Type 988 radar in the Falklands.

[NOMISYRRUC]

As for the Tromp - Type 42 comparisons, I think that's a misnomer.

They have the same machinery and have hulls of similar dimensions so I think the comparisons are fair.

And even if it was an unfair comparison, it wouldn't be a misnomer because when I looked it up the definitions were.

“A wrong or inaccurate name or designation” ​

And.​

“A wrong or inaccurate use of a name or term.”​

The Tromps were designed as flagships for the Dutch ASW sqns and incorporated Command spaces and suitable communications, so in concept they are more akin to the Type 82s than Type 42s.

And the point that they had more weapons in a hull of similar dimensions to Type 42 Batch 3, with the same machinery as a Type 42, with a similar size crew as a Type 42 and still had space for the command spaces and suitable communications still stands.

 

[Rule of cool]

They have the same machinery and have hulls of similar dimensions so I think the comparisons are fair.

And even if it was an unfair comparison, it wouldn't be a misnomer because when I looked it up the definitions were.

“A wrong or inaccurate name or designation” ​

And.​

“A wrong or inaccurate use of a name or term.”​

And the point that they had more weapons in a hull of similar dimensions to Type 42 Batch 3, with the same machinery as a Type 42, with a similar size crew as a Type 42 and still had space for the command spaces and suitable communications still stands.

I don't disagree, and what most pertinent to this thread is that for the same machinery and similar sized hulls the Tromps had the SPS-01/Type 988 radar.

The Tromps look highly impressive ships, presumably they could jam all the stuff in because of the aluminium superstructure, and I suspect that the Mk13 SAM launcher and other things were smaller and lighter than the Sea Dart and other equivalents.

My point is that Tromps were command ships, like Type 82s and unlike Type 42s. Indeed, for all of the talk about Bristol being a test bed ship the actual reason she was built in the absence of CVA01 was to command the new ASW Task Forces the RN was to feature in the future, much like the Invincible class.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

In that case what would you do with the space, weight and money released by deleting the Harpoons? I'm not being sarcastic. I'm curious. If Sea Dart was about as effective an SSM as Harpoon could the Sea Dart magazine be enlarged to take 48 missiles instead of 40?

It could, or you increase the size of the flight deck and hanger, or add in more command and control, or more ASW assets. Or you leave the space for future growth.

And yes, a Sea Dart is about as effective as a Harpoon. While Harpoon is a heavier, somewhat larger, missile and has a much larger warhead, Sea Dart is moving at about triple the velocity of a Harpoon and the impact damage from that is sufficient to even out the results.

 

[Rule of cool]

It could, or you increase the size of the flight deck and hanger, or add in more command and control, or more ASW assets. Or you leave the space for future growth.

And yes, a Sea Dart is about as effective as a Harpoon. While Harpoon is a heavier, somewhat larger, missile and has a much larger warhead, Sea Dart is moving at about triple the velocity of a Harpoon and the impact damage from that is sufficient to even out the results.

That's all well and good assuming the target is within sight of the Type 909s to guide the Sea Darts. The Harpoon has over the horizon capability with active radar terminal homing, early ones could reach out to 60 miles and later ones double that.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

While we're on the TI radar, USN Terrier and Tartar ships from the 60s had a 2D search and 3D radar, does the 3D radar act as the Target Indication radar? Further, the Ticonderoga class AGEIS cruisers had an SPS49 2D search radar in addition to their SPY1, does this mean that in it's earliest versions the AGEIS was in effect and Target Indication radar?

Yes to both questions.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

That's all well and good assuming the target is within sight of the Type 909s to guide the Sea Darts. The Harpoon has over the horizon capability with active radar terminal homing, early ones could reach out to 60 miles and later ones double that.

The reality is, that no anti-ship missile of that period proved capable of being targeted against something that the firing platform couldn't see itself. Having longer range ASM's does you zero good if you can't use that range because you can't target stuff at those ranges. The dual capacity of SAM's against ships is probably the single biggest reason the West hasn't invested much in longer range ASM's. There simply is no need or ability to actually use them.

