The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

[Abraham Gubler]

The other ‘figure’ of the F-35 is becoming a bit clearer now as we get closer to bulk orders. So how much does the F-35 cost? The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has declassified the detailed cost predictions of the F-35 project in their recent audit (which was strongly supportive of Australian management of the F-35 acquisition). These figures were current as of September 2012.

Management of Australia’s Air Combat Capability—F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition

The total cost to Australia for 100 F-35s in then-year US dollars that are inflation adjusted to the year in which each dollar is spent is … drum roll…

US$ 13,210,620,000 ! Or just over $13 billion. Of which $12.362 billion is the unit production costs. The other billion being Australia’s project development costs and contributions to the shared cost of establishing the production line, upgrade capability, etc.

So that’s a unit weapon system cost of $123.62 million. Which is slightly better than the US$129.1 million Australian paid per unit weapon system cost for the F/A-18F Super Hornet.

 

[LowObservable]

Strewth! Looks like you got hosed right and proper on the Super Hornet deal, cobber, since all the US documentation that anyone can see, or has produced here, shows that the SH is cheaper than any F-35A price projected in the SAR.

Or maybe you're comparing apples with oranges, or kookaburras with wombats. But something in that comparison makes less sense than a platypus after six tubes of Fosters.

EF - CDAs were Concept Demonstration Aircraft, the X-35s and X-32s. PWSC was Preferred Weapon System Concept, the designs that Boeing and LockMart developed in 1996-2000 and took into the 2001 source selection.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Strewth! Looks like you got hosed right and proper on the Super Hornet deal, cobber, since all the US documentation that anyone can see, or has produced here, shows that the SH is cheaper than any F-35A price projected in the SAR.

Or maybe you're comparing apples with oranges, or kookaburras with wombats. But something in that comparison makes less sense than a platypus after six tubes of Fosters.

So how does one get over charged (ie “hosed”) via an FMS deal? The RAAF Super Hornet weapon system unit cost comprises very similar products and services to the proposed F-35 weapon system unit cost. Including the in-USA initial training package.

The alternative, as unthinkable as it may be in some corners, is that the non-recurring flyaway cost of the F-35 (not included development costs) averaged over a buy including multiyear procurement (not exclusively high cost, early production aircraft) is actually quite modest and affordable. And when combined with the designed in efficiencies of its training and operational budget actually work out to be cheaper than previous generation alternatives.

No amount of Australian vernacular, as clumsily applied as it may be, can cover this up in the cold light of the audited figures.

 

[LowObservable]

So how does one get over charged (ie “hosed”) via an FMS deal? The RAAF Super Hornet weapon system unit cost comprises very similar products and services to the proposed F-35 weapon system unit cost. Including the in-USA initial training package.

The alternative, as unthinkable as it may be in some corners, is that the non-recurring flyaway [sic] cost of the F-35 (not included development costs) averaged over a buy including multiyear procurement (not exclusively high cost, early production aircraft) is actually quite modest and affordable. And when combined with the designed in efficiencies of its training and operational budget actually work out to be cheaper than previous generation alternatives.

The question is exactly that. Even the recurring flyaway costs, for full-rate batches in the 2020s underwritten by 130 US jets per year, are projected by the Pentagon (the SAR is a report issued by the SecDef) to be higher than the SH today. The program office director has said that there are no reliable operating cost estimates as yet.

So how does the ANAO come up with a lower unit cost than the SH? What assumptions are being made?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The question is exactly that. Even the recurring flyaway costs, for full-rate batches in the 2020s underwritten by 130 US jets per year, are projected by the Pentagon (the SAR is a report issued by the SecDef) to be higher than the SH today. The program office director has said that there are no reliable operating cost estimates as yet.

So how does the ANAO come up with a lower unit cost than the SH? What assumptions are being made?

Well one could always look at the audit… As to the ‘assumptions’ the information they use to determine the figure is “JSF MoUs and subsidiary documents”. As to operating costs these are like all other weapon system costs just the initial float of spares provided as part of the purchase. Also operating costs would be part of the initial in-USA training purchase but the US is certainly quoting a price for this service. They may lose money on it if the F-35 costs a lot more to fly than they thought but that’s their business. The key part in driving down this cost is the level of simulation expected in F-35 training. Which doesn’t require any fuel burn, stealth treatment maintenance, etc.

