The F-35 No Holds Barred topic

[RyanC]

In fact of all the problems the F-35 has had skin has not been one of them. Engines and sensors are where the money goes today, as has been previously stated in this thread.

It costs a lot to maintain the necessary precision on the skin; both in tooling costs and lifecycle costs. Plus, the skin then becomes a virtually unbreakable outer mold line that you can't play around with if necessary; due to the stealth requirements. (AKA, no aerodynamic quick fixes).

 

[AeroFranz]

A broken acquisition system that forces the Department of Defense and military contractors to deliberately misrepresent costs and the dates of program milestones? So what you are saying is that any information coming out of the JPO and Lockheed Martin should be treated with suspicion and skepticism.

This is exactly my beef. Thanks for putting words to that. The only way of winning the contract is to lie on what you can deliver for what price. Eventually the proof's in the pudding, but the longer you can delay the unpleasant truth and milk the government's teat, the better. With this in mind, how can you trust what a contractor says?

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

A broken acquisition system that forces the Department of Defense and military contractors to deliberately misrepresent costs and the dates of program milestones? So what you are saying is that any information coming out of the JPO and Lockheed Martin should be treated with suspicion and skepticism.

I think any information coming out of anywhere should be treated with suspicion. Also there is no easter bunny. I am sorry I am the one to have to tell you that. many people also disagree with the GAO, and other Government entities numbers. the DoD is a part of the government so make of that what you will. Again there are two sides of every story. Lets look at that whole recent aerial tanker selection fiasco. that was a nice clean cut affair wasn't it? There are a lot of moving parts. The primary manufacturer is just one element of it.

I remember talking to a classmate that had recently seen a film that talked about how a modern military bomber had parts built in all 50 states and how "wasnt that a sad waste? they did that so the bomber couldnt be canceled"

My response was along the lines of "whats sad is that you have to do that stuff to have even half a chance of getting anything built at all and in the case of the B-2 you get a whole 20 of them"

On that note the government awards contracts to business based on criteria that have nothing to do with the best value. For example the Government must look at giving the contract to certain sexes, and certain races first. So a hispanic female will get the preference for the contract for example. But lets say she doesn't run her business as well so the price goes up. Don't look now but the cost is increasing. who do you blame? how does the price creep up? In the below article someone logically asks why any of that stuff matter and why dont the best simply get the contract? well because there are self imposed rules, built in speed bumps to prevent the whole thing from becoming an autobahn

http://www.chicagonow.com/chicago-muckrakers/2011/07/does-giving-contracts-to-minority-owned-companies-matter/

The next thing is democracies move slowly. They are delibrately built to be slow. There are finance commitess and over watch for commitees and commities for overwatch. ITs not an efficient system. from top to bottom EVERYONE plays the system or they get played by it. usually those slow down speed bumps are used as choke points or ambushed by carious sides trying to get what they want (whatever that is) Budgets are also done year by year, there are no five year blocks like communist countries. Again folks there are SOOOO many different things that go into all of this.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

In fact of all the problems the F-35 has had skin has not been one of them. Engines and sensors are where the money goes today, as has been previously stated in this thread.

It costs a lot to maintain the necessary precision on the skin; both in tooling costs and lifecycle costs. Plus, the skin then becomes a virtually unbreakable outer mold line that you can't play around with if necessary; due to the stealth requirements. (AKA, no aerodynamic quick fixes).

Again its a relatively small component of the cost. If I am wrong and you can get a price breakdown and show me, I will be more than happy to take a look at it. Stealthy or not the aircraft was going to have composite skin, like most modern or future machines so its kinda semantics but im all ears.

 

[sferrin]

Very well put, Aerofranz. And anyone who points out that we aren't getting what we were promised is attacked as an F-35 Detractor who delights in the program's failures or desires the program's cancellation.

Uh, no. Detractors are people like BS, and the like who do NOT want it to succeed. If the F-35 program were executed perfectly from here on out, nobody would be more disappointed than that bunch.

I want the JPO and Lockheed Martin to deliver on their promises.

I gather you've never been involved in a development project? As the saying goes, "$hit happens" and the more complex, cutting edge, difficult the project is the more likely you're going to run into unpredictable unknowns. Welcome to the world of cutting edge fighter development.

This aircraft will constitute a large portion of the air forces of the United States for the next couple of decades.

Yes it will. All the more reason to get it right wouldn't you say?

It's a really good indication that this program is out of control when opinion leaders are starting to advocate a re-opening of the F-22 Raptor production line as an affordable alternative to the JSF.

What the hell is an "opinion leader" and why should they be listened to?

As a tax payer and citizen of the United States, we were sold expectations concerning the JSF program and I am mad as hell.

You should probably educate yourself then. This program was NEVER going to be "Super" Hornet easy. Again, welcome to the world of the cutting edge.

I am beginning to feel that the case for the JSF was built on lies and damn lies

Nope. Anybody with an ounce of foresight knew this was going to be difficult. The only people who are pissed are the ones who naively thought it would be as easy as an aircraft mod.

and placing all our eggs in the JSF/Lockheed Martin basket makes the program impossible to cancel and we are left with no viable alternatives.

I hardly know where to begin with this one. It didn't matter who won the JSF competition, that was going to be the situation. The F-teens have had their day and we can't afford seperate USAF/USN/USMC designs. It is what it is because that's the ONLY way it could be done. Reality can be brutal at times can't it?[/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote]

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Another fun element that runs up costs is that "one hand doesn't talk to the other" in some cases thats a good thing and a breach of that is illegal , but in others its very wasteful. Comparisons of the F-35 to other aircraft doesnt follow an apples to apples comparison either. Even Bill pointed out that AWACs are expensive to operate. Former secretary of the USAF Wynne, suggested curtailing E-8 JSTARs and AWACs to buy more F-35s with their improved situational awareness. So that is one of those "hidden costs" that gets lost when talking about the price of the F-35. Whether Michael Wynne is correct is up to you, but I like that he is looking beyond just the fighters.

Another thing that gets lost is the F-35 is not a one for one replacement. So even if it cost 1.5 times as much to run than a single F-16 its still cheaper than 2 F-16s. If you think the JSF is expensive now, wait until the USAF is trying to upgrade its old F-16s, maintain the F-16s hanging on by a thread, swell its fleets with more maintainers, while trying to procure even more highly upgraded aircraft and equipment to maintain them after its canceled. so the USAF will essentially be trying to double its number of fighters with a shrinking budget. It can't do that with quantity alone which is where fifth generation quality comes in. Some have said that the F-35 is 400 percent more effective than legacy aircraft. Now people will have a problem that but my point is that 4 F-16s is not saving by any stretch and that before we get into support elements like AWACs

I have read articles that suggest that in the long run buying lighter cheaper carriers and filling them with the more expensive F-35Bs would save more money than buying expensive super carriers and filling them with Super hornets and F-35Cs the thing is that "ship budgets" and "Aircraft budgets" are not looked at in such a way even though aircraft and their carriers are obviously interlinked in real life. attempts to rectify issues like this through things like the "Quartely budget review" instituted by rumsfeld seem to just add more element to traverse or take advantage of depending on which side you are on.

