Surface Ships Need More Offensive Punch, Outlook

Josh_TN said:
I suspect the control software, processors, and sensors have come a long way since then. But pity this system was always evolving all along as an option.
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You would hope so. But the more I look at those pictures, the more it seems that literally nothing has changed over 35+ years. Same operator seat with a couple of control levers, same arm, same handling rings, etc. I would hope that a modern version would be more automated, at very least.

possibly they revived this as proof of concept and a finished operational version will be more refined. Or maybe it really is easier to just use the old tech for this. It is pretty straightforward, overall.
 
TomS said:
You would hope so. But the more I look at those pictures, the more it seems that literally nothing has changed over 35+ years. Same operator seat with a couple of control levers, same arm, same handling rings, etc. I would hope that a modern version would be more automated, at very least.

possibly they revived this as proof of concept and a finished operational version will be more refined. Or maybe it really is easier to just use the old tech for this. It is pretty straightforward, overall.
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I'm guessing proof of concept is exactly what we're looking at. At the risk of being flippant, they can show this to the software people and say "See, it works mechanically. Now design a control system to do it without a butt in that seat."
 
Moose said:
I'm guessing proof of concept is exactly what we're looking at. At the risk of being flippant, they can show this to the software people and say "See, it works mechanically. Now design a control system to do it without a butt in that seat."
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Or ideally, here's how you do one at a time; scale this up across Mk41s. Again, sad that this kind of process was not always how the USN did business such that it could be incrementally improved over time, but hopefully the USN can play catch up.
 
Trying to dig out all the details on the 1980s reloading system, I found a reference in Marvin O. Miller's Designing the U.S. Navy's Underway Replenishment System. This dates the breadboard development to 1989, though I'm sure the images posted earlier are from a 1988 publication. By 1991, Op-03 decided there was no money to fund this capability.

The attached diagram hopefully helps illustrate how the system works. Basically, there are longitudinal rails mounted on the deck around the VLS. The reloading rig itself rides on these rails and consists of two athwartship rails and a handling mechanism. The mechanism has two rings and a winch. It uses a loader to grab the canister as it comes across on the high line from the supply ship, and transfers it to the handling mechanism. That mechanism then slides both longitudinally and athwartship to position the canister at the correct cell, rotates to vertical, and winches the canister down into the cell.

The cells have to be emptied before the UNREP begins. In high-tempo operations, the spent canisters would probably be dumped overboard, or they could be crossdecked back to the supply ship for reuse. Not clear to me how the empties would be removed other than using the same rig in reverse. This is a bit of a complication, because the idea is that the mechanism is carried by the supply ship and cross-decked to the receiving ship before the UNREP proper. So you still end up spending a couple of hours alongside pulling the empty canisters, then a couple more (at least) reloading the new ones. That's a long time alongside.

[Edit: I realized I left out a step above. There's a separate loader that takes the missile off the high line and positions it for the handler to grab.]

image001.png
 
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Xav's at SNA:
View: https://youtu.be/aal4hM2Q7UA?si=HTRKOXiAcKmFtsxL

Further confirmation that SPY-6 has exceeded the program's performance estimates. A Backfit Flight IIA "DDG MOD 2.0" (and yes I DO hate that term, thanks for asking) will have a quartet of SPY +15db AESA panels, which was the threshold performance for Flight III's version at the initiation of the program. This would also indicate that an objective of a SPY+30 to +40 SPY-6 variant for DDG(X) will be easier to achieve.
 
TomS said:
Trying to dig out all the details on the 1980s reloading system, I found a reference in Marvin O. Miller's Designing the U.S. Navy's Underway Replenishment System. This dates the breadboard development to 1989, though I'm sure the images posted earlier are from a 1988 publication. By 1991, Op-03 decided there was no money to fund this capability.

The attached diagram hopefully helps illustrate how the system works. Basically, there are longitudinal rails mounted on the deck around the VLS. The reloading rig itself rides on these rails and consists of two athwartship rails and a handling mechanism. The mechanism has two rings and a winch. It uses the rulings to grab the canister as it comes across on the high line from the supply ship, then slides both longitudinally and athwartship to position the canister at the correct cell, rotates to vertical, and winches the canister down into the cell.

The cells have to be emptied before the UNREP begins. In high-tempo operations, the spent canisters would probably be dumped overboard, or they could be crossdecked back to the supply ship for reuse. Not clear to me how the empties would be removed other than using the same rig in reverse. This is a bit of a complication, because the idea is that the mechanism is carried by the supply ship and cross-decked to the receiving ship before the UNREP proper. So you still end up spending a couple of hours alongside pulling the empty canisters, then a couple more (at least) reloading the new ones. That's a long time alongside.