They also provide an analysis of how this TYD unit weapon system cost has changed over time. In 2006 it was US$9.685 billion with spend out to 2025. In April 2009 it was US$10.734 billion out to 2022), again revised in February 2011 to US$11.013 billion out to 2025). In February 2012 it was revised to US$12.362 billion with the spend out to 2037 (obviously an option keeping the Super Hornets until the end of their airframe life).

 

[LowObservable]

The key part in driving down this cost is the level of simulation expected in F-35 training.

Excellent. Because one key feature of this venture to date has been the enormous success attending its reliance on modeling and simulation.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Excellent. Because one key feature of this venture to date has been the enormous success attending its reliance on modeling and simulation.

Modelling and simulation in the development and flight testing of an aircraft is apples and oranges compared to simulation in pilot and ground crew training.

 

[GTX]

Excellent. Because one key feature of this venture to date has been the enormous success attending its reliance on modeling and simulation.

Modelling and simulation in the development and flight testing of an aircraft is apples and oranges compared to simulation in pilot and ground crew training.

Agreed! The use of flight simulators and maintenance simulators is a well proven thing now. The fact that there is no two seat trainer variant of the F-35 hasn't concerned any of the air forces involved has it?

 

[pathology_doc]

How long did the RAAF have to wait for its F-111Cs, again? Are we going to see history repeat itself?

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

How long did the RAAF have to wait for its F-111Cs, again? Are we going to see history repeat itself?

They weren't worth the wait were they?

 

[pathology_doc]

Difficult to say. They were nice to have, and would have been a powerful deterrent if relations with Indonesia had gone rapidly south. They didn't, for which we should be thankful.


It's a bit like Chris Gibson arguing (in BSP4) that Sandys was right about Red Top being unnecessary - with all due respect to Chris it probably was, but only because a shooting war never developed that required a head-on kill of an incoming fast bomber by a British interceptor. (If I might digress temporarily, it might easily have gone the other way, and I can't help but think that Sea Vixen pilots in particular would have appreciated something they could fire head-on or at least from the front quarter against a significantly faster adversary.)


In the end, when it comes to defences against somebody's bombers (or in the Aardvark's case ships or tanks) bearing in on your cities, airfields or carriers, it is better to have and not need than need and not have. And the best defence is still a strong offence.

 

[GTX]

How long did the RAAF have to wait for its F-111Cs, again? Are we going to see history repeat itself?

What? A weapons platform that although taking a little longer to enter service then originally desired goes onto become a centrepiece of the RAAF's capability and one that when eventually being replaced has people complaining that nothing will ever be as good.. well yes, probably.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

How long did the RAAF have to wait for its F-111Cs, again? Are we going to see history repeat itself?

What? A weapons platform that although taking a little longer to enter service then originally desired goes onto become a centrepiece of the RAAF's capability and one that when eventually being replaced has people complaining that nothing will ever be as good.. well yes, probably.

All while being cheaper than the alternative? How horrific.

Difficult to say. They were nice to have, and would have been a powerful deterrent if relations with Indonesia had gone rapidly south. They didn't, for which we should be thankful.

Are you at war with Indonesia now and can't wait for the F-35?

 

[RyanC]

Page 27 of that Aussie report, specifically bulletpoint 41 says:

URF for F-35A in FY12 to be $131.4M
URF for F-35A in FY13 to be $127.3M
URF for F-35A in FY19 to be $83.4M

It also has some classic british understatment later in that bulletpoint:

However, these estimates remain dependent upon expected orders from the United States and other nations, as well as the delivery of expected benefits of continuing Will-Cost/Should-Cost management by the US Department of Defense.

Page 36, specifically bulletpoint 67 says:

Australia will order it's first two F-35A in 2012, and they'll be part of the 2014-15 LRIP Lot 6 program; but the majority of Australian F-35A orders will occur between 2015 and 2020.

 

[LowObservable]

In other news, all that stuff from MG Bogdan was clearly just rhetoric:

https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ff4d9bf72e00c0889dff49fca48a9ca1&tab=core&_cview=0

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

In other news, all that stuff from MG Bogdan was clearly just rhetoric:

https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ff4d9bf72e00c0889dff49fca48a9ca1&tab=core&_cview=0

Well Bill, what do you think the Major General's intentions are? Interested to hear your take on his objectives

 

[GTX]

Page 36, specifically bulletpoint 67 says:

Australia will order it's first two F-35A in 2012, and they'll be part of the 2014-15 LRIP Lot 6 program; but the majority of Australian F-35A orders will occur between 2015 and 2020.

