The title block is 'Dreadnaught Consulting', which was the name Dick Landgraff used for his engineering consultancy efforts. Based on that, I'd say that it's an extremely unofficial proposal from an informed amateur.
Based on his experience, the naval architecture underpinning it is likely to be reasonable. But the selection of combat systems is idiosyncratic at best.
I agree very much with this assessment. That said: it does suggest a few things that seem to match the plan in the first post of this thread, replacing the ABL's with VLS and replacing the 5''/38 with 5''/54. Hell, it even looks as if the crossed out 'tags' say 16 cell VLS amidships, matching Tzoli's friend's plan. Could it be these are the same and/or related?
Based on his experience, the naval architecture underpinning it is likely to be reasonable. But the selection of combat systems is idiosyncratic at best.
The best conversions are the simplist. Once you start cutting decks open at some point it was probably better to have just built new. Thats why adding aircraft always seemed a no go from the start. Removing a turret for a deep vertical launcher is not a terrible idea, but so few of Mk41-compatible missiles would fit in that space it sounds like a poor choice. But even a small number of very high quality, larger missiles may be worthwhile to some degree, such as navalized GBI or Arrow 3, which far outranges SM-3 and introduces an MRBM defense that is currently non-existent. KISS. Keep it simple, stupid.
I wonder if they were going to convert the 5-inchers if they ever considered off the shelf like the British Mark 6. The 4.5 inch gun compared favorably to the 5's in so many ways and were probably fairly compatible with the below-deck magazine space. Work with the space already there.
That's fairly consistent with the theme of 'save the battleships' ideas from the mid-late 1990s onwards. More than a few of which originated from the desk of Mr. Langraff.
I wonder if they were going to convert the 5-inchers if they ever considered off the shelf like the British Mark 6. The 4.5 inch gun compared favorably to the 5's in so many ways and were probably fairly compatible with the below-deck magazine space. Work with the space already there.
Zero chance of that. The USN has extensive stocks of 127mm and over time has planned several guided rounds for that caliber (that none have ever actually come to fruition is a persistent problem). Switching to a new caliber would just make things worse.
The only new caliber that would have made any sense at all is some sort of Army-compatible 155mm. Even with the HERO Safe issues, it has to be better/easier than a caliber that exists nowhere else in US supply chains.
Could it be, from this document "Dreadnaught Consulting" by Dick Landgraff was the original info my friend got hold the knowledge of and told me about and hence I've created the drawing and this thread?
Without knowing the provenance of what your friend provided, it's hard to be sure. One could have inspired the other, or both could be independently based on a third, older document.
My guess would be that Landgraff's proposal was based either on what your friend unearthed, or that both are based on something earlier. Given that Landgraff actually was responsible for managing the reactivation and maintenance of the battleships in the 1980s, prior to his retirement, it's likely that his unofficial proposals draw on the work he did officially.
It should be noted that pretty much every engineer has a mental file of 'things I would have done differently, if it wasn't for those pesky budgets'.
Without knowing the provenance of what your friend provided, it's hard to be sure. One could have inspired the other, or both could be independently based on a third, older document.
My guess would be that Landgraff's proposal was based either on what your friend unearthed, or that both are based on something earlier. Given that Landgraff actually was responsible for managing the reactivation and maintenance of the battleships in the 1980s, prior to his retirement, it's likely that his unofficial proposals draw on the work he did officially.
It should be noted that pretty much every engineer has a mental file of 'things I would have done differently, if it wasn't for those pesky budgets'.
Naval historian Bill Jurens is currently working on an update to Garzke & Dulin’s classic book on American battleships, so I would be interesting to see if it will have any information on potential post-Gulf War modernization plans for the Iowas.
Naval historian Bill Jurens is currently working on an update to Garzke & Dulin’s classic book on American battleships, so I would be interesting to see if it will have any information on potential post-Gulf War modernization plans for the Iowas.
BattleshipNewJersey just found sketches and designs for potential upgrades, including "Battle-Carrier" ones. He also talks about the Sea Sparrow launchers, it seems it was the missiles that couldn't survive the main guns firing.
