Stealth specs of USN A-12 and NATF.

Flateric and OlivierM already demonstrated that the Wichita picture from 2014 shows a B-2.
The straight trailing edge is just a compression artifact.


I guess the U-2, A-12, SR-71, C-141, C-5, F-117 were all flukes...
Have they also demonstrated how a bomber which is painted F.S. 36118 Gunship Grey on the bottom, same as the top, is in fact glowing F.S. 36495 like a Navy Jet at high altitude, when viewed from below? No?! Hunh.

The last mass produced fighter which Lockheed built was the F-104, largely constructed under license, by Canadair, Fokker and Alenia I believe. Because the associated countries had the Old Country craftsmanship to build and maintain a Ferrari, by hand. Which is essentially what the F-104 was.

Lockheed did not and the USAF was not buying the F-104C in any kind of numbers because it was not practical as a nuclear delivery system or a SAGE guided interceptor with potential AIM-26A or AIR-2 weapons onboard. At least not compared to what we already had as alternatives.

It was purely a Sidewinder, daytime, CAVU, fighter, based on what USAF pilots said was absent from their F-86, over Korea.

Which was nothing like what was needed for air combat, in the missile age. And so it stagnated after a token purchase, with TAC. And was corruptly sold to as a MAP fighter, something it was not, in Europe and Japan. So badly so that there were multiple felony indictments and convictions for the undertable dagger and purse job which was done foisting it off on airforces whose weather and experience were not compatible with the Zipper's absolutely unforgiving handling.

The Navy got no closer, with either the F-8 or Ford, both of which could do a reasonable imitation of a daytime strike fighter but were not self-escorting and could not work at night.

And then, as work stagnated with the Century Series, someone at McDonnell Douglas looked at an attack airframe that had just been rejected for the second time and said: 'How about this...' and pulled out the Big Book Of Aerodynamic Solutions to kluge a fighter out of it which, good grief, worked.

Because it was big enough for two of the biggest engines in the business, had a big nose and a lot of gas, plus a unique way of mounting AIM-7s that left the wings free for gas and sidewinders and bombs.

And so the F-4H/F-110 brought us the multirole Phantom.

James McDonnell was not an aerodynamicist but he knew how to bend metal and was a decent aerospace engineer. He was also a Scot. Which means he never committed his company to something they could not do, did not have answers for, before jumping right in.

His son, John, by comparison, was a 'top down' kinda guy (multiple business admin degrees) who, while he also had a couple token aeronautical engineering addons, like his da; unlike James was an absolute moron when it came to risk assessment and having all your ducks lined up before pulling the trigger.

Two things which are critical for anyone in the C-suite. Everything you do, every investment you make, has to be planned ahead, at least 36 months of bet on this capability emphasis shift. Based on who you had lunch with and played a round of golf listening to , the prior weekend.

And John McDonnell's inheriting the business after almost a decade spent living in the shadow of his father's memory while negatively evaluated by men who knew how to run a defense aerospace company, took the company on a death spiral from 1988 to being sold off, completely wrecked, in 1997.

Not even a full decade.

Now, I'm not saying it was all his fault, the world was a lot more complicated, politically and technically, in terms of Ye Compleat Warrior weapons system engineering, in his time than his father's 30+ years.

But the thing of it is: MDD was more than the Phantom Works of post-Boeing purchase. As some kind of jumped-up ADP wannabe.

It was a genuine tacair production entity with a unique approach to making large scale manufacturing work. And for all that, it was also a good teaming player, always able to work with other companies, like Northrop and even BAe, to get a program over the finish line.

You don't mess that up and John McDonnell did.

For example, I know, that if James F. had called up Thomas Jones and said "Tom, I'm in over my head, I know you backed out under bad circumstances but I need ideas and I need'em quick, before they gaslight me on this fixed price contract, because we've committed to something we do not understand."

Tom would have said, "I'll send my jet. We'll get you two out here for the weekend and we'll talk about The Subject as Prissy and Ruth catch up."

Because that's how the Gentleman's league of the aerospace industry worked. Who you knew became what you could do, based on recommended investments in capital overhead and personalities in the field. Even technology itself was traded or at least subcontracted between friends. The defense of the nation came first. And the maintenance of viable partnerships (F/A-18 etc.) next.

Business as usual (screw the other guy first) was not a part of it.

Which means everyone who needed to, could talk to everyone in their circle and get the 411, before the overarching CSAR on observables wrecked everything.

That is why losing McDonnell Douglas was a tragedy. Because their lineup included the Phantom, the Skyhawk, the AV-8B, the Eagle and the Hornet. And only the last was not really their work.

Lockheed...I can't hardly speak about them, without cussing.

The F-22 should have gotten all the development effort that was lavished on the F-35.

And been purchased in a minimum 500 examples, with the correct engine and MORE GAS.

While UCAVs and F-15E took over the majority of the longrange strike and especially SEAD roles. And the F-16 was eased out of service.

Because you do not need a 350nm radius, single engine, manned strike fighter in SWA or the Pacific Rim.

My take, your mileage may vary.
 
To be honest that just sounds like a load of conspiracy-minded garbage.

You have a grainy photo of (we aren't entirely sure) made by (no idea), how does that tie into the A-12, cancelled 24 years earlier? A very slight planform similarity?
Except that I backed my tinfoil hat up with an RF meter, proving why I was being Havana Syndromed.

And nobody will answer my questions in turn.

The wings on the A-12 don't match, side to side. There is no obvious way for it to be either a full-depth LEF or an extensible slat. Certainly not while maintaining a deep RAS layer, built into the leading edge. How do you board a short chord, wide span, close coupled, flying wing with out a way to entrain airflow and keep the LE in a believable range for sink rate. But not pitchup?

How do you explain contractual language of 'those contractors' in 'that context' as part of the termination message?

Why are there massive tools for a non-existent airframe? Why are there so many parts?

Why is the excuse that it was a lolo interdictor when it has both equipment indicative of a high altitude role and easy access to 'why we fly high' logic of the hypotenuse theory.

Why would ANYONE select a 1,308 square foot wing area system for low level ride using terrain following, in an aggressive maneuver environment? A 45lb per square foot wing area is not necessary for carrier compatibility it is likely fatal for high G maneuver close to the dirt, at 500-550 knots.

