The Davidson window: conflict between the U.S. and PRC

[Josh_TN]

I think that offensive technology and defensive technology go through occasional drastic swings of superiority, especially in naval matters. And I think right now we are undergoing a technological swing that heavily favors the offense. This applies against all sides, but not necessarily equally depending on the strategic situation and goals.

I do not think it is a hard sell to say that UAVs are dramatically affecting current conflicts. This is a combination of cheaper electronics, cheaper manufacturing techniques, much greater processing power, much greater battery energy density, and other technical trends. The various air to ground UAVs used in Ukraine by both sides along the front lines are the first thing that most people think of.

But another aspect is all the various long range UAVs used by both the Houthi and Ukraine in their strategic campaigns. These include cruise missiles, UAVs converted to one way munitions, converted civil sport aircraft, and everything in between. The technologies that make front line attack drones cheaper and easier to achieve also apply to what would be considered military PGM cruise missiles.

These trends are dramatically reducing both the money and time costs associated with munitions production. Design is easier with digital tools, commercial components make assembly faster, and “middleware” modifications greatly accelerate integration. This has resulted in private companies designing new weapons outside of the specifications of any DoD specific program, and the various services putting out RFIs or even complete programs of record for low cost cruise missiles/effectors based on these offerings - MACE, ERAM, ETV, LRAM, etc.

Not only is development and production cost much reduced in time and money, adoption is easier if you are willing to accept partial integration solutions. Ukraine wound the best example of this with their NATO weapons hacked onto Soviet airframes, but the USAF has also experimented with having integration hardware/software pylons for Harpoon on its F-16s. The much bigger middleware hack is Rapid Dragon. This takes a cargo aircraft and palletizes cruise missiles/effectors such that they can just be kicked out the back by a standard transport crew and unmodified aircraft. It is notable that Baracuda 500 has already been vertically dropped tested to mimic this launch method, and LMs CMMT effector also seems designed for this market, with a claimed capacity of 25 weapons per pallet in place of the 9 JAASMs of Rapid Dragon (6 per pallet in C-130 for weight reasons). Production claims for weapons of this type range from thousands to low tens of thousands, and while part of that is like corporate marketing hype, there is no question that production costs and times are plummeting. Costs are generally in the low hundreds of thousands, an almost order of magnitude reduction.

This is a radical shift in terms on quantity of stand off precision munitions that can be produced by the U.S. It also is a huge shift in how quickly they can be adopted. And finally, it is a titanic shift in which platforms can employ them and the quantities than can be realistically used in single engagements.


More in follow on posts.

 

[Josh_TN]

Let’s look at a real world examples by service. The USN is probably in the weakest position, since it is largely limited to tactical aircraft. Its current plan seems to be using MALD-N to fill out its F-18s in support of Tomahawks from surface ships or else LRASM also carried by the same aircraft. MALD-N is not an anti shipping missile, but it has the advantage of lookalike on in terms of size and delivery profile, and being able to accept target updates. An F-18 should be able to carry ten under its wings, and perhaps even another pair on the fuselage: it weighs less than AIM-120. But this effector has no terminal effects; it is a decoy/jammer only.

The USN has put forward an RFI for “MACE”, a lightweight effectors with AGM-158C-1 range and speed and ideally (perhaps unrealistically) two per F-35 bay. Removing that F-35 requirement, there are probably a lot of commercial offerings that would already fit the MACE RFI. And most any of them could be carried ten deep by an F-18, or perhaps in lower numbers but augmented by LRASMs.

The uSAF has both the ERAM programs, ostensibly for export, and ETV. The focus here seems to be both swing ordnance for bombers but also cheap munitions for transport aircraft. While C-17s are rather rare and irreplaceable, C-130s are far more ubiquitous among the services and Allie’s, as well as still being in production. The LM claimed capacity of 25 per pallet would give this type a salvo of 50 weapons from relatively short, rough strips.