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Thanks for the description. It sounds a little painful, but given that the only reloading facilities outside ballistic missile range are in Hawaii (and likely soon Australia) having some kind of mobile capability still seems like a huge plus. It saves days/weeks of steaming time. I cannot believe this method has been left to rot until just the last couple years.
 
Moose said:
Xav's at SNA:
View: https://youtu.be/aal4hM2Q7UA?si=HTRKOXiAcKmFtsxL

Further confirmation that SPY-6 has exceeded the program's performance estimates. A Backfit Flight IIA "DDG MOD 2.0" (and yes I DO hate that term, thanks for asking) will have a quartet of SPY +15db AESA panels, which was the threshold performance for Flight III's version at the initiation of the program. This would also indicate that an objective of a SPY+30 to +40 SPY-6 variant for DDG(X) will be easier to achieve.
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The DDG 2.0 (agree, cringy name) actually seems like an incredible upgrade. Seems to get you a Flt III ish capability on the cheap. I know the program is in its early stages, but have they published the upgrade cost estimate per ship?
 
Lc89 said:
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/194ec81
View: https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/194ec81/bae_has_an_interesting_concept_to_put_their/
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I'm with some of the redditors; there's just no way a DDG-51 Flt IIA has enough top weight margins for all of those extra launchers. Especially if you fill up the VLS with heavy (dense) missiles like SM-6 and TLAM. And you are at best adding 12% to the ship's total loadout.

I'd rather put a RAM launcher up forward or something. Gives you an extra missile layer so you don't need to use ESSM in the end game.

The more sensible application for these ADLs is on ships like carriers and big-deck amphibs that need to lose their Mk 29 launchers.
 
Josh_TN said:
. I cannot believe this method has been left to rot until just the last couple years.
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Agreed. It could easily have been fielded in the late 1990s, when deployed VLS reloading (for TLAM) first became an actual issue.

It's especially sad because Martin O. Miller, who basically reinvented USN UNREP from the 1950s onward, died in 2009 and never got to see people take this idea seriously.
 
An good, detailed overview on the rising importance of sea power from The Economist. It looks at the new era of piracy, the possibility of a naval blockade of Taiwan and how to deal with it, undersea cables and pipelines, USVs, law, etc.

www.economist.com

Welcome to the new era of global sea power

Naval might is back at the heart of competition—and conflict
www.economist.com www.economist.com

May be paywalled but if you register for free, you get access to a few articles per month.

This peacetime shadow-boxing has a minatory quality. In the post-cold-war era the oceans had become a “benign conduit for the projection of power”, says Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a think-tank in London. American and allied navies bombarded Afghanistan and Iraq at leisure. Occasionally they hunted pirates. “Now,” says Mr Childs, “we’re back into a new age where people are having to prepare for the potential for warfighting at sea.” This is unfamiliar territory. The last officer to have served in the Falklands war between Britain and Argentina, the last big naval war waged by a NATO country, is long retired. To fight hardier foes, ships are getting bigger and better armed, notes Mr Patalano, pointing to the example of the Italian navy’s Francesco Morosini—an offshore patrol vessel. These were usually small ships for coastal defence. But new ones are often the same size as 1990s-era frigates and come armed with air-defence systems and heavier weaponry. America’s next generation of destroyers might carry one-third more missiles than the current ones.

[...]

Undersea warfare is particularly important because that is where the West has its sharpest technological edge over Russia and China, both of which have limited capacity to detect, track and target American and allied subs. That explains why a midsized power like Australia is willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars over three decades on leasing American nuclear-powered subs and building new ones with Britain. The AUKUS deal was announced by the three countries back in 2021. The prospective AUKUS-class sub also shows the increasing emphasis on firepower: unlike Britain’s current attack sub, it will have a vertical launch system (VLS), upright tubes with many more missiles, and more advanced ones, than traditional torpedo tubes.

[...]

Almost all major navies plan to operate large USV fleets in the future, alongside crewed ships. Technology is outpacing the law. Much of the relevant law is more than a century old, says Commander Caroline Tuckett, the Royal Navy’s top adviser on international law. Even in peacetime the UNCLOS, adopted in 1982, puts obligations—such as rendering assistance to mariners in distress—on the “master” of a vessel or the commanding officer of a warship. A USV navigating autonomously has neither.

Sceptics argue that the military impact of USVs has been hyped. Basic gunfire, well aimed, could take many of them out. New weapons, like shipborne lasers, which most big navies are testing, might further tilt the advantage to the defender. Nevertheless, Captain Rowlands argues that a structural shift has taken place in the nature of naval power. “Having a navy used to be a very expensive thing,” he says. “There were great barriers to entry. Now there aren’t. You don’t need to have a baroque navy with billion-pound destroyers to exert influence at sea.”
 
