An all nuclear battlegroup would still require replenishment as both it's crew and aircraft require consumables. As best I can establish from the various congressional documents now available online the concept of operations for the replenishment of all-nuclear groups was to be different though. With conventionally powered escorts a proportion of the carriers liquid fuel capacity would be used to carry fuel for her escorts, meaning less available for the air wing, the faster the group steamed the more ship fuel it would require. This was offset by providing an AOR or AOE as an integral part of the battle group (hence the AOE-6 class) that could replenish the carrier and her escorts within the combat area. Once the AOE's stores were expended the group would have to retire and replenish from an Underway Replenishment Group (URG), likely out of the range of Soviet shore-based strike aircraft. By contrast, a CVN with nuclear escorts would be able to dedicate its entire liquid fuel capacity to JP-5 allowing greater combat endurance from it's air wing. The all-nuclear group would not have an accompanying AOE and once its own stores were expended it too would have to retire to the URG, but would be able to do so at a higher speed than the conventionally escorted group and thus return to the combat area faster. The maths depends on the inputs but nuclear-propulsion advocates argued that the combination of a high-transit speed to and from the URG and greater JP-5 stowage in the carrier would result in greater time on station than a carrier with conventional escorts.

A fleet of nuclear escorts would have less ships than one consisting of conventionally powered ships. A 1967 study (The Endurance Supplement to the Major Fleet Escort Force Level Study) concluded that a CVN escorted by 4 DXGNs was equal to one escorted by 3 DXGs and 3 and 3/8ths DXs. This remained the accepted ratio throughout the nuclear versus conventional debate. Right through to the end of the Cold War the Navy was stating it needed 6 gas turbine destroyers in each carrier battlegroup (or 12 in a two-carrier group) whilst the basic assumption for nuclear escorts per CVN in the late 1970s was also 4.

I have included some commentary below from the Naval Historical Foundation website, the full piece can be found here. VADM Doyle became Op-03 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in 1975 and was therefore a key personality in the debates around the CSGN and other programmes in the late 1970s, much of his testimony to congressional hearings can now be found online.

Title VIII refers to Sections 801-804 of the FY1975 defense authorization act that required all "major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy" to be nuclear powered, this covered all carrier escorts and the ships allocated to surface action groups but it did not cover frigates, amphibious ships, auxiliaries, etc, it neatly lined up with Rickover's belief that it was uneconomical to equip warships below 8,000 tons with nuclear propulsion. Title VIII was repealed by Section 810 of the FY1979 defense authorization act.

DOYLE: Well, it was very challenging, because we did have these two factors, the budget cuts, and actually the reduction in the number of ships during that period. Many of the older ships were put out of commission to make room for and to provide more resources for building new ships. So there was a reduction in force levels, but there was the growing Soviet naval and air threat, which required us to improve our capabilities, particularly in fleet air defense.

In 1975, the Navy was building two single mission ASW ships–the Spruance-class destroyer (DD 963) for task group operations and the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate (FFG 7) for convoy operations. Both ships were outgrowths of OSD’s major fleet escort study of the late 60’s. Their surface to air missile systems were limited to self defense and could not counter the Soviet missile threat from aircraft or submarines. We were also building the Virginia-class nuclear powered guided missile cruiser (CGN 38), but the Tartar D AAW system with rotating radars and a short range surface to sir missile would be saturated by sophisticated Soviet air to surface missiles launched from Badger and Backfire bombers. Thus, we needed to build a new class of multi-mission cruisers and destroyers, equipped with the latest technology in all warfare areas.

Fortunately, we were well along in the development of the Aegis weapon system consisting of a multi-function phased array radar, slaved illuminators and digital computers, and engineered to meet the operational requirements of firepower, reaction time, coverage, countermeasures and availability.