Finally, the USMC seems to already have adopted its LRAM system and be actively testing it off of the H-1 series helicopters. But a recent statement by a USMC spokesperson indicated a desire for ground launch, on top of an already established goal of pallet launch by USMC transport assets. Those assets would include C-130s, but would also include CH-53Ks with an almost C-130 capacity and MV-22s with a 10,000 lb or so capacity and mid hundreds of miles of combat radius. Those assets can execute attacks from almost anywhere, and depending on the facilities available, they might have 5th gen jump jet fighter support.

I consider it almost certain that by 2030, each of the above services has adopted a PGM munition with a product cost of $200,000 - $400,000, a >200 mile/300km range with a terminal seeker capability to recognize a ship target and engage it given accurate course updates or target position predictions. I also think it likely that strikes of over a hundred munitions would be planned for by every service. And I consider it likely the combined yearly production of these munitions, along with existing higher end programs, exceeds 10,000 a year. To hear Anduril talk about their new factory, they might achieve those numbers ny themselves, though I remain skeptical.


More to come.

 

[Josh_TN]

Now the obvious question is: why can not China do all these things too in greater quantities than the U.S.? And I would say, yes they can. This is where we circle back to geopolitics and strategic situation.

At the end of the day, the U.S. and it’s allies want the status quo. If the PRC wants to change that, they have to exert sea control over an area to create that effect (alternatively they could institute a blockade purely through aircraft and missiles, but that makes PLAN a fleet in being - separate discussion for that if anyone wants it). So the question is not whether the U.S. can out produce the PRC: in most respects, it cannot. The question is, can the U.S. asymmetrically oppose an attempt by the PRC to militarily expand, given local basing? And I think that could be a relatively firm yes by the end of the decade. The U.S. does not need total platform or munition equivalency to achieve the desired effect. Moreover, if cargo platforms become weapons carriers, the U.S. has some clear advantages in most every aspect of that realm. This is not to say that the U.S. and anyone who allied with it wouldn’t also suffer horrible casualties - that absolutely would happen. Taiwan, Japan, 7th fleet, etc would suffer catastrophic losses. But likely so would the PLAN, and likely without achieving their strategic goals.

I think that fundamentally being a surface fleet right now is like being a seal during Shark Week. Two examples: the Black Sea Fleet and the Red Sea. In both cases, groups that seemed to have no naval capabilities at all until recently heavily made their presence felt. The Russian Black Sea fleet is essentially a much diminished fleet in being. The U.S. task forces attacking the Houthi have had little long term results and expended hundreds of high end defensive munitions just holding their ground. The idea that the PLAN is immune to these trends does not hold up: their opponents likely will be far more prolific, even now, let alone in 2030. U.S. development of attack USVs probably warrants an entire separate post or two in this thread.

Perhaps that changes in the future when softkill and/or DEW defenses are better developed against massed cheap threats, but I think for the foreseeable future, offensive technology has an advantage. And that makes opposed landings and blockades within a couple hundred miles of opposition held territory a much more difficult thing.


I also think there are a couple advantages the U.S. innately has in terms of technology and positioning, but those can be addressed separately and independently of this series of posts.

 

[VishnuOsiris]

FWIW [IMO] The pendulum of military power has swung hard to US favor.

• Taking the initiative of pulling the economic rug out from the rest of the world, when you have your own designs on the future and the muscle to achieve your will, is to the US favor because other nations have to undergo a multi-year adaptation to new circumstances otherwise unanticipated. A dislocation of rational-actor decision making on all fronts, and like ripples in a pond this is going to touch every other facet of every other consideration over the future.
• Will: The Admin is pretty much at 1930's levels of foreign policy rhetoric, and the opposing side is more likely than not going to fall into the same decision dilemma as everyone else: They can't be serious, right? Naah. Can't be. This must another ruse. Best to wait this out and reason will prevail. People keep laughing, but "he who laughs last, laughs loudest."
• Speaking of 1930's rhetoric, and in line with Musk's post-inauguration speech of "taking our civilization back," I believe they have zero problem becoming an isolated fortress from the rest of the world, and developing new lebensraum to the North, whether anyone likes it or not.
• Speaking of which, if we're really going for the 2.0 version of civil-military fusion, it's best for them to take advantage of the "shock & awe" of the sweeping policy changes and exploit confusion. I think the faster these changes happen the greater the US position becomes. Things get into "full speed ahead" territory if/when a true cultural revolution takes place and anti-administration speech becomes forbidden (or what have you)

