agreed.

Which is why the 2027 date started popping up.

There are systematic economic problems that may or may not be addressed, and long term demographics that are basically unsolvable without largely divorcing productivity from labor force. That in no way changes the capabilities of the PLA; given enough political will they could easily be in position to force reunification indefinitely. It’s just a question of resource allocation, and even a faltering PRC would have more resources than practically anywhere else.

The one advantage is that it will take some time to move enough sealift into the vicinity of Taiwan, in addition to moving all the combat units. So there will be warning of an attempted invasion.

 

[Blitzo]

Xi made a statement about being ready to fight.

Plus it's the 100th anniversary of the PLA.

In addition, their fighting mass of military age men is falling pretty rapidly, I suspect there is an even stronger drop coming around 2027.

If your military ability to take and hold ground is weakening, you get stuck in a mentality of "use it or lose it".

Also, there's Xi's age to consider.

Were the mainland willing to let the economic ties drag the island back under mainland control in the ~2050s, it wouldn't be much of an issue to anyone.

But the political apparatus at the mainland is not making noises like they are happy with that plan any more. Probably because it's gotten even less likely to work since the mid 2010s.

There's no particular element of China's current Taiwan strategy which anticipates the PRC to initiate a conflict over Taiwan in 2027, however the goal of continued military modernization and growth in military capability (and whole of nation economic/tech/industry advancement) is basically still the priority.

If they were serious about wanting to initiate a conflict in 2027 their procurement wouldn't be looking like what it was for the last few years -- it instead would be much more expansive and much more near term and Taiwan oriented, rather than the relatively moderate pace of purchasing new platforms (yes, the production of new ships and fighters some have called "war footing" is more like a fraction of what they're actually capable of) and R&D (medium/long term) focused approach we have observed


The way I see it, there are only a few prongs to the PRC's Taiwan strategy:
1. Have sufficient forces to wage a war over Taiwan if political circumstances force it
2. Ideally, possess forces that are able to A) deter Taiwan from moving towards de jure political independence and/or B) deter US intervention if conflict occurs
3. Continue to develop and grow the military forces as well as the non-military circumstances to enable 1. and 2. to occur more and more in the PRC's favour as time goes on
4. In the long term, achieve such an overmatch in military, economic/industrial/technology and political capability in the regional level and on the global level that Taiwan will be forced to unify on China's terms.

Of those prongs, only 4. is a situation where China might prepare to actively initiate a conflict, but the prerequisites for them to even start planning step 4. is still not fully existent yet, and certainly not going to happen in 2027.


The relevance of all of the above to USAF's caution to getting NGAD right, IMO can be summarized to a single question -- "whose side is time on?"

There seems to be some elements of the natsec community who believe that if the US can get through the mid/late 2020s without a conflict (or if conflict occurs, being able to win one), then by the early 2030s various technological/economic/political circumstances will shift back to the US's favour, including in terms of the ability to get superior military capabilities in service by then which the PLA won't be able to match.
That's also partly why the US military seems very cognizant of also wanting to try and maximize its preparedness and attain some degree of near term "deliverable" capabilities to be ready for a "2027" (or mid/late 2020s) conflict if it occurs, with the risk that this may partly be to the detriment of capabilities desired for the 2030s (in terms of opportunity cost).

I wouldn't be surprised if the USAF is trying to work out all of the permutations and possibilities for what PLA capabilities in the 2030s (and 2040s, and beyond) may look like, before fully committing into a potential big ticket air superiority/manned fighter project.
There isn't much margin for error.

 

[flateric]

View: https://youtu.be/q0iiNHWYZus?si=Etphw7w-8wKO5nbg

 

[Scott Kenny]

The way I see it, there are only a few prongs to the PRC's Taiwan strategy:
1. Have sufficient forces to wage a war over Taiwan if political circumstances force it
2. Ideally, possess forces that are able to A) deter Taiwan from moving towards de jure political independence and/or B) deter US intervention if conflict occurs
3. Continue to develop and grow the military forces as well as the non-military circumstances to enable 1. and 2. to occur more and more in the PRC's favour as time goes on
4. In the long term, achieve such an overmatch in military, economic/industrial/technology and political capability in the regional level and on the global level that Taiwan will be forced to unify on China's terms.