Why are you building five canopies?

If it's a stealth cripple, why did the USN desperately try to save it? Why did the USAF also help, so late in the game? Why is the argument for a 'stealth bra' so sensitive it's not allowed to be included in the legal brief for how far the airframe signature reduction effort had progressed but no one in the GD/MDD side was able to say: "Uhhh, your Honor, that's not good enough, they cannot deny us the right to present legal evidence into the record which might prove our point, at the same time they say we were not making progress based on the national security sensitivity of that evidence... The bean counter who made the assessment over whether the termination for default has admitted, he never even saw this part of the effort because it was a clearance level beyond his own, so how does he get to make such an assessment?"

Tap-tap, is this thing on?
 
To get back on topic....

The GD-McAir team was not able to make the engine inlet stealthy, in spite of a concerted effort. During the demonstration and validation phase there was no radar cross section specification. The team simply attempted to reduce the RCS requirement as much as possible. During the early part of its investigation, the GD-McAir team used a one-half scale model RCS without benefit of other low observable information from the government. When the engine inlet was tested on a full-scale model during the FSD phase, it proved to be deficient. The team changed the inlet to make it more efficient but because the navy did nor have the funds to investigate the low observable aspects of this design, it was not tested.

So at least during the dem/val phase there was no actual RCS specification. In contrast, CIA and USAF low observables programs historically had RCS requirements (target values) as part of the goals early in those programs.

The full-scale model of the General Dynamics-McDonnell Douglas A-12 shown mounted on the model support pylon inside the target support facility at the RAMS test site in New Mexico. The ninety-five-foot pylon extended into an underground silo that cannot be seen in this photograph. The divided roof above the model can be rolled open so the model can be raised on the pylon for testing. Note that the model did not have actual panels or doors; the gaps were radar reflectors.

To properly measure a target (aircraft) on an RCS range the "noise floor" has to be -20dbsm or lower than the target. For example, to properly measure an aircraft expected to have an RCS of -30dbsm, the noise floor of the range has to be -50dbsm. During the XST program the RCS ranges had to be improved significantly to properly measure the XST models.

Here, with the A-12 full scale model at RATSCAT a cylindrical pole was used. If the A-12 was indeed "VLO" they would have been measuring the signature of the pole, not the A-12! A cylindrical pole has a much higher RCS than the poles used for VLO aircraft such as the XST.

The use of a cylindrical pole strongly suggests the RCS of the A-12 was expected to be.... not very low.
 
So at least during the dem/val phase there was no actual RCS specification. In contrast, CIA and USAF low observables programs historically had RCS requirements (target values) as part of the goals early in those programs.
Do you have any idea how the A-12 contractors were actually incentivised to reduce RCS? e.g. via specification to include certain RCS reducing features (not very good at consistently driving down RCS) or e.g. or via a measure and declare at the end with bonus fees for achieving a cerrain level?

If its not in the spec then why do a bunch of work on it?
 
Do you have any idea how the A-12 contractors were actually incentivised to reduce RCS? e.g. via specification to include certain RCS reducing features (not very good at consistently driving down RCS) or e.g. or via a measure and declare at the end with bonus fees for achieving a cerrain level?

If its not in the spec then why do a bunch of work on it?
My understanding was that Lehman tried to crib kill the program based on combination of his own ignorance and genuinely low level of advancement of the program. Have Blue first flew in 1977. Senior Trend in 1982.

'Real Change' (RIMA = Retirement In Mass Of Admirals) often takes 15+ years to develop sufficient inertia, by which time, of course, any underlying technology leverage has long since lost relevance. And of course there is also The Little Kid modifier of the Saltwater Air Force not wanting to have anything to do with the True Blue Danger Rangers.

See: NATF.

Someone got a look at real data and, out of envy or greed (we were spending ENORMOUS amounts of money on the Stealth Revolution at that time with four active airframe programs and at least two missiles...) and someone high in the rarefied air of Flag Country said: "Building 512, you need to do this..." and Lehman's preference to wait until after the USAF got done doing the expensive bear trap finding of the F-117 and especially ATF programs, instead got overruled, in 1984.

Except that the Navy has to pay for these sideways floating skyscrapers called carriers and all their ladies in waiting so, as usual, they tried to cheapify it. First doing an RFI which became a full-blown Concept Formulation and then a Concept Development effort, wherein their Christmas List of desired features just kept getting longer and longer, with no money to show for it.

CF/CD became like the nervous waiter with the important customer who has run up their fancy-dinner tab well into the thousands and is 'embarrased to ask when you plan to pay for this'. And because the program was CSAR, (deny the compartment, deny the program to anyone not on the read-in list for each as both an inwards and outwards block info flow), the Navy was able to keep funding this abortion with small incentive fees, equivalent to the modern SBIR/STTR seed money effort.

'At least that's the story'. Though nobody appears willing to explain why, up until 1986, the ATF was white world enough to have public press briefings and they were spending a LOT more money on that program through genuing (AFTI), lab+range test work.

Now, without a written MENS/COEA brief as Mission Elements Needs and Cost And Operational Effectiveness Analysis collation from these CF/CD efforts, the plunge into DemVal was just more of the same, on a larger scale. This was technically illegal as hell as the JRMB and later DSARC exist solely to prevent Anti-Deficiency Act shenanigans on someone's wild ass pet project (X-29 anyone?) so it's not like the DFAR wasn't already in place to prevent overcommitment without a logical necessary vs. nice to have features verification process to narrow down the engineers sandbox from football stadium to Olympic Swimming Pool to King Sized Bed. levels of risk.

And again, if you believe the official story, this was all avoided solely because CSAR removed much of the high-risk/high payoff entry level determinations of 'do we need it and how much will it cost compared to other solutions' sanity checking.

IMO, this is where the cover story and the actual program intent began to mix and merge because, again, what nobody is asking is why the ATA started silent with barely a reference to it's existence, in a world where everyone had ten different concept artwork representations from the majors. Including some which were remarkably accurate in planform shape, if only for the top 20% of the airframe (F-22, she be a thicc gurl).

