Boeing knowing the Army well, doubted that "winged things" would be popular with the senior aviation officers or the rest of the Army. Their logic was that this was a low risk option. With JHL there were no low risk options.
@jsport - Indeed the recognition that there was a significant number of artillery means that could respond rapidly led to the "air-mechanized force" becoming a less favored capability over the fantastic amount of logistics that these platforms could move forward. Indeed the ability to move materials from port to the fight in one trip was what kept the effort alive until USAF Inc., stepped in and said it was their mission. A mission they have only done in critical circumstance (Khe Sahn as an example), not as a regular endeavor.
In fairness to the USAF (not to be mistaken for USAF Inc., that resides in leather chairs in the Pentagon), putting high value aircraft like C-17 at risk in the forward area landing in the dirt really makes no sense. C-130 however certainly could do the mission, but are also a high demand, low density platforms. Because of this low density the USAF focuses on
efficient aircraft operations. The Army finds
effective to be more critical to their operations. Thus JHL, then C-27J, were developed to meet the Army's desire for effective logistics. My ire with USAF Inc., is, that even being told this, they (successfully) lobbied to have those programs turned over to the USAF, and then promptly cancelled both while keeping the (Army) funding for them.