 

[Josh_TN]

The economics of the the current administration probably does not matter in the period of now to 2030, even if one were to describe the U.S. policy of tearing apart its allies as productive. Make your own thread for that.

And more broadly, a lot of people are talking economics and politics here. My desire was to keep this thread to strickly military trends, and I would appreciate us moving back in that direction. Invasion barges? Drones? Hypersonics? Mega factories? Ok, let’s hash it out.

Current administration, future economic predictions, superiority of one political system: that not only is outside this thread, it’s probably outside this forum.

I acknowledge it was a risk to open this thread, and yes I am guilty of the occasional political transgression post, but let us try to keep it technical.

 

[uk 75]

Dealing with a land based threat like Somalian pirates or the Yemeni Houthi will require a ground force to go in and inflict severe damage on their leaders and families. Even then as the Israelis have found in Gaza and S Lebanon the opponent simply gets new leaders and there are always plenty of new fighters.

Air and missile strikes are a waste of expensive munitions. Most shipowners have simply rerouted their ships and passed on the costs.

Turning to China. As long as the US has a lead in nuclear submarines the PLAN surface fleet is just a nice target. Aircraft carriers are no longer valid weapons in a full on general war.

The bottom line is Would the US risk a nuclear exchange with China just for Taiwan? We know it would no longer do so for W Europe where it has much greater economic interests. China will not push the US into a corner by going as far as to launch an invasion.

As in Hong Kong it will use social and political subversion splitting the business class from unruly students. The way in which Hong Kong destroyed its own society by turning peaceful demos into lawless occupations should be a warning to Taiwanese.

 

[shin_getter]

I really wonder if US just should put its "defense" dollars in intel/global foundries/etc and call it a day. It is unlikely that the US can derive much value out of security assurance and as an alliance leader after the current regime.

Wars are damned expensive and one against the premier industrial power off its coast can hardly be called wise in the best of times.

Ultimately the long conflict is won on the basis of which system works best, not in conflicts that move the needle for a few decades at most and there are other things that takes money and attention in this era.

 

[Explorer121]

Economics aside, I feel like the current US forces and allied forces are designed from the ground up for coalition warfare. This coming from the idea that the US would need to face a two or three front war and was generally seen as unpalatable, but given a complete abandonment of Europe, I suppose the US could focus all efforts on the Pacific theatre and any smaller conflicts in the middle east. Of course, if the US doesn't have European support in wars other logistical and geopolitical problems may arise. In the end I think the Chinese are correct, and war comes down to a comparison of 'Comprehensive National Power' and the economy, domestic political environment, and alliances of a given nation are inescapably intertwined with its combat potential.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Dealing with a land based threat like Somalian pirates or the Yemeni Houthi will require a ground force to go in and inflict severe damage on their leaders and families. Even then as the Israelis have found in Gaza and S Lebanon the opponent simply gets new leaders and there are always plenty of new fighters.

True, but the west is really freaking tired of stomping someone into a mudhole in the Middle East.

I was honestly hoping that the Chinese would take a swing at that. They'd be adequately ruthless in their ROEs to make it very likely the Houthis would never raise their heads again.

Turning to China. As long as the US has a lead in nuclear submarines the PLAN surface fleet is just a nice target. Aircraft carriers are no longer valid weapons in a full on general war.