 

[AeroFranz]

"Nope. Anybody with an ounce of foresight knew this was going to be difficult. The only people who are pissed are the ones who naively thought it would be as easy as an aircraft mod."

Yes, the reality is that in all fairness it's a really difficult program to execute.
I just don't like the LM party line that it's all rainbows and butterflies and unicorns and we are doing fine when we're not. If you look at the trajectory that the program was supposed to take in order to fulfill its promises, well it does not correspond to the current. I have some faint hope in course correction, but the first step of solving a problem is admitting you have one.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

I gather you've never been involved in a development project? As the saying goes, "$hit happens" and the more complex, cutting edge, difficult the project is the more likely you're going to run into unpredictable unknowns. Welcome to the world of cutting edge fighter development.

Exactly. Even the most perfectly run program was going to hit some big challenges. If they didn't then the bar was set too low.

Even Bill Sweetman concedes that the F-35 was a huge challenge.

People with even a passing knowledge of aviation had to know that making an airplane that could land on an aircraft carrier, break the sound barrier, and hover for three services was going to be just a tad complex and hard to pull off... might run into a big problem or two. and thats just the air frame we aren't even getting into the avionics.

Canceling the F-35 to get away from these problems is like trying to get away from your mother in law by divorcing your wife and then marrying her sister. Any aircraft that can compete with the F-35 is going to have an F-35 sized price tag probably even cost more, especially without the advantage of commonality and a larger serial production.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Yes, the reality is that in all fairness it's a really difficult program to execute.
I just don't like the LM party line that it's all rainbows and butterflies and unicorns and we are doing fine when we're not. If you look at the trajectory that the program was supposed to take in order to fulfill its promises, well it does not correspond to the current. I have some faint hope in course correction, but the first step of solving a problem is admitting you have one.

And thats fair. But in LMs defense this is a program that started behind the 8-ball. A lot of disinformation was circulating by nations trying to abort it early in order to have a shot at F-22s. The F-35 had a high disapproval rating before the first aircraft even took to the skies. Im pretty sure even the USAF downplayed it as much as they could in order to procure more F-22s. Naturally there are still some in the USAF that think F-22s are worth getting. In fact a Marine Aviator wrote into the Gazette about the USMC buying F-22s rather than F-35s.

There are a lot of people rooting for the JSF to fail. Lotta spoils to be had if it does. Lockmart is still trying to "sell" it and its obviously still a tough sell to a lot of regular citizens who don't have access to the unique/classified things that make it well worth having. As it gets more expensive It gets "sold" harder to justify it. And the competitors get to "sell a negative" by saying things like "hey we could have done that better you know"

The JSF was created to fulfill a genuine military need. Without the JSF that need does not disappear.

 

[quellish]

People with even a passing knowledge of aviation had to know that making an airplane that could land on an aircraft carrier, break the sound barrier, and hover for three services was going to be just a tad complex and hard to pull off... might run into a big problem or two. and thats just the air frame we aren't even getting into the avionics.

That is *entirely* the problem with the program. The requirements were/are unrealistic. Because of that, the price point and milestones are constantly in jeopardy.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

This graph was originally made for the F-22. I didn't make it, but I remember at the time the F-22 production was killed that the same arguments used against it would be used against the F-35.

Note where the F-35 would be on this chart and how annual budget considerations play their part in cost.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

That is *entirely* the problem with the program. The requirements were/are unrealistic. Because of that, the price point and milestones are constantly in jeopardy.

Whats that old saying "difficult we can do, impossible will take a bit longer" ;D

Aviation more than anything pushes the envelope. The F-35 is only going to get better, and like I said Its past the toughest part.

 

[quellish]

In fact of all the problems the F-35 has had skin has not been one of them.

I assume what you are saying here is that "the F-35 has met the program's original signature goals". What makes you think that?

 

[quellish]

Whats that old saying "difficult we can do, impossible will take a bit longer" ;D

Aviation more than anything pushes the envelope. The F-35 is only going to get better, and like I said Its past the toughest part.

If you agree to deliver the "impossible", don't give the price and milestone dates for the "possible".

 

[sferrin]

People with even a passing knowledge of aviation had to know that making an airplane that could land on an aircraft carrier, break the sound barrier, and hover for three services was going to be just a tad complex and hard to pull off... might run into a big problem or two. and thats just the air frame we aren't even getting into the avionics.

That is *entirely* the problem with the program. The requirements were/are unrealistic. Because of that, the price point and milestones are constantly in jeopardy.

And the alternative would have been completely undoable at the same price. Most likely the USMC would have been out of the STOVL business and we'd have slashed our fixed wing capable flight decks in HALF.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

That is *entirely* the problem with the program. The requirements were/are unrealistic. Because of that, the price point and milestones are constantly in jeopardy.

The F-22 is an example of a fifth generation aircraft that was highly specialized and for one service, and it took 14 years and was very expensive. What are "realistic requirements" for an aircraft that each service would have to develop?

The Cost of all three services trying to pursue their own fifth generation fighter would be something to behold. And The Navy needs a lot more than 187 to give its carriers any value.

 

[AeroFranz]

This issue of realistic requirements is a very pertinent one. Assume at the beginning of the JSF activities I had told you "the Navy COD fleet is old and there is no foreseeable replacement; without one I can't perform the mission. Make JSF do that as well since we're going to land it on aircraft carriers anyway. Oh, it's also VTOL? Cool, let's make it do VERTREP as well, so I can get rid of some CH-46s too!"


Ok this example is a bit extreme, but if such a job had landed on my desk, i would have politely told the messenger to stick it where the sun don't shine. The reason we have different machines (in this case VERY different machines) to do different missions is because commonality quickly reaches diminishing returns - sometimes for a given level of technology it's quite impossible to combine requirements in a feasible design. By feasible i mean something that meets all its original specifications.


