SENIOR PROM and ACM - precursors and alternatives to the AGM-129

Isn't this pretty much how Lockheed got a seat at the table on Have Blue? And we see how that worked out for them.
 

John Cashen interview
CASHEN: All right. After XST—you asked the question, here it is. It was a DARPA program called Teal Dawn, which was a re-look at the intercontinental cruise missile. Northrop back in the '50s had built and fielded an intercontinental cruise missile, and it was called the Snark. This is basically going back and looking at the Snark as a potential weapon for the United States. This time, however, they had to be stealthy. DARPA created a program—this is a different DARPA now. It was not Perko's DARPA, which was tactical technology; it was a strategic technology office of DARPA. And the project was called Teal Dawn. We got a contract, and Boeing got a contract.

WESTWICK: So how did you get then from the XST to the Tacit Blue? The path of evolution goes from XST to Tacit Blue to B-2? Is that correct?

CASHEN: No. It's from Teal Dawn; that's why I'm bringing it up.

WESTWICK: Teal Dawn, okay, got it.

CASHEN: All right. Teal Dawn was unmanned—it was a cruise missile, a long range, very large cruise missile. We got the award because we did a very good job on XST. We lost by a whisker. It was close. And by the way, there's also a frequency issue in this, the bandwidth. Radars operate over, oh, the best way to describe it is two decades. From basically a hundred megahertz to 20 gigahertz, okay. So it's more than two decades actually. And how did that stack up? Because that was a factor too. In the XST competition we were much better in bandwidth.

WESTWICK: So, say, at the extremes of the frequency range?

CASHEN: Yes.

WESTWICK: Both extremes, or just short, or long? Both?

CASHEN: Long.

WESTWICK: You’re better at the long wavelengths.

CASHEN: That's the long suit of this place. We know that end of the spectrum really well.

WESTWICK: Northrop does?

CASHEN: Yes, we do.

WESTWICK: Why is that?

CASHEN: Because we concentrated on it. Because we think it's important, and we concentrate on it, and we've got a long track record and history of it, starting with XST. But there it didn't count very much. The evaluation put weight on azimuth angles and frequencies and pitch angles. It was Damasko’s scoring criteria. It was all geared to the Lockheed design, and we didn't fit it very well. Where we were good didn't count as much. You see? Where we were bad had significant credit. But when it was all said and done, we did an incredible job, and we were close. That's why I think we had no trouble getting Teal Dawn. Teal Dawn we had for about a year, and then DARPA asked us to spend significant company money, to build an RCS model. Kent Kresa refused.

WESTWICK: So Kresa has already come to Northrop?

CASHEN: Kresa is now running Ventura. And Ventura division, which was then the unmanned division of Northrop, made that thing. [pointing to model]

WESTWICK: Which is the…?

CASHEN: The Chukar, the 74.

WESTWICK: BQM-74?

CASHEN: Yeah.

WESTWICK: It's not actually a cruise missile. It's a target.

CASHEN: Yes, it's a target. The reason I brought that—I don't know why—I should have brought two of them in here. Is that the pointy nose one?

RIVAS: Yes.

CASHEN: Well, there's another one—and I don't know if it's still in the box or not—that's a rounded nose. The design changed. Now, I'm not sure I know why the design changed, but pointy noses are good for RCS. I'll leave it at that. I could have sworn I brought the other one.

WESTWICK: Here's one.

CASHEN: Yeah, here it is. This thing was produced forever and always. See the differences? Now, you can argue the differences are for aerodynamic performance. But trust me, the frontal radar cross section is a hell of a lot better just due to the shape changes.

CASHEN: All right. And see that, Maggy?

RIVAS: Upside down, huh?

CASHEN: No. Look at this; now, look at this. This is the Chukar that was made for decades. Look at the wing sweep. Look at the nose shape. Anyway, I leave it at that. They went into production on all of this after I retired, but I can tell you that I wouldn't have argued with it.

WESTWICK: So Kresa comes over from…

CASHEN: Kresa was at DARPA.

WESTWICK: Yeah. Had he been involved with the XST?

CASHEN: Well, the short answer is yes and no. He was involved in the setting up of that telex. But before the contracts were ever awarded, he joined Northrop to run our research lab. He consulted with us on our XST activity and our bid.

WESTWICK: Did you get any inside scoop from him on what DARPA was looking for?

