uk75 #63: Seaslug: a dead end system
The wonder is...not that Seaslug did not have post-GWS-2 enhancements and/or more hulls, but that it went to sea.
Task identified 1944,
County DLG Devonshire commissioned 15/11/62. Incompetent.
RN
Future Fleet brain was long devoted from 1944 to anti-
kamikaze (SAM) and anti-Gnat (smart) torpedo defence. Brain, 1946-64 centred in RN Scientific Service (RNSS) and in a plethora of its shore Research Establishments.
Hood, here, has recently posted in the sense that (smart) torpedoes are THE Project Management challenge; has noted RN Bath Architects' hostility to attempts by
SAMsters to meddle with their designs; and
#62: 1960 thoughts on NIGS.
Dilandu #14 exquisite artwork, sculpted civil engineering of Seaslug launcher (recognisable to
Brunel).
RN/RAF from 1943 operated W.Electric/GE Mk.24 Mine/FIDO passive but smart torpedo, claiming some of
50xU-boats it sank/damaged. P.Hennessy',Silent Deep,Pp.305/6 traces RN Controlled torps: " horror, dismal record";
Mk.23
Grog, ITP '55, Fleet Weapon Acceptance '71: “rotten...useless”.
Project Mngt. incompetence in smart underwater and Air weapons has led to RNSS/Establishments' extinction. UK now does such work in industry - MBDA + BAES.
CVF overall Integration was contracted to US Consultancy/ Venture Finance House, KBR.
Q: How did the Navy of
Nelson so decline?
Candidate
As include low RN volume, so rationed funds, spending time as cheaper than money.
I prefer silo-mngt: no sense of "System"; zero co-ordination to match needs of platform with needs of weapon.