The truth likely comes closer to being 'We really needed a penetrating ISR platform and the numbers were actually vastly greater than for the A-12 550+ mission radius as an A-6 program and so, rather than have to explain this away in a MENS/COEA, we simply smothered everything and didn't let them know what they didn't need to, which was that we were building a new gatherer for the Klingons...'

Again, the Defense Federal Acquistion Regulations made all of this HIGHLY illegal but, just like the slush funds which are powering Ukraine with 'Oops, another 300 million in couch-change', budget aberrances, for the Black World, it wasn't an issue. They likely funded, completely, the CF/CD stage as well (Stevenson just didn't have access to that no-auditable budget documentation to prove it).

Today, MENS/COEA is JORD as Joint Operational Requirements Document and is an In Stone mandatory condition for even BW projects, largely because of the wretched lying rat bastards outcome of the 20 year litigation that was the A-12.

Supposedly. If it's not another slush fund to pay for an operational ISR platform.

Like this-

View: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/wrt5_wpfEpU


By the time came, around 1988, to switch from DemVal to FSED (Full Scale Engineering Development), as the runup to flight level hardware and FINALLY a fully funded budget authorization, the requirements document was actually written.

Now Quellish may say something like "Aha! I told you! Too late for the initial RATSCAT work..." but you see, there is something squirrely in his statement in that Ben Rich would not be able to give a numeric range EITHER for true RCS or 'a model' if there were no numbers for either.

And I seriously doubt if he would jeopardize his professional reputation saying he turned a B-36 into merely a T-38 sized RCS as proof of 'Well it worked when we were done, I can't say what they did after...' which would be his only defense.

By that point, major RCS work on the Senior Trend effort was likely 10-12 years completed. And so, the idea that RATSCAT couldn't measure 'truly Low Observable' designs is equally obnoxious in its assumed credulity.

The F-117 achieved IOC by 1983 and was admitted, publicly, by 1988.

>
When was the F-117 in service?


The aircraft achieved initial operational capability in 1983 but was kept under the strictest of secrecy for many years. It wasn't until 1988 that the program was publicly acknowledged, and not until 1990 that it made its first formal public appearance. By this time, the aircraft had been operational for seven years.
>


So, are you saying that the F-117 was also built using 'inferior pole modeling' when the USAF has been well known for preferring analytical models to simulate complex RF environments 'since forever' (Hopeless Diamond, at least)??

It just doesn't line up, especially since, as late as 1990, the USAF was still lined up to procure the A-12 ATA, just not until after they had finished ATF procurement, around 1998.

This led to a major bridging funding problem, yet, given that the USN total of 620 aircraft (divided by 14 carriers = 42 aircraft per deck, i.e. a complete divestment of the 'light attack' Hornet) was still a quite large program commitment. If you take that total deck number down to 12, you can gain massive improvements in fleet size, scaling.

What was perhaps more critical was the failure to fund the totality of the program's operational/support costs which is the excuse DefSec Cheney 'they couldn't give me any hard numbers on how much this thing would cost!' used to cancel.

But the entire bill (triple the 'Christmas Party' procurement predictions of the 1988 Chicago Times article of 142 million/airframe), if you triple the procurement costs, is still 88 billion X 3 = 264 billion dollars for total life cycle. i.e. MASSIVELY less than the combined costs of the F/A-18E/F and F-35 JSF.

Now read what the period GAO/NSIAD statement says:

>
DoD: Partially Conour. -- The finding appears to imply that the Navy has not recognized or reported all A-12 program costs or cost growth. The June 1990 A-12 Selected Acquisition Report incorporates cost impacts identified within the GAO report that were quantifiable at the time the Selected Acquisition Report was prepared. In addition, A-12 acquisition related costs will be incorporated as they are identified. -- The statement regarding competition is correct, except that elimination of airframe/engine competition and deferral of the top 29 cost component competition to coincide with Air Force production remains viable and will be considered during the DOD A-12 Program Review. The effect of reduced competition has already been included in program cost estimates and is reflected in the June 1990 Selected Acquisition Report. The statement regarding increased Navy costs is correct except that nonrecurring tooling requirements is the responsibility of the Service causing the increase and, therefore, will not be split 50/50. The cost increase to the Navy is primarily related to having to procure more aircraft earlier in the program without the increased quantity and learning curve benefits the earlier Air Force production program would have provided. -- The statement regarding the general effect of inflation is correct. The specific $11.5 million increase due to inflation effects between FY 1968 and FY 1989 cannot, however, be substantiated. * l l * l RECONMENDATIONB 0 RECOMMENDATION2 The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Navy update the A-12 program requirements and cost estimates, and periodically provide the Congress with the latest information needed to make decisions related to A-12 procurement. (p. lo/GAO Draft Report) -2 Conour. The recommendation is, however, essentially moot. While initially considered a highly sensitive classified program, the A-12 has been reported as a special access Selected Acquisition Report since 1988, in compliance with section 127 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 00-09. The June 1990 Selected Acquisition Report incorporates all cost impacts identified within the GAO report that were quantifiable at that time. The DOD is currently Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-91-98 Navy’s A-12 Avenger Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense Now on p 8 Now on p 8 Now on p 9 w reviewing the A-12 program and the outcome will serve as the basis for new baseline requirements and cost estimates to be reported in the December 31, 1990 Selected Acquisition Report. The Deputy Director, Acquisition Policy and Program Integration (Cost Management) is responsible for monitoring compliance. -ION 2: The GAO recommended that, in updating the A-12 requirements and cost information, the Secretary of the Navy consider the possibility of further reductions in the number of aircraft carriers--from the 14 currently in the fleet to 12 or fewer. (p. lo/GAO Draft Report) QpD R-l Nonconcur. First of all, force level decisions (such as suggested in this recommendation) are made at the DOD level and proposed to the Congress in the President's budget. Second, the Secretary already determined, during his Major Aircraft Review, that 620 A-12 aircraft would be required for 12 deployable carriers. -3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Navy also consider the possibility of using fewer that 20 A-12s in each air wing, given the increased A-12 capability, survivability, maintainability, and reliability over the A-6Es-- and the planned FY 1994 transfer of the refueling mission to the S-3 aircraft. (p. lo/GAO Draft Report) DoD: Partially conour:. The Secretary of the Navy is conducting a Defense Planning Resources Board-directed study to consider changes from the Roosevelt Air Wing configuration (20 A-12s), but not for the reasons suggested in the recommendation. The air wing mix is based on optimizing the fighting potential of the carrier battle group and factors being considered include threat, affordability, aircraft missions, warfighting requirements, and air wing composition. As discussed in the DOD response to Finding 8, the refueling mission cannot be transferred completely to the S-3.
>


The total program numbers for maintenance and acquisition should be known, since 1988, when the CSAR restrictions on a black world program ceased, as FSED began.

