Spartan/Sprint ABM and Derivatives

[Forest Green]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARx2-wRn9-Y

 

[T. A. Gardner]

They are wrong on the start date for ABM systems. The first ones were studies started in late 1945 as projects MX 794 Wizard and MX-795 Thumper. While Wizard and Thumper were just prolonged studies into ballistic missile defense, they represent the beginning of the US looking into how to do this.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

I'm curious about a couple of things I've read on this particular thread: I've tried to keep my questions concise for brevity purposes

I. Regarding the idea of ABM's being destabilizing
My assumption would be, from what I've read on this topic, that a missile shield is only destabilizing when it is actually capable of repelling nearly all or all ICBM attacks: Am I right or wrong?

Wrong. Anything that potentially prevents destruction of the ABM owner's own assets means that it will either be safe from a first strike or second, retaliatory strike. An ABM defence doesn't have to be 100% effective, in fact it doesn't have to be effective at all, however it has to be perceived as effective. Once the perception is planted and grows, the perceivers will act upon the assumption that it is effective. So, the first use imperative will grow, on both sides of a strategic balance. The owners, to destroy the potential threat that the other sides' ICBMs represent and the opponents' to ensure that while the ABM system is still being built and not yet operational, so as to prevent it from rendering it's ICBM forces obsolete.

This happened with the SDI "Star Wars" system. The US hyped it, with lots of pretty animations and drawings showing how it would destroy the nasty, incoming Soviet missiles and RVs. The Soviets fearful that their missiles would be rendered obsolete were forced to try and build their own (or more ICBMs to swamp SDI). No SDI system was built but the fear was sufficient to see the Soviets try and build the means of either matching or defeating it. The real danger was if the hawks had managed to gain power, that they would have seriously contemplated a first strike, rather than see their missiles rendered obsolete the moment the system was operational.

Remember, the Cold War was as much as about perceptions of capabilities as it was about the real capabilities themselves. Both sides often acted on faulty, flawed intel. In the US there was the "Bomber Gap", the "Missile Gap" and the "Window of Opportunity" which were used for domestic political gains. In the fUSSR there were similar scares about US capabilities, which led up the Able Archer '83 scare. The fUSSR was no more monolithic than the US and there were debates within the Politburo as to who or what should be believed, just as there were in the US. Hawks versus Doves, etc. Cold War Warriors who saw a capitalist under their beds, just as those in the US saw Communists under theirs.

I apologize about bringing back politics. There was a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article from I think 2004 that goes into the adding on effect an ABM system creates. It draws more fire down on it to make sure it’s overwhelmed. The Bulletin is very peacinik-y but they have the best detailed articles. They‘ve put their archive behind a paywall now but I think I have it somewhere printed out. If I can find it, I’ll post pics. It compares 2 nuke targeting plans against Moscow. 1 from 1968, 1 from 1989. About double the amount of warheads targeted by 1989.

I also own the BB Briggs book on strategic defense. And yeah, I think ABMs are both effective AND if not destabilizing, they further arms races. Now if your opponent can’t afford a large nuclear arsensal & you can, a small ABM system gives you some maneuvering room.

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

 

[Forest Green]

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

The more warheads you put on a single missile, the worse the effectiveness would be against a fully deployed SDI.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

The more warheads you put on a single missile, the worse the effectiveness would be against a fully deployed SDI.

The 40 (or rather 38) MIRV design wasn't to deal with SDI defences, and died when SALT II was signed. Fractionated ICBMs and SLBMs, proposed by both the US and USSR, as seen in the images below, however, were. Ironically these were all probably more practical to develop and field than the defences they were designed to defeat.

 

[zen]

Applying third stages to each RV, is inefficient and increases dead mass for the whole. In turn requiring more fuel in the first and second stages.

So either bigger missiles or less RVs

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

The more warheads you put on a single missile, the worse the effectiveness would be against a fully deployed SDI.

The point is the Soviets weren’t going to throw their hands in the air and say We Surrender. That was just one idea.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

The more warheads you put on a single missile, the worse the effectiveness would be against a fully deployed SDI.