Of those prongs, only 4. is a situation where China might prepare to actively initiate a conflict, but the prerequisites for them to even start planning step 4. is still not fully existent yet, and certainly not going to happen in 2027.

Ironically, China deterring Taiwan from de jure political independence guarantees that the US will intervene in a conflict between Taiwan and China.

The US has said repeatedly that Taiwan declaring independence from China means that the US will no longer support them as the last remnants of the 1912 Republic of China.

The relevance of all of the above to USAF's caution to getting NGAD right, IMO can be summarized to a single question -- "whose side is time on?"

There seems to be some elements of the natsec community who believe that if the US can get through the mid/late 2020s without a conflict (or if conflict occurs, being able to win one), then by the early 2030s various technological/economic/political circumstances will shift back to the US's favour, including in terms of the ability to get superior military capabilities in service by then which the PLA won't be able to match.
That's also partly why the US military seems very cognizant of also wanting to try and maximize its preparedness and attain some degree of near term "deliverable" capabilities to be ready for a "2027" (or mid/late 2020s) conflict if it occurs, with the risk that this may partly be to the detriment of capabilities desired for the 2030s (in terms of opportunity cost).

Thing is, China is already in a major manpower crunch and it's looking to greatly collapse by about 2030.

And that pushes China towards an attitude of "if we do not militarily take Taiwan soon, we will not have the military power to do it later."

Fallout from the One Child policy for decades. Culturally, the Chinese only wanted sons, to carry on the family name. But that means that female infants are aborted or abandoned at birth, announced to family and friends as a stillbirth. No one for all those sons to marry, so no one to take the family name for a next generation.

Imagine a 40yo who realizes that he will never have a family. You can do a lot with that "nothing left to lose" mentality.

I wouldn't be surprised if the USAF is trying to work out all of the permutations and possibilities for what PLA capabilities in the 2030s (and 2040s, and beyond) may look like, before fully committing into a potential big ticket air superiority/manned fighter project.
There isn't much margin for error.

No, there's not.

Especially since I think the US needs to get back to a 20-year aircraft life, and alternating between the high end F-15/F-22/NGAD and the low end F-16/F-35/maybe CCAs.

Because stealth tech and electronics will have changed so much that the aircraft will not be viable for much more than 30 years from introduction to service.

 

[B2Blain]

I think the question to ask is: where exactly is NGAD going to be based out of? And the sevetal answers are basically first island chain (Japan, possibly PI), second island chain (U.S. and associated protectorates), or Australia. The first option requires no large increase to combat radius. The third requires a likely unachievable combat radius for anything with fighter-ish performance. The second option is limited to a small handful of airports/bases with runways capable of handling large aircraft, and no longer offers much more protection against PRC PGMs as their effective range has increased.

My guess is that the spiraling costs forced a harder look at the survivability of the platform given its basing scheme. That may or may not force a major change to the program requirements. But it is worth reconsidering the program if basically every suitable runway at the range band the aircraft can achieve is located in Guam. It seems to me having a fighter and tanker force with better short/rough airstrip performance is a more flexible basing concept, even if it comes at the sacrifice of absolute range of the combat platform.

Another thought as to why this has changed recently - besides the huge Sentinel cost overruns and increased PLARF range and precision, Japan has taken a decidedly more assertive security role in the region in the last year or two. “Offensive “ weapons are now on order. Japan’s reset might have convinced USAF planners that it will always be available for forward basing, where as previously the USAF might have been planning around a U.S. only contingency. The U.S. might have come to the conclusion that Japan is fully committed to hosting U.S. forces in a Sino-American conflict, or alternatively they may have come to the conclusion the U.S. cannot win without Japanese basing and there is no point in designing equipment around that scenario. It is even possible some kind of formal agreement was reached on open ended use of Japanese bases in private.

i am not sure where the program stands or what the optimal solution is; just some food for thought.