And the inability to predict _from that point to end of program_, is based on a signature value which the USAF apparently agreed with enough to be willing to sign on for 400 jets, as late as December 1990, just before cancellation.

With 1,000 jets, you are now greater than the programmed buy of 750 aircraft. And yet the two companies suddenly are backing away from the initial contract requirement of dual-competed percentages of yearly production through the Tulsa, Oklahoma, FACO facility.

None of which makes sense, unless the program is not what it seems to be and the 'USAF side' is in fact the CIA side, with independent, still highly classified, operations account numbers for a highly specific inventory.

If that 50-100 tail number inventory was 'all she wrote' (or ever intended to) on the classified program, then it suddenly makes sense that the contractors were not willing to divide and compete their percentage segments on a ONE THOUSAND AIRFRAME BUY.

Even as it starts to look like the Navair side of things was less incorrigible corruption and incompetence, complicit with a highly dubious acquisition malpractice event and more like a Squids-Got-Screwed payback for the F-111 fiasco.

As they committed everything (A-6F and G, F-14D(R)) to getting this 1,000nm radius platform on-deck. As part of a genuine attempt to change up the way we do the Naval Airpower business.

i.e. Looking ahead to a point where the Kh-80/AS-X-19 would become the DF-17/21/26 and suddenly, Carriers, couldn't even approach, let alone break into the littoral verge.

And for their efforts got stuck with a failed OPEVAL Super Hornet with 363nm radius and an F-35 which, on a good day, might make 700nm (both bombs, I tell'ya!).

Lies Within Lies...
 
There seems to be some confusion regarding some of my previous posts. Allow me to clarify.

1. Lockheed improved the quality of the GD full scale model. They did not improve the RCS of the model or A-12 design.

2. The XST and other VLO aircraft were measured on VLO poles. The A-12 was not. The A-12 was not a VLO design.

there is something squirrely in his statement in that Ben Rich would not be able to give a numeric range EITHER for true RCS or 'a model' if there were no numbers for either.

As I stated in my previous post here:

The GD full scale model did not fit together well. It also used radar reflectors as substitutes for panel gaps.

Lockheed assisted GD with their *model*. The quality and fidelity of the model was improved. Lockheed did nothing to improve the RCS of the design or the model.


By that point, major RCS work on the Senior Trend effort was likely 10-12 years completed. And so, the idea that RATSCAT couldn't measure 'truly Low Observable' designs is equally obnoxious in its assumed credulity.

As I stated in my previous posts


and


During the XST program the RATSCAT range was improved to measure VLO targets. This was necessary, the XST models were below the noise floor at RATSCAT. This included developing a new VLO pole for testing VLO targets. At no time did I say that RATSCAT was not capabile of measuring VLO targets after the XST program.

The A-12 full scale model was tested at RAMS. It was not tested using a VLO pole, it was mounted to a conventional cylindrical pole. This pole was inadequate for measuring VLO targets.

The A-12 was not a VLO design. If it was, they would have used the proper pole to measure it.
 
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There seems to be some confusion regarding some of my previous posts. Allow me to clarify.

1. Lockheed improved the quality of the GD full scale model. They did not improve the RCS of the model or A-12 design.

2. The XST and other VLO aircraft were measured on VLO poles. The A-12 was not. The A-12 was not a VLO design.



As I stated in my previous post here:

The GD full scale model did not fit together well. It also used radar reflectors as substitutes for panel gaps.

Lockheed assisted GD with their *model*. The quality and fidelity of the model was improved. Lockheed did nothing to improve the RCS of the design or the model.




As I stated in my previous posts


and


During the XST program the RATSCAT range was improved to measure VLO targets. This was necessary, the XST models were below the noise floor at RATSCAT. This included developing a new VLO pole for testing VLO targets. At no time did I say that RATSCAT was not capabile of measuring VLO targets after the XST program.

The A-12 full scale model was tested at RAMS. It was not tested using a VLO pole, it was mounted to a conventional cylindrical pole. This pole was inadequate for measuring VLO targets.

The A-12 was not a VLO design. If it was, they would have used the proper pole to measure it.

I don't believe you.

To say what you just did is to argue that Ben Rich made improvements to an RCS pole model for the heck of it. That ADP engaged in make-work, knowing it was pointless.

That the nature of those improvements were cosmetic and he was 'damn proud of it'.

Sufficient to assign a 3-9 or 3-11 improvement to the RCS of the model. Not how well it was built. But the base value. According to the Stevenson book.

And that the ATA itself was designed around a flying wing with full internalization of munitions and obvious 'stealth features' (IRST, Contrail Suppression, Thermal Sensitive RCS controlled exhaust, inlet devices, IR mixing plenum...). Again, all for the heck of it.

With the exhaust in particular being a detail design element of the Skunkworks R&D people. Which means they too _had to know_, the actual, functional, RCS value to meet the spec within material and design compromise datums.

A wing is a LOUSY choice for a carrier airframe, and a worse one for a lolo interdictor, unless it buys you stealth.

That the ATA was stated, AT THE TIME, to be the most highly stealthy of the known trio of ATA/ATB/ATF, stealth emphasized, aircraft. And the USN believed their own hype so much that they suppressed what must have been a huge number of reports stating otherwise.

That neither Captain Elberfeld nor Admiral Calvert went to the stockade for a profound betrayal of their oaths to the country when the falsehood was proven, after Elberfeld's little safe full of hidden documents came to light. While Peg Olsen did, for the weight issue, when she was not even an engineer but a lawyer.