The bottom line is Would the US risk a nuclear exchange with China just for Taiwan? We know it would no longer do so for W Europe where it has much greater economic interests. China will not push the US into a corner by going as far as to launch an invasion.

As in Hong Kong it will use social and political subversion splitting the business class from unruly students. The way in which Hong Kong destroyed its own society by turning peaceful demos into lawless occupations should be a warning to Taiwanese.

The catch is how many chip factories, the GOOD ones, are in Taiwan. As is what Taiwan will do to those factories if they get invaded (destroy them outright to deny them to the enemy).

But if Chairman Xi wants to reunify China while he is still alive, I think he's going to make a military attempt.

 

[Arjen]

True, but the west is really freaking tired of stomping someone into a mudhole in the Middle East.
I was honestly hoping that the Chinese would take a swing at that. They'd be adequately ruthless in their ROEs to make it very likely the Houthis would never raise their heads again.

Like the Soviet Union or any other hegemon in Afghanistan?
Mudholes that are, unfortunately, the home of millions and millions, who, with indiscriminate stomping of the targeted 'someones' will be stomped as well. For uncertain returns.

 

[shin_getter]

The catch is how many chip factories, the GOOD ones, are in Taiwan. As is what Taiwan will do to those factories if they get invaded (destroy them outright to deny them to the enemy).

Factories is just stuff, anyone that can buy from ASML can build it, and it isn't "that expensive" as far as national strategic perspective.

The issue is the people, organization and data.

Wars are pretty damned useless as economic value nowadays since the elites that make the system operate can and would flee. If you lock down the elites, they are also much less effective due to losing network effects. Value is attracted in this era, not captured.

 

[Dilandu]

Mudholes that are, unfortunately, the home of millions and millions, who, with indiscriminate stomping of the targeted 'someones' will be stomped as well. For uncertain returns.

Well, nowadays with increasingly robotic warfare, you probably could manage territory control without even putting boots on ground - just the array of constantly patrolling drones, the AI that crunch the data & detect dangerous anomalies, and the FPV drones to kill the threats AI pinpointed.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Like the Soviet Union or any other hegemon in Afghanistan?
Mudholes that are, unfortunately, the home of millions and millions, who, with indiscriminate stomping of the targeted 'someones' will be stomped as well. For uncertain returns.

I was assuming Chinese ROEs that would be pretty legitimately described as "genocide" by The Hague.

Because I have no doubt that "That village was close to the place where the missiles launched from? Delete it" is SOP for the PLA.

 

[Josh_TN]

The PLA has not seen a major conflict since 1979, so I think assigning behaviors or performance is rather pre mature. In any case the PRC has no interest in getting its hands dirty in the mid east and currently lacks the local infrastructure for any major ground or likely even naval operation. The only base I can think of in the region is a rather modest establishment in Djibouti.

 

[Ainen]

I was assuming Chinese ROEs that would be pretty legitimately described as "genocide" by The Hague.

Why? That sounds like blatant racism.
China is tied by same IHL as everyone, and while WW2 Japan made certain... bad impact on general perception, it's exactly that - overgeneralization, based on one particular case 80-90 years ago.
China isn't Japan, especially not the long gone militaristic one.

 

[1635yankee]

I was assuming Chinese ROEs that would be pretty legitimately described as "genocide" by The Hague.

Because I have no doubt that "That village was close to the place where the missiles launched from? Delete it" is SOP for the PLA.

That doesn't seem much different how forces have been known to behave in, say, Gaza or Afghanistan. It's a side effect of using bombs, missiles, and artillery to respond.

 

[shin_getter]

I was assuming Chinese ROEs that would be pretty legitimately described as "genocide" by The Hague.

The Chinese is running a "successful" "reeducation program for Muslims", for what it is worth.

The alternative view is that:

Whatever Chinese ROEs would be pretty politically described as "genocide" by The Hague.

Though I do wonder why is it that a tight blockade against houthis doesn't get applied? Can houthis really produce cruise missiles after a strategic bombing campaign?