I believe the CSIS Taiwan wargame indicated that the US cannot win without at least having Japan/Ryukyus to operate from. If the plan was to operate long range fighters from the Second Island Chain, which had the combat radius to reach Taiwan unrefueled, this was very foolish. I really doubt this was the case as you correctly indicate that it would have required a planform more like a bomber than a fighter. It seems the demonstrators were fighter sized, but Vago Muradian and JJ Gertler have talked about NGAD being a different planform than a traditional fighter to achieve gains in combat radius. Was that some kind of a hint?

Relying on a complex choreography of larger tankers refueling NGAS, which then refuels NGAD is another foolish idea. Guam has limited ramp space. Are KC-46s going to escort NGAS out, then top off at some point, and then meet them on the way back? Or would they top off the fighters at some point and NGAS would join up at some point? It might be more cost effective to build the infrastructure in Japan to harden bases, building hardened aircraft shelter, prepositioning runway repair supplies/equipment, and improving air defenses. As long as Japan would be willing to be targeted, an advanced industrial large island nations provides a greater ability to support a war effort than small islands such as Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Palau, etc.

 

[Blitzo]

Ironically, China deterring Taiwan from de jure political independence guarantees that the US will intervene in a conflict between Taiwan and China.

The US has said repeatedly that Taiwan declaring independence from China means that the US will no longer support them as the last remnants of the 1912 Republic of China.

The issue that has emerged over the last decade is that US actions and rhetoric have been interpreted by the other side as enabling and providing cover for Taiwan to move towards de jure independence.

Even if that isn't the case deliberately, there is significant mistrust (which imo is mutual) on the Taiwan matter.

Thing is, China is already in a major manpower crunch and it's looking to greatly collapse by about 2030.

And that pushes China towards an attitude of "if we do not militarily take Taiwan soon, we will not have the military power to do it later."

Fallout from the One Child policy for decades. Culturally, the Chinese only wanted sons, to carry on the family name. But that means that female infants are aborted or abandoned at birth, announced to family and friends as a stillbirth. No one for all those sons to marry, so no one to take the family name for a next generation.

Imagine a 40yo who realizes that he will never have a family. You can do a lot with that "nothing left to lose" mentality.

This is one facet the "whose side is time on" question I wrote in my last post.

I don't want to talk too much about this as it is outside of the scope of the thread -- however let's just say that seeking to try and gauge PRC intentions accurately to try and predict their Taiwan strategy and future PLA capability is important to US 6th gen planning.
What ends up eventuating in terms of the PRC-US military power balance and PRC strategy, we will see.

No, there's not.

Especially since I think the US needs to get back to a 20-year aircraft life, and alternating between the high end F-15/F-22/NGAD and the low end F-16/F-35/maybe CCAs.

Because stealth tech and electronics will have changed so much that the aircraft will not be viable for much more than 30 years from introduction to service.

Yes, that is one major aspect of US procurement priorities too, which is all greatly exacerbated by the uncertainty of how the US-PRC power balance will change in coming years and decades.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I believe the CSIS Taiwan wargame indicated that the US cannot win without at least having Japan/Ryukyus to operate from. If the plan was to operate long range fighters from the Second Island Chain, which had the combat radius to reach Taiwan unrefueled, this was very foolish. I really doubt this was the case as you correctly indicate that it would have required a planform more like a bomber than a fighter. It seems the demonstrators were fighter sized, but Vago Muradian and JJ Gertler have talked about NGAD being a different planform than a traditional fighter to achieve gains in combat radius. Was that some kind of a hint?

It's foolish to try to operate airbases that the enemy can hit with ballistics and hypersonics. Even without the enemy using nukes.

Relying on a complex choreography of larger tankers refueling NGAS, which then refuels NGAD is another foolish idea. Guam has limited ramp space. Are KC-46s going to escort NGAS out, then top off at some point, and then meet them on the way back? Or would they top off the fighters at some point and NGAS would join up at some point?

Agreed, that's beyond foolish.