In an effort to restore the traditional role of the cruiser as an independent striking unit, in 1975, Admiral Holloway proposed a strike cruiser (CSGN) that would be nuclear powered with a speed of 30+ knots and a displacement of 17,000 tons. In addition to Aegis with Standard Missiles and Tomahawk, the CSGN would be armed with Harpoon, a new light weight 8 inch gun, 2 VSTOL aircraft or LAMPS helicopters, SQS-52 sonar, torpedoes, Phalanx, a towed array, a tactical flag command center, and robust ballistic protection. The Navy’s program called for 8 CSGN’s and 16 conventionally powered Aegis destroyers.

The CSGN program was terminated by OSD in favor of a less expensive (and less capable) Aegis CGN 42 class. However, this program was subsequently dropped when CVN 71 was canceled by the Secretary of Defense.

Nuclear propulsion in warships other than submarines and aircraft carriers was a major divisive issue in Congress and OSD. (Even in carriers it was an issue with SecDef Harold Brown and SecNav Claytor as I will mention later). At the urging of Admiral Rickover with CNO support, Congress had passed Title VIII requiring that all major combatants be nuclear propelled. The Navy wanted to capitalize on the operational experience and advantages of all nuclear powered carrier tasks groups–Enterprise, Long Beach, Bainbridge and Truxtun–in future shipbuilding programs. Nimitz (CVAN 68) had just been commissioned. Eisenhower (CVAN 69) and Vinson (CVAN 70) were building, so it made sense to fill out the all nuclear powered task groups with nuclear powered Aegis cruisers. The Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee strongly supported nuclear power in cruisers; the Senate Armed Services Committee and OSD did not. As a result of the impasse, neither an Aegis nuclear powered cruiser nor an Aegis conventionally powered destroyer was authorized in the 1976 budget. The Navy was twice the loser. A subsequent plan to land Aegis and Tomahawk in Long Beach (CGN 9) was partially funded by the Congress, but was withdrawn under the pressure from the Secretary of Defense.

Cancellation of the strike cruiser and the CGN 42 class shifted emphasis to building an Aegis conventionally powered destroyer. However, there was no support in OSD for building a “new” destroyer, but dramatic reductions in the size and weight of the Aegis system permitted installation in a redesigned Spruance (DD 963) destroyer hull. Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer, the program manager for Aegis and rightly known as the father of Aegis, challenged industry to down-engineer the system in size, weight and cost, and industry complied. Thus, Ticonderoga (DDG 47), later renumbered as CG 47, was finally authorized and funded in the 1977 budget. Admiral Rickover was unhappy and told me so, but we had absolutely no support for a nuclear powered Aegis cruiser. I felt we had to get the Aegis combat system to sea as soon as possible to counter the Soviet missile threat.

Earlier I mentioned controversy over building a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. When CVN 71 was cancelled by SecDef, SecNav Claytor proposed building three conventionally powered carriers for the price of two nuclear powered carriers. In testimony before the HASC, I presented the Administration’s proposal but when asked my personal and professional opinion, I recommended building two nuclear powered carriers instead. Secretary Claytor was not pleased, but SecDef Harold Brown upheld my right as a career officer, not a political appointee, to state my personal and professional opinion when asked. The three conventional carrier proposal went nowhere and CVN 71 was subsequently restored by the next administration.
 
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I will likely going to draw the USS Long Beach AEGIS/CSGN Conversion of 1975 in sometime in the future.
I like to clear things on her armament:
4x4 RGM-84 Harpoon
2x4 BGM-109 Tomahawk
2x1 8"/55 Mark 28/32 Guns
2x2 RIM-66 Standard MR
No ASW torpedoes or ASROC? or the Standard MR launchers and magazine would handle some ASROC ammo?
I assume at least minimum 2 SPY-1 Radar based on the artist impression.
Anybody have more data or sketch or description of the proposed conversion?
 
I will likely going to draw the USS Long Beach AEGIS/CSGN Conversion of 1975 in sometime in the future.
I like to clear things on her armament:
4x4 RGM-84 Harpoon
2x4 BGM-109 Tomahawk
2x1 8"/55 Mark 28/32 Guns
2x2 RIM-66 Standard MR
No ASW torpedoes or ASROC? or the Standard MR launchers and magazine would handle some ASROC ammo?
I assume at least minimum 2 SPY-1 Radar based on the artist impression.
Anybody have more data or sketch or description of the proposed conversion?