Is Farcical.

Because it means report writers/whistleblowers within both Federal and Corporate engineering oversight committees (JRMB) were also somehow suppressed/compromised/collectively stupid. And there were a lot of them.

Further, your view does not agree with the reality that Navair knew enough to promise the two contractors aid in getting the stealth right if they would just 'get the weight out' of the airframe. But not enough to know that the airframe could not be saved, based on the inlet compromise, the wing LE/TE alignments, and the exhaust compromise.

Even though they had access to USAF briefings and the period premiere stealth contractor for tactical aircraft, on the payroll.

And that they AND THE AIR FORCE continued anyway, with an emergency, compartmentalized, effort to correct this flaw which was so secret that it could not be introduced to the litigative record, lest it compromise existing stealth technologies, 20 years after the man responsible for Navy VLO had said there was absolutely nothing to be gained from the ATA effort.

Meaning that not only they but the contractors knew about the 'stealth flaws' and NEITHER SIDE did or said anything, with an order for up to 1,000 aircraft at risk.

Right up through the multi-tier trial and appeal process, all the way to SCOTUS.

Which involved 2 billion dollars in default fees and would end up costing both companies their defense aerospace divisions and a serious amount of post-litigative, post divestment, freebies, as settlement.

Only to turn around and claim the exact opposite, in the final appeals.

All because they had some miraculous power over the lawyers that left them dumb and mute to the point of being unable to make a simple argument: "You cannot deny us the right to introduce evidence that would acquit us at the same time you use the absence of that evidence to hang us!"

That is Constitutionally protected, inherent to Due Process sir. You cannot override it with NatSec declarations because the NatSec rule is compromised by the institutional corruption of a lack of acknowledged need vs. a lack of proof of progress in meeting the need. If the A-12 is non-stealthy from the start and everyone knew it, then the development team cannot be held accountable for not meeting an unstated spec.

If there is no stealth to be compromised, there is no need to contain the secrets of non-existent stealth! If 'the stealth' was to be GFE, courtesy of the Navy, then it is entirely up to them to supply it as proof of that need, before, during and after the program, with documented MENS/COEA.

There is not a corporate lawyer on the planet who, having won the majority of cases and appeals in the A-12 litigation, would allow his own and his law firm's reputation to be destroyed for want of having had the means to win for his corporate clients and not employed them. As that would, itself, be actionable.

They would quit first.

Finally, none of what is being argued matters in the face of light grey painted jets with a wing sweep too great and lack of TE saw-tooth notches too obvious to be 'A B-2 returning to Whiteman...'.

That's physical evidence of a flying wing that is not a B-2 but matches the outline of the A-12, almost perfectly, more than 20 years after the ATA effort was nominally cancelled using abstruse contractual language (by Cheney's own crew, not Navair) which doomed the R&D phase but _not the program_, in a way that would make it easy to halt all work on the naval variant while transferring existing hardware to another, classified, spook, mission.

It is NOT a digital photography artifact. Because the LE sweep and the color modification flatly do not support the Spirit theory. And the same jet has been seen elsewhere.

You do not answer my questions, you talk around them. When I catch you in an absurdity of dates and places, you change the narrative some more. You could be the ghost of Denys Overholser himself, 'Combat Survivability Award for Technical Achievement' winner and NDIA honorary Jason and I still _would not believe you_.
 
I don't believe you.

To say what you just did is to argue that Ben Rich made improvements to an RCS pole model for the heck of it. That ADP engaged in make-work, knowing it was pointless.

It is funny that you say that! The Skunk Works was literally engaged in "make-work" on this program.

Again, quoting from Stevenson:

In exchange for its efforts, Lockheed wanted to act as a manufacturing subcontractor for 15 percent of the A-12. As Ben Rich said, "I needed the construction. I needed shop work. That's where you make money, keep the people in the shop working. And I was getting . .. 15 percent by weight.... So they gave me all the trailing edges and the hot section of the engine."

Sufficient to assign a 3-9 or 3-11 improvement to the RCS of the model. Not how well it was built. But the base value. According to the Stevenson book.

Again, quoting the same paragraph from Stevenson that I have previously:

There were two finalists, but before the final decision [was made] we took their model to the Skunk Works, rebuilt it, tested it at RATSCAT, and raised them from a factor of 2 to a factor of 9... And they had a good design, believe me it was a good design. But it was not stealthy.... So we then got it, and sure as hell they won.23

I find it curious that these statements are being continuously referenced in error, even when the source text is provided.

Lockheed improved the model. Not the A-12 design. Not 3-9 improvement, or a 3-11 improvement. A 2 to 9 improvement on the model.

That the ATA was stated, AT THE TIME, to be the most highly stealthy of the known trio of ATA/ATB/ATF, stealth emphasized, aircraft. And the USN believed their own hype so much that they suppressed what must have been a huge number of reports stating otherwise.

Do you have a reference for that? Because that is not my recollection. I do not recall any statements to the effect that the A-12 was the "most highly stealthy".
 
You do not answer my questions, you talk around them. When I catch you in an absurdity of dates and places, you change the narrative some more. You could be the ghost of Denys Overholser himself, 'Combat Survivability Award for Technical Achievement' winner and NDIA honorary Jason and I still _would not believe you_.
Then this discussion is clearly at an end. You dismiss any evidence that doesn't fit your pet hypothesis.

You've presented your opinion. Thanks. Its certainly a novel interpretation of the known facts.
 
@LEG What evidence would you accept that the A-12 ATA has the RCS of a barn door?

I don't think it comes to that. Because I don't believe that the actual airframe which was the intended outcome from the ATA program, even if only as a monetary bluff to drive the Soviets to bankruptcy, was necessarily the same exact shape.

Though I stand by my statement that the jets which have been photographed are not B-2s but much closer to the A-12 in appearance and either tested something unrelated to VLO or operated within its rules in an non-conformist fashion, which ignores the 'as we know it' definition of how stealth works, today.

