Does any.material exist describing what.Seaslugs were expected to be fired at?
Initially.Il28 light bombers and Tu16s?
Would a County destroyer be expected to shoot down Migs and Sukhois?
Soviet.stand off missiles were like small jet aircraft well into the 70s.
These were the practice shoots by the ships once 'in service' and are not part of the development of the missile.
Kynda and Kresta 1 were armed with Shaddock SSM. Although not available in large numbers and probably focussed on the UK and US carriers they might have been fired at a County in its role leading a Surface Action Group (SAG) or as part of a NATO force (Stanavforlant or Navcomformed). That might have been too much for Seaslug
File AVIA 6/15463 in The National Archives (written in 1949!) identifies potential targets as the equivalent of a Superfortress or Lincoln bomber at 400kts or a single seater fighter-bomber at 600kts. File ADM 220/957 describes trials of manual lock-on procedures for the Type 901 radar using Canberras and Sea Hawks.Does any.material exist describing what.Seaslugs were expected to be fired at?
Initially.Il28 light bombers and Tu16s?
Would a County destroyer be expected to shoot down Migs and Sukhois?
Soviet.stand off missiles were like small jet aircraft well into the 70s.
In the mid eighties I was instructed to destroy all the Seaslug firing reports that we held; I fought a long rearguard action to have them preserved as historical documents but as they were classified as 'secret' no-one could hold them. Ironically at about the same time up at ASWE the Director General Surface Weapons was signing a letter downgrading all Seaslug technical matters to 'restricted' but we were never told that. Sadly I was the person who put those 70-odd ducuments through a shredder; RNAD Ernesettle would also have had copies along with other MoD (Navy) offices, including Branch 35 at Ensleigh. It would be lovely if one of them had preserved a set!These were the practice shoots by the ships once 'in service' and are not part of the development of the missile.
Thanks for that clarification. The further information is awaited with eagerness.
Perhaps if we ever invent time travel, we can waylay the people who were taking all the original documents on all this stuff to the shredders and bring it forward in time for preservation? Who here has read Connie Willis's SF time travel novel To Say Nothing Of the Dog? You know the moment I mean.
Ironically at about the same time up at ASWE the Director General Surface Weapons was signing a letter downgrading all Seaslug technical matters to 'restricted' but we were never told that. Sadly I was the person who put those 70-odd ducuments through a shredder
The NATO standard was originally KH -Target will disintegrate immediately, K -Target will fall out of control within 15 seconds, A -Target will fall out of control within 5 minutes, B -Target will return to base, C -Target's attack will not be completed, and E -Target will be structurally damaged while landing. The USN/missile manufacturers would class all of these as a success (see ADM 1/28039 -TNA) while UK manufacturers would only consider KH and K as successes. UK/US arguments on this resulted in a new NATO standard; K(t) where t is the time taken in seconds for the target to disintegrate. Seaslug, Bloodhound, Firestreak etc., all had to meet K(15).So for the USN a successful firing and hit applies to targets which were forced down or had to retreat but for the RN only those apply which were shot down?
The NATO standard was originally KH -Target will disintegrate immediately, K -Target will fall out of control within 15 seconds, A -Target will fall out of control within 5 minutes, B -Target will return to base, C -Target's attack will not be completed, and E -Target will be structurally damaged while landing. The USN/missile manufacturers would class all of these as a success (see ADM 1/28039 -TNA) while UK manufacturers would only consider KH and K as successes. UK/US arguments on this resulted in a new NATO standard; K(t) where t is the time taken in seconds for the target to disintegrate. Seaslug, Bloodhound, Firestreak etc., all had to meet K(15).
SRJ.
The NATO standard was originally KH -Target will disintegrate immediately, K -Target will fall out of control within 15 seconds, A -Target will fall out of control within 5 minutes, B -Target will return to base, C -Target's attack will not be completed, and E -Target will be structurally damaged while landing. The USN/missile manufacturers would class all of these as a success (see ADM 1/28039 -TNA) while UK manufacturers would only consider KH and K as successes. UK/US arguments on this resulted in a new NATO standard; K(t) where t is the time taken in seconds for the target to disintegrate. Seaslug, Bloodhound, Firestreak etc., all had to meet K(15).So for the USN a successful firing and hit applies to targets which were forced down or had to retreat but for the RN only those apply which were shot down?
SRJ.
Seaslug could only engage one target at a time but a salvo firing with a sufficient interval would allow the interception of two missiles. The second pair would be ready to fire before the first pair had reached the missiles. The shipborne system was designed to allow Seaslugs to be launched in time to complete their interception at maximum range; that range varies with altitude. For a Mk2 missile that is 35,000 yards at sea level, rising to nearly 45,000 yards at 40,000 feet. What is the attack profile for these Soviet missiles?If I recall correctly, the Seaslug reload time was about 30+ seconds. The max range of Model II was about 32000 meters. And the P-35 was capable to 350-380 m/s max velocity.