There are several paintings and line drawings earlier in this thread.

Only one SPY-1, with four faces just like every other SPY-1 shipboard installation.

Mk26 GMLS would handle ASROC as it did in the Ticos and Virginias.

On the 8-inch gun, the mount designation would have been Mk 71. The actual gun designations are not used very often.
 
I will likely going to draw the USS Long Beach AEGIS/CSGN Conversion of 1975 in sometime in the future.
I like to clear things on her armament:
4x4 RGM-84 Harpoon
2x4 BGM-109 Tomahawk
2x1 8"/55 Mark 28/32 Guns
2x2 RIM-66 Standard MR
No ASW torpedoes or ASROC? or the Standard MR launchers and magazine would handle some ASROC ammo?
I assume at least minimum 2 SPY-1 Radar based on the artist impression.
Anybody have more data or sketch or description of the proposed conversion?
Long Beach's AEGIS proposal was meant to be armed with a pair of Mark-26 missile launchers. The Mark-26 could originally fire the RIM-66 Standard MR, but was upgraded in the late 70's to fire the RUR-5 ASROC. Additionally, it could have been upgraded to fire the Harpoon missile, given that the Harpoon could be fired from the smaller Mark-13 launchers on the Oliver Hazzard Perry class frigates. As the Long Beach's AEGIS/CSGN conversion would have served as a prototype to a class of Strike Cruisers, it would be reasonable to assume that it would have been outfitted with a pair of Mark-26 mod 2 launchers. In theory, the launchers could carry 64 missiles each, though that could be reduced by one or two per launcher given a need to carry training and calibration rounds. So that would give a grand total of either 124 or 126 actual missiles in the launchers.
 
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I'm familiar with the artist rendering of the Typhon class frigate, it's in the Conway's book of Postwar Warships. The side elevation rendering is interesting, I've never seen helicopter facilities before, anyone else? I've never seen the image of the Norton Sound with the Typhon array, that's interesting.
 
Besides the Typhon array looking like an Apollo Command capsule, how were the emitters arranged and what were the small spheres for.
 
Those were the Receiver Sets and the top one (Which should be a larger sphere) is the Transmitting Set
I think their number depended on the type of installation as 3 was envisioned at first but only two (the Frigate and Cruiser variants) were to be deployed:
Frigate with 3500 elements (Luneberg Lens)
Destroyer with 7000 elements
Cruiser with 10.000elements
But maybe the difference being the 3,5K, 7K and 10K versions being their transmit power eg the 3,5K could only guide the Typhon MR while the larger 10K could guide the Typhon LR as well not sure about the 7K version, that might be only able to guide a limited number of Typhons?
 
If Typhon had worked as hoped, Long Beach and Bainbridge would have been the last non-Typhon equipped nuclear ships.
Truxtun, and the California/Virginia class ships would have been built as Typhon ships.
I wonder if Long Beach and Bainbridge would have then received Typhon upgrades?
 
If Typhon had worked as hoped, Long Beach and Bainbridge would have been the last non-Typhon equipped nuclear ships.
Truxtun, and the California/Virginia class ships would have been built as Typhon ships.
I wonder if Long Beach and Bainbridge would have then received Typhon upgrades?
I have read the the Long Beach's Scanfar arrays was basically a simplified version of Typhon, design concurrently as a back up incase Typhon proven too much of a reach. With Typhon suffering many early denials that pushed it back several years.

If Typhon had worked out as plan it very likely that Long Beach and Enterprise would have been launched with the SPG-59s.
 
The earliest Typhon designs when the missiles still called Super Tartar and Super Talos (There seems to be no Super Terrier??? ) one was envisioned with the SPS-32/33 set the other a more simple one what looks like enlarged SPG-51's?