The nature of the ATA, due to its all-composite airframe materials and 'outside->in' construction condition, may well have supported deep RAS structures which were the structural equivalent of the SR-71 composite wedges. Only several generations more (active cancellation) advanced. We have rumors of this on the B-2, with its ZSR-2, for instance and it's presence, as the so called 'wormhole generator' would do much to explain how the entirely conventional, protuberance festooned, F-35 is, in fact, both more stealthy and less so, than the F-22 with its optimized shaping.

Depth of airframe, from a relatively low edge-scatter straight LE/TE, to insert these active cancellation systems, along with the structural robustness required of a naval landing airframe in general, could then explain the geometry choices without necessarily invalidating the shape.

As a serving F-35 pilot once put it to me: 'On any given day, I can go out to the flightline and my jet will have exactly the same signature performance as a NATO, RAAF, JASDF or IDFAF ones.' Even though all of those jets are regionally specific according to their 'Mission Data Files'.'

This is because he doesn't fly training missions with the WHG turned on. That is a separate, Go To War button which requires hyper accurate (to the serial number) thumbprint verifications of the radars in those theaters.

If this is the case, and if the ATA began this process (meaning much of the ado in the _The Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding_ is not just wrong but completely out of step with what the ATA active cancellation pioneered) we may never be able to see it from just a visual inspection.

Which also lines up with what several industry experts have publicly said as 'RCS cannot be guestimated by eye'. Likely meaning shape-shape-shape-and-materials is a lie based on other systems performing the majority of the stealth role. Or, at best a way to simplify dealing with some fairly fragile, non-load bearing or aspect dependent RAM/RAS.

Here, it must be further stated that the ATA, had it flown as a navalized A-12, has the same operational problem as the F-35 and it's 'baked right in' RAM potential to degrade with oxidization to obscenely 'rusty' streaks, down the fuselage and spine.

So anything that explains why The Wing design itself was considered operationally suitable for a naval attacker could be useful as an explanation for the actual approach the USN used, since it's highly unlikely (galvanic cell) that it used period equivalent techniques to the narrow band 'linoleum over aluminum' on the F-117.

(And yes, it was VLO. See the first page of this thread: 'With heavy, some consider too much, emphasis on stealth'. Of course, I no longer have access to 40 year old Aviation Week articles which showed advertisements much like the B-21 'under cover' ones. All, denoting ATA as the best/most secret of the VLO trio being worked on...)

As for the A-12 (not the ATA umbrella program) itself, here is what I would like to know:

1. What exactly characterized the primary shortcoming of the inlet. Was it the sidewall, or the devices or not enough serpentine or perhaps something related to the mass flow enhancer VG doors, like those of the Eurofighter, which 'broke the envelope' of the stealth? If you are running an active loaded, 180` polarized phase, _surface wave jammer_, right along or under the skin; having few or no mechanically articulated edge breaks could be important.

As indeed the 'panel surrounds' on the Stealths we know all seem to indicate, to me, a design goal to establish a separate, RF isolated zone around those few areas which ARE routinely accessed or gapped. Like the DAS/ELS/Ladder on the F-35 nose and the large, seemingly dialectric, panel insert which literally changes the shape of the DSI behind them.

2. What was the solution, specifically, deriving from the initial Skunk Works assistance that caused a credible increase the RCS model reaching a verified signature threshold such that it caused Ben Rich to toot his own horn as having radically improved the model's RCS? Not it's fidelity for measurement, but it's _phsyical_ Radar Cross Section.
Anything else, on a VLO platform, is ridiculous, just on the assumption that you would be using a non-VLO pole to model a VLO object.

Did this initial solution involve multiple gross-silhouette changes to the airframe (fat/skinny wing) itself or only to the inlets themselves as a signature hotspot within it? Knowing will dictate at what point signature became a primary driver on development, before or after FSED. As well as what coming or going threat bands and emitters were considered important.

3. What was the function of the 'second pass' approach of the Stealth Bra? And did it also radically alter the airframe shape beyond the aforementioned sectional changes?

4. What was the purpose of the A/X technology recovery process and did it or did it not involve a wing restart as part of a new airframe? Again, we're looking to delineate what early-mid-late-followon design criterion and whether the airframe itself became more or less stealthy as it flowed through design.

As an adjunct to this, why were gentlemen associated with that effort, seen openly wearing a flying wing set of cuff links which marked their secret-decoder-ring affiliation (natsec violation) and why did those cuff links show a cranked arrow wing with outboard panel spans of lesser sweep (similar to the X-47B) yet still having a straight trailing edge?

If the VLO itself was a key issue and this is a serious flaw in conventional stealth engineeering, something is truly Funk And Wagnel as a function of carry over of a poor design feature into a cleansheet approach.

5. Politically and litigatively, what was the purpose of hiding the stealth progress made within the program, while using a bean counter approach to determine whether milestone payments had been correctly made, that would have required opening up secure compartments to expose payment levels. It is normally the contractual party making the payments responsibility to determine if those payments are deserved within the framework of a well defined goals and program timeline (milestone) OVERSIGHT of the effort. Typically through sub-leaders who have access to multiple related compartments while still not having global view of the intended, real world, application.

Not once has anyone said there was no ATA contract. Only that the MENS/COEA was not properly done. We know that said contract included weight, speed, SEROC, and radius numbers, so it likely included RCS. From the very start. Did the RCS requirement become more demanding, remain the same or slip? What were the ameliorating solutions sought to bring it up to standard and from what date in the program?

If no progress had been made, to render default of contract a valid conclusion, why was the secondary RCS cleanup effort deemed too hush-hush not to revealed in a public document due to its effects on national security? If nothing was going to save that airframe then revealing that 'attempts had been made' would at least remove the doubt that the DOJ was too ignorant to know if program failure, _for signature_ was a valid excuse.

Assuming a program which is not VLO by nature but only of reduced observables quantification, the 'cannot become stealthy' issue seems to be logical, within the openly source available data on the subject.

The F/A-18E/F does not become <.001m2 by the addition of cuffs on the sway braces and more RAM treatments on the pylon noses and inlet lips. Though it should be noted that it has less RAM (by several hundred pounds) and better signature management than the Lot-17 onwards F/A-18C which also was so-treated. So underlying structural issues may still be in-play.

It is the difference between baseline and still too high values that matter here, not necessarily what the actual mandated number needed to be.