And your point being?? This is nothing new and has been understood to be the case for a while now... :

 

[GTX]

In other news, all that stuff from MG Bogdan was clearly just rhetoric:

https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ff4d9bf72e00c0889dff49fca48a9ca1&tab=core&_cview=0

Hmmm, so the they are simply doing what would have (and indeed to a degree has already happened - I was actually involved in a similar thing a couple of years ago!). Please point out why you may think this is something to get all excited about? As for the comment about rhetoric, to me it seems just a reflection of what Maj Gen Bogdan said was part of the plan:

We’ve got to inject some competition into the long term sustainment of this program.

NOT what some such as yourself have tried to imply he said... :

 

[quellish]

Hmmm, so the they are simply doing what would have (and indeed to a degree has already happened - I was actually involved in a similar thing a couple of years ago!). Please point out why you may think this is something to get all excited about? As for the comment about rhetoric, to me it seems just a reflection of what Maj Gen Bogdan said was part of the plan:

The specifics are interesting. For example, they're calling out ALIS specifically. ALIS has been a pain point for the customer because they feel as it is now it's not a system they can use operationally. A major redesign is underway to address some of the issues, but that is not supposed to be delivered until 2014-2015.

 

[GTX]

Care to be specific? From what I understand (from my own internal contacts), the concerns have mainly centred on the security side.


Is ALIS a big jump for some? Sure. However, I can also assure you that similar jumps with similar (in concept) systems has been accomplished before (any RAAF/ex-RAAFies remember the introduction of CAAM/CAMM2?).

 

[Triton]

Editorial from Aviation Week:

"Pentagon Should Investigate Fighter Options Beyond The F-35"

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_10_01_2012_p58-500608.xml&p=1

[Editor's Note: This editorial ran in the October 1 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology.]

In October 2001, when the U.S. Defense Department awarded Lockheed Martin the contract to develop the Joint Strike Fighter, it looked like the deal of the century for the company and its customer. In the largest defense procurement in history, Lockheed would produce three variants of one stealthy design to replace the mixed and aging fleets of three U.S. services, saving money and time.

Eleven years in, the deal still looks pretty good for Lockheed, but less so for its customers, including the eight international partners. In 2001, they expected by 2020 to be operating a large fleet of stealthy “fifth-generation” fighters.

Instead, the cost to develop and produce the aircraft has grown to $330.5 billion, far more than the original $177.1 billion estimate (both in 2012 dollars). Projections of operating and support costs for the F-35 have escalated far beyond the estimates of 2001, and fielding is years behind the original schedule. In fact, 11 years in, the exact timings—and capability levels—for initial operation of the three variants are still uncertain.

Before going farther down this cracked and broken path, the Pentagon needs to take a hard look at the consequences. On schedule and affordability, the JSF program is already a failure. In terms of capabilities and the long-term benefits of commonality, the jury is still out. And even if the F-35 delivers on everything it promised, the world has changed since 2001.

One problem is the lack of competition. Including the F-22, Lockheed will have been the sole U.S. producer of all-new fighters for 50 years by the time a “sixth-generation” aircraft comes along—no earlier than 2030—with significant consequences for the industrial base.

Faced with an ill-defined, but unacceptable trillion-dollar sustainment cost estimate for the F-35 fleet, the new tough-talking leader of the joint program office is considering abandoning the contractor-run support system and opening it to competition, including from government depots.

That might work long term, but it would do little to help warfighters stay ahead of threats through the 2020s. By 2021, U.S. forces will be operating only a fraction of the 2,400-plus F-35s they plan to buy. The bulk of U.S. fleets will comprise the same F-15s, F-16s and F/A-18s of 2001.

Some portion of that force will have been upgraded with the latest radars, avionics and weapons—at a cost that was not anticipated when the F-35 contract was awarded. But, for the most part, their airframes and engines will date back to the 1980s and 1990s, with all the costs and issues that come with age.

One bold plan might be for President Barack Obama or Republican rival Mitt Romney to commit the Pentagon to competing the purchase of its next 300 fighters. It would shake things up, although it is questionable the Pentagon could stage a meaningful competition between the F-35 with its estimated costs and promised abilities and the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 with known costs and available capabilities. And the value of new tails must be balanced against the impact of reducing F-35 procurement, potentially causing partners to defect, production rates to drop and costs to soar.