BattleshipNewJersey just found sketches and designs for potential upgrades, including "Battle-Carrier" ones. He also talks about the Sea Sparrow launchers, it seems it was the missiles that couldn't survive the main guns firing.
They should try to buy Canadian extending arm launchers...
P.S. I wonder, why didn't they consider Mk-13 or Mk-22 launchers? They have under-deck missile storage, so wouldn't be affected. Not enough power for illuminators?
Correction, this is the video I meant to post. I didn't realize Ryan had posted a second follow up video with the blueprints. This one has the initial drawings and large scale drawings of one of the carrier conversions.
Both are worth looking at because they aren't just tables, they are actual drawings, plans, and blueprints of what was considered and what was deemed worth planning. For example, there isn't a detailed drawing of the "replace each 16" turret with 88 vls cells" that would let you see how the modules would be arranged in the barbettes, but there is a large scale blueprint of the single angled deck carrier including the hangars with aircraft. The second video (the one in post 54) even shows electronics and concrete ballast in the bow to balance for the carrier deck and hangar.
The Mk 13 (or a derivative) was used on the DEG conversions of the Garcia DE's. It replaced one of the 5"/38 single mounts. So it would seem that it would fit in the space where a twin 5"/38 mount had been installed. However, I doubt it could handle the ESSM weapons.
The Mk 13 (or a derivative) was used on the DEG conversions of the Garcia DE's. It replaced one of the 5"/38 single mounts. So it would seem that it would fit in the space where a twin 5"/38 mount had been installed. However, I doubt it could handle the ESSM weapons.
The Mk 13 (or a derivative) was used on the DEG conversions of the Garcia DE's. It replaced one of the 5"/38 single mounts. So it would seem that it would fit in the space where a twin 5"/38 mount had been installed. However, I doubt it could handle the ESSM weapons.
No, I meant for SM-1MR missiles, if they have so much problems with Sea Sparrow's. Just install a pair of Mk-22 launchers in the position of upper forward 5"/38 mounts.
Yep. The Mk-22 main difference was a design of magazine; it have only one (inner) storage ring for 16 missiles, and the ring was immobile. Instead the whole top of the magazine, with loading hatch in it, rotated with the launcher. During reload, launcher turned to the position of the missile chosen, the loading hatch aligned with the missile, and the missile got loaded. The whole system was as compact as possible.
No, I meant for SM-1MR missiles, if they have so much problems with Sea Sparrow's. Just install a pair of Mk-22 launchers in the position of upper forward 5"/38 mounts.
Yep. The Mk-22 main difference was a design of magazine; it have only one (inner) storage ring for 16 missiles, and the ring was immobile. Instead the whole top of the magazine, with loading hatch in it, rotated with the launcher. During reload, launcher turned to the position of the missile chosen, the loading hatch aligned with the missile, and the missile got loaded. The whole system was as compact as possible.
I suspect the real limiting factors on the Mk 22 were weight and diameter. On deck, I think the Mk 22 and Mk 13 would need not dissimilar amounts of cleared area for them to fit, with the Mk 13 being bigger but the moving part being much more compact. The Mk 13 was similar in ship impact to an Mk 42 gun, the Mk 22 similar in ship impact to the older 5''/38 (Twin IIRC?) mount.
On an Iowa, the limiting factor might be the hole in the deck for the 5''/38 gun, but it might also be easier to fit the larger Mk 13 instead as the actual launcher could be further away from the superstructure near it as it was fixed in place.
That said, these proposals are of a time when the Mk 41 or at least an Tomahawk-launching VLS was available. I don't think at that point an Mk 13 would be fitted. And even if they would be fitted, how vulnerable are the SPG-51's needed for shock and blast? Is anything known about that?
Since the Iowa ships would be part of a task group with at least a couple of AEGIS ships (more once the Burkes arrive) and an ASW screen with Spruances and Knox plus some Perrys I am not sure anything more than the 80s upgrade (Phalanx and Tomahawk) would have been needed.
The key role of these ships was to provide heavy fire support. Improving the 16" guns and related systems would have been useful.
Unshipping the secondary 5" guns might have allowed for more Phalanx and/or Tomahawks?
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The key role of these ships was to provide heavy fire support. Improving the 16" guns and related systems would have been useful.