1607632794655.png

But I don't think the SPS-32/33 were simplified SPG-59's as the SCANFAR was a search radar though maybe the SPS-33 (The vertical sets) could be used for guidance while the SPG-59 was a dedicated missile guidance system.
 
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The earliest Typhon designs when the missiles still called Super Tartar and Super Talos (There seems to be no Super Terrier??? ) one wwas envisioned with the SPS-32/33 set the other a more simple what looks like enlarged SPG-51's?

View attachment 646244

But I don't think the SPS-32/33 were simplified SPG-59's as the SCANFAR was a search radar though maybe the SPS-33 (The vertical sets) could be used for guidance while the SPG-59 was a dedicated missile guidance system.
The Terrier was to be taken over by the Super Tarter since it had the same max range of the older Terrier while retaining the minumun range of the older Tarter.

The SPG59 was to the Full Detected to Kill set, in a very similar way to the Army's Patriot System, a full proper one and done system ment replace the 12 different radars usual found on warships at the time. Air search ground search, navigation, target control it was to do it ALL.

Then they got around to do the power curve testing and the maths for it.

And found the system Took a metric ASS TON of power.

As in take thousand of miles off a ship range to run it types of power limiting the ship usage to the nuke boats.

So they decide to make the SPS systems, which later became SCANFAR, to take over the general search settings to save power, That didn't work since Scanfar itselt was a very power hunger system since it was an early version of the AESA types*. That brings to the usual line of designs we see with the SPS-43 and similar search radars while the SPG59 was limited to combat use only. Which gave use some funky designs like the Des Moines Typhon refit with four SPS-43 set up in panels around the main SPG59 fire control group. That didn't do the trick either causing the navy to cancel it in December of 63.

Then the Navy finaly tested it on the Norton Sound in the 63/64 and nearly fried that ships electric system, THAT BEEN OVERBUILT IN THE REFIT just for that. Which was the final nail in the coffin for the system.

*During this time SCANFAR was order in designing phases originally to take over the search, then it was divorced from the program all together for use on the Long Beach and Enterprise nearing completion since it could also use the regalur SPG-49/55 systems as well and the navy figured it may as well get something for its money. That system had it's own issues as we know it and never really did work how the Navy wanted it.

Which leads us to 64 when a certain Program call the ASMS, Advanced Surface Missile System, was started to met the anti missile requirements the Navy felt was needed for the future. With alot of the Typhon and Scanfar personal being dropped over to work on it.

A few years later in 69, ASMS was remained AEGIS and the rest is history.
 
But AEGIS still required quite some years to develop and another decade to get it afloat on the Ticonderogas no? Though tested again on the Norton Sound, there are photos of her with the hexagonal(ish?) SPY-1 or proto SPY-1 sets.
7660131_orig.jpg



SPS-32/33 and SPG-59 are way ahead of their time though it is stated that the Vacuum Tubes of the Long Beach's set replaced by Solid State ones, did this improvement had any effect on their reliability?
 
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The Typhon ships as envisioned would have been amazing, but unfortunately they took existing technology one step too far. The power requirements were one thing, but it was meant for nuclear ships. But the waveguide array was insanely complicated, and that was the final nail in the coffin.

To wit, a picture of the Luneberg lens of the SPG-59 as fitted to the Norton Sound:

spg-59-waveguides.png


All of those waveguides had to have their length to within a fraction of the wavelenght of the radar signal.

Some reading:
 
But AEGIS still required quite some years to develop and another decade to get it afloat on the Ticonderogas no? Though tested again on the Norton Sound, there are photos of her with the hexagonal(ish?) SPY-1 or proto SPY-1 sets.
7660131_orig.jpg



SPS-32/33 and SPG-59 are way ahead of their time though it is stated that the Vacuum Tubes of the Long Beach's set replaced by Solid State ones, did this improvement had any effect on their reliability?
The Norton SOund got the prototype SPy-1 arrays in about 1973, they were not true SPY-1s as it were, believe they were smaller but it was reasonably fast getting the system set up and running. The SPY-1 were very much base on the SPG58s and SPS32/33 tech and experainces from said systems.