I think the signaling value of military action is more important than neutralizing the threat in this case for lots of participants.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Why? That sounds like blatant racism.
China is tied by same IHL as everyone, and while WW2 Japan made certain... bad impact on general perception, it's exactly that - overgeneralization, based on one particular case 80-90 years ago.

Because the Chinese tend to just outright eliminate entire villages of dissidents internally?

Because their artillery, bombs, and missiles aren't as accurate as US equivalents, so they need to use a lot more for the same effects on targets?

 

[Explorer121]

It always struck me as odd that the Uyghur genocide was mostly ignored by the Islamic world given the sheer scale of it all, but if the US steps back in protecting the trade routes and the EU pursues closer ties, we might see the Fujian doing some patrols in the Red Sea. Whether this is enough to provoke attacks from various extremist forces is something I suspect the CCP is willing to risk, given its stated desire for a more substantial international presence and reputation.
This would likely be put on hold until after any plans for a Taiwan invasion

 

[edwest4]

Taiwan invasion? Seriously? A detailed look at any attack plan will reveal no possibility of a surprise attack. And no possibility of landing ground troops.

Raise defense spending to 3.4% of GDP: expert - Taipei Times

Bringing Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan

www.taipeitimes.com

The situation there is far less complicated than the United States defending Europe against a Soviet invasion in the 1980s, bolstered by Eastern European troops.

* Russia no longer has Eastern Europe and is weaker as a result.

 

[MrPhantomMan]

A blockade is more likely, in the event of force, in my opinion.

 

[In_A_Dream]

Rest assured, China will take Taiwan without a big shooting war. They know the US will concede given the recent on-shoring of TSMC.

I don't expect much to happen after that, just a continuation of their planned military buildup & expansion. China will also be in competition with the EU & US to fortify economic alliances around the globe.

 

[publiusr]

It always struck me as odd that the Uyghur genocide was mostly ignored by the Islamic world given the sheer scale of it all.

After Munich, 9/11, etc…not a lot of world wept.

Were China to leave Taiwan alone and push deeper into Asia where there are resources—but far from American carriers reach—I might expect a similar reaction.

 

[Josh_TN]

Getting back to technical discussions - submarines.

I think it is fair to say that the U.S. has a rather huge undersea advantage, and I think it is hard to overstate that. There might be a relatively massive fleet of PLAN D/E boats, but plot how many courses they can use to exit the first island chain. Then think about what the transit time is for an SSK to reach a patrol station a thousand miles away with a 5knt rate of advance (over a week one way). There is a rapidly increasing SSN force, but it seems likely this is still somewhat second rate to USN boats. But I think this does not address the true advantage the USN has: that it’s been operating in theater since 1945 and anything the PLAN does falls in range of its sensors.

The paradoxical analogy I like to use is sports related: the PLAN has a backyard advantage, but it has no home field advantage. That is to say, PLAN units do not have to commute far to be where they want to be. But they also do not control the area in terms of sensors and observation: the USN might have ships, aircraft, subs, or seabed sensors anywhere outside the 12 mile limit of China’s territorial waters. This means any weapons or training that the PLAN does in deep water has to be assumed to be under U.S. observation, even in the only easily accessible deep water inside the first island chain, the South China Sea.