Legally, the fact remains, that the A-12 airframe was cancelled and then the ATA program shut down, separately, based on an assessment that it was not meeting its progress payment milestones and signature was one of those characteristics, only for those characteristics to be later determined 'unknown' due to a lack of access by the forensic accountant to the CSAR RCS reduction effort.

Again, not because the KPP wasn't known, but because he didn't have access to that compartment.

As such, his analysis as a means to determine validity of cancellation could not be honestly certified as a basis of a legitimate OSD issuance of the termination notification. Since, CLEARLY, the accountant, at a fundamental, explainable, non-classified, level _did not even have access to the full program expenditures_ with which to make the 'accounts payable/receivable' analytics decision!

And again, if it was this 'stealth bra' redesign which was so critical to NatSec that revealing the nature of those improvements, as a KPP delineated contract specification (there was one, after the 1988 FSED transition, newly implemented DFARs mandated it). Then it stands to reason that a considerable effort as financial expenditures were made, effecting his assessement. If nothing else, this would have required additional pole modeling, on an instrumented range, which is expensive to schedule, on the fly.

And/or computer simulated RF mapping of a more complex IADS/ADGE network. The latter being a USAF/Rome specific specialty. Indicating that the 'USAF won't share' problem, really wasn't one.

In turn this should tell us whether or not the ATA, as delineated by CF/CD/DemVal was really different from the A-12 FSED.

I don't believe they were, for much the same reason as the total lack of a dedicated MDF lab for doing whatever the ASQ-239 _actually achieves_ mattered when outside forces said 'Don't worry about it, we'll handle it...' determining if the F-35 was ready to exit IOT&E and enter IOC workup as precondition to full rate production.

If they like the program, they will pencil whip. If they are looking for excuses, nothing will save you from their sabotage.

IMO, this active malfeasance also has a secondary the genuine deception/misdirection intent in that it masks ultimate question of 'what is Very Low Observables?' in general and the ATA programs 'don't worry, we'll get you the stealth, you just get the weight out...' specific source condition.

The Stealth is not coming from within the Navy and maybe not even from within the USAF/Northrop/Lockheed technologies complex on the other two stealth-centric platforms. It is brought in, as GFE, from an outside supplier.

And that source must always remain securely masked (LOCLOEXCOM) so as to minimize espionage penetration vulnerabilities. Maybe the Space Aliens are just shy.

Either way, with respectful apologies to Quellish for an unintended insult, I do not trust strangers on the Internet to have all the data or to reveal it, honestly, as potential minder/gate keeper illusionists, specifically assigned to sites like this one.

Contrary to the meme, 'those who know', will often say things that are deliberately misinformative. And only by treating it like a game of Go, blocking off sections of the lies within lies, on a multi-front campaign to clear away the smoke and mirrors, can we narrow down the open spaces through which the actual truth can be visible, in pieces, and thus tied together, into a coherent whole.

Tell me why they lied, either from an engineering or political perspective, and maybe we can get somewhere. As presented, none of what they say passes the syncretic smell test.
 
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How, as a serving F-35 pilot once put it to me: 'On any given day, I can go out to the flightline and my jet will have exactly the same signature performance as a NATO or RAAF or JASDF or IDFAF ones.' Even though all of those jets are regionally specific according to their 'Mission Data Files'.

This is because he doesn't fly training missions with the WHG turned on.
Without wanting to interrupt the wider methelayted spirits drinking going on here, this bit is very easily explainable.

All F-35s are delivered to a LO specification, not regionally different. The maintenance program tells you what to do to keep that spec red or green. If it is green, you have a spec jet. All nations will (it is assumed) follow the maintenance program (and use defined/provided maintenance products) to keep jets green hence there are no nominal differences in terms of passive signature.

This is entirely irrelevent to mission data or other software differences between nations.
 
With respect to carrier-landing suitability, "Everyone knows this (Gutless, Skyray) is weird and still the Navy chose a flying wing configuration", I for one know that both the F7U (aka "gutless Cutlass") and F4D Skyray had unique but acceptable carrier-landing handling qualities, as opposed to the F8U Crusader (truly challenging) for example. Launches were routine and virtually carefree, except when fired off on a hydraulic catapult, the harder acceleration and relationship of the F4D's catapult hooks relative to the cg resulted in a bumpy and disorientating ride during the shot. By contrast, for example the F4H pilot needed to pay close attention to stick position during and after the catapult stroke to avoid overrotation off the bow. And, by the way, the Cutlass was not entirely "gutlass" even when repurposed as a fleet air defense fighter (F7U-3M) and loaded down with four Sparrows and additional avionics/internal fuel without the benefit of additional thrust.
 
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With respect to carrier-landing suitability, "Everyone knows this (Gutless, Skyray) is weird and still the Navy chose a flying wing configuration", I for one know that both the F7U (aka "gutless Cutlass") and F4D Skyray had unique but acceptable carrier-landing handling qualities, as opposed to the F8U Crusader (truly challenging) for example. Launches were routine and virtually carefree, except when fired off on a hydraulic catapult, the harder acceleration and relationship of the F4D's catapult hooks relative to the cg resulted in a bumpy and disorientating ride during the shot. By contrast, for example the F4H pilot needed to pay close attention to stick position during and after the catapult stroke to avoid overrotation off the bow. And, by the way, the Cutlass was not entirely "gutlass" even when repurposed as a fleet air defense fighter (F7U-3M) and loaded down with four Sparrows and additional avionics/internal fuel without the benefit of additional thrust.
As I understand it, the problem with the Cutlass was the first-ever afterburner and more specifically the convergent-divergent nozzles. They could change position too fast, dump the engine pressure and blow out the afterburner (and sometimes the engine proper!!!). Now you suddenly have low thrust and maybe need to do an emergency air restart... while in the middle of trying to land your plane.

And I'm not seeing any good options to replace those J46s with. J85s are seriously underpowered at MIL (3,000lbs instead of 4,000lbs thrust).
 