It might be more cost effective to build the infrastructure in Japan to harden bases, building hardened aircraft shelter, prepositioning runway repair supplies/equipment, and improving air defenses. As long as Japan would be willing to be targeted, an advanced industrial large island nations provides a greater ability to support a war effort than small islands such as Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Palau, etc.

And that's the challenge. There'd be very large protests outside any bases used by the US to attack China, nevermind the "oops, sorry we missed the base and bombed a large part of Tokyo" factor.

 

[Josh_TN]

There's no particular element of China's current Taiwan strategy which anticipates the PRC to initiate a conflict over Taiwan in 2027, however the goal of continued military modernization and growth in military capability (and whole of nation economic/tech/industry advancement) is basically still the priority.

If they were serious about wanting to initiate a conflict in 2027 their procurement wouldn't be looking like what it was for the last few years -- it instead would be much more expansive and much more near term and Taiwan oriented, rather than the relatively moderate pace of purchasing new platforms (yes, the production of new ships and fighters some have called "war footing" is more like a fraction of what they're actually capable of) and R&D (medium/long term) focused approach we have observed


The way I see it, there are only a few prongs to the PRC's Taiwan strategy:
1. Have sufficient forces to wage a war over Taiwan if political circumstances force it
2. Ideally, possess forces that are able to A) deter Taiwan from moving towards de jure political independence and/or B) deter US intervention if conflict occurs
3. Continue to develop and grow the military forces as well as the non-military circumstances to enable 1. and 2. to occur more and more in the PRC's favour as time goes on
4. In the long term, achieve such an overmatch in military, economic/industrial/technology and political capability in the regional level and on the global level that Taiwan will be forced to unify on China's terms.

Of those prongs, only 4. is a situation where China might prepare to actively initiate a conflict, but the prerequisites for them to even start planning step 4. is still not fully existent yet, and certainly not going to happen in 2027.


The relevance of all of the above to USAF's caution to getting NGAD right, IMO can be summarized to a single question -- "whose side is time on?"

There seems to be some elements of the natsec community who believe that if the US can get through the mid/late 2020s without a conflict (or if conflict occurs, being able to win one), then by the early 2030s various technological/economic/political circumstances will shift back to the US's favour, including in terms of the ability to get superior military capabilities in service by then which the PLA won't be able to match.
That's also partly why the US military seems very cognizant of also wanting to try and maximize its preparedness and attain some degree of near term "deliverable" capabilities to be ready for a "2027" (or mid/late 2020s) conflict if it occurs, with the risk that this may partly be to the detriment of capabilities desired for the 2030s (in terms of opportunity cost).

I wouldn't be surprised if the USAF is trying to work out all of the permutations and possibilities for what PLA capabilities in the 2030s (and 2040s, and beyond) may look like, before fully committing into a potential big ticket air superiority/manned fighter project.
There isn't much margin for error.

I think this is an excellent summary that pulls the entire discussion back to NGAD. A couple of key considerations I think that make the entire program questionable: when do you think there will be a war and how does that change the focus of your preparation? And what do you think air to air warfare looks like in the long (decade plus) term?

If you think a conflict happens this decade, then NGAD full stop. Stock up on ammunition and increase readiness, and upgrade what you can short term. There are a lot of USAF upgrade and munitions contracts that seem to have a completion window of circa 2029, to include the 7+ billion B-2 maintenance/overhaul, the F-22 upgrades, the billions for the JDAM program, expansion of AGM-158 production, expansion of SDB 2 production, full bore multi year buys of AIM-120, JSM buy, etc.

Medium term there is HACM, SiAW, B-21, and CCA, all roughly around 2027 (realistically 2030 with delays and/or in service in sufficient numbers to matter).

NGAD is a long term project beyond 2030, possibly way beyond 2030 now. The B-21 is one of the most successful USAF development programs in recent memory and it still had its contract signed a decade ago with a design freeze in 2018. So ~2035 seems like a realistic estimate to me. If you believe a war comes before that, or you believe air to air warfare as we know it becomes unrecognizable by then, what is the solution? Quite possibly, not any manned platform at all, or at least not the one you envisioned a decade ago.