But complexity is no excuse for inaction. The Pentagon has begun to act by acknowledging there is a problem and publicly increasing pressure to perform. Step 2, also underway, is to gauge the severity of the problem and come to realistic acquisition and operating cost projections so the U.S. and its partners can decide what they can afford.

There must be a hedge against further problems. The U.S. should keep producing F/A-18s for the Navy, upgrading F-16s for the Air Force and promoting the F-15 and F-16 internationally so a fallback option remains open. Then, the Defense Department must revisit how to evolve tactical aviation through the 2020s and sustain the industrial base to keep competition alive for the next fighter.

The F-35's problems could provide an opportunity to adjust military plans to the new capabilities and realities that have emerged since 2001. Instead of the smooth transition to the fifth-generation fighter force envisioned then, the turbulent, mixed-fleet 2020s could bring a reason to rethink. Some military leaders already say U.S. relies too much on stealth—a technology China is moving rapidly to match. There is nothing to say the U.S. must wait beyond 2030 for the next fighter, or to introduce competition for the F-35.

 

[quellish]

Care to be specific? From what I understand (from my own internal contacts), the concerns have mainly centred on the security side.

- ALIS-related issues are driving up the time individual maint. tasks are taking on the aircraft.
- ALIS hardware is too large and heavy to be easily deployed to forward locations or onboard ship.
- System requires a climate controlled environment
- Overall ALIS software and integration issues
- Supply database integration
- LOHAS and overal signature maintenance capabilities falling short of performance expectations
- Crypto key management issues, which ended up highlighting larger security architecture problems

Is ALIS a big jump for some?

Conceptually it's not a big leap over previous systems - it has a lot in common with systems in use on the F-22 and other platforms. The system as it is now, however, would be difficult to deploy to a forward land base, very difficult to deploy to a ship, and would have a lot of issues actually maintaining the aircraft health. These have been identified as problems with the design rather than just the system being immature. ALIS was identified as the biggest block to operational suitability, which prompted the redesign that's to be finishing in 2014.

What's interesting about the industry day is that it mentions ALIS support training and administration contracts - for a system undergoing a major redesign. A redesign that has been called out by DoD for lacking an end to end testing plan.

The LOHAS subsystem is another matter, and one not mentioned in public much. LOHAS is/was based on a system in use on the F-22. The F-22 program uses Air Force and DoD-wide assets in addition to systems specific to the F-22 program. For example, systems like CLOVeRs are used to directly measure the signature of the individual aircraft on the ground, and the F-22 program has access to dynamic measurement capabilities (i.e. in flight measurement, at one of the two dynamic ranges and using a measuring aircraft like NT-43). While the Air Force could use existing ground based signature measurement systems on the operational F-35, there are currently no plans to. Those systems, as currently implemented, would not work very well at all aboard a ship.

For dynamic measurement, existing systems would need major upgrades to handle the projected volume of operational F-35s. One F-35 test aircraft has flown against a dynamic range, which prompted changes elsewhere in the program. LOHAS is primarily a model - it is a predictive tool rather than a system that takes direct measurements of the aircraft signature. That model was based on pole work done by Lockheed over the past few years of the F-35 full scale pole model in various conditions (battle damage, various types of repairs, etc.).

The F-22 recently went though a multi year program called "Low Observables Stability Over Time". The objective was to measure how well the signature maintenance methods were working. LOHAS, which is based on the systems in use on the F-22, has not yet benefited from the data obtained from that program.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Editorial from Aviation Week:

"Pentagon Should Investigate Fighter Options Beyond The F-35"

Source:
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_10_01_2012_p58-500608.xml&p=1

I can tell its election season, because that article is full of so much double speak it made me feel double plus ungood. for example:

It would shake things up, although it is questionable the Pentagon could stage a meaningful competition between the F-35 with its estimated costs and promised abilities and the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 with known costs and available capabilities. And the value of new tails must be balanced against the impact of reducing F-35 procurement, potentially causing partners to defect, production rates to drop and costs to soar.

So the whole thing could also cause costs to soar, and partners to run? brilliant gamble!! The entire article contradicts itself to the point where "Headline is
contradicted by actual article"


Thats a wonderful idea to waste money and it would be an absolute blast to see politics drive up the cost of yet another weapon system. There seems to be this idea out there, that all cost problems point directly at lockheed, and it is the lone trouble maker, and that just isn't the case.

I mean who can be satisfied with having cost overruns on one fighter when you could have it on two? Don't they have to open up a new competition as well? The government can't just say "OK Boeing heres the money for 300 planes, surprise us" Also, I am getting older, and the memory starts to play tricks, but wasn't the entire JSF "winner take all"? conceding from the start that there would be a sole aircraft supplier for the next 50 years? wasnt that the idea?