With the US SAM's there was the capacity to ballistically fire them against ships, not just LOS. That is, if the firing ship could detect and track the target, the missile could simply be lobbed ballistically into it using the guidance radar without terminal homing. Ships were considered large enough targets that the missile, given its speed, would very likely end up hitting it regardless. If guidance ended at say 5 miles from the target, a missile going roughly Mach 2 (30-ish miles a minute) on a stable trajectory would hit it in under 10 seconds. I don't think you really need terminal guidance at that point.

 

[Rule of cool]

Apparently HMS Bristol fired 2 Sea Darts at spurious radar rutrns because of interference from other ships radars. Would that occur with the Type 988?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 43.

And yes, a Sea Dart is about as effective as a Harpoon. While Harpoon is a heavier, somewhat larger, missile and has a much larger warhead, Sea Dart is moving at about triple the velocity of a Harpoon and the impact damage from that is sufficient to even out the results.

Does moving at triple the velocity mean it's harder to shoot down?

 

[Hobbes]

3D radar isn't necessary for SAM systems. Once a target is detected and the target tracking radar locked onto it, it really doesn't matter that you know the altitude, just the slant range for firing.

Where 3D radar is necessary is in controlling a CAP. That is, you need it when operating in conjunction with an aircraft carrier. Thus, in the Falklands war, RN ships having 3D radar wasn't going to help much since they had a limited number of aircraft for CAP and were far more reliant on SAMs for taking on raids.

More than ships with 3D radar, what the RN needed in the Falklands was an AEW aircraft of some sort. Even pulling a Fairey AEW 3 Gannet out of some museum and brushing off the dust so-to-speak would have been a better idea. There was at least one still airworthy in the UK in the 80's. They were flying from Hermes in the 60's and 70's so...

A 3D radar does matter. If you cue the target tracker from a 2D radar, the target tracker has to do a vertical sweep to find the target, which increases the time to lock onto the target.
If you feed 3D information to the tracker, it has a much smaller space to sweep which will take less time.

 

[Rule of cool]

Part of Post 43.

Does moving at triple the velocity mean it's harder to shoot down?

On a high, ballistic trajectory it might be easier to track than a sea skimmer, especially if the target is equipped with old radars like the Types 965 and 992.

 

[Hobbes]

I don't disagree, and what most pertinent to this thread is that for the same machinery and similar sized hulls the Tromps had the SPS-01/Type 988 radar.

The Tromps look highly impressive ships, presumably they could jam all the stuff in because of the aluminium superstructure, and I suspect that the Mk13 SAM launcher and other things were smaller and lighter than the Sea Dart and other equivalents.

The aluminum superstructure wasn't ideal. They had trouble keeping it watertight: tears developed in the superstructure due to the flexing of the ship in high seas.

 

[zen]

If....
If Broomstick carries on and the Dutch stick with Sea Dart, then the situation with the later Tripartite (Britain, France and Netherlands) discussions in '69 is less likely to break down.
The Dutch backed out of Sea Dart, not for some nebulous reasons of Britain being a declining power. But for hard headed reasons of cost and complexity of ADAWS and Sea Dart. They hot a sweet offer the US and took it.
ADAWS had retained a certain legacies from it's inception and DIASY is essentially started with the benefit of seeing what worked well or not on this.
It's easier to catch up when you're in the slipstream of someone else...

 

[T. A. Gardner]

A 3D radar does matter. If you cue the target tracker from a 2D radar, the target tracker has to do a vertical sweep to find the target, which increases the time to lock onto the target.
If you feed 3D information to the tracker, it has a much smaller space to sweep which will take less time.

Except that for SAM systems of that era none used a 3D radar. Instead, the search / detection set found targets well beyond firing range which gave time for the relatively slow fire control systems--often originally tube based--to make a firing solution and get the targeting radar--separate set--locked onto it. Altitude could be estimated using the equivalent of a fade chart which, at the time, was sufficient.

 

[Rule of cool]

The aluminum superstructure wasn't ideal. They had trouble keeping it watertight: tears developed in the superstructure due to the flexing of the ship in high seas.