You do not need to take my word for it; there is a great real world example we know of in open source: the train driven carrier target in the Gobi desert. Rather than make an ocean going barge and target it with ballistic missiles, the PRC created a massive CV target drawn down four parallel rail lines to simulate a ship sized moving target on dry land. Think about the effort involved in that given that any tanker or container ship hull from any Chinese yard could have been used as a target. Why do this? Because conducting a full at sea test would tell the Americans about as much about PRC anti ship weapons as it would the Chinese. Now think about how that likely reflects on every aspect of PLAN operations: ASW development, training sub crews, testing new weapons or tactics, or even just setting up a sound range to listen to your own boat’s acoustic performance to evaluate designs and quality control individual boats and ships. The U.S. has a half dozen sound measurement ranges at various depts from Florida to Cali to Hawaii to the Bahamas. (I think there’s one off the coast of Alaska as well?). Where does the PLAN test a new boat, or a new sonobuoy, or a new rapidly emplacemed semi persistent system like TRAPS or the shallow water Anduril seabed system? Anywhere outside the shallow, heavily trafficked Sea or Borei is potentially in enemy reach. It’s like having a baseball, futbol, or cricket team with a stadium that your opponent gets to sit in whenever they want. Any practice game might have the away team just hanging out in the stands, and you cannot do anything to stop them.

And then there is the aspect of underwater engineering. In this field, Russia and the U.S. simply have forgotten more than most anyone else has ever learned. Both have been running nukes boats with specific underwater intelligence collection tasks (cable taps, sensor emplacement, deep water wreck recovery/explotation) for over half a century. This is a technical ability the PRC likely cannot compete in.

Take all of the above together, and I think there’s is a much greater ability of the U.S. to gather data, train crews, test new systems, deploy sensors off opponent shores, perfect undersea communications, develop new tactics, etc. than China can ever hope to have. And I think if you add all those advantages up and put them together as a single force that has operated nuclear submarines longer than anyone else in the world, and you end up with an advantage best described as ‘ we do not know what we do not know’: neither us in open source or the PLAN likely has a good idea of even the extent of the capability gaps between the PLAN and USN.

This is probably a situation that simply fielding many more submarines, nuclear or otherwise, will not solve.

 

[uk 75]

Assuming three US carriers are available initially in the Western Pacific that is only twelve squadrons of F18s or a mixture of F18s and F35s.
Against most countries that would be more than their whole air force but in the case of China I am not sure what they would be capable of doing.
B2s and in due course B21s add some strike punch but are expensive planes to lose unless they are going to deliver nuclear weapons.
As in the South Atlantic War the ship killers for the US (and Japan if involved) will be submarines.

 

[Josh_TN]

Assuming three US carriers are available initially in the Western Pacific that is only twelve squadrons of F18s or a mixture of F18s and F35s.
Against most countries that would be more than their whole air force but in the case of China I am not sure what they would be capable of doing.
B2s and in due course B21s add some strike punch but are expensive planes to lose unless they are going to deliver nuclear weapons.
As in the South Atlantic War the ship killers for the US (and Japan if involved) will be submarines.

Two carriers seems more realistic, and was generally the assumption of the CSIS wargames. Their conclusion was that these would have little offensive power and short survival times, though most every scenario they tested assumed US CSGs started the war within easy reach of most any PRC attack as part of message sending. A single scenario that allowed them to stage from further back saw them last longer/survive. IMO, carriers will struggle to last through the first day if they are within PLAAF tactical fighter range.

I also think that they will have no ability to significantly attack the Chinese mainland. But I think they might easily be able to stage several large attacks against PRC shipping, assuming they survive long enough to do so. Again, I think the USN ‘secret weapon’ in the short term is MALD-N. It is a version of ADM-160 that has three notable improvements: a weapon datalink for new targets/commands after launch, a hot swap payload that can be changed out in a couple minutes even after being attached to an aircraft (think of the old Shrike ARM), and a radar altimeter for sea skimming. Taken together, it can either act as a physical decoy/stand in for an AShM or alternatively provide stand in jamming for the same using an EW package. It not only solves to problem of low inventories for LRASM and Tomahawk, it also solves the problem of deploying sufficient mass in single attacks: an F-18 can likely use its outer pylons and fuselage stations to carry four while keeping its four inboard pylons free for real weapons or fuel. Alternatively, using tandem BRUs it might carry as many as a dozen. A squadron of ten aircraft might launch over a hundred effectors. A modest amount of in flight refueling plus the several hundred mile range of MALD itself (I am assuming the new version does not have the full 500 mile range of the original that just used a physical radar reflector) means that an attack could pretty easily range out to a thousand miles.