The solution? relax the requirements so you open the design space again. Or increase the technology level. Any other alternative is equivalent to having cake and eating it too.
In our case, F-35 will be STOVL, supersonic, and Stealthy, but what had to give was affordability. I also suspect you accept a higher number of problems that individual stealthy, supersonic, and a VTOL designs would have had all summed up, because you are doing all of those things while having to deal with interrelated aspects of the design.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

This issue of realistic requirements is a very pertinent one. Assume at the beginning of the JSF activities I had told you "the Navy COD fleet is old and there is no foreseeable replacement; without one I can't perform the mission. Make JSF do that as well since we're going to land it on aircraft carriers anyway. Oh, it's also VTOL? Cool, let's make it do VERTREP as well, so I can get rid of some CH-46s too!"


Ok this example is a bit extreme, but if such a job had landed on my desk, i would have politely told the messenger to stick it where the sun don't shine. The reason we have different machines (in this case VERY different machines) to do different missions is because commonality quickly reaches diminishing returns - sometimes for a given level of technology it's quite impossible to combine requirements in a feasible design. By feasible i mean something that meets all its original specifications.


The solution? relax the requirements so you open the design space again. Or increase the technology level. Any other alternative is equivalent to having cake and eating it too.
In our case, F-35 will be STOVL, supersonic, and Stealthy, but what had to give was affordability. I also suspect you accept a higher number of problems that individual stealthy, supersonic, and a VTOL designs would have had all summed up, because you are doing all of those things while having to deal with interrelated aspects of the design.

I respectfully disagree and reemphasize that their wouldn't be money to make multiple aircraft to do all the jobs that the JSF will do.

Even on the limited 187 unit run that was the F-22 the cost was lowering, naturally that meant it was time to cancel it thus continuing the bad habit of investing billions and years in development and then cutting the tree down as it started to bare fruit. The B-2 takes the cake in this department. But of course one consolation of the F-22 cancellation was that the F-35 was there, The F-35 doesn't have that luxury. There is no F-24 or F-36 walking through that door any time soon.

So of course a lot of people are screaming things like "The F-35 now costs as much as the F-22 before cancellation!" But of course thats not a fair comparison. the truth will show when the last F-35 rolls off the production line.

 

[Void]

I respectfully disagree and reemphasize that their wouldn't be money to make multiple aircraft to do all the jobs that the JSF will do.

Maybe that is the problem...?

Unless I am missing something the Airforce could fly the F-35C without serious problems.

 

[quellish]

But of course one consolation of the F-22 cancellation was that the F-35 was there, The F-35 doesn't have that luxury. There is no F-24 or F-36 walking through that door any time soon.

The F-35 and F-22 were designed for very different missions, and you seem to be implying that the F-35 fills some gap left by lower than planned F-22 production. That does not make any sense.

 

[quellish]

And the alternative would have been completely undoable at the same price.

If it's undoable either way, it's undoable either way.

Most likely the USMC would have been out of the STOVL business and we'd have slashed our fixed wing capable flight decks in HALF.

Keeping the USMC in the STOVL business should be the USMC's problem, not the USAF's problem. USMC's STOVL needs have driven a number of JSF requirements common to the USAF version, which have contributed to the complexity of the overall program.
For example, some of the LO features of the aircraft are extremely challenging in order to meet the needs of the STOVL version. The solutions that had to be used to meet those needs are not necessarily the same as those that would apply to a land-based CTOL version, or even a carrier based CTOL version.

What *is* the curie point of a $100 bill, anyway?

 

[shedofdread]

OK, so if the main problem with F35 is affordability, has there been any thought given to alternative business models under which it can be delivered? Considering the size of the programme (especially for the US but still a significant outlay for UK and others), the customers should have real 'clout' should they wish to excercise it.

Thoughts? At this point, I think I should make it clear that only responses to my question containing solutions are welcome. The problems have [in my opinion] already been covered ad nauseum.

 

[sferrin]

And the alternative would have been completely undoable at the same price.

If it's undoable either way, it's undoable either way.

Given that we're doing it it's obviously NOT undoable either way.

 

[sferrin]

I respectfully disagree and reemphasize that their wouldn't be money to make multiple aircraft to do all the jobs that the JSF will do.

Maybe that is the problem...?

Unless I am missing something the Airforce could fly the F-35C without serious problems.

Why would they want to at this point? The majority of the development of the F-35A is done.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

But of course one consolation of the F-22 cancellation was that the F-35 was there, The F-35 doesn't have that luxury. There is no F-24 or F-36 walking through that door any time soon.

The F-35 and F-22 were designed for very different missions, and you seem to be implying that the F-35 fills some gap left by lower than planned F-22 production. That does not make any sense.

I meant as in, there is no other 5th gen fighter to take up the slack in any sense.

Lets take a look at "realistic" expectations shall we? F-22 took 14 years to reach operational stage and we didnt even buy 200 hundred of them. The B-2 took years and billions and we got 20. The B-1B was killed and then reserected to be curtailed and then the force reduced in order to have spare parts and I believe the BONE is now around 60 operation examples? the V-22 took forever and cost a bunch and killed people in the meantime.

The Super Hornet doesn't count in my book because its based off a previous design.

So pop quiz, when was the last time the US made an aircraft with "realistic requirements?"

 

[AeroFranz]

Before answering the question, i'd make a distinction. There is the problem of conflicting technical requirements, and the affordability issue largely driven by numbers. I am not sure which of the two, or both, you are touching in your question.


All of your examples had IMHO a simpler design/technology problem to deal with than F-35 (that's what I personally mean by technical requirements). V-22 did have the self-inflicted wound of the small rotors and folding, a large penalty that we could argue about on its merits, but that's another story.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Before answering the question, i'd make a distinction. There is the problem of conflicting technical requirements, and the affordability issue largely driven by numbers. I am not sure which of the two, or both, you are touching in your question.


All of your examples had IMHO a simpler design/technology problem to deal with than F-35 (that's what I personally mean by technical requirements). V-22 did have the self-inflicted wound of the small rotors and folding, a large penalty that we could argue about on its merits, but that's another story.

My point is simply that after years of development and billions thrown into something to them get comically short production runs means that by definition the USA hasnt built anything "realistic" in sometime. The poster would have to clarify what "realistic" means to them. But i believe by their definition of it no major american aircraft of the last 3 decades meets the criteria. In other words the f-22 was unrealistic alomg with the bone and b-2 for example

 

[AeroFranz]

The comically short production run can be initiated by factors outside of the technical merits/success of the aircraft itself...Budgetary climate, political climate...as a general rule it's not as easy to cancel/curtail production of an aircraft if it is meeting its stated technical goals and the program is on track dollar-wise and time-wise. That's where IMHO, realistic technical requirements play a big part. Like I said, it's no guarantee. A program might be sadly cancelled even when the contractor is doing everything right.