IIRC some class of Australian patrol boat with steel and aluminum ionised like a battery and corroded, although that was an anecdote from a SNCO so could be simply a story.

 

[Rule of cool]

If....
If Broomstick carries on and the Dutch stick with Sea Dart, then the situation with the later Tripartite (Britain, France and Netherlands) discussions in '69 is less likely to break down.
The Dutch backed out of Sea Dart, not for some nebulous reasons of Britain being a declining power. But for hard headed reasons of cost and complexity of ADAWS and Sea Dart. They hot a sweet offer the US and took it.
ADAWS had retained a certain legacies from it's inception and DIASY is essentially started with the benefit of seeing what worked well or not on this.
It's easier to catch up when you're in the slipstream of someone else...

I don't know about Tripartite destroyers, although the Sheffield was ordered in 1968 and laid down in 1970.

Backing out of Sea Dart did involve a drop in capability, IIUC the Sea Dart had a 12 second reaction time to the Tartar's 30 seconds and a ~40nm max range against the Tartar's ~15nm and early Standard's ~25nm.

As for declining power, that's a chicken and egg or virtuous circle thing; a confident Britain which isn't constantly looking to cancel it's projects to save a quid short term can make better offers to it's partners, like the US does. After all not choosing the ADAWS meant spending money developing DAISY, rather than being a free good.

 

[Rule of cool]

Except that for SAM systems of that era none used a 3D radar. Instead, the search / detection set found targets well beyond firing range which gave time for the relatively slow fire control systems--often originally tube based--to make a firing solution and get the targeting radar--separate set--locked onto it. Altitude could be estimated using the equivalent of a fade chart which, at the time, was sufficient.

USN Tartar and Terrier destroyers and frigates/cruisers used 2D search and 3D TI radars from the early 60s, like the AN/SPS37/43 turning at 7.5 rpm and the AN/SPS48 turning at 15rpm.

 

[Hobbes]

Except that for SAM systems of that era none used a 3D radar. Instead, the search / detection set found targets well beyond firing range which gave time for the relatively slow fire control systems--often originally tube based--to make a firing solution and get the targeting radar--separate set--locked onto it. Altitude could be estimated using the equivalent of a fade chart which, at the time, was sufficient.

Yes, you can do without a 3D radar, I'm saying this will reduce performance, because your tracker is spending more time locking onto each target. If you only have one target this doesn't matter too much, but if you have multiple targets inbound, the time lost locking onto targets will reduce the number of targets you can engage.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

USN Tartar and Terrier destroyers and frigates/cruisers used 2D search and 3D TI radars from the early 60s, like the AN/SPS37/43 turning at 7.5 rpm and the AN/SPS48 turning at 15rpm.

The 3D were for CAP control with NTDS.

 

[Rule of cool]

The 3D were for CAP control with NTDS.

It had no other functions?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

It had no other functions?

Not really. If you look at Friedman, Naval Radars, the progression is from 2D air search sets to adding a height finder, to 3D sets, all for controlling CAP. It wasn't necessary for just targeting for SAM systems. The clearest indication of this is in systems where CAP control wasn't a function, and those are ground based. There, you have a long-range target acquisition radar that is usually powerful enough to find targets well beyond firing range. This gives the battery plenty of time to select and then lock fire control radars on the target as it enters firing range.

 

[Rule of cool]

Not really. If you look at Friedman, Naval Radars, the progression is from 2D air search sets to adding a height finder, to 3D sets, all for controlling CAP. It wasn't necessary for just targeting for SAM systems. The clearest indication of this is in systems where CAP control wasn't a function, and those are ground based. There, you have a long-range target acquisition radar that is usually powerful enough to find targets well beyond firing range. This gives the battery plenty of time to select and then lock fire control radars on the target as it enters firing range.

I don't deny that 3D radars can and do control CAPs, what I'm saying is that SAM systems needed a Target Indication radar as well as a search radar and this TI radar provided more data than the search radar. In the RN this TI radar was the 2D Type 992 but in the USN it was 3D radars like the SPS39, SPS48 and SPS52 that undertook this function.