The 40 (or rather 38) MIRV design wasn't to deal with SDI defences, and died when SALT II was signed. Fractionated ICBMs and SLBMs, proposed by both the US and USSR, as seen in the images below, however, were. Ironically these were all probably more practical to develop and field than the defences they were designed to defeat.

View attachment 685471
View attachment 685473
View attachment 685474

View attachment 685475
View attachment 685476
View attachment 685477

Would love to see those archives. I think they would’ve rolled back out the 38 warhead plan & others if SDI was ever “fully deployed“.

 

[Forest Green]

The 40 (or rather 38) MIRV design wasn't to deal with SDI defences, and died when SALT II was signed. Fractionated ICBMs and SLBMs, proposed by both the US and USSR, as seen in the images below, however, were. Ironically these were all probably more practical to develop and field than the defences they were designed to defeat.

View attachment 685471
View attachment 685473
View attachment 685474

View attachment 685475
View attachment 685476
View attachment 685477

Interesting, so basically it's like a MIRV system but for second stage onwards, multiple second stages. Of course, based on the diagram it seems the chemical lasers would still be able to hit it pre-split.

 

[Forest Green]

Would love to see those archives. I think they would’ve rolled back out the 38 warhead plan & others if SDI was ever “fully deployed“.

I know the AICBM (aka WS-120A aka BGM-75) which eventually morphed into Peacekeeper was originally supposed to carry up to 20 warheads.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

I'm curious about a couple of things I've read on this particular thread: I've tried to keep my questions concise for brevity purposes

I. Regarding the idea of ABM's being destabilizing
My assumption would be, from what I've read on this topic, that a missile shield is only destabilizing when it is actually capable of repelling nearly all or all ICBM attacks: Am I right or wrong?

Wrong. Anything that potentially prevents destruction of the ABM owner's own assets means that it will either be safe from a first strike or second, retaliatory strike. An ABM defence doesn't have to be 100% effective, in fact it doesn't have to be effective at all, however it has to be perceived as effective. Once the perception is planted and grows, the perceivers will act upon the assumption that it is effective. So, the first use imperative will grow, on both sides of a strategic balance. The owners, to destroy the potential threat that the other sides' ICBMs represent and the opponents' to ensure that while the ABM system is still being built and not yet operational, so as to prevent it from rendering it's ICBM forces obsolete.

This happened with the SDI "Star Wars" system. The US hyped it, with lots of pretty animations and drawings showing how it would destroy the nasty, incoming Soviet missiles and RVs. The Soviets fearful that their missiles would be rendered obsolete were forced to try and build their own (or more ICBMs to swamp SDI). No SDI system was built but the fear was sufficient to see the Soviets try and build the means of either matching or defeating it. The real danger was if the hawks had managed to gain power, that they would have seriously contemplated a first strike, rather than see their missiles rendered obsolete the moment the system was operational.

Remember, the Cold War was as much as about perceptions of capabilities as it was about the real capabilities themselves. Both sides often acted on faulty, flawed intel. In the US there was the "Bomber Gap", the "Missile Gap" and the "Window of Opportunity" which were used for domestic political gains. In the fUSSR there were similar scares about US capabilities, which led up the Able Archer '83 scare. The fUSSR was no more monolithic than the US and there were debates within the Politburo as to who or what should be believed, just as there were in the US. Hawks versus Doves, etc. Cold War Warriors who saw a capitalist under their beds, just as those in the US saw Communists under theirs.

I apologize about bringing back politics. There was a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article from I think 2004 that goes into the adding on effect an ABM system creates. It draws more fire down on it to make sure it’s overwhelmed. The Bulletin is very peacinik-y but they have the best detailed articles. They‘ve put their archive behind a paywall now but I think I have it somewhere printed out. If I can find it, I’ll post pics. It compares 2 nuke targeting plans against Moscow. 1 from 1968, 1 from 1989. About double the amount of warheads targeted by 1989.

I also own the BB Briggs book on strategic defense. And yeah, I think ABMs are both effective AND if not destabilizing, they further arms races. Now if your opponent can’t afford a large nuclear arsensal & you can, a small ABM system gives you some maneuvering room.