 

[quellish]

My point is simply that after years of development and billions thrown into something to them get comically short production runs means that by definition the USA hasnt built anything "realistic" in sometime. The poster would have to clarify what "realistic" means to them. But i believe by their definition of it no major american aircraft of the last 3 decades meets the criteria. In other words the f-22 was unrealistic alomg with the bone and b-2 for example

Given these requirements, I will deliver something that satisfies these requirements on date X for cost Y.
If these requirements change, delivery/milestone date and cost adjustments will be communicated to the customer through process Z.

That is how engineering works.
In the case of the ATB, USAF inserted a major requirements change that greatly increased costs and drove major design and assembly changes - but the costs and delays associated with that were clearly communicated back to the customer (USAF and the oversight committees).
The B-2 was always going to be an expensive platform. The "comically short" B-2 production run was due to to the realignment of priorities following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The B-2 lost it's primary mission due to forces that had little to do with the program itself.

If the requirements are unrealistic, you don't make your obligated dates and dollar amounts. You run over due to technical problems and the fixes they drive. You change requirements because your design just can't possibly meet them. Etc.
If you're not making dates because it's taking longer to assemble aircraft because of union strike or natural disaster, that's not a requirements problem.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

The comically short production run can be initiated by factors outside of the technical merits/success of the aircraft itself...Budgetary climate, political climate...as a general rule it's not as easy to cancel/curtail production of an aircraft if it is meeting its stated technical goals and the program is on track dollar-wise and time-wise. That's where IMHO, realistic technical requirements play a big part. Like I said, it's no guarantee. A program might be sadly cancelled even when the contractor is doing everything right.

Can you see why I don't have much faith in the "slash, burn, and start realistically fresh" strategy? An optimist would say canceling the F-35 and starting anew with more "realistic" requirements would surely bring a fighter on time, on budget, and in enough numbers to make a difference. And I am saying we havnt done that in 30 freaking years with a wide variety of programs and requirements there in. In judging" realism" by results, we don't build realistic aircraft and havnt for sometime.

Now all the factors you point out are true. If someone with no aviation experience or military know how or experience were to take an independent look, all your above reasons aside they would come to the conclusion that "You can't seem to make aircraft of performance you desire, that is cheap enough for you to have the numbers you need." Aircraft are either too expensive, or the half empty version, you don't have enough money. either way its the same result. Now whats the solution? Lets start over. Lets create another problem child born of defunct parents. This time it will work I can feel it.

What post F-35 cancellation aircraft is going to reverse this decades long trend? why would killing the fighter we have already invested so much time/money in and has the best chance of large serial production change that? What arguments that have been used to cut F-22 production and kill the F-35 won't be used on the F-36 or any other follow on aircraft?

A pessimist looks at the F-35 and says "my god what a disaster" I look at the F-35 and think "Thank God we aren't going through this with 3 separate programs, because not one of them would survive. It would be waaayyyy worse with anything else" And yes I believe that. Why? Look at the last 30 years.

So I know its "proving a negative" But frankly, For as bad as things had been/have been/will be I am 100 percent convinced it would be even worse with multiple systems and the alternatives many here have presented. So in short "yeah life sucks, But it could suck a lot worse" I know people love to "drop in" and say something like "WE cant afford this our country is broke! we should buy______" And in the context of an aircraft to aircraft comparison you might get a hint of maybe they are right... F-16s are cheaper than F-35s... but thats a pretty superficial yardstick. Maybe the F-35B is Cheap compared to a super carrier? Maybe an F-35 is cheaper in the long run than an F-16. Look a little deeper: Maybe instead of trying to save 5 million here, 5 million there on aircraft, we buy a knew tank that doesn't have the maintence cost of an F-16. Maybe we cut missile defense? Maybe we clean up the disaster that is Modern American Weapons procurement?

Heres a story talking about just that:
http://defense.aol.com/2011/12/05/dod-sinks-fang-into-acquisition-process-marines-darpa-join-for/

Maybe we see the Defense budget not in catergories of airplanes planes ships etc, but as an interrelating bank? If I buy more Tanks, do I need as Many Submarines? Or vice Versa? Maybe we look at personnel. The Marines had an idea to save that banned marriage for first term enlisted Marines, after the corps figured out that letting a 19 year old get hitched to someone and then having three kids on the government dime wasn't worth the money.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Given these requirements, I will deliver something that satisfies these requirements on date X for cost Y.
If these requirements change, delivery/milestone date and cost adjustments will be communicated to the customer through process Z.

Is lockheed not doing that? Have they gone rogue? Are they no longer under customer control and not going through process Z?

That is how engineering works.

That might be how engineering works, but engineering is just one piece of this mighty puzzle isn't it? youre not negotiating rebuilding your buddies car engine over beers here. There is one helluva a protocal for every single detail.

In the case of the ATB, USAF inserted a major requirements change that greatly increased costs and drove major design and assembly changes - but the costs and delays associated with that were clearly communicated back to the customer (USAF and the oversight committees).
The B-2 was always going to be an expensive platform. The "comically short" B-2 production run was due to to the realignment of priorities following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The B-2 lost it's primary mission due to forces that had little to do with the program itself.

Thats my point. It doesn't matter if it was canceled because of alien invaders or a lack of budget the result was the exact same. Every one of these programs has their own details, but 20 is 20. And lack of foresight now, means you pay big later. For most politicians (who are the shot callers in this country) The deep future is a whole 4 years away, and by then it may be someone elses problem. So lets say a realignment of priorities happens and we only buy 200 F-35s not nearly enough to replace anything, then its ok with you because the political priorities shifted? Or we are now badly short of aircraft that we may need when priorities shift yet again? You will give the F-35 a pass right when it comes up comically short of its original stated goal?

Is the US just unlucky? Do we just happen to oops only got 20 B-2s, oops, just 187 raptors, darn just 66 B-1Bs, crap EFV got canceled, oops there goes the global hawk, mulligan on the DDX, so long Crusader.

Maybe the system is to blame? Is the military aiming to high? to low? Or civilians too cheap or too frivolous with money? Politicians too ignorant? too smart? engineers too slow? Computers too quick? contractors too greedy? too stingy? Is the world changing so fast that any weapon system is obsolete before the paint has dried? Fate conspires? bad timing? KArma? Why on earth does this always seem to befall the good old US of A?

if the USAF started development of a hang glider it would be years over budget and would barely escape cancellation so we could buy a whole 6 of them. But its not the hang gliders fault, it was an awesome hang glider it was just --Insert whatever excuse here. When the chances of building a high performance aircraft are pretty much the same, or a ship, or a tank, one starts to wonder if maybe it isn't the weapon system good or bad.