While SAMs may not need a 3D TI radar they certainly are nice to have if you get them. The SeaSlug had a dedicated height finding radar in addition to its missile guidance radar, the cancelled (by the RN) Type 998 had a 3D TI radar and the 2D Type 992 was eventually replaced by the 3D Type 996.

 

[Scott Kenny]

IIRC some class of Australian patrol boat with steel and aluminum ionised like a battery and corroded, although that was an anecdote from a SNCO so could be simply a story.

A stack of aluminum plates submerged in seawater makes a very good battery for a single use.

IIRC, steel and aluminum will also galvanically corrode.

 

[Yellow Palace]

And the point that they had more weapons in a hull of similar dimensions to Type 42 Batch 3, with the same machinery as a Type 42, with a similar size crew as a Type 42 and still had space for the command spaces and suitable communications still stands.

You don't get something for nothing. Since the UK and the Netherlands both had generally competent ship designers, it's very likely that there was something the Type 42 had that the TROMP class didn't.

I suspect that part of the answer is that Standard was a much more compact system than Sea Dart. I'm not sure it's all of the answer.

If Sea Dart was about as effective an SSM as Harpoon could the Sea Dart magazine be enlarged to take 48 missiles instead of 40?

The design of the Sea Dart magazine lent itself to scaling up the missile capacity quite easily; see discussions here and here. There is some reason to think that Type 42 Batch 3 was dimensionally capable of accommodating a 46-missile magazine.

The reality is, that no anti-ship missile of that period proved capable of being targeted against something that the firing platform couldn't see itself. Having longer range ASM's does you zero good if you can't use that range because you can't target stuff at those ranges. The dual capacity of SAM's against ships is probably the single biggest reason the West hasn't invested much in longer range ASM's. There simply is no need or ability to actually use them.

In practice, the people designing warships that entered service in the 1970s felt that having long-range anti-ship missiles was desirable, so they were provided. Although note in the second link above that in 1969 there was a proposal for as much as a third of the Type 42 magazine space to be given over to a Sea Dart SSM.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

In practice, the people designing warships that entered service in the 1970s felt that having long-range anti-ship missiles was desirable, so they were provided. Although note in the second link above that in 1969 there was a proposal for as much as a third of the Type 42 magazine space to be given over to a Sea Dart SSM.

Hindsight is everything here. In hindsight, having an ASM with longer range didn't buy you anything over just using SAMs in the role which was what the US was doing before Harpoon, and why Harpoon didn't last as a shipboard weapon system. It got a bit more life as an air launched and submarine launched weapon, and as a sort of cruise missile in the SLAM-ER version of it.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

You don't get something for nothing. Since the UK and the Netherlands both had generally competent ship designers, it's very likely that there was something the Type 42 had that the TROMP class didn't.

Which is why I wrote.

Therefore, what were the Dutch designers doing that the RCNC wasn't doing? And was it's the fault of the RCNC? Did the British ships have any compensating features that this "Top Trumps" comparison doesn't show.

But so far nobody's said what the something the Type 42 had that the Tromp class didn't. That doesn't necessarily mean that there wasn't something the Type 42 had that the Tromp class didn't. [See Edit]

I suspect that part of the answer is that Standard was a much more compact system than Sea Dart. I'm not sure it's all of the answer.

For what it's worth (1) that's something that I suspect too.

The design of the Sea Dart magazine lent itself to scaling up the missile capacity quite easily; see discussions here and here. There is some reason to think that Type 42 Batch 3 was dimensionally capable of accommodating a 46-missile magazine.

For what it's worth (2) I'd seen here and here before writing Post 41 and its predecessors.

Edit made on Sunday 01.12.24.
@Rule of cool wrote in Post 42.

The Tromps look highly impressive ships, presumably they could jam all the stuff in because of the aluminium superstructure, and I suspect that the Mk13 SAM launcher and other things were smaller and lighter than the Sea Dart and other equivalents.

The aluminium superstructure may be part of the reason why the displacement of the Tromp class was considerably less than Type 42 Batch 3 and as well as why the former carried a heavier armament than the latter, despite both ships having similar dimensions. (The paraphernalia of the Standard MR system being smaller and lighter than the paraphernalia of Sea Dart has already been noted by me and @Yellow Palace.)