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

Found the article. Well worth the read. and, btw Sentinel & Safeguard were to protect against a Chinese ICBM attack. Not against a force the size of an all out USSR strike.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I'm curious about a couple of things I've read on this particular thread: I've tried to keep my questions concise for brevity purposes

I. Regarding the idea of ABM's being destabilizing
My assumption would be, from what I've read on this topic, that a missile shield is only destabilizing when it is actually capable of repelling nearly all or all ICBM attacks: Am I right or wrong?

Wrong. Anything that potentially prevents destruction of the ABM owner's own assets means that it will either be safe from a first strike or second, retaliatory strike. An ABM defence doesn't have to be 100% effective, in fact it doesn't have to be effective at all, however it has to be perceived as effective. Once the perception is planted and grows, the perceivers will act upon the assumption that it is effective. So, the first use imperative will grow, on both sides of a strategic balance. The owners, to destroy the potential threat that the other sides' ICBMs represent and the opponents' to ensure that while the ABM system is still being built and not yet operational, so as to prevent it from rendering it's ICBM forces obsolete.

This happened with the SDI "Star Wars" system. The US hyped it, with lots of pretty animations and drawings showing how it would destroy the nasty, incoming Soviet missiles and RVs. The Soviets fearful that their missiles would be rendered obsolete were forced to try and build their own (or more ICBMs to swamp SDI). No SDI system was built but the fear was sufficient to see the Soviets try and build the means of either matching or defeating it. The real danger was if the hawks had managed to gain power, that they would have seriously contemplated a first strike, rather than see their missiles rendered obsolete the moment the system was operational.

Remember, the Cold War was as much as about perceptions of capabilities as it was about the real capabilities themselves. Both sides often acted on faulty, flawed intel. In the US there was the "Bomber Gap", the "Missile Gap" and the "Window of Opportunity" which were used for domestic political gains. In the fUSSR there were similar scares about US capabilities, which led up the Able Archer '83 scare. The fUSSR was no more monolithic than the US and there were debates within the Politburo as to who or what should be believed, just as there were in the US. Hawks versus Doves, etc. Cold War Warriors who saw a capitalist under their beds, just as those in the US saw Communists under theirs.

I apologize about bringing back politics. There was a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article from I think 2004 that goes into the adding on effect an ABM system creates. It draws more fire down on it to make sure it’s overwhelmed. The Bulletin is very peacinik-y but they have the best detailed articles. They‘ve put their archive behind a paywall now but I think I have it somewhere printed out. If I can find it, I’ll post pics. It compares 2 nuke targeting plans against Moscow. 1 from 1968, 1 from 1989. About double the amount of warheads targeted by 1989.

I also own the BB Briggs book on strategic defense. And yeah, I think ABMs are both effective AND if not destabilizing, they further arms races. Now if your opponent can’t afford a large nuclear arsensal & you can, a small ABM system gives you some maneuvering room.

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

The "Atomic scientists" part of this shows a gross naivety about war and economics. An ABM defense system does not create a response that is more massive. Instead, it shifts how things are done.
For example, in the late 40's and early 50's the expected means of nuclear attack was by subsonic "strategic" long-range bombers. The response was developing SAM, fighter, and early warning systems that could intercept and shoot these down before they reached their targets.
When IRBMs and ICBMs became a more capable alternative, defense shifted to passive means to survive such attacks as the missiles couldn't be shot down. Had an effective ABM system come about, the means of delivery would likely have changed to say, high-speed (high subsonic, transonic, or even supersonic) cruise missiles that could evade the ABM system and things like SAMs.
That might look like say AGM-28 Hound Dog:



Now your ABM system is worthless, and your previous SAM system needs serious upgrading to be able to intercept a low-flying very fast target in an ECM environment. Same number of warheads, just the delivery system has changed to keep it effective.

Yes, you have to spend to keep up with these changes, but that's inevitable.