If the requirements are unrealistic, you don't make your obligated dates and dollar amounts. You run over due to technical problems and the fixes they drive.

So again what program has been realistic in that regard? because every program has blown/is blowing through its dates and dollar amounts. All programs are unrealistic by your definition. Unless I missed one.

If REALISM is based on the OUTCOME then nothing is realistic with the US Military.

If its a great weapon system but was delayed and cost an arm and a leg and you only got 1/8 of what you needed then it wasnt realistic IE 5th generation

If its a lousy weapon system that you got on time an on budget and 100 percent of numbers required is that realistic? so 2400 Super Hornets instead of 5th gen is realistic?

You change requirements because your design just can't possibly meet them. Etc.

What happens when the customer changes the requirements as you listed above with the B-2?

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Given these requirements, I will deliver something that satisfies these requirements on date X for cost Y.
If these requirements change, delivery/milestone date and cost adjustments will be communicated to the customer through process Z.

Is lockheed not doing that? Have they gone rogue? Are they no longer under customer control and not going through process Z?

That is how engineering works.

That might be how engineering works, but engineering is just one piece of this mighty puzzle isn't it? youre not negotiating rebuilding your buddies car engine over beers here. There is one helluva a protocal for every single detail.

In the case of the ATB, USAF inserted a major requirements change that greatly increased costs and drove major design and assembly changes - but the costs and delays associated with that were clearly communicated back to the customer (USAF and the oversight committees).
The B-2 was always going to be an expensive platform. The "comically short" B-2 production run was due to to the realignment of priorities following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The B-2 lost it's primary mission due to forces that had little to do with the program itself.

Thats my point. It doesn't matter if it was canceled because of alien invaders or a lack of budget the result was the exact same. Every one of these programs has their own details, but 20 is 20. And lack of foresight now, means you pay big later. For most politicians (who are the shot callers in this country) The deep future is a whole 4 years away, and by then it may be someone elses problem. So lets say a realignment of priorities happens and we only buy 200 F-35s not nearly enough to replace anything, then its ok with you because the political priorities shifted? Or we are now badly short of aircraft that we may need when priorities shift yet again? You would give the F-35 a pass right when it came up comically short of its original stated goal?

Is the US just unlucky? Do we just happen to oops only got 20 B-2s, oops, just 187 raptors, darn just 66 B-1Bs, crap EFV got canceled, oops there goes the global hawk, mulligan on the DDX, so long Crusader.

Maybe the system is to blame? Is the military aiming to high? to low? Or civilians too cheap or too frivolous with money? Politicians too ignorant? too smart? engineers too slow? Computers too quick? contractors too greedy? too stingy? Is the world changing so fast that any weapon system is obsolete before the paint has dried? Fate conspires? bad timing? KArma? Why on earth does this always seem to befall the good old US of A?

if the USAF started development of a hang glider it would be years over budget and would barely escape cancellation so we could buy a whole 6 of them. But its not the hang gliders fault, it was an awesome hang glider it was just --Insert whatever excuse here. When the chances of building a high performance aircraft are pretty much the same, or a ship, or a tank, one starts to wonder if maybe it isn't the weapon system good or bad.

If the requirements are unrealistic, you don't make your obligated dates and dollar amounts. You run over due to technical problems and the fixes they drive.

So again what program has been realistic in that regard? because every program has blown/is blowing through its dates and dollar amounts. All programs are unrealistic by your definition. Unless I missed one.

If REALISM is based on the OUTCOME then nothing is realistic with the US Military.

If its a great weapon system but was delayed and cost an arm and a leg and you only got 1/8 of what you needed then it wasnt realistic IE 5th generation

If its a lousy weapon system that you got on time an on budget and 100 percent of numbers required is that realistic? so 2400 Super Hornets instead of 5th gen is realistic?

You change requirements because your design just can't possibly meet them. Etc.

What happens when the customer changes the requirements as you listed above with the B-2?

 

[GTX]

Let me help GTX out here

Why thank you Bill. However, as requested already, I much prefer to have the actual transcript of what was said. But don't worry, I have gotten a hold of it myself. See here - makes quite interesting reading. In fact, I strongly recommend all those here have a good, careful read of it. Might be enlightening... :

The following are a few key points I would like to highlight from the speech (note that the bits in quote markings are from the Maj. Gen.). However, unlike some, I am not trying to simply cherry pick bits and report them out of context therefore if you don’t believe what I have written/selected I urge you to just go back and read what was actually said...

Putting it in context

First up Maj. Gen. Christopher Bogdan provided quite a useful statement in regard to the overall complexity of the F-35 Program:

This program is so incredibly complex variant to variant that to label it a single program and think of it that way sometimes does it an injustice.

So what I’d ask you to do at times when we’re looking at how these programs perform, remember that it’s just not a single program. It’s really three airplane programs built into one. That makes it hard sometimes.

This is quite an important consideration IMHO. Why? Well, as has been pointed out numerous times, when trying to use other platforms such as the Super Hornet as a point of comparison, please remember that you are not necessarily comparing ‘apples with apples’.

Moreover, please also remember the complexity of the customer side of the equation too and the fact that this adds to the complexity of the issues those responsible have to deal with (I challenge many here to try to accomplish what they are doing):

...the construct of this program with three services, eight partners, two FMS customers today, many more knocking on the door...So that is not an excuse for where the program’s been and it’s not going to be an excuse for where the program’s going. It is just a reality that we have an awful lot of people that are trying to take care of in this program.

Now one point that has been reported as a criticism from Maj. Gen. Bogdan has been the software. However, let’s just read what he actually said:

...when you’re staring ten million lines of code in the face on just the airplane alone, and another ten million almost off on the ground, that should scare anybody. The software is simply not easy to do.

IMHO, this is simply a statement emphasising how large the task was to start with. No-one is disagreeing with him here from the program. We will revisit this issue again further down.

Now as to all the constant bemoaning what should have happened (as seems to be the penchant of many here), and more specifically the issue of “Concurrency”, I simply point you to these comments from the Maj. Gen:

...concurrence...The first thing I’ll tell you about it is, it is what it is. We can’t go back and rewrite history. We can’t go back and change decisions that were previously made.

The Plan

Now the Maj Gen., also made comments regarding what has happened in recent years – something that some in the media have partially reported. However, once again shall we have a look at what was actually said:

What’s been going on for the last two years under Admiral Venlet’s leadership? The way I use an analogy here, that is we have this gigantic aircraft carrier called the Joint Strike Fighter program. And it was sailing, and quite frankly it was sailing and it was going to run aground. Admiral Venlet and his team with Lockheed Martin and the help of OSD have steered that ship another way.