 

[TomS]

Further, the Ticonderoga class AGEIS cruisers had an SPS49 2D search radar in addition to their SPY1, does this mean that in it's earliest versions the AGEIS was in effect and Target Indication radar?

Yes to both questions.

Not exactly. The SPS-49 in the Ticos was in effect a form of electronic deception -- a ship emitting only SPS-49 could be any of a number of things (a Tico, a DD-963, an FFG-7, or an older cruiser), while SPY-1 was distinctively an AEGIS ship. That allowed you do do sneaky things like running a CG-47 SAM trap stationed out in the screen like an ASW escort, only going live with SPY-1 when the SPS-49 showed a raid inbound. As specific emitter ID became more prevalent and the situational awareness value of SPY-1 became more apparent, SPS-49 was less and less important, which is one reason why the DDG-51s have no separate 2-D radar.

 

[Rule of cool]

Back to the subject at hand.

1 May Sheffield, Coventry, Glasgow (and Invincible) arrive in TEZ.
4 May Sheffield lost (abandoned, later sunk)
12 May Glasgow lost (withdrawn damaged)
21 May landings at San Carlos
22 May Exeter joins TF
25 May Coventry lost (sunk)
26 May Bristol, Cardiff join TF.

Are there engagements, especially prior to the loss of Sheffield and Glasgow that could have gone better with the Type 988 radar so the TF wasn't down to a single Type 42 destroyer on the day of the San Carlos landing?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 52.

If Broomstick carries on and the Dutch stick with Sea Dart, then the situation with the later Tripartite (Britain, France and Netherlands) discussions in '69 is less likely to break down.

Part of Post 55.

I don't know about Tripartite destroyers, although the Sheffield was ordered in 1968 and laid down in 1970.

I've not heard of this Tripartite Destroyer before. Does anyone have more details?

In any case a Tripartite Frigate instead of the British Type 22, Dutch Standard Frigate (Kortanaer class) and French C70 seems more likely as the POD is 1969. It could be come a Quadripartite Frigate if the Germans built instead of the Type 122 which was based on the Dutch Standard Frigate.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Back to the subject at hand.

1 May Sheffield, Coventry, Glasgow (and Invincible) arrive in TEZ.
4 May Sheffield lost (abandoned, later sunk)
12 May Glasgow lost (withdrawn damaged)
21 May landings at San Carlos
22 May Exeter joins TF
25 May Coventry lost (sunk)
26 May Bristol, Cardiff join TF.

Are there engagements, especially prior to the loss of Sheffield and Glasgow that could have gone better with the Type 988 radar so the TF wasn't down to a single Type 42 destroyer on the day of the San Carlos landing?

I count 5 Type 42s in that list. Of the other 9.

• Birmingham (Batch 1) paid of at Portsmouth in March 1981 for a refit . . . "and she was ready for service again at the end of March 1982, literally days before Argentina invaded the Falklands. Despite frantic efforts to get the ship fully operational, including a reduced sea trials period and a shortened Basis Operational Sea Training (BOST) course it was 18th June before the ship finally sailed for the South Atlantic in company with her sister ship HMS Southampton."
• Newcastle (Batch 1) started a refit at Portsmouth in January 1982 which was completed in December 1982.
• Southampton (Batch 2) was still working up when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands (she was commissioned on 31.10.81) and didn't sail for the South Atlantic until 18.06.82.
• Liverpool (Batch 2) was still under construction. However, the book I'm using says she was formally handed over to the RN at Plymouth on 12.05.82 (one year ahead of schedule) commissioned on 09.07.82 and after working up sailed for the South Atlantic early in November.
• Nottingham (Batch 2) was still under construction and didn't commission until 08.02.83.
• Manchester (Batch 3) was still under construction, but she was one of the ships pressed to an early completion as a result of the Falklands War and was commissioned on 16.12.82.
• Gloucester (Batch 3) was still on the slipway. She was launched on 02.11.82 and completed on 11.09.85.
• York (Batch 3) was still on the slipway. She was launched on 21.06.82 and completed on 09.08.85.
• Edinburgh (Batch 3) was still on the slipway. She was launched on 14.04.83 and completed on 17.12.85.