Unshipping the secondary 5" guns might have allowed for more Phalanx and/or Tomahawks?
That's the funny thing, though. During the initial battleship reactivation, the guns were distinctly secondary to the Tomahawk ABL launchers. The Navy seriously considered leaving the turrets mothballed.
Of course, by the time Phase II was being discussed, there were many more TLAM at sea on other ships. At that point, the battleship were frankly platforms in search of a mission.
That said, these proposals are of a time when the Mk 41 or at least an Tomahawk-launching VLS was available. I don't think at that point an Mk 13 would be fitted. And even if they would be fitted, how vulnerable are the SPG-51's needed for shock and blast? Is anything known about that?
My suspicion is that decision of not putting any SAM on Iowa's was mainly caused by "why bother?" attitude. They were mostly relying on their escorts for protection anyway. Against a lone straddler anti-ship missile, the CIWS mount would likely suffice. And if Iowa's would became a target for a salvo of Soviet supersonic shipkillers... well, the battleship would die anyway, no matter would one of missiles be destroyed by SAM, or not. Early 1980s Sea Sparrow wasn't exactly a good missile defense system; and with just a single illuminator radar anyway, it added little to air defense. At most, a single missile may be knocked out; there would be no time for a second launch, considering Sea Sparrow small range.
So my IMHO is, that while the problems of launcher vulnerability being far from unsurmountable - at very least, they could just took old ASROC "matchboxes" from some decomissioned FRAM destroyers, and stuff Sea Sparrow inside them! - the engineers just decided not to bother with solving a meaningless problem.
Actually their key role was to carry a lot of Tomahawk missiles. The whole initial refit were basically born out of inability to stuff enough Tomahawks on smaller ships. The above-deck ABL launchers were heavy; each one added about 26+ tons to the ship upper weight. Most of USN cruisers and destroyers could not handle more than two of them - i.e. just eight missiles in total.
Iowa's, on the other hand, were big enough to handle eight ABL, for the total of 32 missiles. Each Iowa therefore carried a missile load of four cruisers - for a fraction of the cost of four new units.
I agree with #63. I think the arrival of the Kirov CGN class and the demise of the costly Strike Cruiser programme led the Reagan administration to reach for the Iowas.
Their actual service off Lebanon and in the 1991 Kuwait war plus Clancy's books do emphasise the guns though.
My suspicion is that decision of not putting any SAM on Iowa's was mainly caused by "why bother?" attitude. They were mostly relying on their escorts for protection anyway. Against a lone straddler anti-ship missile, the CIWS mount would likely suffice. And if Iowa's would became a target for a salvo of Soviet supersonic shipkillers... well, the battleship would die anyway, no matter would one of missiles be destroyed by SAM, or not. Early 1980s Sea Sparrow wasn't exactly a good missile defense system; and with just a single illuminator radar anyway, it added little to air defense. At most, a single missile may be knocked out; there would be no time for a second launch, considering Sea Sparrow small range.
So my IMHO is, that while the problems of launcher vulnerability being far from unsurmountable - at very least, they could just took old ASROC "matchboxes" from some decomissioned FRAM destroyers, and stuff Sea Sparrow inside them! - the engineers just decided not to bother with solving a meaningless problem.
This is not far off from how the early RIM-7 was put in ASROC boxes on top of an 3in mount to create the Mk 25 launcher of the BPDMS.
That said, while you are right, we are looking here in the context where they also put a big 3D radar on the ships foremast, which would be available plenty on the escort ships too, so we are of course in the scope of being outside of the practicality of real life decisions!
Just as a side note : Don’t know exactly where I read or heard (Drachinifel ?) that replacing the old fire control system by a digital system failed, because it couldn’t stand the shock of the main guns firing. Would have been sometime in the ´80s. Still know the computers of that time, still in the ´90s our PCs on job crashed, because a piledriver was busy on the neighbouring estate.
A lot of that depended on the construction of the circuit boards etc.
In 1984 my squadron (VMA(AW)-242) was involved in large-scale trials of a "field fix" for the AN/ALQ-126 self-protection system.