Note my emphasis re Lockheed Martin. I have done this since people need to recognise that this activity has been a joint activity. It is not simply a case that big, bad Lockheed Martin has been hauled in from doing the wrong thing – they are actually part of the solution!

And as for an assessment of where we stand now and the outlook for the future:

...the Admiral went out and said we’re going to put a realistic plan in place. In my five weeks here I would tell you not without some risk and not without some hard work and not without our industry partners performing, we can get there. We can. That’s something, like I said, that bodes well for the program today.

Now before you go off saying “sure, but how likely is that?” or “wait until the next problem”, let’s also look at what was said next:

...there was some margin built in there so we were not pie in the sky...And if folks don’t think things are going to go wrong in the next two to five years on this development program, I’ve got to tell you otherwise. We’re going to find things that we didn’t know about and we’re going to have to deal with them...

This is exactly what some here, including myself have been saying all along!

Testing

Moving on to testing and his reported comments regarding test points etc, once again, let’s look at what was actually said:

We need to rework the enterprise so that we can start measuring what’s really important in test. I can tell you, it’s not the test points, it’s not test hours, it’s not test flights. It’s more capability based and it’s different than that. [

But having said that...we’re ahead of the plan. That’s a good thing.

We did have some major accomplishments this year also...We finished the first full-flight testing of the Air Force variant, all 8,000 hours. We’ve dropped our first weapon. We’ve continued to expand the envelope of getting ready for live weapons releases. We’ve completed all the air starts on both the A and the B models and we’re getting ready for complicated high angle-of-attack testing...So my perspective on the test program. We’re making progress. We’re measuring that progress. I’m not sure we’re measuring the right progress, but the test program is starting to create some momentum and that’s a good thing.

Yet again, not quite the doom and gloom story that some here would have you believe. And yes, it is still quite a challenge and there will undoubtedly be some less then desirable things that will be discovered, just as the Maj Gen has said himself:

...I expect that we’re going to find some more bad news as we move along. If we didn’t, I’m not sure we’d consider ourselves doing adequate testing.

But that’s why you do testing – to find things now rather then in actual combat!!!

Real feedback from the 'frontline'

A short comment re the progress on the actual progress on the ground (i.e. aircraft getting to the services) from the Maj Gen:

We have airplanes. In fact we have 19 airplanes down at Eglin that are training pilots today. Training maintainers today. That’s an astounding thing. It’s an astounding thing because quite frankly we’re only about a third of the way through the flight test program. So you have operators out there in the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and soon our international partners with the UK and the Dutch coming down very shortly, who are flying this airplane every day. They’re not flying complex missions, they are flying training missions that have a lot of operational restrictions on them but they’re flying the airplane and it’s not in a test environment. That’s a good thing. That’s a good thing because we’re learning a lot about the airplane. I believe we have the appropriate processes in place to learn about the airplane in a safe way that we get our training and we get that information back into the program so that we can improve it as we move along.

Once again, certainly far from doom and gloom… :

Production

Now as to his comments regarding actual aircraft production:

...I would tell you that Lockheed Martin is showing some improvement in their production facility. Is it coming fast enough for us? No. Are they showing some good improvement? Yes. Would we expect them to be a little ahead of the learning curve, being on their fifth lot of airplanes? Yes. But we are where we are. What I can tell you is I am seeing some glimmers of hope in Lockheed Martin’s production and their facility that will help us down the road. Costs are coming down. Are they coming down as fast as we want them to? No. But they’re coming down. I would tell you that over time it will mean we’re going to get this reduction thing done pretty well.

That’s a fair enough comment and as has been stated before, no-one in Industry would disagree. However, just as has also been stated before, this is something that will come. However when dealing with small numbers there is only so many improvements that can be made. Sorry, but that is just the nature of the beast…

Software development...again

Coming back to the software issue, let’s look at more of the Maj. Gen.’s comments:

Although we’re doing okay in developing Block 2 software, we’re a little bit behind. If you want a number to put on it, I’d put on it in the last two years the department has fallen behind 90 to 120 days. Now, take that with a grain of salt because there are a million people out there who will give you a million different estimates on where we are on software.

What’s that? Take this assessment with a “grain of salt”? That can’t be correct can it? Isn’t this all doom and gloom? ??? Nope – seems like the Maj Gen is spot on and dare I say, seems to be echoing what some such as myself have be saying for quite some time… :

What’s worse, he then goes on to give some praise…

If you took a look and said I’m a little behind on Block 2, Block 3 is even harder. Oh, the sky is falling in. Not necessarily. I say not necessarily because Lockheed Martin to their credit, the government to our credit, recognized that software is a big big deal, and over the last six months or so we have put a concerted effort into improving both the government’s oversight and Lockheed Martin’s processes.

Now a comment on the perception that if only the F-35 people would listen to outside experts (I mean experts though, not some of the Armchair Generals and similar here! : ):

...one thing that is very very good in my opinion is we have used the expertise of outside, independent reviewers at the NavAir and the Life Cycle Management Center folks at Wright-Patterson, to share all of our design reviews for our software. Okay? That’s a really good thing. Those folks are very experienced. They’ve seen a lot of airplanes and a lot of software programs. To have them co-chairing all the design reviews of our software is a very good thing.

The other thing the government has done and Lockheed Martin has been a good teammate here, is whenever we move anything out of block of software, whether it’s from 2A to 2B, to 2B to the 3I, 3F, that is going to be done not under a veil. It is going to be transparent.

What? Can’t be right – Lockheed Martin getting some praise? ;D

ALIS

Moving on. Yet another aspect reported as coping a blasting from the Maj. Gen, has been the ALIS. Now though, let’s have a look at some of what he actually said:

ALIS...We had some problems leading up to this point. One of the big problems was security. You can imagine a system that has all that information about a Joint Strike Fighter in it. What parts do you need fixed? What pilots are qualified? What maintainers are qualified? What mission plan is going? ...We did some testing and found out we had some vulnerabilities. To Lockheed’s credit and to our credit we took that seriously. We did a pause on ALIS. We went back and fixed those vulnerabilities...And we’re in the end game of doing that security vulnerability testing...I believe we’re on plan by the end of November to have that resolved. I’m fairly confident we’re going to get there...

