UK Contributions to NATO -1959

[JFC Fuller]

From the NATO archive (link), this covers most of the UK contribution to NATO in 1959 along with a forecast through to the early 1960s and commentary from SHAPE and SACLANT on the the contribution. There is lots of interesting stuff, e.g. the appearance of various tactical ballistic missiles, commentary around the replacement of UK based Canberras with Valiants, criticism of the planned withdrawal of air defence capability from Germany, criticism of the lack of ASW carriers etc.

It covers an era of transition and many of the short-term forecast deployments never happened but it is a fascinating snapshot links to many of the discussions on this forum.

 

[zen]

Many thanks for the link and much to ponder here...

 

[lordroel]

There is also this FORCE GOALS FOR 1952, 1953 AND 1954

 

[zen]

Lots to chug through here.

Not enough of an Army man to delve out the goodies there.
But I think Air Defence suggests that had Small Sea Slug been achieved, Army use would increase production, lower costs and permit the desired result.
Also implies the drive behind PT.428 and Mauler.
Lightning wasn't going to achieve levels of availability desired, especially when it was being treated as no worse to maintain than a Hunter. When in fact it was far worse than the older types like Javelin, Scimitar, Hunter or Swift etc....
Had an alternative won/survived that was easier to maintain, such availability might have been more achievable.
Seems like a Javelin successor was foremost for AD, and this shows the logic behind RAF F4s.

Valient = 2 Canberras and is better as a system, can only imply how much better Victor and Vulcan was over that.

But it also implies a reason for the overspec of TSR.2 and why it was felt to be a V-Bomber successor. In essence returning to a Canberra-like running cost thanks to less crew and engines, but superior avionics to V-bombers.
Sadly by not giving it the range/radius to match V-bombers this seems certain to fall apart as a justification.
Especially when performance is over specified but investment in avionics suffers as a result.
The bigger, longer ranged, larger bomb load toting aircraft with superior avionics is effectively more efficient a investment as a system.
Had OR.339 winner been more 'fighter-like', then it's arguable the effort would continue instead of F4

ASW, really suggests both the lack of the Helicopter Type 191 and a ASW CV is a major failing as a successor to the Colossus/Majestic and Gannet fleets.
Also shows up the flexibility of the Centaurs and Victorious.
Sort of shows the problem of focusing on East of Suez as a mission for CVA-01.

Hefty lack of MPA here, 34 to the desired 72, even with Nimrod years later, only the supplement of V-bombers and Tankers delivered even close to the desired number at less capability.

 

[uk 75]

It is very useful to at last have a NATO view of UK forces.
The shortcomings of the Royal Navy's contribution to ASW in the N Atlantic feeds into the 1966 changes to the sort of fleet we build.
In this pre flexible response era NATO wants more Valiant (laterTSR2) aircraft. The need to replace tactical strike and fighter forces leads us to F4.
The missile force is supposed to include Redstone and Lacrosse units in the early60s. No mention of Blue Water except as the Honest John analogue.
It would be fascinating to have these documenta for 1962 fo 1968

 

[uk 75]

A thread which comes to mind after reading the harsh crticism (you only have to look at Janes from 1959 to 1962 to agree) is the obsolescence of the Royal Navy escorts. Seen from a USN perspective with its Asroc and Tartsr equipped destroyer escorts the RN looked pretty much as it did in WW2 except for Limbo launchers and twin 4.5 gun turrets

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

A thread which comes to mind after reading the harsh crticism (you only have to look at Janes from 1959 to 1962 to agree) is the obsolescence of the Royal Navy escorts. Seen from a USN perspective with its Asroc and Tartsr equipped destroyer escorts the RN looked pretty much as it did in WW2 except for Limbo launchers and twin 4.5 gun turrets

In 1959, the new-build US Destroyer Escort fleet consists of the Dealey and the Claud Jones classes, which, being mainly equipped with Hedgehog, are clearly inferior to even the Type 14s in Anti-Submarine capability. The first escorts with ASROC, the Bronstein class, are not commissioned until 1963, whilst the first of the Tatar-armed Brooke class aren't commissioned until 1966.

If you consider the the Royal Navy's escorts in this period to be obsolete, then how do the US ships compare, armed with the same Hedgehog, 3"/50s and 5"/38s as their Second World War counterparts?