 

[Bruno Anthony]

I'm curious about a couple of things I've read on this particular thread: I've tried to keep my questions concise for brevity purposes

I. Regarding the idea of ABM's being destabilizing
My assumption would be, from what I've read on this topic, that a missile shield is only destabilizing when it is actually capable of repelling nearly all or all ICBM attacks: Am I right or wrong?

Wrong. Anything that potentially prevents destruction of the ABM owner's own assets means that it will either be safe from a first strike or second, retaliatory strike. An ABM defence doesn't have to be 100% effective, in fact it doesn't have to be effective at all, however it has to be perceived as effective. Once the perception is planted and grows, the perceivers will act upon the assumption that it is effective. So, the first use imperative will grow, on both sides of a strategic balance. The owners, to destroy the potential threat that the other sides' ICBMs represent and the opponents' to ensure that while the ABM system is still being built and not yet operational, so as to prevent it from rendering it's ICBM forces obsolete.

This happened with the SDI "Star Wars" system. The US hyped it, with lots of pretty animations and drawings showing how it would destroy the nasty, incoming Soviet missiles and RVs. The Soviets fearful that their missiles would be rendered obsolete were forced to try and build their own (or more ICBMs to swamp SDI). No SDI system was built but the fear was sufficient to see the Soviets try and build the means of either matching or defeating it. The real danger was if the hawks had managed to gain power, that they would have seriously contemplated a first strike, rather than see their missiles rendered obsolete the moment the system was operational.

Remember, the Cold War was as much as about perceptions of capabilities as it was about the real capabilities themselves. Both sides often acted on faulty, flawed intel. In the US there was the "Bomber Gap", the "Missile Gap" and the "Window of Opportunity" which were used for domestic political gains. In the fUSSR there were similar scares about US capabilities, which led up the Able Archer '83 scare. The fUSSR was no more monolithic than the US and there were debates within the Politburo as to who or what should be believed, just as there were in the US. Hawks versus Doves, etc. Cold War Warriors who saw a capitalist under their beds, just as those in the US saw Communists under theirs.

I apologize about bringing back politics. There was a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article from I think 2004 that goes into the adding on effect an ABM system creates. It draws more fire down on it to make sure it’s overwhelmed. The Bulletin is very peacinik-y but they have the best detailed articles. They‘ve put their archive behind a paywall now but I think I have it somewhere printed out. If I can find it, I’ll post pics. It compares 2 nuke targeting plans against Moscow. 1 from 1968, 1 from 1989. About double the amount of warheads targeted by 1989.

I also own the BB Briggs book on strategic defense. And yeah, I think ABMs are both effective AND if not destabilizing, they further arms races. Now if your opponent can’t afford a large nuclear arsensal & you can, a small ABM system gives you some maneuvering room.

Soviet Kataev archive used in Hofman’s book The Dead Hand mentions plans for ICBMs with 20-40 warheads to get through a fully deployed SDI system. Could they afford that? Who knows.

The "Atomic scientists" part of this shows a gross naivety about war and economics. An ABM defense system does not create a response that is more massive. Instead, it shifts how things are done.
For example, in the late 40's and early 50's the expected means of nuclear attack was by subsonic "strategic" long-range bombers. The response was developing SAM, fighter, and early warning systems that could intercept and shoot these down before they reached their targets.
When IRBMs and ICBMs became a more capable alternative, defense shifted to passive means to survive such attacks as the missiles couldn't be shot down. Had an effective ABM system come about, the means of delivery would likely have changed to say, high-speed (high subsonic, transonic, or even supersonic) cruise missiles that could evade the ABM system and things like SAMs.
That might look like say AGM-28 Hound Dog:

View attachment 685509

Now your ABM system is worthless, and your previous SAM system needs serious upgrading to be able to intercept a low-flying very fast target in an ECM environment. Same number of warheads, just the delivery system has changed to keep it effective.

Yes, you have to spend to keep up with these changes, but that's inevitable.

If you read the article, the number of warheads assigned to ABM suppression almost doubled btw 1968 & 1989. ALCMs were also part of the plan by then. It wasn’t a case of a total changeover from ballistic to cruise. Although in a previous post in this thread, switching to ALCMs had a weight/range penalty for the B-52s.