Please note my emphasising that last part. It’s currently late September and we should be there “by the end of November” – hardly the end of the world is it?! But maybe I am just being too easy…

Money

Now as to the comments re there being no more money. Well, once again, shall we read what was said:

So one of the tasks he and I have is to create culture within this enterprise, and I’m talking stakeholders, Lockheed Martin, subs, and with JPO. This is fundamentally a fixed price development program. There’s no more money and there’s no more time, so we’re going to have to make trades, we’re going to have to do this in a disciplined way.

Note that I am not trying to deny what was said. However, please note that this should not be simply taken as a criticism of Lockheed Martin…as some would like to have us believe. Rather, IMHO, this is exactly what it is – a recognition that this is a team effort and thus we need to all work together. Once again, no arguments here.

Production again...

Touching back on aircraft production again, we see what I take yet again as some guarded praise when discussing Lockheed Martin’s performance:

I see a glimmer of hope that production’s getting better...I believe they’re right on the edge of getting really, really good at this. Now I want to see them take that and translate it into lower costs in production on this airplane...

Sustainment

Now turning to the issue of Sustainment which has gotten some media coverage. I really welcome the following statements that put the long term cost estimates in some perspective:

...the long term sustained cost and strategy. We have a lot of estimates out there in the billions and trillions of dollars...Those numbers are so sensitive to the assumptions that you make that I’m not sure they can inform any of us today about what to do and what not to do.

...So we have on one side everybody woe is me, all the world is falling in, it’s going to cost a gazillion dollars. Then we have other folks that say no, it’s not, it’s only going to be this much more than the legacy airplanes...I’m not worried about the folks that say it’s going to cost the same as a legacy airplane. I’m not worried about people that say it’s going to cost a katrillion times more than legacy airplanes. What I will tell you is looking today, the basic strategy on the way we’re going to sustain this airplane has got to make some fundamental changes to it.

Sounds like a great idea from someone who wants to work in the real world. I couldn’t agree more! This also aligns with what I and others here have been saying all along!

Summing up

Now finally, let’s look at some of the Maj Gen’s closing statements:

...there is not a more complex program on the planet. We did it to ourselves a little bit. We did it because we had this grand vision. Whatever the reasons, this program is hugely complex and in order to manage a hugely complex program you need to make sure that your basic fundamentals of acquisition are in place. That means knowing where every penny is, knowing who every person on the program is and what they’re doing, know where every pencil is. What I mean by pencil is all the equipment. We’ve got to have that kind of discipline in a complex program like this. And it’s on both sides, by the way. It’s on both sides. The government and industry side.

Note the recognition of the need to be disciplined and the recognition that that is happening…on both sides! Sounds like someone who is looking to work to solve problems rather then to simply kick heads…

Now he also pointed out that some of the causes of delays and instability have come from outside of the likes of Lockheed Martin…remember my comment about it “taking two to tango” :

Accountability...I’m not going to pick on Lockheed Martin here and say by God, the way to get the best outcomes on this program is to hold Lockheed Martin accountable. Yes. That’s one. But there are other accountabilities we need to talk about.

Stakeholders have to be accountable to this program. You can’t drive instability and change on this program on a whim. We have to worry about meeting your needs and not your wants.

Another element of accountability. We have to hold our JPO accountable. When we make promises to Lockheed Martin or we make promises to the department or we make promises to our stakeholders, we have to be held accountable to the same standard that I am going to hold Lockheed Martin to.

Overall, I have to say that I have found the comments of the Maj Gen. absolutely refreshing…and dare I say, quite far from what some have reported : . However, just in case you don’t agree with my assessment above or think I have taken things out of context, why don’t you go back and read his comments in the raw form? I actively encourage you to!

 

[quellish]

Is lockheed not doing that? Have they gone rogue? Are they no longer under customer control and not going through process Z?

Did the customer try to get the contractor to cover some of the costs of engineering fixes during testing?
Did the contractor then complain that the customer expects them to "stretch technological boundaries" to meet obligations the contractor was already contractually committed to?

This was the customer saying enough is enough, and attempting to bring the contractor under control.

The contractor eventually agreed to the cost sharing, but the contractor team then stated that this would put the longer term financial status of the program at risk.

That might be how engineering works, but engineering is just one piece of this mighty puzzle isn't it? youre not negotiating rebuilding your buddies car engine over beers here. There is one helluva a protocal for every single detail.

Engineering is what was being discussed.

Thats my point. It doesn't matter if it was canceled because of alien invaders or a lack of budget the result was the exact same.

This was a discussion of the engineering requirements and how they were not in line with the obligations of milestone dates and prices. Alien invaders are best discussed at ATS.

What happens when the customer changes the requirements as you listed above with the B-2?

As previously outlined, when requirements change the contractor must communicate the necessary level of effort to meet the new requirements, including dates and dollars. The customer either agrees to this or doesn't, and the contract is amended or terminated.
In the case of the B-2, the aircraft underwent major changes which added added cost and complexity to the design. The aircraft's development timeline and costs were adjusted accordingly. The customer got what they wanted, and were willing to pay for it. Northrop has been through this process several times, on several major programs. Lockheed went through that with the F-117, and to some extent with the F-22. A number of requirements changes on the F-22 were deferred from initial production into the incremental modernization program.
I beleive Boeing has been through much the same thing with the CLOVerS program.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

Did the customer try to get the contractor to cover some of the costs of engineering fixes during testing?
Did the contractor then complain that the customer expects them to "stretch technological boundaries" to meet obligations the contractor was already contractually committed to?

This was the customer saying enough is enough, and attempting to bring the contractor under control.

The contractor eventually agreed to the cost sharing, but the contractor team then stated that this would put the longer term financial status of the program at risk.

Are you saying that lockheed was operating outside its agreed upon contracts? and not informing the government?

As previously outlined, when requirements change the contractor must communicate the necessary level of effort to meet the new requirements, including dates and dollars. The customer either agrees to this or doesn't, and the contract is amended or terminated.

And despite multiple restructures you are saying that didnt happen?

In the case of the B-2, the aircraft underwent major changes which added added cost and complexity to the design. The aircraft's development timeline and costs were adjusted accordingly. The customer got what they wanted, and were willing to pay for it. Northrop has been through this process several times, on several major programs. Lockheed went through that with the F-117, and to some extent with the F-22. A number of requirements changes on the F-22 were deferred from initial production into the incremental modernization program.
I beleive Boeing has been through much the same thing with the CLOVerS program.

So when all three variants are in service will you change your opinion from "unrealistic" to "realistic"? How does one tell the difference between a program that is reaching vs overreaching?

Finally have you looked into a lot of your above complaints or is this all based on hunches?