CASHEN: No more than we already knew from Perko. I mean, he confirmed everything that Perko said. It was pretty simple. You know, what we were talking about. He didn't know about Nick Damasko or any of that. He tried to help us in every way possible while he ran our research lab. After that he took over the Ventura division, and he was running the Ventura division at the time of Teal Dawn. He also started a program called Tacit Rainbow, which was kind of his pet project. It got quite far along before it got canceled, but that's another story. It's not stealthy. There are plenty of people to tell you about Rainbow. I can tell you some about it, but it's not on this table. Anyway, Teal Dawn made us step back and think about what we'd done on XST and create for the very first time a wing-body-tail all-aspect design. What it was based on was the original Mark 12, the Minuteman reentry vehicle, the ice cream cone, had been studied by the Siegel group at Michigan to the extent that they were convinced it was the ideal radar cross section shape for the reentry application, that you could never do any better than the ice cream cone. It was ideal. And I think it's been proven that way over the decades since then. So, what is the ideal airplane? The ice cream cone's axially symmetric. An airplane can't be axially symmetric. An airplane's got to have wings. That by definition makes it planar. Maybe it's a flat plate, an infinitely thin flat plate. That would be the ideal radar cross section shape for an airplane. You can't make an airplane infinitely thin because you have to put a person and engines in it. So what you do is start out with a flat plate, and you grow above and below that plate the volume necessary to make it into a functional system, and minimize as much as possible the increased RCS due to the addition. But you start out with a flat plate.

WESTWICK: Does it have to be round?

CASHEN: Well, I didn't say that. I just said a flat plate. Now, there are other rules that say that it should not more importantly, the alignment of the edges is important. If you've got multiple edges, you do everything to align them.

WESTWICK: You mean where they meet?

CASHEN: Aligned edges—a set of parallelograms.

WESTWICK: I got it.

CASHEN: They're aligned. Parallel. Parallel planforming we call it. Now, it turns out the design of an airplane historically starts out with a plan view, whether a designer hand draws it or does it on a computer. He starts out with a plan view, and then he starts to grow the third dimension. So the idea of RCS design, Stealth design, of an airplane that starts out with a plan view is consistent with the existing airplane design process. That's the process here at Northrop. It always has been, always will be. Lay out a plan form that you want, because your RCS pattern in azimuth is dominated by the plan form that you've created. And then change it as necessary in creating the real airplane. It's done that way with Tacit Blue—they're all that way. So, we learned that on Teal Dawn, a wing-body-tail cruise missile, and we created our Teal Dawn accordingly. We also learned to use MOE-based system analysis.

WESTWICK: Measure of effectiveness

CASHEN: Oh, yeah. Let me see what I have here. We're about ready for Tacit Blue. Tacit Blue goes quick, because I can't say much because of its stupid, antiquated security classification. Tacit Blue ran from '78 through '85. If you recall, we lost XST about mid '77. About that time, August '77, we started Teal Dawn. I'm sorry, we started Teal Dawn in '76 at midyear, just about the time we lost XST. A year later—and I think it was like September or October of '77—we got asked by DARPA if we could configure a stealthy airplane that would also integrate a stealthy radar. In other words a stealthy ISR airplane.
 
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James T. Karam

United States Air Force, R&D Officer, 1964-1978
Program Manager, Strategic Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Rosslyn, VA (1975-1978)
Conceived & executed three major advanced cruise missile technology thrusts (approx. $15M annually). "Zero-CEP" guidance incorporated active (laser & mmw) & passive sensors with sophisticated image processing. Demonstrated compound rotary and reciprocating engine concepts for reduced fuel consumption, small propulsion. More survivable airframes used radical shaping and new advanced materials, i.e., the beginnings of "stealth". Several eventually entered Full Scale Development and/or production by the Air Force and Navy.


Convair's AGM-129A Advanced Cruise Missile, a direct descendant of one of my DARPA initiatives that was nick-named Teal Dawn (gee, I wonder where he came up with that name?). No, the picture is not upside down and backward, and do not let anyone tell you how easy it is to design forward swept wings with today's modern structural analysis software.
 
Although further development of the AGM-86B ALCM was originally planned, the Air Force cancelled it in favor of the AGM-129A Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). The program began as Teal Dawn at DARPA in the late 1970s, and in 1981, General Dynamics won a preliminary design competition for the new long-range, stealthy, nuclear strike missile. The Air Force took over the program in 1982 with plans to use the ACM on the B-52G/H and B-1B bombers. The newest cruise missile had greater range, accuracy, and survivability than either the ALCM or the Navy's Tomahawk. The ACM made its first flight in 1985. In 1987, production problems at General Dynamics/Convair led the Air Force to choose a second source vendor, McDonnell Douglas, to produce ACMs. Initial operating capability was achieved in 1991 , shortly before President George H.W. Bush reduced the program to the acquisition of 640 missiles (down from the 1,000 planned the previous year). Budget issues further reduced this number to 520 before the program was officially closed out in 1993.

Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose
Developing Air Power for the United States Air Force During the First Century of Powered Flight

 
So SENIOR PROM was a Have Blue / F-117 -shaped cruise missile ? makes some sense. They wanted a stealth cruise missile and, by the late 1970's, the only flight proven stealth shape was the Have Blue / F-117.
 
So SENIOR PROM was a Have Blue / F-117 -shaped cruise missile ? makes some sense. They wanted a stealth cruise missile and, by the late 1970's, the only flight proven stealth shape was the Have Blue / F-117.
Yep, Lockheed got a bit fixated on the "magic configuration" of the F-117 for a little while.
 

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