The point of the article was that building even assumed effective defense will NOT end a rivalry. It’s not the final word.

But the article detail is astounding. Bulletin puts out informative stuff even if their policy points are peacnik.

 

[sferrin]

Had an effective ABM system come about, the means of delivery would likely have changed to say, high-speed (high subsonic, transonic, or even supersonic) cruise missiles that could evade the ABM system and things like SAMs.

Now your ABM system is worthless, and your previous SAM system needs serious upgrading to be able to intercept a low-flying very fast target in an ECM environment. Same number of warheads, just the delivery system has changed to keep it effective.

Yes, you have to spend to keep up with these changes, but that's inevitable.

 

[CaseyKnight]

If you were to hit a nuclear warhead with a large sleet of neutrons; the materials in the warhead would gobble it up like crazy, and cause the warhead to dud when the signal to initate it is sent.

I'm not sure if this was ever covered before, but wouldn't the detonation make for a giant dirty-bomb? While it wouldn't produce a huge explosion, the radiation appears to be quite substantial.

 

[Forest Green]

If you were to hit a nuclear warhead with a large sleet of neutrons; the materials in the warhead would gobble it up like crazy, and cause the warhead to dud when the signal to initate it is sent.

This is actually mentioned here:

Bloodhound (missile) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It's known as warhead poisoning.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I'm not sure if this was ever covered before, but wouldn't the detonation make for a giant dirty-bomb? While it wouldn't produce a huge explosion, the radiation appears to be quite substantial.

Despite what’s often published, it’s actually where the neutron bomb came from (the Sprint’s W66 warhead was the first real one). If you read the right literature, neutron poisoning of a nuke’s sensitive parts is pretty well known.

One possible outcome not mentioned by Ryan is the possibility of creating a non sustaining prompt criticality ( not quite a chain reaction) in the nuke that releases sufficient energy to disintegrate the RV. High energy neutrons are next to impossible to stop with shielding.

As for the outcome, half a square mile showered with plutonium fragments is bad, but 50 square miles being erased from history is far far worse.

 

[NMaude]

One possible outcome not mentioned by Ryan is the possibility of creating a non sustaining prompt criticality ( not quite a chain reaction) in the nuke that releases sufficient energy to disintegrate the RV.

What would happen is that the fast-neutrons would induce enough fissions in the plutonium pit to heat briefly into a molten state causing it to slump and deform so that even if the warhead's X-unit was able to fire properly there'd be no symmetrical implosion and it would fizzle.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

What would happen is that the fast-neutrons would induce enough fissions in the plutonium pit to heat briefly into a molten state causing it to slump and deform so that even if the warhead's X-unit was able to fire properly there'd be no symmetrical implosion and it would fizzle.

Correct, but don’t forget the thermodynamics of the RV heat shield are balanced on knife edge, with crazy energy densities. Inject even a small amount of additional heat from an unintended source and it’ll come apart.

Also all the fast neutrons/hard X-ray /gamma etc is not good for the RV’s electronics.

 

[CaseyKnight]

As for the outcome, half a square mile showered with plutonium fragments is bad, but 50 square miles being erased from history is far far worse.

So the issue is based on the amount of overall destruction? Did they have any ability to clean up plutonium dust over a few square miles in the 1970's?

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

With numerous broken arrow events (crashed nuke armed bombers) in the 50 & 60’s they got plenty of practice. Also above ground nuclear weapons test fizzles, test that were terminated with a sub critical salvage detonations, weapon roasting safety tests, hundreds:maybe thousands of X unit tests all produced at bit of a mess required a degree of clean up. Just how clean was/is really clean, is a matter of debate, as it always will be. (Google “Plutonium Valley USA”https://mapcarta.com/23366520)

 

[Prophet141]

sferrin - thanks for the stats. The Super Roadrunner (Meep Meep ) is an amazing system. I wonder if a system like LOSAT or CKEM use similar solid propellant for their "acceleration"?