Finally, the sole objective of the "competitive" fighter would be to save money through competition, so in order for this plan to make any sense, you will have to convince me that buying 300 more aircraft of a different type will make lockheed competitive to the point where you actually save money in the long run. So we save millions if we spend billions? where do I sign? You also have to convince lockheed who will quickly see it as a idiotic bluff (they can do math), accuse you of not knowing "how all of this works," and then quickly say "If you want to do that you can, but it will make the F-35 more expensive..."

This is like trying to make your girlfriend jealous by making out with the dog. That'll show her!

 

[Triton]

This is like trying to make your girlfriend jealous by making out with the dog. That'll show her!

ROFL!

 

[GTX]

Sounds to me like someone trying to make mountains out of molehills... :

- ALIS-related issues are driving up the time individual maint. tasks are taking on the aircraft.
- ALIS hardware is too large and heavy to be easily deployed to forward locations or onboard ship.
- System requires a climate controlled environment
- Overall ALIS software and integration issues
- Supply database integration
- LOHAS and overal signature maintenance capabilities falling short of performance expectations
- Crypto key management issues, which ended up highlighting larger security architecture problems

It is obvious to me that you are referring to issues raised in the DOT&E Annual Report released earlier this year, specifically some of the Operational Suitability assessment aspects. Interestingly, this is an aspect of testing often overlooked and rarely understood properly by many, including even testers themselves (having a wife who is an expert in this exact field gives me both a greater appreciation and an advantage here ;D ). It is also an area that if you care to investigate, you will rarely find a weapons platform pass on. Anyway, let's have a closer look at what was said then shall we:


Re maintenance delays:

Maintenance of flight test and production lot 1 aircraft is taking longer than required for the mature system...Current maintenance repair times are driven largely by immature health management and autonomic logistics information systems...It is too early to predict whether the required maintainability thresholds can be met.

Note the bits I have highlighted. These are Lot 1 aircraft being assessed...in other words, this is where everyone is learning how to 'play' with the systems (both the aircraft itself and support systems such as ALIS). I would be very surprised if it did go perfectly at the start. It is also being assessed against what a "mature system" is expected to deliver. Well, guess what, the F-35 is not yet a mature system.

So are "ALIS-related issues ... driving up the time individual maint. tasks are taking on the aircraft"? Well, obviously yes. However, maybe it would be better to make the final call on whether ALIS etc is up to the job in a few years time when it is mature and when everyone involved has gained a bit more experience with the new systems?

Note also the final line about it being "too early to predict". Well, this works both ways: just as it is too early to say whether "required maintainability thresholds can be met", it is equally too early to say they won't, or even if the level reached will be deemed acceptable by operators...

Re ALIS hardware issues:

The program failed to design the unit-level ALIS hardware for deployability. The squadron operating unit weighs 2,466 pounds and measures 79 inches high by 40 inches deep and 24 inches wide. It also requires climate-controlled environments. The program worked through late 2010 and 2011 to redesign the system and provide improved deployability by late 2014

An oversight? Maybe. However, without knowing the specific reasons behind this lack of deploy able unit level ALIS hardware, it is difficult to comment. Perhaps this was a budgetary reason? Perhaps a technical one? Perhaps a change in operating concept? I don't know - if anyone can provide an actual answer (as opposed to some cynical comment or opinion), it would be appreciated.

Either way, I do note that the problem is already identified as being worked upon and is planned to be ready by 2014. If anyone is concerned about F-35s not being ready to deploy to a forward operating combat location between now and then, please speak up...

Re,the comment about ALIS not being able to be deployed on board ships, I think you need to read carefully what was written in the report and also consider the circumstances involved. The trials concerned involved the F-35B initial ship trials on USS Wasp (you know, the ones that didn't burn holes in the deck... : ). As such, it would not have had any on board ALIS system as would be expected in a mature, operational system. They would only have had a temporary deployable system, which as already discussed is still in development. This is however, a long way from saying that ALIS will be unable to be used on board ships. Once F-35Bs and F-35Cs start operating on board ships with actual operational units, you will find this is all well sorted out.

Similarly, the size of the current hardware and it's environmental requirements are hardly an area for concern...especially when one considers the size of the ships planned to operate these platforms. Similarly, even for a F-35A, I suspect you wouldn't find it to be an issue, especially for anyone familiar with the way modern Western Air Forces deploy and the amount (and size) of support equipment they take.