Although it found “no fundamental design risks,” a November 29, 2011, report by a DOD team
identified “13 current or likely test issues of varying severity, the combined impact of which
‘results in a lack of confidence’ in the aircraft’s ‘design stability.’ The issues include the Navy
version’s tailhook for aircraft carrier landings, the system for dumping extra fuel before landing
and excessive aircraft shaking during flight.”
The report also noted that the F-35 had “has had
more retrofits and changes than planned,”
Cost Overrun and LRIP-5 Agreement
Costs for current lot of low-rate initial production (LRIP-4) aircraft were reported to be 7%-10%
above the contract’s target cost of $3.46 billion, with the government and Lockheed Martin due to
split the expected overage evenly.
Tom Burbage, vice president of F-35 program integration for
Lockheed Martin, “says the company is already working to reduce the cost of these LRIP 4 units.
‘Everybody is actually feeling reasonably good about it’” he says. ‘It doesn’t mean that we aren’t
going to have any overruns, but it is within the bounds of being manageable.

Clearly the DoD messed up in that assessment right? so the customer is saying the program is realistic...

On March 20, 2010, DOD formally announced that the JSF program had exceeded the cost
increases limits specified in the Nunn-McCurdy cost containment law, as average procurement
unit cost, in FY2002 dollars, had grown 57% to 89% over the original program baseline. Simply
put, this requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress of the breach, present a plan to
correct the program, and to certify that the program is essential to national security before it can
continue.
90
On June 2, 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) certifying the F-35 Program in
accordance with section 2433a of title 10, United States Code. As required by section 2433a,
of title 10, Milestone B was rescinded. A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) was held in
November 2010… No decision was rendered at the November 2010 DAB… Currently,
cumulative cost and schedule pressures result in a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach to both the
original (2001) and current (2007) baseline for both the Program Acquisition Unit Cost
(PAUC) and Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC). The breach is currently reported at
78.23% for the PAUC and 80.66% for the APUC against the original baseline and 27.34%
for the PAUC and 31.23% for the APUC against the current baseline.
91

This breach led to the January 2011 program restructuring described in “Recent Developments.”
February 2010 Program Restructuring
In November 2009, DOD’s Joint Estimating Team issued a report (JET II) stating that the F-35
program would need an extra 30 months to complete the SDD phase. In response to JET II, the
then-impending Nunn-McCurdy breach and other developments, on February 24, 2010, Pentagon
acquisition chief Ashton Carter issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
restructuring the F-35 program. Key elements of the restructuring included the following:
• Extending the SDD phase by 13 months, thus delaying Milestone C (full-rate
production) to November 2015 and adding an extra low-rate initial production
(LRIP) lot of aircraft to be purchased during the delay. Carter proposed to make
up the difference between JET II’s projected 30-month delay and his 13-month
schedule by adding three extra early-production aircraft to the test program. It is
not clear how extra aircraft could be added promptly if production is already
behind schedule.
• Funding the program to the “Revised JET II” (13-month delay) level, implicitly
accepting the JET II findings as valid.
• Withholding $614 million in award fees from the contractor for poor
performance, while adding incentives to produce more aircraft than planned

Lockheed clearly operating outside of government control.

All quotes from the Congressional Research Service.

Simply put, I dont think the "customer" IE the Government, has been "blindsided" by a single JSF price increase. The Government is involved in nearly every facet of the JSF, if the customer has been suddenly hit with a surprise bill, then he must have been asleep at the helm-- IE Someone has been derelict in their duties. Lockheed Martin couldn't "surprise" the government if it tried. At no point was it ever "out of control" by any stretch. I also don't believe lockheed needs to inform the government that it has to "stretch technological boundaries" anymore than it has to inform them that the sun will rise in the east.

If you have evidence that Lockheed Martin willingly and knowingly covered up cost or operated outside of its contracts, that violates an awful lot of laws, Fraud being the first that comes to mind. So is Lockheed in serious trouble, or have they been doing everything you say engineers should do, following their contracts as well, while developing an aircraft their customer still feels is realistic and your perception is that they aren't?

There seems to be an idea out there that LockMart is like some teen girl who stole daddy's credit card and is out there maxing it out before she gets caught and hits daddy with the bill. That could not be further from reality. And if something like that did happen it is a MASSIVE break down in oversight on the government's part. Heads would roll at a rate that would make the french revolution look like a minor tickle fight.



Oh please GTX, obviously General Bogdan has been "turned" by lockheed : LOL Just sounds like "tough love" to me.

All I am trying to do is show that there is a much bigger picture, while asking if America has lost its ability to procure weapons.

 

[sferrin]

How does one tell the difference between a program that is reaching vs overreaching?

Didn't you know? Any program that isn't on time and on budget is over-reaching. If it manages to get into service it turns into "ground breaking", "ahead of its time" etc.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

How does one tell the difference between a program that is reaching vs overreaching?

Didn't you know? Any program that isn't on time and on budget is over-reaching. If it manages to get into service it turns into "ground breaking", "ahead of its time" etc.

realistic in retrospect. I like it.

 

[sferrin]

How does one tell the difference between a program that is reaching vs overreaching?

Didn't you know? Any program that isn't on time and on budget is over-reaching. If it manages to get into service it turns into "ground breaking", "ahead of its time" etc.

realistic in retrospect. I like it.

Consider the F-15. So "over reaching" there were dozens of airframes sitting around with no engines (over reaching engine too you know), and it had to have numerous changes done during development (clipped wing tips, sawtooth stab, for example). It was villified by Sprey, Ricionni, Wheeler as "gold plated", "heavy", etc. (That alone should be a mark of future greatness.) And now? "ZOMG best fighter evah!!!". Oh and there was no competetitive flyoff. McDonnell Douglas was handed the contract based on a promise.

 

[chuck4]

I recall reading the soviets too were pleased by the rapid selection of MD design without fly off competition. The soviets regarded the North America Rockwell airframe design to be the best of the bunch, and is the one which they could not easily surpass. They thought the MD airframe design was mediocre, and was confident they could surpass it in fuel fraction, payload, performance and maneuverability.

 

[TaiidanTomcat]

I recall reading the soviets too were pleased by the rapid selection of MD design without fly off competition. The soviets regarded the North America Rockwell airframe design to be the best of the bunch, and is the one which they could not easily surpass. They thought the MD airframe design was mediocre, and was confident they could surpass it in fuel fraction, payload, performance and maneuverability.

by that measure, the US has been very pleased by most soviet decisions as well. ;D I'm sure if the USSR was around today you could just add them to the list of detractors proven wrong.

Chuck whats your point? For as excellent as the F-15 is we really could have had more excellent had we bought something else?