Namely in what NOT to do.

It just took them another decade to finaly get the system out sea on the USS Ticonderoga in 1983. Namely cause of funding, design and doctrine issues. Just look at all the Designs for the Strike Cruisers for example.

During which time the Norton Sounds systems was tested on and refined, which is part of the reason why it still in use basically. It went thru one of the most through testing programs ever with the Navy being very picky on the issues.

Didn't stop it from having issues thru.

The User Interface wasn't the best for for one, and the Ticonderoga class dual SPY modules with right angle array design caused timing issues between the Different faces and the directors. Which lead to it basically jamming itself and missing targets since the directors were not pointing in the right directions, or the computers just crashing. You think the Ford and Zumwalt class have issues? They were nothing on the Tico errors in the 80s to early 90s.

Which lead into the New Threat Upgrade being considered "better" at the time that you still see on occasion.

Rather or not the Strike would have that issue I don't know.

And Yes apperantly the SCANFAR solid State was more reliable and about 20 tons lighter. But at the end of the day it was still...

A problemic system that the navy felt pulling it for the Aegis system later downgraded for the NTU was worth the cost and effort.
 
I don't recall seeing the photo of Norton Sound with the Aegis system on the superstructure. Isn't there some with the radar array on the aft end by the launcher or is my brain playing tricks.
 
I don't recall seeing the photo of Norton Sound with the Aegis system on the superstructure. Isn't there some with the radar array on the aft end by the launcher or is my brain playing tricks.

I don't think they ever configured Norton Sound with the SPY-1 arrays aft of the superstructure.

Lots of pics here: http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/41/4111.htm
 
I'm making the Long Beach AEGIS proposal drawing. Am I correct that the SPG-60 radar for the Mark 86 GFCS isn't a small radar? The only source that states it's size is this site:

For a 4m diameter of the parabola dish. Is this correct?
 
I'm making the Long Beach AEGIS proposal drawing. Am I correct that the SPG-60 radar for the Mark 86 GFCS isn't a small radar? The only source that states it's size is this site:

For a 4m diameter of the parabola dish. Is this correct?

More precisely 160 inches (4.06m) but 4m is close enough. It's certainly bigger than the SPG-62 illuminator for AEGIS (90 inches/2.29m)
 
Thanks! This kind of radar and layout seems quite frequent though in different sizes.
The drawings showing these kind of radars on the Long Beach AEGIS version seems to belong to the smaller SPG-62 despite that was first appeared on the Ticonderogas whose laid down in the 1980's
 
Long Beach AEGIS was only a couple of years earlier than the Ticos, and I would expect it to have SPG-62s, not SPG-60s, if it had been built. There is no reason for an AEGIS ship to incorporate true fire control radar trackers like the -60.

Remember that SPG-62 is a simple slaved illuminator. It just points where AEGIS tells it to without actually tracking the target. It also achieves greater range than tracking radars like SPG-60, despite being more compact, because it only has to send a signal to the target and get a reflection back to the missile, which should be near endgame before it starts looking for the CW illumination signal. Saves a ton of signal strength over a complete round trip.
 
Probably correct but at the time GFCS the Mark 86 based on the SPG-60 and SPQ-9 radars to provide fire control for the proposed 8" gun(s) am I correct?
 
Artist impression of Aegis-modified Virginia-class cruiser (CGN 42) steaming alongside Virginia-class cruiser.

Outboard profile of Aegis-modified Virginia-class cruiser (CGN 42).
Maybe it's just me, with no practical naval background, but a "Aegis-modified Virginia-class cruiser (CGN 42)" makes sense to me in terms of Congressional support/risk/development time/cost. Sure it's not the armoured 17,000t design initially wanted, but given the choice of 'some vs none' that the USN would eventually recieve......