Josh_TN said:
Thanks for the description. It sounds a little painful, but given that the only reloading facilities outside ballistic missile range are in Hawaii (and likely soon Australia) having some kind of mobile capability still seems like a huge plus. It saves days/weeks of steaming time. I cannot believe this method has been left to rot until just the last couple years.
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Hasn't been needed since 1991.
 
TomS said:
2003, at least

www.baltimoresun.com

Tomahawk missiles in dwindling supply

WASHINGTON – The war in Iraq has taken its toll on the United States’ stockpile of Tomahawks, depleting supplies of the Navy’s favorite long-range cruise missile at a time when pr…
www.baltimoresun.com www.baltimoresun.com
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The fun thing about operations in the Middle East is that there's a friendly port within a day's sailing to reload.
 
An explainer.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6GKTLUswIQ

The title's clickbait, it's not really about battleships, except what they were used for in their final years: as seaborne artillery in support of land and amphibious forces.

Essentially, there's ongoing/renewed interest in artillery as Ukraine has shown that while advanced weapons are effective (precision, range and speed), the attrition is severe and the weapons are expensive, so the fighting rapidly exhausts arsenals, production capacity, and budgets. Moreover, electronic warfare can disrupt kill chains at any point, rendering the most advanced weapons useless if they can't find their targets.

The author considers the original concept of the Zumwalts viable - that is support of amphibious forces. Missiles can strike where they are most effective but it's a waste to use them for saturation, so artillery can follow up instead, much more cheaply and in much greater volume and with immunity to jamming. The video then moves on to a revival of the arsenal ship concept with USVs now serving the role.

Hmmm, methinks, aren't arsenal USVs only solving part of the problem?
 
Ship based artillery seems pointless to me and did back when the Zumwalts were conceived. The entire concept relies on their being oppose amphibious landings to support such that entire weapon systems need to be designed around that goal. IMO, a complete and utter waste of resources then and now.
 
Yeah and I think Triemes could be the next thing all navies need, eco friendly, built of non-metals, no magnetic signature, reduced radar reflectivity, reduced acoustic signature, pointy low-cost weaponry, a massive ram, can carry troops, can be multi-role, sails deter low flying UAVs.
All I need to do now is make a Youtube video in my basement and I'll be a leading naval expert with Mahan and Fisher levels of strategical nous.
 
Clarification: putting a gun on a ship makes sense. Making shore bombardment a primary mission and building the ship around the gun armament does not. Making that gun shoot expensive non standard ammo like the Zoomie is batshit crazy.
 
Josh_TN said:
Clarification: putting a gun on a ship makes sense. Making shore bombardment a primary mission and building the ship around the gun armament does not. Making that gun shoot expensive non standard ammo like the Zoomie is batshit crazy.
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Shore bombardment is a legally mandated role for the USN. (Marines have one hell of a lobby in DC)

The Zumwalts were designed around the idea of being over the radar horizon from the coast themselves, and still being able to drop counter-battery fire on 122mm guns shooting at the V-22 LZs.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Shore bombardment is a legally mandated role for the USN. (Marines have one hell of a lobby in DC)

The Zumwalts were designed around the idea of being over the radar horizon from the coast themselves, and still being able to drop counter-battery fire on 122mm guns shooting at the V-22 LZs.
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I’m aware. That does not change the stupidity of the requirement or the massive waste of resources invested pursuing it.
 
I honestly don't really see the problem with non-standard rounds. Navies having multiple calibres that are not standard with those of the land services has pretty much been the norm since the dawn of naval artillery.

New equipment, with new standards is going to have to be introduced and put into service, or your armed forces will stagnate. Yes, a degree of technical risk is involved, but without that you don't get improved performance.
 
A Tentative Fleet Plan said:
I honestly don't really see the problem with non-standard rounds. Navies having multiple calibres that are not standard with those of the land services has pretty much been the norm since the dawn of naval artillery.

New equipment, with new standards is going to have to be introduced and put into service, or your armed forces will stagnate. Yes, a degree of technical risk is involved, but without that you don't get improved performance.
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Well perhaps I should have specified the 155mm AGS in particular, whose nonstandard rounds dictated that standard 155mm could not be used and were expensive enough to question why guided artillery rockets wouldn’t be a much cheaper expedient.

If Nammo successfully comes up with an inexpensive ramjet in 127mm I could see the use case. I really don’t see the point in developing brand new 155mm gun platforms just to placate USMC egos given the other spending priorities.
 