Advanced energetics for propulsion and warheads are an incredibly important part of future warfighting requirements. In the National Academy Press report on Future Strategic Strike they recommended aggressive R&D on energetics to produce material 100 X's as energetic as TNT, when today's state of the art is around four or five X's as measured by energy per volume and density. Imagine a one hundred pound bomb with the explosive power of today's 2000 pounders.

There have been some pretty impressive ideas out there over the years. Sprint at 100Gs or so, HiBEX at nearly 400Gs, several European programs the name of which escapes me (there was the PDF floating around the site with the Typhoon carrying air-launched ABMs). LOSAT and CKEM definitely are fast accelerators and one antitank concept I have in a PDF around here was to be a cold launched missile with thrusters to tip it over (much like Tor / SA-15) which would then accelerate at 1400+ Gs. There was another ABM test vehicle that I only know from a blurb in a Military Technology supplamental on the value of computer simulation. They talked about an ABM test vehicle that accelerated at 400Gs that they only launched once and that was just to validate the simulation. Then there's the Russian Gazelle and S-300V, and at least one Chinese test vehicle. . .

I don't suppose that you still have that PDF about the 1400+ G acceleration missile, do you?

 

[sferrin]

sferrin - thanks for the stats. The Super Roadrunner (Meep Meep ) is an amazing system. I wonder if a system like LOSAT or CKEM use similar solid propellant for their "acceleration"?

Advanced energetics for propulsion and warheads are an incredibly important part of future warfighting requirements. In the National Academy Press report on Future Strategic Strike they recommended aggressive R&D on energetics to produce material 100 X's as energetic as TNT, when today's state of the art is around four or five X's as measured by energy per volume and density. Imagine a one hundred pound bomb with the explosive power of today's 2000 pounders.

There have been some pretty impressive ideas out there over the years. Sprint at 100Gs or so, HiBEX at nearly 400Gs, several European programs the name of which escapes me (there was the PDF floating around the site with the Typhoon carrying air-launched ABMs). LOSAT and CKEM definitely are fast accelerators and one antitank concept I have in a PDF around here was to be a cold launched missile with thrusters to tip it over (much like Tor / SA-15) which would then accelerate at 1400+ Gs. There was another ABM test vehicle that I only know from a blurb in a Military Technology supplamental on the value of computer simulation. They talked about an ABM test vehicle that accelerated at 400Gs that they only launched once and that was just to validate the simulation. Then there's the Russian Gazelle and S-300V, and at least one Chinese test vehicle. . .

I don't suppose that you still have that PDF about the 1400+ G acceleration missile, do you?

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/tanks-with-vertical-launch-atgms.23218/#post-239745

 

[Forest Green]

Woah, HIBEX had up to 300g lateral too! Mach 8 in a 1 second.

Boeing HIBEX

https://www.reddit.com/r/EngineeringPorn/comments/sq1il

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/EngineeringPorn/comments/sq1il/hibex_missile_0mach8_in_a_second_400g/

 

[sferrin]

Shame there is no decent video (or any video for that matter) that's been released on that.

 

[MihoshiK]

One can imagine that a HIBEX launch has more in common with a very straight lightning strike than what we normally think of as a missile launch, because at that accelleration you won't even see it leave the launch pad with the MkI eyeball. One moment it's there, the next is just a very hot plume of gas.

 

[Forest Green]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvZGaMt7UgQ&list=PLmNPjM52zUx8DxeGbq5DbZPxxtjuXg_pr

 

[sferrin]

sferrin - thanks for the stats. The Super Roadrunner (Meep Meep ) is an amazing system. I wonder if a system like LOSAT or CKEM use similar solid propellant for their "acceleration"?

Advanced energetics for propulsion and warheads are an incredibly important part of future warfighting requirements. In the National Academy Press report on Future Strategic Strike they recommended aggressive R&D on energetics to produce material 100 X's as energetic as TNT, when today's state of the art is around four or five X's as measured by energy per volume and density. Imagine a one hundred pound bomb with the explosive power of today's 2000 pounders.

