Well yes, but don't forget that this system is mostly for point-to-point bombardment.Wouldn't this system basically allow any fairly large ship (including commercial) to become a missile platform? Park it on the deck and let 'er rip.
Another thing about the Typhoon is that it was, like the Tacos, a very large missile so in order to have an adequate number of them in the ship's magazine it would've needed a very large magazine meaning a large (And expensive) cruiser.
Typhon ER was roughly the size of Terrier. Not that big.
I just checked on the wiki RIM-50 Typhon article and I stand corrected, I suspect that if the Vietnam war hadn't happened it would've likely entered service.
Does anyone know if there are any online historical monographs describing the development of the RIM-50?
RIM-50 mostly died because it was expensive to make, like all ramjet missiles, and not because of Vietnam.
Ramjet motored missiles were extremely nice to have for about 5-10 years and then solid fuel rockets pretty much had surpassed them in performance. The USN procured oodles of RIM-66Cs and RIM-67s in the post-Vietnam malaise and never bought a batch of RIM-50s or anything for the SCANFAR CGN-9 or Talos boats, which would have been a fairly trivial modification all this considered, for instance.
Sea Dart's mere existence is something of a bizarre anomaly TBH. I guess that's just because the UK entered the 1960's as the reigning world champion of naval combat systems and left them a second rate player, at best. Perhaps if the Typhon Combat System had actually worked the RIM-50 would have been deployed, but it didn't. By the 1970's there just wasn't much point as solid motors were showing a lot of muscular performance increases with things like the RIM-66B nearly doubling range performance of RIM-24B.
I don't think that would be the case though, as I suspect the USN would figure a way to finagle the Standards to work with Typhon too. Or they'd just scrap all maybe three or four Typhon escorts like they did the Long Beach and stuff.
Do we have any g- or maneuvering limits available for Sea Dart (or Standard-family) to compare? A quick search on the net gets zero.Another reason ramjet missiles died off is that they are inherently less maneuverable than pure rockets. This is because the rate of change in direction directly impacts the intake inlet of the engine and can cause loss of air flow resulting in something like a compressor stall in a jet engine. The missile flames out and that is bad.
I don't have any specifics, but this issue was mentioned in the Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest Vol 13 Nov 1 1991 in an article by James Keirsey, Airbreathing Propulsion for Defense of the Surface Fleet. Where he mentions during wind tunnel testing this problem came up and was another reason Typhon was cancelled. He also discusses how the missile burner section had to be redesigned using burner cans as altitudes and speeds increased.Do we have any g- or maneuvering limits available for Sea Dart (or Standard-family) to compare? A quick search on the net gets zero.Another reason ramjet missiles died off is that they are inherently less maneuverable than pure rockets. This is because the rate of change in direction directly impacts the intake inlet of the engine and can cause loss of air flow resulting in something like a compressor stall in a jet engine. The missile flames out and that is bad.
I'd guess it's less to do with G-load and more to do with AOA.Do we have any g- or maneuvering limits available for Sea Dart (or Standard-family) to compare? A quick search on the net gets zero.Another reason ramjet missiles died off is that they are inherently less maneuverable than pure rockets. This is because the rate of change in direction directly impacts the intake inlet of the engine and can cause loss of air flow resulting in something like a compressor stall in a jet engine. The missile flames out and that is bad.
Or solid fuel ramjets? Takes away the liquid fuel criticism of past air breathing missiles.So with the current push for hypersonic missiles the mode of propulsion will be solid fuel rockets?
5. You still need Tomahawk. The only thing SM-6 can do that Tomahawk can't (currently) is hit a ship. Block II will be more interesting but that's an expensive missile for hitting a land target.1) SM-6 exists today. It's also fully integrated with AEGIS.
2) SM-6 has both AAW/TBMD and ASuW capability. So it is more versatile on ships with constrained numbers of VLS cells and no easy ability to swap them out.
3) Assuming that the PrsM ASuW seeker uses the full diameter of the missile is an assumption that might not be valid. or possibly relevant. How big does the antenna need to be to pick a ship out of sea clutter from above?
4) SM-6 also drops in from above, over a very long range indeed. Especially with Block 2, with the 21-inch diameter motor.
5. You still need Tomahawk. The only thing SM-6 can do that Tomahawk can't (currently) is hit a ship. Block II will be more interesting but that's an expensive missile for hitting a land target.