Don't tell anybody, but I made some notes.....Ironically at about the same time up at ASWE the Director General Surface Weapons was signing a letter downgrading all Seaslug technical matters to 'restricted' but we were never told that. Sadly I was the person who put those 70-odd ducuments through a shredder
Oh dear. *pats shoulder* You poor bastard, you had no way of knowing. And you did try to hold out for as long as you could.
What is the attack profile for these Soviet missiles?
But how did it became from a gunnery smaller twin/quadruple dish radar system to a single drum or bucket shaped radar?
The tracking and guidance beams are co-axial; the spinners are back to back and both are focused by the dialectric lens of the type 901. The gathering antenna is a small parabolic dish set to one side. In the LRS systems one antenna was for target tracking and the second was to gather the target.
SRJ.
Of the remaining 62 firings 25 were classed as unsuccessful and 37 as successful,
Out of interest, what is the definition of a successful firing? Destruction of the target is of course unequivocal, but were there "softer" criteria in some or all of the firings? Inquiring minds want to know what they were looking for and why they were looking for it.
(I remember reading a case of a Fireflash ripping its wings off when the boosters separated, but the control actuators still steering it to a kill. Success and failure in the one shot!)
In other words, are these all live firing practice, or do they include experimental and/or development shots?
As noted in various sources, the issue was that the resulting "stack" length presented significant problems for shipboard handling, and especially below-deck handling and storage. During the design, it was noted that a ready-stack of missiles prepared to be pushed onto the launcher would demand much more internal preparation area. The wrap-around boosters were designed to lie within the span of the fins and thus not actually expand the footprint of the missile beyond what was already needed on the dollies.I had understood that Seaslug got the wrap-around boosters because Farnborough (?) thought that tandem boosters would be vulnerable to shock.
According to the histories I've read, there was some degree of the opposite argument going around. With Sea Slug still being under development, there was push-back on the idea of starting another missile development at the same time, especially as there was widespread concern it would be delayed in the same way. However, the dramatically increased performance of the proposal eventually won the argument that this could be considered more of a fighter-cover replacement than a defensive weapon like Sea Slug. This led to the (somewhat questionable IMHO) claims of its performance relative to F-4's.My impression is that by about 1959, when what became Sea Dart was being proposed, many in the British defense bureaucracy were heartily sick of the high developmental cost and delay associated with Seaslug, and wanted something -- anything -- else. Sea Dart was pushed as something entirely different, not a Seaslug replacement (which it was).
The concern was not size or cost per se, but that the crew requirements of a larger ship, combined with the manpower limits imposed on the Navy, resulted in a choice between more smaller ships or fewer larger ones. As the Navy's thinking changed from being 100% focussed on a war against the SU in the north Atlantic to being more heavily involved with worldwide force projection and bushfire wars, the small number of larger designs would present the problem that some task forces would lack cover. Thus the smaller designs immediately took over planning. The various books on the County class go into significant detail on these back-n-forth arguments.It did not help that the Admiralty insisted on cutting the size of the Seaslug ship because it equated size with cost -- the designers were aware that everyone else's missile ships were rather larger.
4923 Met Ship - copy neg of aerial shot of the ship Weather Advisor. 4928/2-12 Damaged sea target Venus Shows the target ship F50 (ex HMS Venus) with bows shot off. Records show that a Seaslug 2 missile fired from HMS Glamorgan on 16 February 1968 achieved a direct hit on Venus.
There is a reference to this in one of the files that deals with Sea Dart trials against surface targets; HMS Venus was one of them. It mentions that Venus took quite a while to be repaired after the Seaslug hit it!According to this:
Collection: DERA ABERPORTH
Black and white negatives and 35mm colour transparencies generated or collected by DERA Aberporth weapons research establishment in Wales relating to the development of various British rockets and missiles during 1945 - 1968 at the height of the Cold War. Including:Negative Ref...www.iwm.org.uk
That was a Seaslug Mk II launched from HMS Glamorgan:
4923 Met Ship - copy neg of aerial shot of the ship Weather Advisor. 4928/2-12 Damaged sea target Venus Shows the target ship F50 (ex HMS Venus) with bows shot off. Records show that a Seaslug 2 missile fired from HMS Glamorgan on 16 February 1968 achieved a direct hit on Venus.
Yes, it made a real mess of HMS Venus (a target ship!) but I think that was the only surface target it hit. Aircraft targets below 1000 feet were fairly safe too.
SRJ.
Having the Counties a single Type 901 Radar direct but a twin launcher, would it be logical to load two missiles at once and launch the first and launch the second as soon as the first on terminal trajectory? Or could the Type 901 direct two missiles on the same target?