There have been some pretty impressive ideas out there over the years. Sprint at 100Gs or so, HiBEX at nearly 400Gs, several European programs the name of which escapes me (there was the PDF floating around the site with the Typhoon carrying air-launched ABMs). LOSAT and CKEM definitely are fast accelerators and one antitank concept I have in a PDF around here was to be a cold launched missile with thrusters to tip it over (much like Tor / SA-15) which would then accelerate at 1400+ Gs. There was another ABM test vehicle that I only know from a blurb in a Military Technology supplamental on the value of computer simulation. They talked about an ABM test vehicle that accelerated at 400Gs that they only launched once and that was just to validate the simulation. Then there's the Russian Gazelle and S-300V, and at least one Chinese test vehicle. . .

I don't suppose that you still have that PDF about the 1400+ G acceleration missile, do you?

 

[nivek626]

found something interesting
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD0371261.pdf

 

[flateric]

1960's Wind Tunnel Nose Cone Model — AGENT GALLERY CHICAGO

Heavily constructed in aluminum with a copper tip this wind tunnel model was most likely for high velocity transonic nose cone testing C.1960 . I have seen models this size with similar characteristics and remind me of the NASA ‘Little Joe’ model I had a few years ago. The piece comes apart in thr

agentgallery.com

 

[Scott Kenny]

I'm curious about a couple of things I've read on this particular thread: I've tried to keep my questions concise for brevity purposes

I. Regarding the idea of ABM's being destabilizing
My assumption would be, from what I've read on this topic, that a missile shield is only destabilizing when it is actually capable of repelling nearly all or all ICBM attacks: Am I right or wrong?

Pardon me, old question:

What "missile shields" lead to in practice is a major increase in spending on more missiles (and more ABMs), plus working on alternative ways to deliver the warheads.

If you are assuming that half of the warheads per target get intercepted, then obviously you need to double the number of warheads per target in order to still achieve the desired effects. Then the target(s) double the number of ABMs, and now you need to double the number of warheads again.

This was particularly expensive early on, when you needed nuclear warheads on ABMs to guarantee a "hit". Effectively, every ABM warhead was one fewer offensive warhead you could field. (Yes, increasing plutonium production is possible, but takes a long time to do. 5-10 years between decision and the start of increased production)

Since the 1990s, it's been cheaper since we now have missiles accurate enough to directly hit an incoming missile. Like Patriot and THAAD.

As to alternative ways to deliver warheads, let's look at the development of strategic systems.

• First, we had high altitude subsonic bombers. Then we added some supersonic bombers, but it proved faster to develop missiles capable of intercepting such bombers than it was to develop the bombers themselves. This forced the bombers to fly down in the weeds to avoid the big SAM radars, which is very hard on the airframes and crews.
• At about the same time as high altitude supersonic bombers were entering service, we also developed ICBMs. ICBMs are hard to intercept, they require very high performance missiles to do so.
• Shortly after ICBMs started development, the US Navy was in an existential crisis to be able to deliver nuclear weapons or be pruned back into irrelevance. After dumping an absurd amount of money into the Program, the Navy was able to say, "We have missiles that guarantee that even if the US is destroyed, so will whoever launched on the US." Early on, the SLBMs were not accurate enough to target hardened military installations, they were city-destroyers only. By the 1970s, SLBMs were accurate enough to target military installations, and by virtue of their movable launching points were also capable of a "depressed trajectory" attack that is extremely difficult to intercept with ABMs, but is interceptable with in-atmosphere high-performance SAMs like Patriot.
• About the time of accurate SLBMs, the "aircraft dropping bombs" were mostly being replaced with "aircraft carrying cruise missiles" with the cruise missiles going into defended airspace to wherever the bombs needed to go. Cruise missiles require AWACS and fighters equipped with look-down-shoot-down radars or data links controlling SAMs to effectively engage.
• Which of course brings us to the ultimate "cruise missile", the Supersonic Low Altitude Missile, AKA Project Pluto. A nuclear-ramjet powered monstrosity that could carry 10-20 warheads and traveled at Mach 2+ on the deck. Once launched, SLAMs could fly for days to years before making their attack runs. All the while seeding whatever they flew over with bits of the nuclear reactor powering the ramjet and leaving a Mach 2 shockwave across the ground.