Josh_TN said:
I’m aware. That does not change the stupidity of the requirement or the massive waste of resources invested pursuing it.
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Given that a MEU only has 6x F-35s attached to it, how exactly are they supposed to deal with artillery etc threatening the LZs?
 
Josh_TN said:
Well perhaps I should have specified the 155mm AGS in particular, whose nonstandard rounds dictated that standard 155mm could not be used and were expensive enough to question why guided artillery rockets wouldn’t be a much cheaper expedient.
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HERO-compliant GMLRS quad-packed into two 64-cell Mk 41s in place of the two AGS mountings and magazines would probably have been a better choice.
 
A Tentative Fleet Plan said:
HERO-compliant GMLRS quad-packed into two 64-cell Mk 41s in place of the two AGS mountings and magazines would probably have been a better choice.
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See POLAR, which was essentially this with a long booster to take advantage of the full depth of the VLS.

In hindsight, this is almost exactly what I would have done. But at the time DD-21 was begun (1997), GMLRS was not yet available (fielded 2005) and the MLRS we did have was ill-suited to naval applications. Bad timing to a large degree.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Given that a MEU only has 6x F-35s attached to it, how exactly are they supposed to deal with artillery etc threatening the LZs?
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Use some other service's aircraft instead? Stay home? Has their been an opposed landing since Korea and would the US risk losing major surface combatants and landing platforms over it? IMO there are too many other things to pay for now to worry about MEUs getting fire support.
 
Josh_TN said:
Has their been an opposed landing since Korea and would the US risk losing major surface combatants and landing platforms over it? IMO there are too many other things to pay for now to worry about MEUs getting fire support.
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If/when a war with China breaks out, opposed landings are going to have to happen.
 
zevets said:
Do the landings even need to happen?
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If the Chinese do land on Formosa, the US will have to also land to dig them out.


zevets said:
Why can't we do anti-access/area denial over Taiwan?
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Mostly because it's 500km inside the Chinese naval A2AD bubble, which makes it very difficult to reinforce or resupply once the shooting starts.


Josh_TN said:
Where and why? And while we are at it, how?
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Invading Taiwan in 2027, because Mainland wants their "wayward province" back for the centennial of the PRC.
 
I agree that its impossible to resupply/reinforce once shooting starts, as the chinese will have a2ad capabilities.

But how do we do a contested landing in Taiwan without first rolling back an A2AD bubble?

I also think this logic applies to the chinese, so why not focus our efforts/resources on rolling back chinese a2ad, and putting up our own bubble? Then since we're defending Taiwan, our landings should be minimally opposed by the locals.

I guess as a broader point: I think the standard US wargame analysis of a conflict with china is directionally correct, and I'm confused as to why you would allocate resources towards a contested landing instead of a2ad?
 
zevets said:
I agree that its impossible to resupply/reinforce once shooting starts, as the chinese will have a2ad capabilities.

But how do we do a contested landing in Taiwan without first rolling back an A2AD bubble?

I also think this logic applies to the chinese, so why not focus our efforts/resources on rolling back chinese a2ad, and putting up our own bubble? Then since we're defending Taiwan, our landings should be minimally opposed by the locals.

I guess as a broader point: I think the standard US wargame analysis of a conflict with china is directionally correct, and I'm confused as to why you would allocate resources towards a contested landing instead of a2ad?
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I want the capability to do opposed landings just in case there's not enough time to roll back the A2AD bubble from the mainland.

Absolute worst case scenario short of nuclear weapons deployed. PLAN marines land and start executing every Taiwanese citizen for not welcoming their "liberators" with open arms.

A carrier needs to be practically on the coast of Formosa to have Super Hornets reach the launch sites for the Chinese AShBMs, the "optimal" weapon to hit the A2AD sites on the Mainland is an ICBM or at least a Tomahawk.
 
i find your perspective a bit baffling - but thanks for clarifying
 
Scott Kenny said:
If the Chinese do land on Formosa, the US will have to also land to dig them out.



Mostly because it's 500km inside the Chinese naval A2AD bubble, which makes it very difficult to reinforce or resupply once the shooting starts.



Invading Taiwan in 2027, because Mainland wants their "wayward province" back for the centennial of the PRC.
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A US landing in Taiwan would not be opposed unless China had already won. I also question the need (and ability) of the U.S. to land or supply Taiwan unless the PLAN has already been largely destroyed. It seems to me the easiest way to dig out PLA forces in occupied areas of Taiwan are via starvation and bombardment, assuming a political solution for their removal cannot be arrived at. Certainly no one is landing marines or risking landing platforms unless the anti access threat is heavily eroded and air superiority firmly established over any landing beaches…in which case, shore bombardment is probably largely meaningless.
 

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