Re the Supply database integration:

This is what the report said:

Data Quality and Integration Management (DQIM) is a vital part of the autonomic logistics global sustainment plan for the F-35. The ALIS version 1.0.3 is supposed to incorporate DQIM; however, missing data elements (e.g. part number, logistics control number, serial number) of vendor supply databases have prevented timely testing and fielding of ALIS version 1.0.3.

Once again though, this simply reflects the immaturity of the entire system (including the information/data aspects). Anyone who has worked in any logistics support organisation that is part of modern military weapons system support knows just how huge this task is and how it simply takes time to sort out and to also keep up to date. Nothing to get your nickers into a knot over though... ;D

What's interesting about the industry day is that it mentions ALIS support training and administration contracts - for a system undergoing a major redesign.

Nothing surprising at all about that. Please remember that any redesign WILL NOT involve a total change of the system or the user interface. Anyone who thinks it will is living in a fantasy world. As such, the training etc mentioned in the industry day is still very valid... :

That's probably enough for now. I am sure readers get the point though...

 

[quellish]

It is obvious to me that you are referring to issues raised in the DOT&E Annual Report released earlier this year, specifically some of the Operational Suitability assessment aspects.

Note the bits I have highlighted. These are Lot 1 aircraft being assessed...in other words, this is where everyone is learning how to 'play' with the systems (both the aircraft itself and support systems such as ALIS). I would be very surprised if it did go perfectly at the start. It is also being assessed against what a "mature system" is expected to deliver. Well, guess what, the F-35 is not yet a mature system.

To quote my previous post:

These have been identified as problems with the design rather than just the system being immature

Many of the issues I've outlined - most - are not system maturity issues but design issues. While ALIS certainly has issues stemming from system maturity, there are many issues that are due to the design or architecture of the system.

So are "ALIS-related issues ... driving up the time individual maint. tasks are taking on the aircraft"? Well, obviously yes. However, maybe it would be better to make the final call on whether ALIS etc is up to the job in a few years time when it is mature and when everyone involved has gained a bit more experience with the new systems?

Let me clarify. This is why I found it curious that the industry day was looking for ALIS training and administration services. The system is undergoing a major redesign, due to be complete in several years. To start competing for these services seems a bit premature, especially given that this will add additional time to mature the redesigned system.

Re,the comment about ALIS not being able to be deployed on board ships, I think you need to read carefully what was written in the report and also consider the circumstances involved. The trials concerned involved the F-35B initial ship trials on USS Wasp (you know, the ones that didn't burn holes in the deck... ). As such, it would not have had any on board ALIS system as would be expected in a mature, operational system. They would only have had a temporary deplorable system, which as already discussed is still in development. This is however, a long way from saying that ALIS will be unable to be used on board ships. Once F-35Bs and F-35Cs start operating on board ships with actual operational units, you will find this is all well sorted out.

The trials on the USS Wasp did not include ALIS on board for a number of reasons. The issues I outlined in my previous post were not a factor in wether or not ALIS was part of those trials.

Similarly, the size of the current hardware and it's environmental requirements are hardly an area for concern...especially when one considers the size of the ships planned to operate these platforms. Similarly, even for a F-35A, I suspect you wouldn't find it to be an issue, especially for anyone familiar with the way modern Western Air Forces deploy and the amount (and size) of support equipment they take.

The size of the system and the environmental requirements for ALIS were highlighted as deployability issues by DoD.

 

[GTX]

Many of the issues I've outlined - most - are not system maturity issues but design issues. While ALIS certainly has issues stemming from system maturity, there are many issues that are due to the design or architecture of the system.

Proof justifying this assertion please?




As for the rest, I simply don't think you understand what the DOT&E report was actually reporting or the cintext of the trials etc that it was based upon. Either that or you are grossly in need of further clarification...and simply regurgitating the same flawed comments doesn't constitute clarification...

 

[DD]

What Quellish has said are pretty much on the money. What we are seeing with ALIS are due to a number of stuff ups and oversights by the MBA type project managers, not the least being failure to follow SEI development standards for Safety & Mission Critical Software.

Not following these standards from the get go is only inviting disasters.

Same goes for the on-board systems' software.

There are many reports supporting what have been summarised in Dr Mike Gilmore's DOT&E annual reports to the Congress.