We might have simply reached a point where manned fighters are not cost competitive, not in terms of money, but just in development time. Certainly NGAD reportedly being several hundred million dollars per copy is a huge bet for 2035 that might have an LCS level ending.

 

[Josh_TN]

It's foolish to try to operate airbases that the enemy can hit with ballistics and hypersonics. Even without the enemy using nukes.

That excludes everything outside Australia, and even bases like Tindal would be in range of any hypersonic deployed from an ICBM. Hawaii and Alaska too. And that excludes localized release of UAVs from saboteurs or “neutral” shipping. Getting far enough away is no longer an option, at least for a fighter type platform. The second island chain is already in reach of hundreds of weapons at least. Unless you are advocating for air to air armed bombers, the only solution is increasing the target list to the point it’s unsustainable for the PRC to find and hit them all, not running further and further away. A STOL type design, or at least one built to USN stall speed standards, might open up a lot of runways and highways in Japan (and realistically there is no A2A fight without Japan).

In the meantime the USAF should be buying F-35B, but that will never happen.

 

[Ozair]

No, there's not.

Especially since I think the US needs to get back to a 20-year aircraft life, and alternating between the high end F-15/F-22/NGAD and the low end F-16/F-35/maybe CCAs.

Because stealth tech and electronics will have changed so much that the aircraft will not be viable for much more than 30 years from introduction to service.

The key to this though remains software. The platform itself likely won't change too much going forward but how the software iterates over the life cycle of the airframe is the key differential. GA and Andruil with CCA phase 1 have spoken about this at length and it clear that software and open architectures are where the real progression will come from.

The US services aren't great at this although credit to them for starting to try, and likely the big SIs are even worse, so it feels like we need to split out the platforms going forward as the CCA program is trying to do. Separate those bending the metal from those making the software and when you do so you potentially have the ability to reuse existing platforms with minor hardware changes but massive software change across a generation.

 

[NMaude]

In the meantime the USAF should be buying F-35B, but that will never happen.

I was under the impression that the USAF was going to buy a limited number of F-35Bs.

 

[Ozair]

NGAD is a long term project beyond 2030, possibly way beyond 2030 now. The B-21 is one of the most successful USAF development programs in recent memory and it still had its contract signed a decade ago with a design freeze in 2018. So ~2035 seems like a realistic estimate to me.

The B-21 model works, so far, because it hasn't been as innovative as manned NGAD likely needs to be.

“The central idea of the B-21 approach is that it is going to leverage decades' experience from a variety of aircraft developmental programs. That is why we say it is using rather mature technologies, but they will be put together in a new and creative way.”
—Deborah Lee James, Former Secretary of the Air Force
Aug. 8, 2017

B-21 Supporting Voices | Northrop Grumman

Hear why government and military leaders support the B-21 Raider and its advanced capabilities.

www.northropgrumman.com

If you believe a war comes before that, or you believe air to air warfare as we know it becomes unrecognizable by then, what is the solution? Quite possibly, not any manned platform at all, or at least not the one you envisioned a decade ago.

We might have simply reached a point where manned fighters are not cost competitive, not in terms of money, but just in development time. Certainly NGAD reportedly being several hundred million dollars per copy is a huge bet for 2035 that might have an LCS level ending.

I expect with CCA and AI progression we are almost past the point of manned fighters. I'm not sure how that bodes for Tempest and FCAS and where those programs will end up, will the manned portions also dissappear...

 

[Ozair]

I was under the impression that the USAF was going to buy a limited number of F-35Bs.

Not at this point in time. That would be a significant paradigm shift away from fixed airfields. We are seeing that with USAF Air Mobility who are looking at unmanned in a big way but no indication that USAF has any interest in the Bee.