GD and McAir went with one of the simplest shapes from a structural design point of view, the delta wing (anyone correct me if I am wrong). GD and McAir had NO experience in the area of LO and composites. Our ATA (Northrop) design and I am going to state this again in regards Northrop LO, this is why the B-21 has the original ATB shaping, don't mess with success. Northrop lineage: ATB, B-2 (Sawtooth TE, low alt), ATA, X-47A, X-47B, B-21 (all in the wing family), can't include Tacit Blue and YF/F-23, different class. Not unless anyone had worked in the bowels of the USG regarding these programs, we only know and get so much regarding what the services will share or gets leaked.

The ATA/A-12 was just a messed-up program from the beginning with bad program management and excessive requirements scope creep. Additionally, there was A-X and A/F-X. Northrop and Lockheed were approached to possibly help bail out the A-12 for A-X, I know Northrop wanted nothing to due with that but we did have a nice A/F-X design with the F-23 v-tails though. Also, a flying wing will work fine on a carrier.
 
The Stealth is not coming from within the Navy and maybe not even from within the USAF/Northrop/Lockheed technologies complex on the other two stealth-centric platforms. It is sourced from an outside supplier.

And that source must always remain securely masked (LOCLOEXCOM) so as to minimize espionage penetration vulnerabilities. Maybe the Space Aliens are just shy.
7bebd458-dfe9-4c35-beee-da10caaaa99b.jpg
 
The Stealth is not coming from within the Navy and maybe not even from within the USAF/Northrop/Lockheed technologies complex on the other two stealth-centric platforms. It is sourced from an outside supplier. And that source must always remain securely masked (LOCLOEXCOM) so as to minimize espionage penetration vulnerabilities. Maybe the Space Aliens are just shy.
<frustrationmode>

Oh forchristssake. The more you talk, the less I believe. More of this, and you will be admitted to my personal IG.n.or.e SCIF (right next to the bitbucket). Enjoy.

A piece of advice: Data talks; bullshit walks. And from where I sit, your heels done wore out.

</frustrationmode>
 
As I understand it, the problem with the Cutlass was the first-ever afterburner and more specifically the convergent-divergent nozzles. They could change position too fast, dump the engine pressure and blow out the afterburner (and sometimes the engine proper!!!). Now you suddenly have low thrust and maybe need to do an emergency air restart... while in the middle of trying to land your plane.

And I'm not seeing any good options to replace those J46s with. J85s are seriously underpowered at MIL (3,000lbs instead of 4,000lbs thrust).
Your understanding is incorrect. The Cutlass was not the first to have an afterburner. At least one very early, non-afterburning engine had a variable nozzle to maximize thrust. All afterburning engines have to have a variable nozzle. "Blow out" sometimes occurs but generally not from the nozzle opening too fast or too slow but from afterburner use at high altitude. The main afterburner problem besides a failure to light off, actually causing a loss of thrust, is the nozzle not opening or not opening quickly enough when the afterburner fuel is ignited, resulting in an over pressure causing a compressor stall, so opening quickly (and also closing quickly to avoid an additional loss of thrust when the afterburner was cut off) was desirable. Another widely held misunderstanding is that the J46's throttle response was slow. In fact, one of its features was that it was operating at 100% rpm above about 67% of military thrust so response to throttle movement on approach was excellent (no need to overcome the inertia of the compressor/turbine with throttle changes) for a jet engine at the time, its thrust being controlled by the nozzle closing and opening: at military power, the nozzle was completely closed.
 
Lockheed did not and the USAF was not buying the F-104C in any kind of numbers because it was not practical as a nuclear delivery system or a SAGE guided interceptor with potential AIM-26A or AIR-2 weapons onboard. At least not compared to what we already had as alternatives.

It was purely a Sidewinder, daytime, CAVU, fighter, based on what USAF pilots said was absent from their F-86, over Korea.

Which was nothing like what was needed for air combat, in the missile age. And so it stagnated after a token purchase, with TAC. And was corruptly sold to as a MAP fighter, something it was not, in Europe and Japan. So badly so that there were multiple felony indictments and convictions for the undertable dagger and purse job which was done foisting it off on airforces whose weather and experience were not compatible with the Zipper's absolutely unforgiving handling.

The Navy got no closer, with either the F-8 or Ford, both of which could do a reasonable imitation of a daytime strike fighter but were not self-escorting and could not work at night.

And then, as work stagnated with the Century Series, someone at McDonnell Douglas looked at an attack airframe that had just been rejected for the second time and said: 'How about this...' and pulled out the Big Book Of Aerodynamic Solutions to kluge a fighter out of it which, good grief, worked.

Because it was big enough for two of the biggest engines in the business, had a big nose and a lot of gas, plus a unique way of mounting AIM-7s that left the wings free for gas and sidewinders and bombs.

And so the F-4H/F-110 brought us the multirole Phantom.
I feel obliged to correct this with respect to the F4H genesis. Neither the F8U (F-8) or Ford (F4D) was originally intended by the Navy to be a strike fighter, either by day or at night (that would have been the F10F Jaguar, F3H Demon, and F7U-3 Cutlass). The F8U was an air-superiority day fighter (like the F-104 but with endurance) and the F4D, an all-weather interceptor with a lack of endurance comparable to the F-104's. A McDonnell "attack airframe" was not rejected twice or at all for that matter. McDonnell had just lost the 1953 day-fighter competition that Vought won with what became the F8U. McDonnell (not yet having bought Douglas, by the way), needing follow-on production for the F3H Demon, submitted an unsolicited design study for various iterations of the F3H to BuAer as the basis for a supersonic, all-weather, general-purpose fighter program. BuAer did a "tabletop evaluation" of the twin J65/J79 variant against other unsolicited proposals it had in hand, i.e. a navalized F-100 and a J79-powered F11F, as well as the F4D-2 (to be redesignated the F5D) as a performance baseline. As a result, McDonnell got a contract for the AH, a supersonic, single-seat, general-purpose fighter armed with four 20 mm cannon and capable of delivering a Mk 7 nuclear bomb. However, OpNav had grown increasingly concerned with the Navy's lack of a Fleet Air Defense capability against Soviet jet bombers and soon decided to hijack the program, converting the AH to be a two-seat, Sparrow-armed fighter, now designated the F4H. For more, buy this monograph: https://tommythomason.com/books/McDonnell F4H-1/
 

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