The source for the first 6 ships is "Modern Combat Ships 3: Type 42" by Leo Marriott and the source for the last 3 was "Conway's 1947-1995".

One of the reasons why Manchester was completed so much earlier than the other Batch 3 ships is that she was laid down on 19.05.78 and the others were laid down much later: Gloucester, 25.10.79 (17 months later); York, 18.01.80 (20 months later); and Edinburgh, 08.09.80 (28 months later).

The other reason is that they took about a year longer to build. Manchester took about 4½ years (4 years 7 months) to build. Her sisters were built in an average of about 5½ years. That is: Gloucester in 5 years 11 months; York 5 years 7 months; and Gloucester 5 years 3 months.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Back to the subject at hand.

1 May Sheffield, Coventry, Glasgow (and Invincible) arrive in TEZ.
4 May Sheffield lost (abandoned, later sunk)
12 May Glasgow lost (withdrawn damaged)
21 May landings at San Carlos
22 May Exeter joins TF
25 May Coventry lost (sunk)
26 May Bristol, Cardiff join TF.

Are there engagements, especially prior to the loss of Sheffield and Glasgow that could have gone better with the Type 988 radar so the TF wasn't down to a single Type 42 destroyer on the day of the San Carlos landing?

Very difficult question to answer;- a response to an FOI, there’s a reply that a file in the UK PRO which may help, “Sea Dart in the Falklands system operation performance assessment”, but I haven’t had time to get it. Maybe some clues.

I’ve cataloged 34 operational firings (ships, dates, times, likely targets) within the duration of the Falkland war from publicly available information. A large portion of these were two missile salvo’s where the second missile failed to guide due to, I believe the Chows exhaust plume, which contains aluminium, chaffed it’s own guidance radar in combination with a launcher control software bug. Ref recent interview with Captain H Balfour. HMS Exeter.

Add on the blast door sensor problem, another Type 42’s 909 sidelobe presenting like a valid target, and flocks of sea birds also presenting as valid targets to a nervous crew……not to mention A Woodwards orders for the operators to be aggressive so launch whenever possible…..it all gets messy.

Against this background it’ll be very difficult to really come to any definitive conclusion.

 

[Rule of cool]

Very difficult question to answer;- a response to an FOI, there’s a reply that a file in the UK PRO which may help, “Sea Dart in the Falklands system operation performance assessment”, but I haven’t had time to get it. Maybe some clues.

I’ve cataloged 34 operational firings (ships, dates, times, likely targets) within the duration of the Falkland war from publicly available information. A large portion of these were two missile salvo’s where the second missile failed to guide due to, I believe the Chows exhaust plume, which contains aluminium, chaffed it’s own guidance radar in combination with a launcher control software bug. Ref recent interview with Captain H Balfour. HMS Exeter.

Add on the blast door sensor problem, another Type 42’s 909 sidelobe presenting like a valid target, and flocks of sea birds also presenting as valid targets to a nervous crew……not to mention A Woodwards orders for the operators to be aggressive so launch whenever possible…..it all gets messy.

Against this background it’ll be very difficult to really come to any definitive conclusion.

Argentina flew ~500 sorties during the war and there were only a few days of intense air activity; May 1, 21, 22, 24 and July 8 and the British forces claimed a lot of kills on those days. It was likely wishful thinking that there were a decent number of engagements where the 988 would have succeeded where the 965 failed. There are some, I think Coventry might have survived attacks that sank her, but Glasgow's 4.5" and Sea Dart were not working when she was hit so a 988 wouldn't have mattered and Sheffield's loss was also not caused by her 965.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Upon looking at my notes I wonder if HMS Cardiff may have performed better in her efforts to stop night flights into and out of Port Stanly if reaction time could be improved;- approximately four unsuccessful engagements although three of these targets rapidly dropped below the radar horizon following detection. After which its impossible for any SARH architecture.