If I was a USAF General I'd be most worried about drone attacks on my bases. With Ukrainian drones reaching 1500km+ it puts a lot of pressure on those choke points and even more so when you consider a pacific contest that has relatively limited ramp space available.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I suspect that there will be one generation of manned fighters past the F22/F35. Maybe two, though the second generation would definitely be a Human/AI combo working together (Yes, I've read Yukikaze, that's where I got the idea from). It's possible that the 6th generation would have an AI copilot, kinda depends on the software engineers at this point.

Past that, it's AI-controlled UCAVs basically told "anything flying in the following geographical area that doesn't pass IFF is to be shot down."

 

[B2Blain]

It's foolish to try to operate airbases that the enemy can hit with ballistics and hypersonics. Even without the enemy using nukes.

During the Cold War, bases in Western Europe were subject to Soviet attack. The US had no choice but to defend their bases with pass defenses such as hardened aircraft shelters and active defense. You cannot win against China with stand off forces and munitions. It is too expensive - you cannot generate enough sorties or mass.

 

[Scott Kenny]

During the Cold War, bases in Western Europe were subject to Soviet attack. The US had no choice but to defend their bases with pass defenses such as hardened aircraft shelters and active defense. You cannot win against China with stand off forces and munitions. It is too expensive - you cannot generate enough sorties or mass.

And the US doesn't own the bases in the Pacific to fit them with HAS and SAMs etc.

 

[Josh_TN]

I was under the impression that the USAF was going to buy a limited number of F-35Bs.

Not that I am aware.

 

[NMaude]

I would be a good idea IMO for the USAF to have two-three squadrons of the F-35B on hand.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I would be a good idea IMO for the USAF to have two-three squadrons of the F-35B on hand.

That would require the people in charge of their expeditionary airfield program to have enough power to make the purchase recommendation stick.

 

[Explorer121]

They should really be building or buying F-35I two-seaters instead if NGAD can't be ready before a major conflict

 

[Ozair]

That would require the people in charge of their expeditionary airfield program to have enough power to make the purchase recommendation stick.

A lot of other things to consider as well in that purchase such as training pipelines, different spares and maintenance for the system. Greater life cycle costs and also both reduced range and payload for the Bee. Nothing cosmic but to a big wieldy difficult to move beast that is the USAF these things would take some effort.

They should really be building or buying F-35I two-seaters instead if NGAD can't be ready before a major conflict

What value is there in a two seat F-35 other than reducing the internal fuel load...?

 

[NMaude]

What value is there in a two seat F-35 other than reducing the internal fuel load...?

You could make a two-seat F-35, call it the F-35D, with an adequate internal fuel load if you used the F-35B nose-section (The second seat in place of the lift-fan), the centre and aft sections of the F-35A with the wings of an F-35C (With the wing folds and folding mechanisms deleted).

 

[Ozair]

you could make a two-seat F-35, call it the F-35D, with an adequate internal fuel load if you used the F-35B nose-section (The second seat in place of the lift-fan), the centre and aft sections of the F-35A with the wings of an F-35C (With the wing folds and folding mechanisms deleted).

All those are tradeoffs that might increase fuel load but would result in other losses. Cee wings on an A clearly results in reduced transonic acceleration for example.

But none of that addresses why you need two seats...?

 

[NMaude]

But none of that addresses why you need two seats...?

I can't remember the name of the paper but I remember reading a paper touching on this subject about 11-12 years ago from the DTIC website about how the USMC after it got the F/A-18 hornet over time realised that it needed two-seaters for reasons other than training. I don't recall the exact details but I suspect that a two-seat version of the F-35 would have its uses.

 

[Explorer121]

The NGAD has always been planned as multicrew because they would scale the number of drone wingmen up as they upgraded it
This ends up needing a dedicated weapons officer

 

[quellish]

The key to this though remains software.

Software is one of the biggest problems with the program right now. Software and the politics/commercial interests around it.

Does anyone really think that Lockheed is going to willingly integrate with non-Lockheed CCA platforms, or are they going to push to make the CCAs as well? And use integration with an existing platform as leverage?

It does not help that the primes and certain DoD components outright lied to SECAF about aspects of the program and how ready the technology was.

If the press was competent this would have been out in the open by now rather than “shrouded in secrecy”.