So the result is a very expensive arms race as you develop a new method of attack and a way of defending against that, at roughly the same time.

Apperantly the Spartan nuke was expected to be able to proxy kill the income warheads by burn out the electronics and fucking up the warhead itself via its radaition pulse*. If turn that will take care of the Decoys and at the time Mirvs pretty well since they had to get within the Spartan range before splitting up to Mirv and would be close enough that it wasn't consider that big of an issue.

Then the Sprint was apparently to have a fairly large kill radius again thanks to the radiation pulse and being a nuclear explosion in atmosphere basically.

With Decoys being consider none issue since these where area of effect weapons and not point, while the SLBM was also consider still a easy target for the Sprint.


*I have heard of this before with the AIM26 and Genie nuclear A2A weapons. How well does that pan out?

On early weapons designs, it can cause them to fizzle. "Where was the earthshattering kabewm?"

On boosted-fission weapons, they won't fizzle, but any RVs are delicately balanced on how fast they drop versus how much heat they can withstand. Adding a big chunk of neutron heating or a prompt critical mass will likely rip the RV apart. Any aircraft carried bombs or cruise missile warheads would still go boom, however.

 

[publiusr]

Anything to this?

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5W0tjYz2EZ4

 

[Scott Kenny]

Anything to this?

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5W0tjYz2EZ4

The long term effects would probably destroy the nuke (heating and burning the explosives, plus melting the plutonium). But that's going to have a lot of setup time to build, plus it'll require some odd angles for the accelerator to put the collider sections so they shoot through the earth at (insert nation).

Honestly, the better option would be for someone to make the muon collider in Siberia and line it up on North Korea.

 

[publiusr]

Ed Teller is crying somewhere--poor baby...

 

[NMaude]

Ed Teller is crying somewhere--poor baby...

He was obsessed with thermonuclear weapons, after Dr. Strangelove was modelled on him and I have no doubt if you showed him a live TN-warhead he'd have pitched a tent.

 

[bobbymike]

He was obsessed with thermonuclear weapons, after Dr. Strangelove was modelled on him and I have no doubt if you showed him a live TN-warhead he'd have pitched a tent.

Thought it was John von Neumann who Kubrick modelled Strangelove after.

 

[Prophet141]

It might be something of a Bond situation, with multiple inspirations who are always claimed to be the inspiration.

 

[NMaude]

Thought it was John von Neumann who Kubrick modelled Strangelove after.

He might've contributed but the main basis was definitely Edward Teller and I wonder much of a role his backstabbing Robert Oppenheimer in that farce of a security hearing in 1954 that revoked his Q-clearance (It was all orchestrated by Lewis Strauss).

Anyway the Sprint's W66 TN-warhead was an impressive piece of engineering that was one of the first production ER warheads, does anyone know if it was designed by UCRL? If so then Teller would've had a hand in its' development.

 

[sferrin]

"The W79 and the W70-3 were to be the first battlefield nuclear weapons to include an “enhanced radiation” (ER) capability. ER provided a relatively high fraction of the prompt weapon output in the form of neutrons (hence the nickname “neutron bomb”). ER technology began to be developed at Livermore in the early 1960s and entered the stockpile in 1974 with the deployment of the W66 warhead for the Sprint antiballistic missile interceptor (see Year 1971)."

https://www.llnl.gov/sites/www/files/1975.pdf

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

If so then Teller would've had a hand in its' development.

Difficult to say how much involvement Teller had. It’s commonly credited to Samual T Cohen who started work on it in 1958 while at UCRL. Somewhere out there is a fairly open interview where he gives a description of working on it especially the early stages.

I understand Teller has a reputation for taking credit for other people’s work;- For many years he was happy to take sole credit for inventing the H bomb’s radiation implosion principle. It was only later that S Ulams fundamental/enabling invention emerged and it became clear that Tellers original proposal wouldn’t work.

I also read at one point he tried to take credit for the explosive implosion lens invention during the Manhattan project, when in truth he declined to lead the lens development and hadn’t t made any prior offering.