Speculation on my part as don't understand why Navy not planning on procuring the Army PrSM Spiral 1 for anti-ship role in preference to SM-6. PrSM with its multimode seeker designed to target ships, antenna area a big plus in any radars capability and the PrSM seeker antenna area ~60% larger than the SM-6 13.5" dia as opposed to 17" of the PrSM and expect its seeker might give additional advantage of a larger search basket area coming in vertically from great height with its ballistic trajectory. Cost of the current standard PrSM ~ $1.8, expect Spiral 1 will be more expensive with its multimode seeker, but will be less than the $5 million for SM-6 Dual II/Block 1B, so would expect Navy could procure two PrSM's for the cost of a single SM-6 . On question of range expect PrSM to be greater and have heavier warhead, PrSM would easily fit in the standard Navy Mk41 VLS launch cell.
PrSM disadvantages for Navy?
Hey Guys, i have gotten recently into all things naval warfare and have one question, that seems kind of obvious, but an answer is not clear to me.
(hope this is the right thread to post on)
What is the US-Navys theory on how to sink chinese ships (in the vicinity of the first island chain - like a blockade of taiwan)?
I ask because its genuinely unclear to me (especially the weapons used).
- Lrasm is procured in low numbers (and the relative ease with which the ukraine air defense has shot down russian stealth cruise missiles makes me question wether they would be really effective in sinking something like a Type 055).
- Tomahawk MST seems like a slow unstealthy missile of which you would need a huge amount to kill something capable.
- harpoon has the same problem minus the range.
- Sm 6 has a really small seeker, that is not desigend for ASuW - seems to me, that the risk would be big, that the chinese could jam/degrade it - it remains something that is not built for ASuW.
- nuke subs seem to loose their advantage in (near) litoral enviroments.
I have not read enough to have serious opinions on these matters - I would appreciate any pointers to good sources.
And the few images of Ships eating Standard Missiles we have seen show.
While it may not SINK the ship.
That Ship not doing much of anything else either for a few YEARS at minimum.
Does anyone know where the IR seeker came from? Was it a new development? Or is it (more likely in my opinion) an existing seeker from another system bolted on?I’ve always wondered if SM-2 blk 3B didn’t have an OTH surface to surface capability with its IR guidance. That would be a big addition to AShMs if so. And of course out to the horizon most anything the USN carries can put a hole in a ship.
Figured it probably had.I've already posted that video upthread.
Does anyone know where the IR seeker came from? Was it a new development? Or is it (more likely in my opinion) an existing seeker from another system bolted on?I’ve always wondered if SM-2 blk 3B didn’t have an OTH surface to surface capability with its IR guidance. That would be a big addition to AShMs if so. And of course out to the horizon most anything the USN carries can put a hole in a ship.
How does the logic work? How does the system decide which seeker has precedence over the other for guidance?
So, I get the impression it was an adjunct to help the radar seeker reject countermeasures.
IIRC the one in Block IVA was much more elaborate.Does anyone know where the IR seeker came from? Was it a new development? Or is it (more likely in my opinion) an existing seeker from another system bolted on?I’ve always wondered if SM-2 blk 3B didn’t have an OTH surface to surface capability with its IR guidance. That would be a big addition to AShMs if so. And of course out to the horizon most anything the USN carries can put a hole in a ship.
How does the logic work? How does the system decide which seeker has precedence over the other for guidance?
It came out of MHIP (Missile Homing Improvement Program (MHIP), which was also intended to provide a supplemental IR seeker for Sparrow. (In Sparrow, it was on the tip of the nose under a blow-off cap, with the radar seeker behind it and looking through it.)
Without going into details, the Navy's public line about MHIP in Block IIIB was that it was intended "to counter specific proliferating electronic warfare systems in existing aircraft and anti-ship cruise missile threats." So, I get the impression it was an adjunct to help the radar seeker reject countermeasures. Techniques left as an exercise for the reader.
PS: Although SM-2 Block IVA also had a side-mounted IR seeker, my recollection is that this was NOT the same MHIP seeker as in the IIIB, just the same general configuration.
That's my memory as well. Cooling the dome was a lot harder, IIRC, given the speed of Block IVA.IIRC the one in Block IVA was much more elaborate.
Cooling the dome was a lot harder, IIRC, given the speed of Block IVA.
Cooling the dome was a lot harder, IIRC, given the speed of Block IVA.
That's why the terminal-seeker was under an ejectable cover till the last few seconds of flight.