Now combine this with the tomahawk inventory of a CSGs escorts. Typically that’s four DDGs/three DDGs and a cruiser (the Ticos are being drawn down to just three hulls by 2027 IIRC). That is about 400 VLS tubes, which would allow for a hundred offensive weapons and a very robust defense. A CSG might conceivably perform several attacks that were 100+ effectors, with only a few dozen of them actually carrying kinetic warheads. A single strike of 300-400 platforms is possible depending on what assumptions you make about VLS cells and aircraft reserved for offensive purposes.

Were something like Baracuda 500 to be adopted by the USN for their MACE requirement, those air launched effectors go from being decoys to full up missiles that could mission kill a destroyer.

 

[Josh_TN]

.
B2s and in due course B21s add some strike punch but are expensive planes to lose unless they are going to deliver nuclear weapons.
As in the South Atlantic War the ship killers for the US (and Japan if involved) will be submarines.

This ignores the B-52 and B-1 force. Tactical aircraft and even transport aircraft might also play an anti shipping role.

 

[mkellytx]

<A lot of good information snipped for brevity>
I also think there are a couple advantages the U.S. innately has in terms of technology and positioning, but those can be addressed separately and independently of this series of posts.

@Josh_TN Three very solid takes. That said, most of your focus is on the systems, and your posts feel like they accept the premise that we fight China where they want us to fight them in and around Taiwan. Not intended as a harsh criticism, more of an observation. So, first I'll discuss factors around the Davidson window, then look at historical factors driving this perceived need to do something by the end of the decade, then finally look at how not to fight a war to our advantage. Disclaimer, in 2012 I wrote an academic paper about this topic for my doing business in China class for my MBA.

Most of the posts so far focus on the obvious aspects, PLA centenary, two decades of US useless dirt decline, or just plain this is why my side will win. First, it must be acknowledged that China is one of the very few civilizations with a continuous 4,000-year history, if not the only one. The dynasties and governments change, but the civilization continued. Many of those dynasties were powerful and influential. Many times, the technology, or administration were without peer. Mind I do not write this as a China apologist, but to acknowledge history and attempt to understand why Xi today aspires to China as the greatest nation on Earth. If you believe in the past your country was the greatest, then it's not a new idea to aspire to past greatness.

The other thing this part of the discussion, brings out is that a lot of the Chinese leadership (in 2012) think in centuries and millennia, while a lot of the West seems to think in years, decades and very few in centuries. Again, full disclosure, most of my in-laws live in Hong Kong, my deceased father-in-law escaped Mao's China. All of the in-law moved to Canada before the handover and went back after all the kids went to college in Canada and the US. It's possible to appreciate the culture but not the Marxist government.

What really struck me as I prepared my paper in 2012 was how much the "Humiliation of China at the hands of the West" showed up in literature about the CCP leadership. Next, most of the this was tied closely together with the goal of China as the world's preeminent nation by the 2047 centenary of CCP rule, many times the connection was made to right the wrongs of the past. But here's where the dilemmas begin. As others have stated, Xi, if still alive will be well into his 90's and if still alive not running things.

The really interesting ones though began the year I visited Bejing, studying at Peking University with my class. The first thing that struck me was one of our lecturers mentioned, 2012 was the first year the new Chinese workforce began shrinking. The one child policy finally caught up with them (the gender imbalance caused further amplifies this). Although that's since been relaxed, it will be many decades before that change makes much of an impact. Especially since much of the better off were concentrated in the cities still have less incentive to have multiple children much like the rest of the developed world.