Regards
Pioneer
 
Probably correct but at the time GFCS the Mark 86 based on the SPG-60 and SPQ-9 radars to provide fire control for the proposed 8" gun(s) am I correct?
Not necessarily. The surface fire control radar for the Mk 86 GFCS is the SPQ-9 (in a ball radome); SPG-62 is just for antiair. But in AEGIS ships, antiair gun fire control is done via SPY-1 and AEGIS. That said, I'm not sure the 8-inch gun would even have an antiair role.
 
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Does any of the documents states how many helos were to be carreid by the Long Beach AEGIS? The drawigns and artist illustrations shows full ship width hanger meaning 22,3 meters which is plenty of space for 2 but even for 3 helicopters either SH-2 Seasprite or SH-60 Seahawk!
 
Does any of the documents states how many helos were to be carreid by the Long Beach AEGIS? The drawigns and artist illustrations shows full ship width hanger meaning 22,3 meters which is plenty of space for 2 but even for 3 helicopters either SH-2 Seasprite or SH-60 Seahawk!

It would have been two, not three. Two helos were planned for Strike Cruiser, and CGN-9 AEGIS was supposed to parallel that.

 
Thanks! This kind of radar and layout seems quite frequent though in different sizes.
The drawings showing these kind of radars on the Long Beach AEGIS version seems to belong to the smaller SPG-62 despite that was first appeared on the Ticonderogas whose laid down in the 1980's
Long Beach AEGIS was only a couple of years earlier than the Ticos, and I would expect it to have SPG-62s, not SPG-60s, if it had been built. There is no reason for an AEGIS ship to incorporate true fire control radar trackers like the -60.

Remember that SPG-62 is a simple slaved illuminator. It just points where AEGIS tells it to without actually tracking the target. It also achieves greater range than tracking radars like SPG-60, despite being more compact, because it only has to send a signal to the target and get a reflection back to the missile, which should be near endgame before it starts looking for the CW illumination signal. Saves a ton of signal strength over a complete round trip.
Another thing to remember is that ALOT of the Aegis Gear, the Spy-1s, SPG-62s, UYK-7s, and the like were ready for ship use far sooner then we saw them. Hell the Norton Sound had most of the gear by 73, with the many Aegis on buildings, like the USS Rancocas, being built soon after as well. With the Navy wanted it at sea by 76-78 with the first strike cruiser designs.

But that did not happen in real life cause the money and politics were not there. The Navy just couldn't get a ship design thru Congress Budgeting to get funds to build the things.
 
Here is my drawing of the Long Beach AEGIS Modernisation, the 2 gun variant:
debki4z-7e737594-8c56-4faf-bbc0-edf6f00832d4.png

Good start.

1) The version of the CGN-9 conversion with 2 guns also had angled Tomahawk launch tubes, not the elevating ABLSs that came later. See the ling drawing here: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/strike-cruiser-from-the-80s.813/post-68378

2) The helo pad markings are probably not right. Even on large ships with helo pads, I've rarely seen two side-by-side spots like that; you almost always have a single landing spot on centerline (the only exception I know if is the Newport LSTs, for some reason). See below, for example: (and the link here for more references)


s98-639201.jpg
 
Yes they had single circles but as Long Beach was quite wide there I thought why not? The Russians and maybe Japanese too use double circles though they are overlapping each other.
As for the Tomahawks I'm pretty sure they would had got those armoured box launchers as the original Long Beach had. I wonder why not put 4 quads there as well, there ard plenty of space.
 
Yes they had single circles but as Long Beach was quite wide there I thought why not? The Russians and maybe Japanese too use double circles though they are overlapping each other.
As for the Tomahawks I'm pretty sure they would had got those armoured box launchers as the original Long Beach had. I wonder why not put 4 quads there as well, there ard plenty of space.

The constraint wasn't on space so much as on the avilaability of missiles. Remember that at the time, Tomahawk was being thought of primarily as a nuclear strike weapon. Eight nuclear warheads was plenty.
 
As for the Helideck painting, yes.... even the much wider Independence had a single circle though that carries (according to the wiki) only 1 Helicopter and 2 small Drones....
 

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