The main part was two boxes about 3' long, 18" wide, and 6" thick - stacked one on the other. Inside each were dozens of printed-circuit boards filled with DIP* chips (over 20 per board) - in plug-in sockets! Yep, some brainy engineer said "this will make troubleshooting & repair easier than the way it has always been done".
The designers had paid lip-service to this being in an aircraft by having soft bumpers on the back of each board to "keep the chips on the neighboring board in their sockets" - but that didn't work well.
Even if the chips stayed in place, the humid air (naval aircraft, remember?) caused micro-oxidation on the contacts, which interrupted current flow.
Mean Time Between Failures was under 10 flight hours - and some 90+% of these were fixed by the "I"-level techs spending some 30 man-hours pulling each chip partway out of its socket, then pushing it back in. EVERY chip in the entire pair of boxes! Some time/labor-saver, eh?
While we were on a 6-month deployment to MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, we got permission to modify half of our systems by unsoldering the sockets and soldering the chips directly to the PC boards - just like all other avionic boxes in the aircraft were made!
On the modified boxes MTBF immediately went to over 100 flight hours and stayed there... and repair times shortened significantly, as between the test bench and good old-fashioned test probe/multimeter/oscilloscope tests, it usually took maybe an hour or two to find and fix the problem.
NavAir then had the modification done on every ALQ-126 in USN and USMC inventories.
* Dual In-line Package, which describes their physical layout.
To give the proper credit, during the deployment the squadron was attached to Marine Air Group 12 (MAG-12) which was based in Japan, and the specific tech who initiated the request for the trial and did most of the physical work was a good friend of mine... Sgt Kevin J. Murray.
We were "I"-level techs - the various squadrons sent us avionics boxes with problems and we tested & repaired them. Our shops were part of H&MS-12 (Headquarters & Maintenance Squadron 12).
Our permanent home was MCAS El Toro, CA as part of MAG-13, H&MS-13.
I saw a Shipbucket design that added a bulbous "wave piercing" bow. Would this have been worthwhile? I don't know nuthin from nuthin, but I have read that the Iowa's were very wet because of the fineness of the bow. If a Phase 2 modernization had been done...and the $billions had been available to make real changes to keep them in service for "decades"...would doing something about the bow buoyancy issue been worthwhile??
I saw a Shipbucket design that added a bulbous "wave piercing" bow. Would this have been worthwhile? I don't know nuthin from nuthin, but I have read that the Iowa's were very wet because of the fineness of the bow. If a Phase 2 modernization had been done...and the $billions had been available to make real changes to keep them in service for "decades"...would doing something about the bow buoyancy issue been worthwhile??
Adding some more buoyancy forward would allow for adding some more width to the weather deck and direct the spray more to the sides than the existing Iowa shape. I'm not sure how much you'd need to add through there.
Due to how the hull was shape there, it created a NASTY wake wave that made UNREP work painful for smaller and even larger ships in any conditions over cruising speed.
It was a workable issue but is one of those deal that the navy would have redesign the hull to remove if they could. Which they apperantly did on Kentucky and Illinois.
Issue is by the time you do all the refit work...
Well it been cheaper to design and build a new hull from scratch that can do the same thing but... Well 100 percent better in all the ways.
Due to how the hull was shape there, it created a NASTY wake wave that made UNREP work painful for smaller and even larger ships in any conditions over cruising speed.
It was a workable issue but is one of those deal that the navy would have redesign the hull to remove if they could. Which they apperantly did on Kentucky and Illinois.
Issue is by the time you do all the refit work...
Well it been cheaper to design and build a new hull from scratch that can do the same thing but... Well 100 percent better in all the ways.
Correction, this is the video I meant to post. I didn't realize Ryan had posted a second follow up video with the blueprints. This one has the initial drawings and large scale drawings of one of the carrier conversions.
Both are worth looking at because they aren't just tables, they are actual drawings, plans, and blueprints of what was considered and what was deemed worth planning. For example, there isn't a detailed drawing of the "replace each 16" turret with 88 vls cells" that would let you see how the modules would be arranged in the barbettes, but there is a large scale blueprint of the single angled deck carrier including the hangars with aircraft. The second video (the one in post 54) even shows electronics and concrete ballast in the bow to balance for the carrier deck and hangar.
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