Which led to the next one, the disparity in wealth between city and countryside. The rural population and the non-Han ethnic minorities are the populations having children above replacement rate (I haven't checked this since I wrote the paper so things may have changed, I'm not writing a journal article here just sharing impressions from work done over a decade ago) while the Han in the cities aren't. This was particularly interesting since the growing populations are the one most likely to formant trouble, more on that later. Second, this creates a massive incentive towards internal migration, especially as the numbers of new workers from the cities shrink. Basic economics here, but wages are going to rise and pull people out of growing food and into factories as the factory wages rise because there are fewer new workers available each year, with the downside of ceding the distinction as the low-cost manufacturer. This is where I find the post about dark factories fascinating...

This then feels like the right place, given the formant trouble remarks, to discuss the two ways Marxist/totalitarian governments operate. Given that I did my MBA at UCLA, we had a fair number of students who might have wanted to make political statements while in communist China. It was pretty interesting that one of the deans gave us a good talking to before we traveled to Bejing. This particular dean is Cuban, and his family was expelled by Castro (robbed of everything at gunpoint, except the cloths on their back, three changes and $25). He described how Marxist totalitarians controlled their populations by the two great books of the 20th century, 1984 by Orwell and Brave New World by Huxley. The thesis here are there are two ways to control. The jackboot (1984) or the keep them so entertained by pleasure they don't care to cause trouble. Prior to and during our visit Huxley seemed to be the preferred method, in the years since Orwell's jackboot became more preferred. The connection here is important especially if the growing population is the most likely to cause problems, the different approach may signal a that the regime is afraid of the people, given the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Xi doesn't want to end things with his back to a wall...

More to come, it's late, I'm tired and I wrote way more than I thought I would. Next post I'll address the historical and maybe my thoughts around how to not play into the enemy's preferred strategy.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Getting back to technical discussions - submarines.

[...]

This is probably a situation that simply fielding many more submarines, nuclear or otherwise, will not solve.

As the forum's "noisy submariner", you've got that pretty well down.

And yes, there is a small acoustic test range up off Kodiak Island. Or at least was in 02-03. I'd assume it's still running.

The USN effectively owns the western Pacific, and has since WW2. Been there doing things, or "never were there, never did things" as case may be.

Favorite not-example, the USN never snuck into the Sea of Okhotsk to wiretap. Nope never did that.

This ignores the B-52 and B-1 force. Tactical aircraft and even transport aircraft might also play an anti shipping role.

Also, with Quickstrike JDAM-ERs, have those ever been tested out of a Rapid Dragon rig? Because a C-17 or even a C-5 abruptly dumping ~80-140 sea mines at a time would absolutely mess up an attempted amphibious landing. Per plane.

@Josh_TN Three very solid takes. That said, most of your focus is on the systems, and your posts feel like they accept the premise that we fight China where they want us to fight them in and around Taiwan. Not intended as a harsh criticism, more of an observation.

I expect that the initial shooting will take place at China's control, where they want to fight the US.

And if that is how it goes down, the US very likely will lose 2 carriers. I can only hope that it doesn't go all "they touched my boats" on China as a result.

The other thing this part of the discussion, brings out is that a lot of the Chinese leadership (in 2012) think in centuries and millennia, while a lot of the West seems to think in years, decades and very few in centuries.

100% agree here, Chinese "short term plans" seem to be 10 years out, and typical planning seems to be 50 years out. Which is something that the West in general and the US in particular has completely lost.

 

[publiusr]

Do we know their sizable fishing fleets aren’t laying their own SOSUS? Call that a “net” too:

“We lost another net”
“Acknowledged.”

I think China will just focus more on infrastructure than sophistication—but they could easily be closing the gap.

 

[martinbayer]

If you want to have an empire you must control the trade routes, if you do not comply with your international commitments you will be increasingly isolated, if you change your strategic orientation with each administration, your enemies must only wait for the next cowardly president, if you retreat do not expect respect from your enemies or your allies, if you do not pursue the enemy within, It makes no sense to consider the external. All this history comes fifty years later, we have already surrendered to the virus... Are we going to start talking about resistance at this point???

Oh hello love/hate child of Animal Farm and 1984, is that you?