 

[SSgtC]

A thread which comes to mind after reading the harsh crticism (you only have to look at Janes from 1959 to 1962 to agree) is the obsolescence of the Royal Navy escorts. Seen from a USN perspective with its Asroc and Tartsr equipped destroyer escorts the RN looked pretty much as it did in WW2 except for Limbo launchers and twin 4.5 gun turrets

In 1959, the new-build US Destroyer Escort fleet consists of the Dealey and the Claud Jones classes, which, being mainly equipped with Hedgehog, are clearly inferior to even the Type 14s in Anti-Submarine capability. The first escorts with ASROC, the Bronstein class, are not commissioned until 1963, whilst the first of the Tatar-armed Brooke class aren't commissioned until 1966.

If you consider the the Royal Navy's escorts in this period to be obsolete, then how do the US ships compare, armed with the same Hedgehog, 3"/50s and 5"/38s as their Second World War counterparts?

I think he was referring to actual Destroyers (hull classification DD) and not Destroyer Escorts (hull classification DE). At this point in time, the USN no longer used the term Destroyer Escort. They called those ships Ocean Escorts, though they retained the DE hull classification and numbering sequence. If you look at actual Destroyers of the time period, the USN was building the Forrest Sherman, Farragut and Charles F Adams class guided missile Destroyers. So yeah, I'd say there was a pretty big gap there.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

A thread which comes to mind after reading the harsh crticism (you only have to look at Janes from 1959 to 1962 to agree) is the obsolescence of the Royal Navy escorts. Seen from a USN perspective with its Asroc and Tartsr equipped destroyer escorts the RN looked pretty much as it did in WW2 except for Limbo launchers and twin 4.5 gun turrets

In 1959, the new-build US Destroyer Escort fleet consists of the Dealey and the Claud Jones classes, which, being mainly equipped with Hedgehog, are clearly inferior to even the Type 14s in Anti-Submarine capability. The first escorts with ASROC, the Bronstein class, are not commissioned until 1963, whilst the first of the Tatar-armed Brooke class aren't commissioned until 1966.

If you consider the the Royal Navy's escorts in this period to be obsolete, then how do the US ships compare, armed with the same Hedgehog, 3"/50s and 5"/38s as their Second World War counterparts?

I think he was referring to actual Destroyers (hull classification DD) and not Destroyer Escorts (hull classification DE). At this point in time, the USN no longer used the term Destroyer Escort. They called those ships Ocean Escorts, though they retained the DE hull classification and numbering sequence. If you look at actual Destroyers of the time period, the USN was building the Forrest Sherman, Farragut and Charles F Adams class guided missile Destroyers. So yeah, I'd say there was a pretty big gap there.

He explicitly refers to destroyer escorts, not fleet escorts. Once we get on to destroyers, the Counties are not noticeably inferior to the DDGs or DLGs.

 

[SSgtC]

He explicitly refers to destroyer escorts, not fleet escorts. Once we get on to destroyers, the Counties are not noticeably inferior to the DDGs or DLGs.

Personally, I read that as referring to the role the ships played and not to the specific hull classification (which, again, the USN no longer used anyway). Even comparing destroyers his point is still valid. The first County didn't commission until November, 1962. The Sherman class were all commissioned by 1959, the Farragut class were all commissioned over a year before the first County was. And 13 of the Adams class were commissioned before the first County was, with another 2 commissioning a month after her. So yeah, the RN Escort fleet was woefully equipped compared to the USN. For very valid reasons, but the point he made is still true.

 

[zen]

The problem is that measuring and comparing for the early 60’s completely misses the point.
Measure and compare for 1957, the 'Year of Maximum Danger". The year that in 1945 they expected WWIII to start.
Because if that's the period you are preparing for, then by the early 60’s it's all half a decade old and stuck with prevailing prejudices and equipment of that time. Which is obviously going to look increasingly out of date.
Consider in turn that in the early 50's Korea looked like the prelude to WWIII and so decisions and process were accelerated. Leaving the RN with legacy kit by the mid 50's.

So for the US with it's huge budgets this was something they could overcome with apparent ease. Compared with the UK, which was struggling. It had struggled to wind down from WWII, struggled with huge debts, a desperate need to inject capital. Which in turn became a nightmare.
Add to this the drain of repeating the development of nuclear weapons.
And factor in the inevitable end of Empire.
How was the UK to field everything to satisfy others, in these circumstances by the early 60’s?