As for our little Ozzie friend's assertion of these, in turn, being assertions - a claim which seems to be based, in part, on his being married to an expert - and then his 'request' for proof, the English have a saying which is appropriate at this juncture and should more than suffice -

"The proof is in the pudding (and the eating thereof)"!

 

[quellish]

Many of the issues I've outlined - most - are not system maturity issues but design issues. While ALIS certainly has issues stemming from system maturity, there are many issues that are due to the design or architecture of the system.

Proof justifying this assertion please?

As for the rest, I simply don't think you understand what the DOT&E report was actually reporting or the cintext of the trials etc that it was based upon. Either that or you are grossly in need of further clarification...and simply regurgitating the same flawed comments doesn't constitute clarification...

ALIS is also not mature and may require some design changes to address known deficiencies. ALIS is in limited operations at test and training sites and officials are evaluating proposed solutions. While additional development time and resources may resolve some deficiencies, several requirements are not going to be met given current schedules, according to the JSF test team report.

The JSF test team operational assessment report concluded that an early release model of ALIS was not mature, did not meet operational suitability requirements, and would require substantial improvements to achieve sortie generation rates and life cycle cost requirements. In particular, the current configuration was not adequate for deployed operations–its current weight, environmental support, connectivity, and security requirements make it difficult to support detachments, operational testing, and forward operations, especially vital to the Marine Corps plans. The report noted that there is no approved concept or design for this capability, no funding identified, and stated a concern that there may be no formal solution prior to Marine Corps declaring an initial operating capability. Operational testers also identified concerns about data and interoperability with service maintenance systems

Are either of these paragraphs from the DOT&E report you keep referring to?

 

[GTX]

Why don't you check for yourself: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2011/

 

[GTX]

DD, thank you for your useless commentary. As always, wishing something to be so (as seems to be the typical strategy of F-35 detractors such as yourself) doesn't make it so. Proof/evidence is required. Something that seems very much lacking in your comments...

 

[Arjen]

Source: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2011/
On page, open 'DoD PROGRAMS', then open 'F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER', scroll to pages 34 and 35.

p.34
The driving operational suitability deficiencies include an inadequate Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) for deployed operations, excessive time for low observable maintenance repair and restoration capability, low reliability and poor maintainability performance, and deficient crypto key management and interface compatibility.
[...]
p.35
Although maintenance was completed while aboard the ship, limited support equipment was positioned on USS Wasp and no ALIS equipment supported the deployment aboard the ship. The test team created a virtual private network connection between the ship and the prime contractor in Fort Worth such that they were able to process maintenance actions as if operating at Patuxent River.
[...]
The program failed to design the unit-level ALIS hardware for deployability. The squadron operating unit weighs 2,466 pounds and measures 79 inches high by 40 inches deep and 24 inches wide. It also requires climate-controlled'environments. The program worked through late 2010 and 2011 to redesign the system and provide improved deployability by late 2014. However, there is no plan for end-to-end testing of the system, and funding of retrofits or changes to the units that will be purchased in the meantime. The problem needs correction in order to take advantage of F-35 capability in forward operating locations expected in combat.
Data Quality and Integration Management (DQIM) is a vital part of the autonomic logistics global sustainment plan for the F-35. The ALIS version 1.0.3 is supposed to incorporate DQIM; however, missing data elements (e.g. part number, logistics control number, serial number) of vendor supply databases have prevented timely testing and fielding of ALIS version 1.0.3. This results in the development of manual data tracking processes for early LRIP aircraft. The program expects to have DQIM data products available to support ALIS 1.0.3 fielding in May 2012.

Many of the issues I've outlined - most - are not system maturity issues but design issues. While ALIS certainly has issues stemming from system maturity, there are many issues that are due to the design or architecture of the system.

I agree with quellish: ALIS has serious design issues. ALIS redesign/modification isn't due to deliver until late 2014; implementing a job that big without end-to-end testing of ALIS seems like bad management to me.

 

[LowObservable]

2446 pounds?

See below for top secret squirrel imagery of the initial ALIS processor hardware, obtained via my cat, who has a Q clearance...

Oh, TT...

This is like trying to make your girlfriend jealous by making out with the dog.

I'm not even going to ask how you learned that this was not a good idea.

However, a better analogy might be this: The longer your girlfriend holds out on third base (or Block 3), the hotter her cougar-ish older sister starts to look.

 

[SpudmanWP]

Since the F-35s are just now being used in an operational environment & being exposed to real techs and ALIS is still in dev, it makes no sense to finalize the hardware (ie make it "field grade") before the final specs & requirements are known.

