FighterJock said:If the rate of consolidation continues, I can see a future where there will only be one giant aircraft manufacturer in the US and that will be truly sad.
Triton said:Do automobile enthusiasts lament the loss of Saab, Mercury, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, and/or Saturn? Do they speak of the legacy of The Pontiac Spring and Wagon Works and of Albert G. North and Harry G. Hamilton? The legacy of Ransom E. Olds of Oldsmobile? The legacy of Edsel Ford and Mercury?
Triton said:that's capitalism boys and girls.
Triton said:I would be very surprised if the majority of investors in United Technologies knows who Igor Sikorsky was, or the history of Sikorsky Aircraft, or even cares about the Sikorsky legacy.
Triton said:I am not even sure if the Sikorsky customer cares. Does the United States military have loyalty to any brand?
Like any business that has survived for 90 years, Sikorsky has weathered a lot of ups and downs since it was acquired by United Technologies Corp. (UTC) three months before the great stock market crash of 1929. So the recent decision by UTC to spin off the storied helicopter manufacturer says less about Sikorsky than it does about its parent company.
The Pentagon’s leading rotorcraft supplier certainly is in better shape than it was a decade ago, when as a somewhat dysfunctional operation it lost a contract to build a new fleet of presidential helicopters. Now, with a backlog valued at $49 billion, the company has more business lined up than any other military helicopter manufacturer. The big CH-53K is the Pentagon’s largest rotorcraft program, at almost $25 billion, and last year Sikorsky won both the $8 billion U.S. Air Force Combat Rescue Helicopter pact and a re-scoped presidential rotorcraft contract worth $3.2 billion.
Sikorsky also is on the cutting edge of rotorcraft technologies, investing in advanced vehicle autonomy—a top Pentagon priority—and prototypes such as the high-speed X2 technology demonstrator, the S-97 Raider light tactical helicopter and (with Boeing) the SB-1 joint multirole technology demonstrator for the U.S. Army. Market research firm Forecast International projects Sikorsky will remain a leading manufacturer of helicopters for at least 15 years “and likely beyond.”
Credit: U.S. Army
And Sikorsky is profitable. But with the military market in a downturn and its margins capped by the Defense Department, the problem is that it is not making enough money to keep Wall Street happy. It cannot keep up with its two larger sister units, Pratt & Whitney and United Technologies Aerospace Systems, which are suppliers rather than platform builders and have much more exposure to commercial markets. Gregory Hayes, UTC’s new shareholder-focused CEO, notes that Sikorsky’s operating margins of about 10% and projected sales growth are significantly lower than for the company’s other businesses.
Still, UTC stood by Sikorsky in much more difficult times, and we find management’s decision to jettison a perfectly good business troubling. During the global economic downturn, Sikorsky’s robust gains in sales and profits helped offset, to a degree, large declines at the company’s non-aerospace businesses.
The move is emblematic of a shift in the aerospace and defense industry where pleasing shareholders has become paramount, even at the expense of funding research in new technologies and products to ensure long-term competitiveness. Frank Kendall, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for acquisition, has worried aloud that some contractors are mainly interested in generating returns in as little as one or two years.
UTC has not been a shortsighted company—witness Pratt’s $10-billion investment in the PW1000G geared turbofan engine. But giving up Sikorsky is a shortsighted move that could prove to be more of a disservice than a boon to investors in the long run.
United Technologies (UTC) appeared to back away from Sikorsky long before new CEO Greg Hayes began dropping hints earlier this year that the technology conglomerate wanted to shed its underperforming rotorcraft subsidiary. The handwriting has been on the wall for the better part of a decade: the complicated nine-year trek to develop, certify and deliver the S-76D; the relatively slow pace of product improvement on the S-92A; and the virtual orphaning of its acquired Schweizer small helicopter division were all clues that UTC’s romance with rotors was over, despite the high-profile, experimental X2 and its military prototype S-97 descendant.
When the latter was unveiled in 2010 it should have been a joyous occasion for Sikorsky. Instead, then-president Jeff Pino lamented, “At this point in the development cycle, it appears that our biggest customer [the U.S. Department of Defense] is unwilling to invest major dollars in future technology. That is the real message that is being sent to us.” His pledge to develop the S-97 alone with industry partners rang hollow; U.S. rotorcraft innovation–both military and civil–ultimately requires DoD funding. Almost every significant U.S. civil helicopter program since the late 1950s was spawned from a military requirement and Defense Department dollars. Last summer the Pentagon did direct some new technology funding that could be applied to the S-97 Sikorsky’s way, in the form of selecting it as a finalist in the Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator Project (JMR-TD); but the amount is not enough to cover costs.
So what happens now? Sikorsky still has a respectable, albeit stale, military business with the time-tested UH-60 Black Hawks and CH-53 Stallions, with the former still winning the occasional foreign military sale. Speculation has abounded that the entire enterprise may be acquired by a solitary buyer from the industry, but that seems unlikely given what will probably be an asking price of nearly $8 billion and the anti-trust phalanx any existing OEM would need to run to get the deal done.
Spinning off Sikorsky as a separate entity also has been mentioned as a possibility, but that likely would produce a tepid response on Wall Street. And Sikorsky will need a steady infusion of funds, either from additional equity or by floating debt, if it wants to remain a player with relevant products in both the military and civil sectors. No, Sikorsky is more likely a “parts and pieces” sale, either indirectly by selling the whole to investment bankers, who would carve it up, or by directly conducting an a la carte bidding war for its separate product lines.
On the civil front Bell seems the logical, and maybe the only, choice to pick up the S-76 and S-92 lines. Doing so would give the Textron unit a larger and more lucrative installed customer base and a complete twin-engine product line that could compete head-to-head with AgustaWestland and Airbus Helicopters, especially for the offshore energy market. Potential suitors for Schweizer seem less apparent, but do not be surprised if the new owners speak Mandarin.
The military side of the house would likely appeal to Boeing, by expanding its offerings beyond the current CH-47 Chinook heavy transport and AH-64 Apache gunship. That is, of course, unless the likes of a Lockheed-Martin gets in the game. For the moment, that appears unlikely, as LMCo seems content with its role as a systems integrator on select rotorcraft projects, including the new Marine One.
Whatever fate awaits Sikorsky, UTC’s signaled divestiture is a powerful reminder of just how difficult the current helicopter market has become for all participants, even those whose parents have deep pockets.
Triton said:Mark Huber believes that Sikorsky Aircraft will be broken up when it is spun-off from United Technologies. Boeing purchases the military product portfolio from Sikorsky while Bell Helicopter purchases the general aviation product portfolio.