 

[Arjen]

We were discussing whether ALIS was immature and/or suffering from design issues. I'm saying: both. Thats's not a good thing to be after this many years of development.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

However, a better analogy might be this: The longer your girlfriend holds out on third base (or Block 3), the hotter her cougar-ish older sister starts to look.

She doesn't really have a sister though, more like her mom who's finest hour has passed, she is older, fatter, and been around the block a lot already. Learning a lot about you, Bill.

Its a stupid idea, and the article constantly points out how risky the entire thing is. Spending Billions to "save" millions is not fiscally smart. If youre a fan of legacy fighters its an excuse to sabotage the F-35 and drive up costs. But, Please don't sell it as a money saving measure, because its not. This plan would not be considered by anyone capable of doing math, and again even the author seems to talk himself out of it.

 

[LowObservable]

The problem is that continuing to double down on JSF was the decision in 2008-09, and whatever anyone says, here we are with no IOC date and no operating cost that anyone agrees on.

And if we believe Bogdan, the operating cost is going to be a factor of how well ALIS works and the contractual structure around it.

So what do the fans say? Keep moving at full speed until we know what ALIS does! Only a few more years! She was goin' down grade, makin' ninety miles an hour...

Should we acquire more classic fighters? Good question. Right now we are headed toward some quite expensive rebuilds and upgrades to sustain force numbers into the 2030s. Buying new jets would cost more, but they might be cheaper to sustain, and have more life to them. No, they're not stealth, but if anyone believes the USAF rather than the intertubez, half the TacAir force is going to be non-stealth until around 2035 in any case.

By the way, everyone seems to assume that they know the identity of the lead author of the AW&ST editorial...

 

[jsport]

The problem is that continuing to double down on JSF was the decision in 2008-09, and whatever anyone says, here we are with no IOC date and no operating cost that anyone agrees on.

And if we believe Bogdan, the operating cost is going to be a factor of how well ALIS works and the contractual structure around it.

So what do the fans say? Keep moving at full speed until we know what ALIS does! Only a few more years! She was goin' down grade, makin' ninety miles an hour...

Should we acquire more classic fighters? Good question. Right now we are headed toward some quite expensive rebuilds and upgrades to sustain force numbers into the 2030s. Buying new jets would cost more, but they might be cheaper to sustain, and have more life to them. No, they're not stealth, but if anyone believes the USAF rather than the intertubez, half the TacAir force is going to be non-stealth until around 2035 in any case.

By the way, everyone seems to assume that they know the identity of the lead author of the AW&ST editorial...

so we are to assume we do not know the author of the editoral?

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

more life to them.

Until they go to war, where their life expectancy drops alarmingly, if you believe all those wacky military folks.

No, they're not stealth, but if anyone believes the USAF rather than the intertubez, half the TacAir force is going to be non-stealth until around 2035 in any case.

Better to almost have none forever then? B-2s and F-22s won't be enough, Combined thats fewer than 200 aircraft. You also miss a basic point: Legacy aircraft aren't being replaced because theyre not stealth, theyre being replaced because they are old and outdated. even if the F-35 was canceled tomorrow, the same problem remains. Its not like they are throwing away perfectly awesome 40 year old designs "because stealth" But that doesn't fit your narrative of older fighters being equal I know.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

I believe the core issue here is that F-35 supporters are terrified that the F-35 will go the way of the Comanche and many other recent US programs if it receives too much criticism, and that therefore to make sure we get the F-35 built, we all have to become cheerleaders and unquestioningly accept its all going well.


Generally, in a democracy, disagreement and criticism is welcome, and is part of every process. In fact there is probably NO large program in any industry done so well it couldn't have been done better. There are always alternatives to consider, weaknesses to be exposed.


Thats not to say that the engineers designing and building the F-35 aren't fantastically dedicated individuals trying to deliver the best product they can. I can understand how frustrating it is to see criticism of a program you are sweating blood and tears on. Its not personal. No-one is saying that you guys are rubbing your hands in piles of ill-gotten taxpayer gold.


The best counter to criticism is not to attack the person delivering the criticism, or accuse them of having a hidden agenda. Its to rebut their criticism with evidence that disproves their criticism. Sometimes, you can't, because that information is classified, or whatever. It doesn't really matter. The day that the US Government sets policy based on the opinions of a bunch of aviation geeks on an internet forum is not yet arrived.